

































The discovery of oil in Uganda in 2006 ushered in an oil-age era with new prospects of unforeseen riches. However, after an initial exploration boom developments stalled. Unlike 
other countries with major oil discoveries, Uganda has been slow in developing its oil. In fact, 
over ten years after the first discoveries, there is still no oil. During the time of the research for 
this book between 2012 and 2015, Uganda’s oil had not yet fully materialised but was becoming. 
The overarching characteristic of this research project was waiting for the big changes to come: 
a waiting characterised by indeterminacy. There is a timeline but every year it gets expanded 
and in 2018 having oil still seems to belong to an uncertain future. This book looks at the 
waiting period as a time of not-yet-ness and describes the practices of future- and resource-
making in Uganda. 
How did Ugandans handle the new resource wealth and how did they imagine their future with 
oil to be? This ethnography is concerned with Uganda’s oil and the way Ugandans anticipated 
different futures with it: promising futures of wealth and development and disturbing futures 
of destruction and suffering. The book works out how uncertainty was an underlying feature 
of these anticipations and how risks and risk discourses shaped the imaginations of possible 
futures. Much of the talk around the oil involved the dichotomy of blessing or curse and it was 
not clear, which one the oil would be. Rather than adding another assessment of what the 
future with oil will be like, this book describes the predictions and prophesies as an essential 
part of how resources are being made. 
This ethnography shows how various actors in Uganda, from the state, the oil industry, the 
civil society, and the extractive communities, have tried to negotiate their position in the oil 
arena. Annika Witte argues in this book that by establishing their risks and using them as 
power resources actors can influence the becoming of oil as a resource and their own place in 
a petro-future. The book offers one of the first ethnographic accounts of Uganda’s oil and the 
negotiations that took place in an oil state to be.
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Figure 1: A shop selling agricultural produce in Hoima town (2013).
Introduction1 
I am grateful for the dialogue that we are going to discuss with you on this 
matter related to our new baby, which is still in the womb. And you are ex-
pecting. We are expecting. Either baby boy or girl by the name of either 
oil or gas. But me, I am expecting that we get a baby girl because girls give 
more. […] My prayer as a LC 5: let there be oil first. […] Because when 
you still have a baby in the womb you might not know that you have a 
stillbirth, you might have what, you might have what. The most impor-
tant thing is we should have the oil. That is when we shall boast as a region 
(Chairman LC 51 Nebbi, Multi-stakeholder dialogue, Nebbi, 2012).
During a civil society multi-stakeholder dialogue on oil and gas and its future poten-
tial for Uganda, the Chairman LC 5 from the host district of Nebbi in northwestern 
Uganda, compared the status of oil in Uganda to a pregnancy. Uganda is pregnant 
with its oil. In 2006 oil was discovered in Uganda and the country started preparing 
for its new found wealth: plans were made, policies and legislations were put in place, 
infrastructure constructed, more oil exploration undertaken and many negotiations 
held between the government2 and the oil companies Tullow Oil Uganda Ltd., a 
1 Local Council (LC) 5 is the highest elected political representative at the district level with seat at 
the district capital. LC 1 is the lowest level, elected at village or town quarter level. In 2016, general 
elections were held in Uganda, including elections for the office of LC 5. The chairmen named in this 
dissertation have since changed. I will refer to them as LC 5 though since it was the position they held 
during my research.
2 In this dissertation I use “government” for the central government and “local government” for the 
district governments.
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smaller, independent company, multinational Total E&P Uganda Ltd and the Chi-
nese multinational China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). These oil 
companies formed a joint venture in 2012.
Instead of fast-tracking access to the mineral wealth though, Uganda decided to 
take it slow. Even ten years after the first discovery, there is still no oil. The wait on 
oil is still on and it is not yet clear what impact the oil will have in social, economic 
and political terms. During the long wait the possibility of a stillbirth, in the form 
of the discovery of dry wells or the withdrawal of the oil companies, was still hover-
ing. In Nebbi, people were expecting and hoping to find oil soon but in 2012 Nebbi 
could not claim any oil, unlike other districts such as Buliisa or Hoima. No oil had 
been found and eventually in 2013 the companies withdrew their activities from the 
district to apparently more promising sites.
The quote and especially the analogy are illustrative of the state of oil in Uganda 
during my research and even up to the writing of this book. My research was situated 
at the “interstices of everyday life” (Gasparini, 2004), which refers to those in-be-
tween experiences in time, space or communication like waiting, travelling or silence. 
One could also say the research happened at the interstices of what the oil companies 
call the “oil life cycle,” which progresses from exploration through development to 
production and then decommissioning. The use of “cycle” for a linear perception of 
time that progresses from untapped oil to exploited oil up until no more oil can be 
extracted might seem odd at first but it refers to the whole business operation. While 
an individual well can only go through these stages once, the oil companies repeat 
them over and over again. When I arrived in Uganda in 2012, the country was at the 
transition from the exploration phase to the development phase. Uganda had suc-
cessfully attracted investors through presenting geological and geophysical proof of 
the presence of hydrocarbons in its soil. Small and independent oil companies took 
the risk and invested into exploration, which confirmed commercially viable quanti-
ties of oil. First exploration successes were made in 1998 and it has been known for 
at least a century or even before colonial times that there was oil in Uganda. This 
was the beginning of the presence of oil in Uganda and the development phase was 
expected to arrive soon but it never did.
This ethnography shows that the interstices of the oil life cycle are not times of 
hibernation but moments filled with various negotiations and attempts at setting the 
course of oil in Uganda. The politician cited above referred to the expectations con-
nected to the oil and the experience of waiting and anticipation during the explora-
tion phase. In his speech he also commented on the many discussions that were be-
ing held in Uganda during that time by civil society organisations (CSO).3 He asked 
3 I will use the term CSO for any organisation operating in Uganda that is presenting itself as 
non-governmental and interested in the promotion of not-for-profit goals, such as human rights or 
environmental protection. These organisations include international and national as well as commu-
nity based or faith-based organisations. I will differentiate amongst the different types of Non-Gov-
ernmental Organisations (NGOs) only when it is crucial to the analysis. I use the term civil society as 
a self-ascribed label by certain organisations operating in Uganda.
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the audience to remain calm and wait for the oil to materialise before debating its 
effects. But during the wait, the main oil-related activity was anticipating risks and 
opportunities from the oil and communicating visions of a future with it.
Rather than truly being absent, oil in Uganda is simply not yet present: It is 
in a state of latency, of not-yet-ness (Adam, 2009), a concept I use to fathom the 
temporal qualities of oil and their societal impacts. Not-yet-ness describes a phase 
of liminality, which is a moment of uncertainty that enables new positionings with 
regard to a future that lies beyond this phase. Not-yet-ness thereby refers to processes 
of future-making in the present. Not-yet-ness is similar to the concept of “presence 
of absence” (Bille et al. 2010), which highlights the ways materiality and temporality 
are connected. But not-yet-ness is a concept directed at the future, not the past.
The not-yet-ness of Ugandan oil posed several methodological challenges. My 
initial research question was to understand the influence of (inter)national political 
and economic forces on the development of oil in Uganda and more especially their 
impact on people in the oil region. Due to the not-yet-ness in which the oil was 
stuck, it seemed an impossible undertaking, since the big developments and trans-
formations I had hoped to find failed to materialise. Realising the importance of this 
waiting for Uganda’s oil, and the future it promised, I started to focus on the ways 
Ugandans anticipated the oil in speech, action, and infrastructural development.
In the phase of not-yet-ness oil-related activities are not yet permanently fixed to 
certain sites. I therefore decided a broad, multi-sited ethnography was best suited to 
focus on oil-in-the-making. During the more than 15 months of fieldwork I con-
ducted in Uganda between 2012 and 2015, I was mainly based in what is known 
in Uganda as the “oil city” Hoima, which functions as a gateway to the oil region, 
and made several trips to villages in the exploration areas. I established relationships 
and conducted interviews with a variety of persons, including actors from civil so-
ciety and donor agencies, representatives of oil companies and their international 
and Ugandan subcontractors, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development 
(MEMD)4 and other government agencies concerned with the oil, as well as oil 
exploration workers, residents and politicians of the oil region. I participated in con-
ferences, workshops and other stakeholder engagements held by both civil society 
organisations and the oil companies. In this book I consider how all these various 
actors play a role in making the resource and how local, national, and global forces 
were, and still are, weaving the story of oil in Uganda.
This book contributes to a growing anthropology of oil that looks at oil from a 
holistic perspective including the practices and processes of exploration, production, 
transportation, consumption, and signification (Behrends et al. 2011, Behrends and 
Schareika, 2010). Moving away from a focus on oil as revenue that prevails in many 
studies in economics and political science, the anthropology of oil expands into the 
materiality and temporality of the resource (Rogers, 2015). Anthropologists working 
on oil use classic ethnographic methods to learn more about the social significance of 
4 In the dissertation I use the shorter terms MEMD or Ministry of Energy.
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oil in all its facets: from production to consumption, from raw material to commod-
ity and revenue, and from power resource to object. Yet the role of immateriality that 
is the absence or not-yet-ness of oil, so pertinent in the Ugandan case, has not been 
studied sufficiently. Anthropologists have noted though that oil can have an impact 
and cause conflicts even when it is not yet there (Behrends, 2008). This ethnography 
analyses processes and negotiations that take place even before the first drop of oil 
is produced and it reflects on how risk narratives such as the “resource curse” are 
employed to influence and gain leverage in these early negotiations. The resource 
curse concept, developed in economic and political sciences, seeks to explain the 
postulated “paradox of plenty” (Karl, 1997: 4), that is how and why, despite greater 
revenues, resource-rich countries perform worse than resource-poor ones in terms of 
poverty, corruption, democracy and political stability (e.g. Auty, 1993; Humphrey et 
al., 2007; Ross, 1999; Yates, 1996).
This book connects to perspectives on oil that take into account both the material 
and temporal aspects of resources. The concept of “resource materiality” (Richardson 
and Weszkalnys, 2014) emphasises that resources do not exist in and of themselves, 
but rather they are brought into being through knowledge, as well as technologies, 
infrastructures and practices. The ethnographic approach is particularly well suit-
ed to understand these processes in new or future oil states because looking at the 
practices of “resource-making” (Ferry and Limbert, 2008) allows the researcher to 
explore how various actors negotiate the significations of oil (Behrends and Reyna, 
2011; Behrends and Schareika, 2010). The concept of “resource-making” is defined 
as processes of social and political negotiation (Ferry and Limbert, 2008: 4). This 
ethnography then looks at how different actors from the state, the oil companies 
and their service providers, Ugandan companies, the extractive communities, and 
civil society tried to influence the process of oil-making in Uganda. It looks at key 
actors of this development and analyses the various visions and their implications, 
as well as the changes the oil has brought to Uganda even when the oil was still “in 
the womb.”
Studying oil in a formative phase emphasises that oil is not just a variable within 
a setting, but rather that it is formed by the context. The phase of not-yet-ness is a 
phase of uncertainty and openness. The oil life cycle is not a smooth transition from 
one stage to the next, but rather the transition can get expanded as one phase has 
ended and the next one is yet to start. It is a temporal moment which various actors 
use, and even prolong, in order to influence the nature of the next stage. This book 
shows how resources are not just made within the phases of the cycle of exploring, 
developing and producing oil but also at the interstices of this cycle.
In this ethnography, I bring insights from the anthropology of risk and uncer-
tainty to the study of oil by suggesting that in order to understand processes of re-
source-making, we need to move away from (more or less) deterministic models such 
as the resource curse. Instead, we should appreciate the uncertainty of the future as 
an openness that different actors may use to influence present and future outcomes. 
In this sense, resource-making is also future-making.
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Uncertainty is a “state of mind and minding” (Reynolds Whyte, 2009: 213) that 
denotes the recognition of a lack of knowledge to predict the outcomes of events. 
Uncertainty thus emphasises an awareness of the contingencies of the future. Risks 
in turn can be seen as a way to anticipate possibilities and to thereby manage or even 
profit from uncertainty. I follow a relational understanding of risk that asks “why 
and how something is considered a risk” (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011: 176), and 
according to which risk is “a product of situated cognition positing a relationship 
of risk linking a risk object and an object at risk” (ibid.: 178). Objects here refer to 
“any kind of physical, cultural, or social artefact that can be delineated and singled 
out” (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011: 177). Risks are not self-evident in this view but 
social concepts that point to what is of value in a given social group, or even society 
as a whole. This relational concept enables me to gain insights into what is at stake 
for different actors in Uganda by analysing different risk narratives. In a sense, oil is 
not the only resource in the process of becoming, because the construction of risks 
itself can be understood as a kind of resource-making. Once ‘made,’ the risks can be 
drawn upon as power resources to influence how the oil is made.
The oil project in Uganda can be understood as an “arena,” (Bierschenk and 
Olivier de Sardan, 1997) meaning a social space that is constituted by various ac-
tors and institutions that are involved in the oil-making, such as the state, the oil 
companies, the extractive communities and civil society5. These actors have also been 
described as the “oil complex” (Watts, 2005), yet the arena concept turns the focus 
more narrowly towards the negotiations that influence the present and future devel-
opment of the oil project. This concept also highlights the interests each set of ac-
tors or strategic group brings to the negotiation (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 
1997). It is constituted by the relations between the different actors and these are not 
stable but subject to change, reinterpretation and even breaking. Furthermore, there 
is no stable totality of relations. Rather actors can always endeavour to create linkages 
to the oil project in order to profit (financially or in other ways) from it.
This book looks at how actors communicate about and establish risks of the oil 
and thereby negotiate their position within the oil arena. They even influence the 
constitution of the oil complex itself by forging or cutting relations to other actors in 
the complex, and by qualifying the relations through according blame, an important 
part of the risk communication (Douglas, 1992). Stephen Hilgartner (1992) who 
was the source of inspiration for a relational theory of risk was concerned with how 
risk objects are constituted. He calls this the “emplacement of risk” and highlights 
how risks can shape the (future) form of socio-technical networks. Risk emplace-
ment is a negotiation of power and it leaves room for agency and engagement if 
successful. Risks can be used as power resources in negotiations because a risk that 
5 The term civil society in this dissertation refers to a strategic group comprised of (mainly) non-state 
and non-profit organisations and actors with a similar position with regard to the oil. I discuss the 
term in more detail in chapter four on the resource curse.
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is emplaced shapes various aspects of the arena: the language used, the knowledge 
produced and the code of conduct.
This book considers various attempts at risk emplacement at different nodes of 
the complex: from the state, to companies and civil society actors. In showing how 
risks are used in negotiations to influence present and future outcomes, this book 
also contributes to the anthropology of risk. Important questions for analysing my 
material were to note who or what was said to be at risk from whom or what. Fur-
ther questions were how persons communicated the risk and with what knowledge. 
Finally, I analysed my material by considering what options for management the risk 
narratives offered, whether the risk found acceptance, what effects the communica-
tion produced and how it helped the actors to gain a more powerful position in the 
oil arena.
Thus, this ethnography contributes to four fields in anthropology: oil, risk, un-
certainty, and the future. It introduces not-yet-ness as a moment in time of oil pro-
duction that is of importance and that has hitherto not been studied sufficiently. By 
looking at processes of anticipation in this uncertain phase, this book can offer new 
insights into the relation between risk and uncertainty that move beyond concep-
tions of linear progressions from uncertainty to risk. Furthermore, the book estab-
lishes that risk narratives are an important way to alter the arena of the oil project, or 
for that matter any arena. Careful attention to how actors make and use risks and un-
certainty in negotiations can help understand why a certain discourse can dominate 
in an arena and at times even why certain normative rules are set the way they are.
In the following, I give an overview of the chapters of this book. The second 
chapter introduces the theoretical and methodological framework. It explains the 
conceptual tools with which this work operates and that served as guiding principles 
throughout the research and analysis of the data. While uncertainty and risk have 
been connected in many studies, the combination with oil is novel. Although the 
risks of the oil industry are mentioned in many publications on oil, these studies 
work with more vernacular notions of risks and do not conceptualise it. After in-
troducing the concepts individually, I discuss how risk and uncertainty can be put 
to (profitable) use. The chapter also introduces my research and my methodology. 
I discuss the question of how to study oil in its not-yet-ness: that is, how to empiri-
cally make use of the combination of the three concepts. I describe the sites of my 
research, the methods used and I reflect on the challenges I faced and the impact of 
my positionality on my research.
After setting the frame, I relate the history of oil in Uganda in the third chapter, 
drawing mainly on a review of the literature and newspaper articles. The not-yet-ness 
of oil in Uganda becomes more plausible when the history of the resource is taken 
into account. Oil has been in the making for a very long time. This has led to some 
frustrations, which also gave room for negotiating just how the oil would come to 
be. I start the history of oil in Uganda with the early exploration activities and follow 
it up to recent events of various scandals and debates around legislation. I show the 
risks that are connected to the search for oil for the oil companies and for the state. 
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In Uganda, the development of oil has been delayed many times and these delays 
are risky to both the government and the oil companies. This historical account 
also points to the negotiations that are part of the resource-making process. I will 
show how risks can be used as leverage in these negotiations once they have been 
acknowledged. In this way the government used the risk of delays in developments 
and the oil companies threatened their withdrawal in order to get an upper hand in 
the negotiations.
The next three chapters then turn to my research findings. They are each con-
cerned with a sub-arena of the oil arena, centred on the revenues in the economy 
of expectation, land issues in the oil region and national content. In these last three 
chapters I present negotiations of participation in the oil and the petro-future. Struc-
turally, these chapters are on the same level and could have been ordered differently. 
The advantage of the chosen order is that it progresses from the broader narrative 
about the oil that taints all interactions towards more specific interactions between 
the state, the oil companies and people in the oil region. These in turn are important 
to understand the positions held by the different strategic groups in the sub-arena of 
national content.
 The fourth chapter focuses on a set of actors that has been very influential on oil 
in Uganda: civil society organisations. The chapter looks at how they communicate 
the resource curse as a risk. In brief, the resource curse discourse creates a causal link 
between the presence of oil in a country and negative social, political, and economic 
outcomes. It is a concept exported from economics and political sciences by civil 
society organisations who intend to impact on the governance of oil. Despite criti-
cism from within social sciences, the resource curse has become a rallying cry for 
civil society actors in oil-producing states and notably also in potential petro-states 
(Weszkalnys, 2011). In this sense, the resource curse is a travelling model that has 
been translated to the Ugandan context (Behrends et al., 2014; Reyna, 2007).
I show how civil society organisations drew on an international discourse of the 
resource curse to communicate what they saw as the risks associated with oil, and to 
make recommendations on how these risks could be managed. I argue to look at the 
resource curse as a risk narrative that helped civil society actors in Uganda to gain in-
fluence and broker space. The resource curse is the anticipation of a catastrophe and 
it comes with risk management tools or international advice on resource governance 
for preventing the curse, such as accountability and transparency. In the resource 
curse discourse, oil is equivalent to a potentially destructive force unleashed by the 
oil companies and the government on Uganda and its citizens.
I present the results of an analysis of documents and presentations by civil society 
organisations that are explaining the resource curse. I will discuss in more detail a 
video production that illuminates the main points of the discourse. In order to be 
able to make my argument, I take a critical look at the term civil society and relate 
my understanding of civil society as a strategic group in Uganda. I consider the 
resource curse discourse to be a way of changing the oil arena in Uganda. Other ac-
tors from the oil companies and the government have taken up the resource curse 
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concept in their language, thus acknowledging the risk although claiming it would 
not happen in Uganda.
The resource curse risk also has an impact on local people in the oil region. Many 
expressed to me a sense of uncertainty with regards to their future in an oil-state. The 
talk about a resource curse combined with past experiences of state neglect, experi-
ences of unfair compensation during exploration, and in general life in a region the 
state considered ‘hard to reach and hard to stay’ made a future with oil seem to be a 
looming disaster rather than a blissful promise.
The experiences of people since the discovery of oil, and the expectations they 
held with regard to the oil, are central to chapter five. The chapter starts out by 
embedding these experiences in the uncertainties of the past. It then continues with 
statements from various actors in villages of the exploration areas that speak of their 
doubts, worries, and unease with regard to the oil. I have singled out the major issues 
that came up during my research: the hope for jobs in the oil industry; the concerns 
over a rise in immoral acts and security threats; the disruptions from seismic surveys 
and other developments such as the construction of a road or a refinery; and in gen-
eral worries about displacement and land grabbing. While many civil society activists 
suggest that people in the oil region live in dire uncertainty, without agency, and in 
need of spokespersons, I show how the people in a village in the exploration area also 
knew how to mobilise resources at the national and international level. People in a 
fishing village on the shores of Lake Albert6 demanded compensation for the alleged 
destruction of their cultural sites during exploration by presenting both their heri-
tage and the success of the oil exploration in their area to be at risk. They drew sup-
port from the national legislation on the protection of cultural sites, from the king 
of Bunyoro7 and from an international community that seeks to protect indigenous 
rights and cultural heritage.
The last chapter is centred on another friction between the oil companies and 
Ugandans: the intricacies of national content, meaning the participation of Ugan-
dans in the oil industry. National content is another social arena, or rather sub-arena, 
within the oil complex. To the oil companies, national content was a legal require-
ment and part of their corporate social responsibility approach. In a debate on the 
participation of Ugandans in the oil sector and the use of international standards, 
Ugandan entrepreneurs from village to national level challenged the oil companies 
of intentionally excluding Ugandans from the profits of oil. Tullow8 and its joint 
venture partners tried to make Ugandans acknowledge the risks they defined and to 
handle them according to international mechanisms, thus creating a “technological 
zone” (Barry, 2006) around the oil, in which all objects and processes are judged 
6 The lake is called Mwitanzige in Runyoro. I continue using the colonial name because it is used by 
most actors in my field and in Uganda in general.
7 Bunyoro is a former kingdom that covers several districts in the oil region but today is only a cul-
tural institution. I will give some more details in chapter two. 
8 In this thesis I use Tullow for both Tullow Oil plc and the Ugandan subsidiary Tullow Oil Uganda 
Ltd. The same applies to Total and CNOOC.
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according to a common standard. The oil companies tried to influence how the oil 
would be produced in Uganda. Like civil society and state officials, they also drew 
on the risks of environmental pollution and human accidents to argue for their dis-
entangled style of business operation (cf. Appel, 2012a; Zalik, 2009). In the chapter 
I also show how this business style is connected to the financialisation of the oil 
industry. I elaborate how oil companies like Tullow follow the logics of shareholder 
capitalism, which is centred on the demands of shareholders and shareholder value, 
and the effects this has on the participation of Ugandans in the oil business.
Overall, the book covers different negotiations between actors and institutions of 
the oil complex. Throughout the book, I show how different actors use risk narratives 
in negotiations to gain a space for brokerage or space for profit-generation. I suggest 
that a fruitful way of studying oil, especially in a state of not-yet-ness, is to consider 
these risk narratives around the oil as they reveal both how the future is anticipated 
and what influence actors can derive from these visions.
Figure 2: Signposts on the way to Butiaba at Lake Albert (2012).
The Conceptual and Methodological Framework2 
The timing of research is always important and in my case it fundamentally influ-
enced my choice of theories and methodologies, which I elaborate in this chapter. 
Following the local politician I cited in the introduction, Uganda’s oil project is like 
a pregnancy. Indeed, just like a pregnancy means waiting for the baby, Uganda was 
waiting for its oil. Likewise, the dominant activity in my research was waiting. Wait-
ing in a broad and a very mundane sense. I was waiting for my research permit, for 
interview appointments or even just to hear back from potential interviewees. I was 
waiting for buses and for conferences to start. And I was waiting for the oil devel-
opments to kick in and for the oil to eventually materialise. I was not the only one 
waiting.
The oil industry was also waiting and so were Ugandan politicians, state officials, 
civil society actors, businessmen and -women, and people in the exploration areas. 
It was a time of waiting filled with anticipation, with plans, fears, doubts, hopes and 
calculations. After all, it was not certain what developments the oil would bring for 
the country. However, contrary to my expectation, I did not find widespread excite-
ment about the oil. It had already been a long wait for everybody. Truly, the oil future 
was too slow in coming as in 2012, six years after commercially viable quantities of 
oil had been discovered, there was little to show for the first excitement.
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Frustrated at first, I started realising with time that my fieldwork would not be on 
the massive changes oil brings, but rather on the wait for them. A maxim of street-
level bureaucrats in Benin states that “C’est le terrain qui commande” (Bierschenk, 
2014a: 238). My field was calling the shots – and my field was making me wait. 
Therefore, I decided that my research would have to be about how people waited for 
the oil; how the oil was being anticipated. Commonly in social anthropology, the 
empirical research is not just a means to flesh out the theoretical frame with data. 
Rather the conditions in the field render (parts of ) the theoretical frame useless for 
understanding what is going on (Bierschenk, 1984: 16). Accordingly, I reoriented 
my framework incorporating concepts that are future-oriented and can help to anal-
yse the processes and narratives of anticipation in the wait for oil. Notably, waiting 
is not passive but rather a very focused activity. Waiting turns the gaze towards the 
future and fills the gap between now and then with imaginations, calculations and 
distractions. People cope with protracted uncertainty through hoping for a better 
future. It is hopeful waiting that keeps people afloat and able to persevere through 
their predicaments (Brun, 2015).
In Uganda, waiting consisted of more than hope: it was a time of hope- and 
doubt-mongering, as well as preparation.9 The Parliament was passing an oil legisla-
tion, Ugandan companies were trying to obtain contracts from the oil companies 
and civil society was busy anticipating the risks connected to oil production. I started 
looking at these visions and tools that helped people make sense of or even influence 
the petro-future, a future that is shaped by the oil, imaginations of it, and the sig-
nifications people give to the oil. Focusing on the anticipation of oil means turning 
towards an understanding of oil not just in material but also temporal terms. Con-
cepts of temporality, future, immateriality and potentiality or not-yet-ness came to 
be important to my research, enabling me to see what was going on when apparently 
nothing much was going on. These concepts focus on the narratives about the oil, 
the visions of the future people created, and the practices of anticipation.
My research in the “interstices of everyday life” (Gasparini, 2004: 339) meant 
that my field was not clearly delineated by activities of the oil companies or by oil 
sites such as a refinery. Rather, my field was quite elusive and not easy to access. In 
this chapter, I present my methodological approach and my theoretical framework, 
that is the concepts that enabled me to study oil in this uncertain phase. I had to 
work with concepts that allowed me to understand the future-oriented waiting for 
oil in Uganda. I position myself within the anthropology of oil. I outline my under-
standing of oil, and more especially oil-making, and of the other two major concepts 
of this work, namely risk and uncertainty. I show how these theoretical engagements 
helped to ask meaningful questions of my empirical material and how it enabled me 
to both conceptually and methodologically engage the wait for oil in Uganda. After-
9 Weszkalnys (2016) calls the contradictory expectations with regard to the future development of 
oil in São Tomé and Príncipe “doubtful hope” and stresses the need to engage with what she terms 
“resource affect”. Chapter 5 considers such affects expressed by people in the oil region.
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wards, I continue the chapter with an introduction to my field and a description of 
my methodology.
Oil, Risk and Uncertainty2.1 
Adding to the current growing field of anthropology and oil, this ethnography com-
bines insights from social science studies on oil with studies on risk and uncertainty 
in order to see how various actors stake their claims on the petro-future in the pres-
ent. In this sub-chapter, I proceed by first elaborating what an anthropological per-
spective on oil means and what perspective I follow in this work. Then I introduce 
risk as an analytical concept. Due to the colloquial notion of risk, it is important to 
set out clearly what sociologists and social anthropologists have contributed to our 
understanding of risk and how this is relevant in my work. Although often used in-
terchangeably, I will show that it is fruitful to discuss it separately from uncertainty. 
I show how anthropologists have engaged uncertainty and what insights I draw for 
this ethnography. The final point of this theoretical framework is the consideration 
of how both uncertainty and risk can be used, which is a vital point for the main 
argument of my book.
Oil
In a call for more ethnographies on oil, Andrea Behrends and Nikolaus Schareika 
(2010) highlight the relevance of this approach.
[T]he ethnographic study of practice can reveal how in particular oil zones in 
Africa a localised mix of actors, stakes, interests, resources of power, and cul-
tural understandings enter processes of interaction and negotiation that yield 
specific outcomes (Behrends and Schareika 2010: 3).
Following their call, I used a practice-oriented approach to understand the process 
of oil-making in Uganda. The research question was how the oil was turned into a 
resource and what signification were ascribed to the (future) oil. In this sub-section, I 
point out what contributions anthropologists have made to the study of oil and I po-
sition myself within this field with a special focus on the temporality of the resource. 
I then define my perspective on oil and the oil project as an arena.
Anthropology of Oil
Oil can be considered in its geological, energetic or economic dimensions. The for-
mer two understandings build on the material qualities of the substance, while the 
latter derives from its exchange value. The economic dimension of oil has dominated 
debates mainly in economics and political science, which have been focused on the 
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economic and political effects of this commodity. The major explanatory concepts 
of the ‘rentier state’ and the ‘resource curse’ derive from studies on the effects of 
oil production on countries in the Middle East and the Americas in the 1970s and 
1990s respectively. I discuss these concepts in detail in chapter four. Here it suffices 
to say that the resource curse thesis has been criticised for excluding the context, e.g. 
the type of regime that was in place when oil was discovered (Basedau, 2005). Fur-
thermore, these concepts mainly look at oil as revenues, as simply money, and do not 
consider the ways in which oil is converted from a physical substance to an economic 
or political object. They also neglect the embeddedness of states in a global economic 
setting, in which large corporations wield influence. This narrow focus on the coun-
try places sole responsibility on the government while forgetting the international 
linkages and the geo-strategic characteristic of oil (Watts, 2008).
Social anthropology has added another perspective to our understanding of oil 
that combines the different facets of oil: the material, economic, political, and social 
structures of its production, transportation, trade and consumption. Oil in this book 
is understood from this anthropological perspective as the product of technologi-
cal, social and natural processes that are intertwined and feed back into each other, 
producing this specific substance and ascribing meanings and uses to it (cf. Mitchell, 
2009). This holistic perspective has been the strength of social anthropology and it 
is this strength that allows oil to be looked at from a new angle that transcends the 
narrow focus on oil as substance or money. What can be gained though by looking 
at oil holistically and by considering it as a social phenomenon? I suggest here that 
anthropologists have brought new insights to the study of oil by looking at it from a 
global, a political, a reflexive, and a historical perspective. It is important to consider 
these studies as they formed the initial perspective I had on oil.
First, social anthropologists accounted for the global dimensions of oil produc-
tion by emphasising the influence of corporations and the global capitalist market 
(Appel, 2012a; Ferguson, 2005; Shever, 2012; Yessenova, 2012). In a widely cited 
article, James Ferguson (2005) postulates that the oil industry is almost working like 
an island, disentangled from its surroundings. He argues that it is not nation states 
anymore that receive investment but only certain territories, splitting Africa once 
again into useable and unusable parts. In both cases the state seems peculiarly absent: 
one part is governed by companies and the other by international Non-Governmen-
tal Organisations (NGO). It seems once more that a scramble for Africa’s resources 
is on. And the companies have scrambled for the best parts of the continent, leaving 
the useless parts for the population while keeping them out of the useable parts. Left 
out to be taken care of not by a state but by internationally financed NGOs. This 
trend has also been noted by other scholars (Frynas and Paulo, 2006; Yates, 2006). 
Unlike mineral extraction, which is considered labour intensive work, the oil indus-
try is capital-intensive only, seeking labour not locally but flying in its experts.
The oil industry in this description is an international industry, financed by in-
ternational capital and exceedingly disconnected from the nation state where its op-
erations take place. And like other industries operating globally, it is protected by 
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international trade regulations and arbitration courts. Nicolas Donner (2011) has a 
similar understanding of the industry, calling it the immune nature of oil enclaves. 
Building on Ferguson’s analysis and looking at oil from a material perspective, Han-
nah Appel analyses oil companies’ business operations in Equatorial-Guinea as con-
stitutive of a petro-capitalism which seeks disconnectedness based on modularity 
(Appel, 2012a,b).
Second, looking at oil from a political perspective, Suzanna Sawyer’s study of 
indigenous movements against oil production in Ecuador analyses the discourses and 
actors of this resistance directed at the oil companies (Sawyer 2004). She shows the 
struggles over the oil profits between the Ecuadorian state, multinational oil compa-
nies and indigenous communities and even within these communities. Elaborating 
on the connection between oil corporations and culture, Rogers (2012) studied the 
image campaigns of Lukoil and PermRegionGaz in Russia in which they used certain 
material qualities of oil and gas to relate to the people of the region. They connected 
the depth of the oil with a depth of regional culture, while the gas pipeline system 
was connected to sociality and connectedness. With this account Rogers shows how 
particular qualities of a resource are used in a politicised field of significations and 
shows how global connections of oil feed back into society and in different ways than 
anticipated by concepts like the resource curse.
Third, drawing once again on a classic tool, anthropologists have used the reflex-
ive gaze to understand how the accumulated oil knowledge of academia was trans-
lated to and influenced the political, economic and social processes in oil states. 
They show that the concepts of the resource curse and the rentier state have been 
influential in shaping the discussion of oil and what to anticipate, expect, hope and 
fear (Hoinathy and Behrends, 2014; Weszkalnys, 2011; Witte, 2017).
Fourth, social anthropologists have considered the history of an oil state to un-
derstand how it evolved without assuming it followed pre-determined oil-driven 
trajectories. In one of the early ethnographies on oil, Thomas Bierschenk (1984) 
looks at the effects of oil in the sultanate of Oman from a historical perspective: His 
ethnography analyses the formation of a rentier state. Later ethnographies on oil 
have also looked at the processes of change and the notions of progress in oil states 
such as Venezuela (Coronil, 1997) or Nigeria (Apter, 2005). While in both Apter 
and Coronil’s books, the oil is not the central theme, they manage to show how the 
state and the performance and representations of the state are essentially influenced 
or even dominated by oil. They emphasise how oil states used the oil money to 
create their visions of a state. Looking at the FESTAC (World Black and African 
Festival of Arts and Culture) in 1977, Apter describes how the oil boom gave rise to 
a new confidence and celebration of African and Nigerian culture. He situates these 
cultural politics within the political economy of postcolonial Nigeria with patron-
client-relations or ethnic clientelism as a salient feature. Similarly, Coronil analyses 
how the idea of a Venezuelan nation at the beginning of the 20th century was closely 
intertwined with oil. He describes the oil boom and bust and its effects on the Ven-
28 Annika Witte: An Uncertain Future – Anticipating Oil in Uganda
ezuelan state and society, more especially the way oil money corrupted the state and 
society in general.
Comparing the historical trajectories of oil and carbon and their impact on de-
mocracy, Timothy Mitchell (2011) points to the importance of following the oil 
and looking at the infrastructures of oil production to understand its impact on 
society. Furthering these insights from historical contextualisation, Jannik Schritt 
(2016) argues that oil is not a total game changer but just another way of playing 
the political game. By showing what is going on before any oil is actually produced, 
ethnographic studies add to our understanding of the dynamics in resource states. 
In her ethnography on Chad, Andrea Behrends (2008) notes how the spectre of oil 
alone can already lead to conflicts.
These four insights from anthropology have added new layers and shades to oil 
but are only part of what the anthropology of oil has to offer especially regarding 
the temporality of the resource. While the studies mentioned so far influenced my 
initial research programme and directed my attention to the physical and technologi-
cal qualities of oil and the infrastructure needed for its production, transport, and 
consumption, this framework was insufficient to engage what was going on in my 
field. It is here that studies emphasising the temporality of resources came to be of 
greater importance.
Temporality of Oil
Temporality was already important in studies that consider the historical trajectory 
of the resource and the state. However, the temporality in these studies was mainly 
focused on the past. What can anthropologists offer though for studying resources in 
the future? Richardson and Weszkalnys (2014) explore the question of how to study 
the process of resource making ethnographically. They propose to look at resources 
not as commodities but as parts of resource environments (Richardson and Wesz-
kalnys, 2014: 7). In particular, they suggest a focus on the resource ontologies – on 
knowledge about the resource, the infrastructure needed to exploit it, and experi-
ences with and embodiments of the resource by people in touch with it (ibid.: 16). 
According to this perspective, resources do not simply exist but are brought into 
being. They consider this process as one “par excellence” of nature being turned into 
culture.
[N]atural resources are not ‘out there’ ready to be seized upon and utilised 
but always in flux and open-ended. They ‘become’ as resource materialities, 
that is, as constitutive of and constituted within arrangements of substances, 
technologies, discourses, and the practices deployed by different kind of actors 
(Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014: 16).
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Before a natural resource is worth being turned into a commodity, a social system 
with all its values, imaginations, anticipation and technologies needs to be in place.10 
Materiality and temporality are intricately bound together and being always has a 
temporal quality. While resources are obviously material and factual, they equally 
pertain to the temporal domain. Studies focusing on temporality consider oil in its 
trajectory and the imaginations and future visions connected to the various stages of 
the oil life cycle and to both its absence and presence (Limbert, 2010; Weszkalnys, 
2014).
Mandana Limbert (2010) looks at how people in Oman perceive the develop-
ment oil brought as an illusion that will fade away once the oil is gone. She describes 
how Omanis live in uncertainty with regard to their oil as they constantly expect 
the oil’s decline. Imaginations of a future without oil build on the oil-less past as a 
template. The orientation towards the future, the modes of anticipation invented 
or followed by actors, are as important as the actual materialisation of the resource. 
Elizabeth Ferry and Mandana Limbert (2008) combine temporality and materiality 
by highlighting the linkage between temporality and resources.
Resource-making is a social and political process, and resources are concepts 
as much as objects or substances. Indeed, to call something a resource is to 
make certain claims about it, and those claims participate in an ideational 
system […] that has a history, perhaps multiple histories. To call something 
a resource is to presuppose a set of interactions between ‘nature’ and ’society’ 
that creates goods, products, and values. Moreover, particular expressions of 
this ideational system, what we might call resource imaginations, often have 
a strongly temporal aspect: they frame the past, present, and future in certain 
ways; they propose or preclude certain kinds of time reckoning; they inscribe 
technologies; and they are imbued with affects of time, such as nostalgia, 
hope, dread, and spontaneity (Ferry and Limbert 2008: 4).
Resource-making or oil-making is informed by social and political processes of nego-
tiating what the future with oil will look like. This is part of what this anthropology 
of oil sets out to do, to cover the processes of oil (states) in the making. The special 
state of oil in Uganda necessitates an exploration of the temporal domain of the im-
material. Immateriality is a kind of absence. Absence does not have an existence per 
se but is one that needs to be perceived and performed. An absence marks a thing 
out of an infinite number of things that are not present in any given context (Fowles, 
2010: 39). Out of all the things that are not present, persons focus their thoughts 
and emotions on one or several things that are not there and whose absence is hence 
registered. The moment the absence becomes noticed, it becomes a presence of ab-
sence. This concept is drawn from archaeology and it is different from the absence 
10 Matthew Huber shows in “Lifeblood” (2013) how essential oil consumption is to the American 
way of life and the rise of neoliberalism because it is so embedded in the ordinary life.
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of presence where the absence is simply not felt or noticed by the actors (not the 
observer) (Bille et al., 2010: 11; Buchli and Lukas, 2001).
Fowles (2010) points out that absence has been neglected in thing theory: La-
tour could talk about the present key as a viable actor but not about the absent key. 
Absent things need a human subject to acknowledge, to perceive them. Thus, they 
do not exist in themselves as agents or actors (Fowles, 2010: 25). The same could 
be said of oil which is absent, immaterial or simply not yet there. Absences can ac-
quire object-like powers and potentialities when they have their own presence in the 
world. They then become “full participants in the social characterized by their own 
particular politics and, at times, their own particular emotional and semiotic charge” 
(Fowles, 2010: 27).
Oil in its absence poses a challenge for research. In a state of not-yet-ness, the 
final materialisation of oil is postponed. The presence of oil in a country is the result 
of a materialising process, which is the combination of various social, political, geo-
logical and economic activities that help to discover and develop the resource. Oil 
production is contingent on the interests of the oil companies and the government as 
well as on price fluctuations on the world market and demands by the shareholders. 
For this process to set in the resource needs to have an economic exchange value and 
the oil quantity must be above the threshold of commercial viability. Without pass-
ing this line, the oil deposits do not count on the international energy market. The 
crossing of this threshold is much less a geological fact than one co-created by market 
prices and technology available for exploration and extraction.
Barbara Adam raised the question of how the future could be studied and stressed 
that empirical science is not well equipped to study the future since its competence 
lies in “the present not the future” (Adam, 2009: 21). Therefore, the way the future 
is created by humans has been neglected for long. Anthropological conceptualisation 
of future in the present are for example “waithood” (Honwana, 2014) and “timepass” 
(Jeffrey, 2010). These concepts are concerned with how young men and women 
who, due to economic hardship have not yet gained adult status and thus remained 
in a socially liminal phase as neither children nor grown-ups, organise their lives in 
anticipation of a better future. While these concepts are useful to understand the 
situation of youth in Uganda, they do not speak to the anticipation practices around 
the oil. Therefore, I suggest that the concept of not-yet-ness, based on Adam (2009), 
allows to think together temporality and (im)materiality of the oil.
The entanglement of time and matter becomes evident in the concept of presence 
of absence: it is the imagination that is geared towards the past or the future that 
brings or keeps things in our lives. Adam has stated the importance of the future and 
especially future in the making for our contemporary world.
[T]oday’s social world encompasses not just social relations, institutions and 
social structures but also the natural environment. In its futurity, much of this 
world is not material in the conventional sense but marked by latency and 
The Conceptual and Methodological Framework 31
immanence. It is a world of deeds under way that have not yet materialised as 
symptoms, not yet congealed into matter (Adam, 2009: 8).
The concept of not-yet-ness I propose here resembles a phase of liminality of being 
in-between. Not-yet-ness is characterised by uncertainty and is a phase in which the 
future with oil is anticipated in practices and discourses drawing on risks and uncer-
tainty. The concept of liminality describes a phase of ambiguity in which a sense of 
uncertainty prevails. The concept of liminality is derived from the anthropology of 
rituals and used to describe the phase between stages in the rites of passage, in which 
the participants are left in limbo (Turner, 1967; Van Gennep, 1960).11
Like liminality the phases Uganda has to go through to become an oil producer 
are clearly delineated by the oil life cycle. Following the time concepts of Roman 
Loimeier (2012), which include natural, religious, social, political, global and clock 
time, the oil life cycle would represent an economic time concept. This time is struc-
tured by the different key moments such as first oil or the inauguration of a refin-
ery.12 Unlike liminality though, not-yet-ness is neither structured nor does it have a 
definite end; in fact, its end may never come. It is precisely not within a ritual time 
frame but like the concept of waithood it is directed at a future that may never come. 
Not-yet-ness covers the time at the interstices of the oil life cycle.
In this book, I follow the perspective of Ferry and Limbert (2008), who highlight 
the process of how oil comes to be a resource of national value and of value to the 
people. The aim of this book is to understand the process of resource-making, or to 
be precise the process of oil-making in Uganda. For almost a century, Uganda’s oil 
was in a state of absence of presence. With this book I explore the lines between the 
present and the future – the not-yet-ness of oil. The way I look at the not-yet-ness of 
oil is through the concepts of risk and uncertainty. Two concepts that speak to the 
human ability and desire to handle the future and its contingencies.
Oil Arena
The relevant actors of the process of oil-making are described by Watts as forming an 
“oil complex,” which is “a configuration of social, political, and economic forces with 
a broadly similar ‘petrostructure’” (Watts, 2005: 378). Later, Watts (2012) called this 
“oil assemblage,” which remained conceptually close to the oil complex. The oil as-
semblage relates to an understanding of oil from the vantage point of actor-network-
theory, which highlights the co-production of oil through actors and actants and the 
creation of linkages. This is a potentially fruitful perspective to study oil but it does 
not account for the immateriality which is important in Uganda.
11 For a recent discussion of the concept see Thomassen (2009).
12 Loimeier sees these different concepts of time as adding up to a distinctive timescape (“Zeitland-
schaften” in German).
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Building on Watts, I see the oil complex as a network of actors such as the pet-
ro-states and the consumer states, the transnational oil industry and the national 
oil companies, the banks and shareholders, the insurance industry, the militaries, 
paramilitaries and security companies, civil society organisations, lobbying groups, 
research institutes, the consumers, and the various groups in the extractive com-
munities. The concept highlights the strategic and everyday importance of oil by en-
compassing the many connections oil creates in our hydrocarbon societies. It points 
to the importance of looking at a variety of national and international actors and the 
linkages between them when studying oil.
Individual national oil projects could be described as arenas in which different 
actors of the oil complex are in confrontation over oil-related issues and negotiate 
the oil. It is the actors who constitute what is understood as an arena in (political) 
anthropology (Lewellen, 2003: 95). Arena has been used as a concept to analyse 
political conflicts and the formation of strategic groups. Political conflict may refer 
to a narrow sense of politics as between politicians or to a broader understanding 
of local politics that includes a variety of actors (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 
2003, 1998).13 The arena concept, in conjunction with those of conflict and strategic 
groups, was chosen by Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (1997) as ideal for ethno-
graphic research and indeed it provides a solid methodological purchase (Olivier de 
Sardan, 2003). It was applied by Bierschenk (1988: 43) to analyse a development 
project in Benin, which was determined by a struggle over perspectives, interpreta-
tions, plans for the future, political power and material resources of different strate-
gic groups. Bierschenk points out that there is not just one development project but 
rather there are many projects each group pursues.
An arena can contain various stages or arenas (Renn, 1992).14 An arena is a field 
of actions that are influenced by heterogeneous interests. Essentially, an arena is not 
a place but a relational space, a space of confrontations or conflicts, to which a set 
of rules applies in Bailey’s conception of the term (Bailey, 1969: 28). Basically, an 
arena consists of actors who are joined by a common issue and strive for their own 
interests, forming strategic alliances of greater or lesser permanence. Therefore, an 
enterprise such as oil production can be viewed as an arena. Combining the concepts 
arena and oil complex, the former underlines the fluid character of alliances between 
individual actors to strategic groups on a micro level, while the latter highlights the 
macro level structures such as the national state, the international oil industry or the 
capitalist system.
The project of oil production in Uganda which is at the base of the resource-mak-
ing is the arena where many different actors position themselves following their par-
ticular interests and form strategic groups. The arena concept is well suited to analyse 
13 Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2003, 1998) used arena in an analysis of political processes of 
democratisation and decentralisation at the local level in Benin.
14 In Renn’s conception an arena is the political actions, that is actions that seek to influence policy 
decisions, of all actors involved in a certain issue (Renn, 1992: 181).
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the negotiations around the oil in Uganda, such as the resource curse, land issues or 
the national content discourse. To Bailey, the acceptance of (but not necessarily the 
adherence to) a common set of rules was a defining characteristic of the arena. There 
are normative and practical rules, that is rules of how the game should be played and 
rules of how to win the game. I argue that risks can be used as resources in arenas and 
they can thereby change the (normative) rules of the game being played.
It is especially the struggle over perspectives, interpretations and the future which 
is of interest to this book. This ethnography looks at how people negotiate the mean-
ing of oil and what positions they take with regard to it, and more especially how 
these positionings and the visions people create, inform the futures that are conceiv-
able and possible.
In the following I introduce risk and uncertainty as analytical concepts. I set 
them apart from other concepts and terms with which they are often conflated, such 
as insecurity or danger. After considering how risk and uncertainty have been con-
ceptualised so far in the social sciences, I turn to the question of how people do not 
just cope with but profit from risk and uncertainty.
Risk
The visions of the future that were exchanged in the oil arena in Uganda where full 
of threatening scenarios and risks. What are risks though and how can we engage 
them theoretically? Different concepts of risk have been developed across the social 
sciences. One very prominent and early contribution was Frank Knight’s Risk, Un-
certainty and Profit (1964). According to Knight the main difference between risk 
and uncertainty lies in the ability to calculate. Unlike uncertainty, risks are known 
and can be calculated. What does calculation mean though? In economics risk is 
understood as the probability of an event, which is calculated numerically. The abil-
ity to calculate with numbers is connected to the existence of a calculative agency, 
of knowledge and of tools to do so (Callon, 1998). In fact, the rise of risk has been 
connected to the rise of probability (Hacking, 1990, 1978). Arnoldi refers to this as 
a probabilistic approach to risk (Arnoldi, 2009: 14). He points out how risk is con-
nected to the rise of probability in science and a belief in its utility for controlling 
the future (ibid.: 33).
Probability made it possible to induce the chances of something happening in 
the future. This is the cornerstone of the modern concept of risk: the scientifi-
cally (probabilistically) calculated likelihood of something unwanted happen-
ing (Arnoldi, 2009: 21).
Probability is seen as a way of turning future uncertainty into scientifically known 
risks and this is the basic premise of risk management (ibid.: 34). Through calcula-
tions and statistics, the likelihood of an event can be predicted. And once this is done, 
once the risk is assessed, decisions can be taken on the basis of that knowledge.
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A social understanding of risk differs from this probabilistic approach. In sociology, 
risks are often understood to be inter-subjective and socially constructed (Arnoldi, 
2009: 15). There are different approaches to the study of risk from sociology and so-
cial anthropology. Two approaches are prominent and widely known: Ulrich Beck’s 
risk society and Mary Douglas’s cultural theory of risk.
To Beck (1986) there are objective risks in the world and they have proliferated 
with the rise of new technology. According to Beck, we live in an ever more risky 
world and risks have become ubiquitous in our lives.15 We are confronted with them 
in warnings, alerts, insurance demands and safety measures. These risks do not affect 
everyone in the same way as people are vulnerable in different ways or to different 
risks. Since some are more vulnerable than others, Beck sees risk vulnerability, rather 
than income difference, as the major difference in society at the end of the 20th 
century (Beck, 1986).16 He calls risk the “Noch-Nicht-Ereignis” (ibid.: 43), literally 
translated a not-yet-event. Elaborating his concept into that of world risk society, 
Beck defines risk as the orchestration or staging of an anticipated catastrophe (Beck, 
2007: 30). The not-yet-ness of oil in Uganda has been filled with stories of the not-
yet-catastrophes of oil.
However Beck’s concept of risk is only useful up to a certain extent because he 
built it on the assumption that risks are more or less objective phenomena that only 
need to be discovered. Social anthropologists in turn, argue that risks are essentially 
cultural (Douglas, 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983). They found that the per-
ception of risks is connected to the norms and values of a culture. Risks are not the 
same across cultures. Rather each culture has selected risks out of all those that could 
be imagined. Mary Douglas (1992: 26–27) compares risks to taboos: they both cre-
ate connections between actions and harm and influence or regulate (future) behav-
iour. An important question is always who is accorded the blame if something goes 
wrong (Douglas, 1992). This cultural or relativistic theory of risk has been for a long 
time anthropology’s most prominent contribution to risk. However influential even 
beyond social anthropology it has been, it has been criticised by social anthropolo-
gists for being neither based on empirical data nor substantiated later on by empirical 
studies (Boholm, 2015: 58). Furthermore, the concept is built on an essentialist idea 
of culture.
The cultural understanding of risk failed to consider all the layers involved in 
risk and treated them as mere black boxes (ibid.: 64). In order to overcome these 
shortcomings, Åsa Boholm suggests a relational understanding of risk, which con-
siders risk as a concept that bundles relations. According to her definition, a risk is 
when something of value to humans could possibly be harmed or destroyed yet it is 
15 To some extent this could also be said of Anthony Giddens’ contribution (1991) to risk research. 
While many risks have been reduced with the onset of modernity, some new high-consequence risks 
have been created. He understands the proliferation and monitoring of risks as an expression of mo-
dernity’s reflexivity (ibid.: 114).
16 However, there are some global risks that would affect all people equally like air pollution. Beck 
called this the boomerang effect and pondered on the chances of them opening ways to a new utopia.
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not certain this will happen (Boholm, 2003: 166). Risks can be related to physical 
or mental or even transcendental harm. What is perceived as a risk is the result of 
negotiations and it can, as mentioned above, vary between societies or within one 
society and it is always open to contestation (ibid.: 161).
The argument […] is for the conceptualisation of risk not as a phenomenon 
in itself but as a frame that produces contexts that link together a risk object 
(a source of potential harm), an object at risk (a potential target of harm) and 
an evaluation (implicit or explicit) of the possible human consequences. Seen 
in this way, risk is a relational order constituting the connections between 
people, things and outcomes (Boholm, 2015: 87).
This understanding of risks as frames of looking at the world, is based on Erving 
Goffman’s frame concept, defined as “principles of organisation which govern events 
– at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them” (Goffman, 1974: 
10–11). In this frame, a risk object is linked to an object at risk by a contingent 
and causal relation. Risk objects are things and actors that are identified as having 
dangerous qualities, the qualities being precisely how they put another object or ac-
tor at harm. To identify these causal links and the actor or object from which they 
emanate, knowledge and the organisation and evaluation of that knowledge is neces-
sary. The object at risk is something to which value is attached and that one wishes 
to keep safe from harm. This understanding of risks highlights how important the 
identification of the risk is, that is the establishing, assembling, and organising of 
knowledge to form these relations and the social processes of attaching value to an 
object (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011).
All of this means that risks cannot be regarded outside the social and cultural 
context in which they are situated. In a relational understanding of risk, probability 
is not as important as the establishment of linkages. “Risk is a matter of connect-
ing things,” (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011: 183) and not primarily a matter of cal-
culating something. For instance, Mairal (2008) suggests in an analysis of Daniel 
Defoes’s A Journal of the Plague Year that European notions of risk have more to do 
with narratives of possible negative events than the rise of probability and statistics. 
Accordingly, not just calculations are important but also, or especially, narratives of 
risks – with or without numbers.
The relational theory of risk draws its major inspiration from a science and tech-
nology perspective on risk: Stephen Hilgartner argues that risk objects do not exist 
but are constructed and emplaced into sociotechnical networks such as auto-based 
transportation (Hilgartner, 1992).17 The struggle to construct and control risks is 
also a negotiation over the future shape of the sociotechnical networks influenced 
17 Auto-based transportation is a sociotechnical network that includes a great variety of components 
such as drivers, cars, highways, manufacturing firms, investments banks, oil fields and government 
agencies (Hilgartner, 1992: 44).
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by power relations (ibid.: 50). Hilgartner suggests that the study of risks should not 
focus so much on the general public but on the agents that are working on emplac-
ing the risks (ibid.: 52). Hilgartner divides the construction of risks into two levels: 
creating the object itself and creating the object as risky, that is constructing a linkage 
between the object and harm.
In other words, to emplace a risk object means to turn it into something to be 
reckoned with, something that is capable of influencing the future of the net-
work. To displace a risk object means precisely the reverse: to strip the object, 
and its risks, of their significance; to neutralize them; to remove their capacity 
to influence the evolution of the network (Hilgartner, 1992: 49).
In this perspective, determining what is risky and what is not is a powerful resource. 
To assert dangerous causal links and to make others believe in them is to have a special 
power resource at hand. Like risk power is also relational and not a feature or a stable 
category (Bernoux, 1985: 126). Power is a social field or process in which different 
actors negotiate their position drawing on different resources to strengthen it (Alber, 
2003: 158). Being able to define a risk means to create and mobilise knowledge in a 
certain way so that the risk can be perceived by a wider public. It means convincing 
other people of one’s own perception of reality, gaining a Deutungshoheit (which can 
be loosely translated as interpretive authority). Knowledge is an important factor in 
identifying risks but it is not a stable category. Rather it gets constantly broadened 
and alternated. This holds especially true for new technology. With the expansion 
of knowledge, new risks come and old risks go. As Beck already pointed out, new 
technologies pose a special problem as they cannot be assessed with accuracy and 
sometimes not even anticipated in any way what catastrophes they might bring.18
An ongoing emplacement of a risk can be viewed in the discussion of the effects 
of fracking. While one side views fracking as an extreme case of environmental pollu-
tion, the other portrays it as completely harmless. The causality of whether chemicals 
in the water have negative consequences on the environment, is being debated and 
scientific knowledge is mobilised on both sides. Yet what is important is whether the 
causality gets wide recognition. This debate has not come to a conclusion yet, since 
the experts creating a linkage between the fracking activity and contamination of 
groundwater or even earthquakes have not yet managed to successfully emplace the 
risk and thus shape the whole sociotechnical network called fracking.19 This example 
points out that with new technology one needs to start anticipating that which can-
not be anticipated.
The insights from the studies on risk show that a risk is socially constructed, be-
cause it emerges from the combination of knowledge of these links combined with 
18 The recent century has provided ample examples of new technologies at first believed to be safe 
that have turned into health risks – think of FCKW, amalgam or smoking, especially passive smoking.
19 For an overview of the debate in Germany see Schirrmeister (2014).
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a narrative and the ability to predict or even calculate the likelihood of such events 
happening. A risk is connected to cultural and social values, it is a recognised poten-
tial threat, an anticipated catastrophe, it is being performed and sometimes it can be 
calculated through probability calculations that control contingency or chance. The 
risk set-up of a society may change and new risks can emerge as old ones get modified 
or displaced. These changes are connected to wider social developments and changes 
in knowledge and beliefs of societies.
Risk and Agency
A problem when talking and writing about risk is that it is often not distinguished 
clearly from other words such as danger or hazard. However, differentiating between 
these terms is helpful as it reveals a major difference: risks do not strike like lightning. 
Niklas Luhmann (1991) defines the main difference between risk and danger as 
whether the outcome is attributed to a decision or is external, i.e. caused by an (un-
controllable) environment. With risk the damage is attributed to the decision-maker 
while with danger the damage is attributed externally to the environment. The dif-
ference lies in the agency that is attributed to humans, their culpability of harm. This 
connects to Douglas’ insight that blame or the ability to accord it is an important 
element of risk. If potential harm is deemed beyond human agency or culpability 
then it is a danger or hazard and not a risk. Still, the line between the two terms is not 
clear-cut. In her work, Susanna Hoffman (2002) shows that so-called “natural ca-
tastrophes,” which in a clear-cut distinction would be a hazard are also connected to 
human behaviour. Luhmann does caution that whether the agency or culpability is 
perceived to lie with someone is the result of perception and negotiation (Luhmann, 
1991: 40). Nevertheless, risk is more directly connected to decision-making, that is 
to choosing from alternatives.
Decision-making is a form of agency (Boholm 2015: 124) and the agency of the 
decision-maker is juxtaposed by the “patiency” (ibid.) of those who are affected by 
the consequences of his or her decision. Based on Alfred Gell’s concept of agency 
(Gell, 1998), Boholm stresses this differentiation between agents and patients or 
agency and patiency. Boholm describes agency as “a capacity to do things and get 
things done” (Boholm, 2015: 123); a capacity though that is not a feature of a 
person but attributed to him or her. Agency refers to the pursuit of goals or the 
disposition to the enactment of projects. Agency is not a property of individuals but 
rather a reflection of power relations in certain webs of social relations (Ortner, 2006: 
151–152). Sherry Ortner (ibid.: 147) described this kind of agency as being “about 
people playing, or trying to play, their own serious games even as more powerful par-
ties seek to devalue and even destroy them”.20 Patiency follows from the fact that the 
goal of agency lies outside of the acting being. His or her decision has consequences 
20 Serious games in Ortner’s conception are cultural formations involving culturally variable and 
subjectively complex actors. Seen from this perspective social life is “actively played, oriented toward 
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for others who thereby become patients to this decision (Boholm, 2015: 124). This 
means the same issue can be a risk for someone (the agent) and a hazard for someone 
else (the patient) (ibid.).
Boholm applies her relational conceptualisation to situations, in which risks are 
negotiated or communicated. In risk communication it is suggested that conflicts 
might be mitigated by encouraging dialogue and sharing viewpoints and hence creat-
ing a sense of agency for everyone involved. However, this does not happen; people 
that are affected by the risk decision of another will continue to perceive their status 
as being a patient. This connection between risk and agency is important in this 
book when discussing the effects of the resource curse discourse on people living in 
the oil region.
Risks as Modes of Anticipation
Following a relational concept, risks can be conceived of as modes of anticipating 
the future. The verb anticipate derives from anticipat, Latin for acted in advance, 
meaning to guess or be aware and to take action to be prepared. Anticipation can go 
beyond merely expecting or predicting something. It can mean to take action based 
on an expectation. In this sense risks are a way of handling the future as they open 
options to actors to influence the future through present actions. Risks are a way to 
obtain agency over the uncertainty of the future, which by its very nature is full of 
contingencies.
The difference between risk and uncertainty was captured by Brian Wynne (1992) 
on a scale that is based on knowledge with risk meaning the odds are known, and 
uncertainty, meaning the odds are not known. Further along the scale, ignorance 
is if we do not even know that we do not know and indeterminacy refers to a state 
where knowledge cannot be obtained (Wynne, 1992: 114). Based on Wynne, Ar-
noldi (2009: 91) referred to uncertainty as known unknowns, ignorance as unknown 
unknowns and indeterminacy as unknowable unknowns. An example of unknown 
unknowns is the 1986 radioactive fallout over Wales and Cumbria described by 
Wynne (1996). While the future is full of contingencies, i.e. events that are possible 
but cannot be predicted with certainty, risks are a way to handle these contingen-
cies to some extent. It is in this way of being a means to anticipate the future that a 
relational risk concept is relevant to the study of oil in a state of not-yet-ness. In the 
following sub-chapter, I turn to uncertainty as an anthropological concept.
culturally constituted goals and projects, and involving both routine practices and intentionalized 
action” (Ortner, 2006: 129).
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Uncertainty
For Susan Reynolds Whyte (2009: 213), uncertainty is a “state of mind and mind-
ing” that refers to an inability to predict the outcome of events. Uncertainty is a state 
that is related to unpredictability, instability, lack of (accurate) knowledge, unreli-
ability, and the difficulty to interpret or even fathom life (De Boeck, 2012: 200). In 
a study on the life of Rashaida in Sudan, Sandra Calkins describes uncertainty as “a 
universal phenomenon, a lived experience resulting from an unease about acting in 
view of an unpredictable future” (Calkins, 2016: 2). She points out that uncertainty 
is not present everywhere and all the time, and that it is not a uniform property of ac-
tion but is perceived, experienced and acted upon in different ways (ibid.). Common 
to all these studies is the emphasis on instability and the lack of knowledge.
It is only when a lack of certainty is registered or felt that a feeling of uncer-
tainty arises. In this way, uncertainty is the absence of certainty. This could also be 
described as non-knowledge.21 Non-knowledge is considered to be a kind of igno-
rance where the borders of knowledge are either known or wilfully ignored (Gross 
and Bleicher, 2013: 319). The transformation of uncertainties into risks hinges on 
knowledge. However, a gain in knowledge does not straightforwardly mean a reduc-
tion of uncertainty.
More knowledge does not necessarily lead to certainty but rather opens the mind 
to all the yet unknowns and hence increases uncertainty. In their book Acting in an 
Uncertain World (2011), Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe define uncertainty as “we 
know that we do not know, but that is almost all that we know” (Callon et al., 2011: 
21). Basing their definition thus on Socrates’ realisation of the boundaries of hu-
man knowledge – the knowledge of non-knowledge.22 While with risk, we know the 
groups who are at risk, we know the events that could take place, their causes and 
their possibility, with uncertainty these conditions are not met (Callon et al. 2011: 
20–21).
Contrary to what we might have thought some decades ago, scientific and 
technological development has not brought greater certainty. On the contrary, 
in a way that might seem paradoxical, it has engendered more and more un-
certainty and the feeling that our ignorance is more important than what we 
know (Callon et al., 2011: 18–19).
Gaining knowledge basically means opening the door to a new room. A room that 
one will find to be filled with more doors. And each door opens to rooms with even 
more doors. Hence the deeper one penetrates into this knowledge maze the more 
one is not just aware of the doors one did not open but also of the doors that are 
21 For a discussion of various types of non-knowledge see Gross (2007) or for the interlinkage be-
tween uncertainty and ignorance see (Smithson, 1989).
22 This element of his philosophy is stated for instance by Plato (2011) in his apologia.
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possibly still waiting ahead. In this situation it becomes clear that certainties are an il-
lusion, or rather they are themselves creations. But we consider the state of certainty, 
of no doubts or questions, to be the proper condition. This already becomes evident 
in how we refer to the different states. While certainty is the basis, we use the prefix 
un- to refer to the other state, a state of absence, the absence of certainty. It seems 
that we perceive the doubting of knowledge and reality, the questioning of the steadi-
ness of our world as the unusual, the extraordinary.
Looking at uncertainty in this way allows us to see that it is not a condition 
inherent to a situation but rather it is a question of perception. How does one then 
come to perceive uncertainty? Most importantly this is through knowledge, as shown 
above. As long as there is no knowledge about certain things or effects, they are not 
on the agenda. Someone, be it a scientist or an activist, needs to show that reality 
is not what it appears to be. Someone needs to sow doubt about reality, or at least 
aspects of it.
Reynolds Whyte (2009: 214) argues that uncertainty in Africa is “a source of 
anxiety and fear because of the prevailing conditions of insecurity.” Although uncer-
tainty and insecurity are often used interchangeably, they need to be distinguished 
from one another. Reynolds Whyte argues that while uncertainty is a state of mind, 
insecurity is a social condition that refers to a lack of protection and weak social 
networks that provide no safety in the face of adversity.23 Likewise, Calkins (2016) 
also stresses the necessity to distinguish clearly between uncertainty and insecurity. 
Uncertainty for her is a radical questioning of what reality is.
Uncertainty emerges from the difference between reality and world. It entails 
the more or less radical questioning of what is presented as reality and opens 
a horizon to imagine other social arrangements […] Insecurity and risk also 
entail a lack of knowledge, because if everything was known there would be 
neither insecurity nor risk. But in contrast to uncertainty, these phenomena 
denote a certain knowledge concerning what knowledge is lacking […] inse-
curity does not lead to a radical questioning of the reality construction but 
refers to uncontrollable hazards within it (Calkins, 2016: 60–61).
Uncertainty is not just caused by a lack of knowledge about the future but by doubts 
about the nature of things, or rather about how they appear to be. Uncertainty hence 
reaches deeper and affects life more fundamentally. While appreciating this distinc-
tion, I suggest that it is also possible to talk of uncertainty when only parts of reality 
are subjected to a fundamental or radical questioning.
For my case study I use insecurity to refer to situations of threats for people’s life 
such as an increase in crimes or the spectre of terrorist activities, while uncertainty 
23 She further distinguishes both terms from contingency, which to her is an existential condition, 
meaning one is dependent on “something else that cannot be fully foreseen or controlled” (Reynolds 
Whyte, 2009: 214).
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describes a broader sentiment and includes less imminent threats such as the poten-
tial dispossession in areas of the oil region. How do people handle this uncertainty? 
Is uncertainty inhibiting action or what ways have people devised to live with un-
certainty?
Reynolds Whyte (1997) shows that the way people handle diseases and other 
misfortunes are culture-specific and humans from different cultures neither ask the 
same questions nor devise the same methods in the face of adversity. Reynolds Whyte 
has been working on questions of misfortune, health and uncertainty in Uganda for 
several decades and has analysed how Nyole question (mis)fortune (e.g. Reynolds 
Whyte, 1997). In an analysis of a diviner session in Bunyole, she shows how it is 
used to move from a stage of uncertainty and ignorance about the cause of illness 
or misfortune (on both the side of the affected person and the diviner) to a stage of 
certainty, at least temporally (Reynolds Whyte, 1990, 1997: 67). Seeking a diviner 
and gaining temporary certainty is one way of handling uncertainty, while another 
would be to create more contingencies. Reynolds Whyte and Etyang Siu (2015) 
show how HIV/AIDS patients in Uganda deal with the uncertain situation of their 
healthcare by creating relations to many people. The term contingency highlights 
how creating social relations is a way of dealing with uncertainty. While social rela-
tions are sources of uncertainty themselves, they carry the potential of opportunities 
and assistance. Creating contingencies means making oneself available for positive 
contingencies (ibid.).
While the uncertainty discussed so far is one of mainly negative connotations, 
this is not necessarily always the case. Uncertainty can also be considered as the basis 
for curiosity and exploration (Dewey, 1929). Uncertainty can be productive and it 
can be used creatively. In a recent collection on uncertainty, Elizabeth Cooper and 
David Pratten (2015) argue that one needs to look at the positive side of uncertainty, 
a claim not unfamiliar to anthropologists working on pastoralism. By virtue of their 
occupation pastoralists actually “live off” uncertainty (Krätli and Schareika, 2010). 
Dealing with the concept of uncertainty from a pastoralist perspective reveals that it 
can be used as a resource. Departing from earlier perspectives on coping strategies, 
in this new view pastoralism is regarded as a high-reliability production system as it 
harnesses from a structurally unpredictable environment. Instead of being focused 
on avoiding risks, it is rather one that explores the potentials of risks (Krätli and 
Schareika, 2010; Roe et al., 1998). Pastoralists navigate their environment by using 
the chances provided by the inherent risks and uncertainties of that environment, 
rather than being constrained by them (Krätli and Schareika, 2010).
Henrik Vigh (2009) shows for Bissau where existential uncertainty was the con-
stant of everyday life how people struggled to both survive in the present and gain 
life chances in the future. People had a heightened sense of the relatedness of people, 
events, harm and chances. The analytic term of “social navigation” expresses the 
social movement of people in an ever-shifting environment and their relations to it 
(Vigh, 2009: 426). Since people do not act in stable and unchanging environments, 
it is necessary to realise how the environment is part of the game.
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[R]ather than being predefined and cartographically pinpointed, our environ-
ments and futures are […] contingent upon our knowledge of the past, our 
experience of the here and now as well as the emergent or potential possibili-
ties and difficulties within it, entailing that the map is never a static set of 
coordinates but a dense and multi-dimensional imaginary, which is constantly 
in the process of coming into being (Vigh, 2009: 429).
Knowledge and anticipation are of essence to navigate. The concept captures very 
well the notion of people living vis-à-vis bigger forces and touches on how people 
themselves change the social environment. Expanding on this point, one may add 
that the uncertainty of the environment is not just there but can be created. In the 
next sub-chapter, I turn to the question of how uncertainty and risk can also be uti-
lised and profited from.
Profiting from Risk and Uncertainty
In the following paragraphs, I review what academics working on risk and uncer-
tainty have added to our knowledge of how people do not just manage risk and 
uncertainty but actively use them. Building on Michel Foucault’s theory of govern-
mentality (Foucault, 2006a,b), risk and uncertainty may not just be profited from 
but they can also be used in governance in general and more especially in capitalism 
and the oil industry (Arnoldi, 2009: 53–61). They can be used to actively shape the 
future in the oil business and in prospective oil states.
The governmentality scholars look at how risks could be used as tools in gov-
erning populations with special focus on the role of insurance companies and their 
probabilistic logic for societies (Ericson et al., 2003). This probabilistic logic has also 
extended to the oil industry, where insurance companies and especially the reinsur-
ers are important actors with regard to risk assessment and management. They have 
an economic interest in reducing risks that they cover for the companies. Therefore, 
they make the companies implement certain standards in order to avoid having to 
end up paying.
In his book Risk, Uncertainty and Government (2004), Pat O’Malley points out 
the dividing agency of risk and how it is one way of imagining the future and mak-
ing it bear upon the present. He traces out the genealogies of risk and uncertainty 
from (social) liberalism to neo-liberalism, thus arguing that uncertainty and risk are 
always ways of governing subjects with regard to visions of the future that are deeply 
intertwined with predominant economic and social theories.
Risk ceases to be a literal depiction of the world that provides objective in-
dicators of future harms. Instead it emerges as a diverse family of ways in 
which certain choices are presented to us, and through which practitioners of 
particular kinds of expertise define the future. Risk assigns us to categories, 
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creates divisions among us and incorporates us in diverse solidarities of fate 
(O’Malley, 2004: 180–181).
According to O’Malley, the differing attitudes to risk and uncertainty can be viewed 
as long-term governmental policies (O’Malley, 2004: 6). He points out that risk and 
uncertainty are both government techniques, hence what is perceived as risk and 
uncertainty and the regimes connected to managing them (through e.g. new subjec-
tivities or insurances) are non-necessities. In other words, they are changeable. He 
claims that governmental configurations are not necessary, that they could have been 
and can become otherwise (O’Malley, 2004: 11). This approach to risk focuses on 
the intentions of governments for constructing risks: governing subjects. The main 
insight from this perspective for this book is that an analysis of risk can help reveal 
how and for what purpose risks are used to guide the actions of others.
In economic theory using uncertainty is understood as being open to the future, 
which is considered enabling to entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial freedom, and 
profit (Samimian-Darash, 2013: 12). According to O’Malley (2004), earlier liberal 
conceptions were based on calculative rationality, which sought to create certainty 
through science, statistics and bureaucracy. The idea was to tame uncertainty and 
thus tame the future and achieve stability that would allow freedom for all. But 
with the neoliberal turn the calculative rationality was replaced by a valorisation 
of “flexibility, imagination, inspiration, acuity and inventiveness” (O’Malley, 2004: 
59). O’Malley (2000) writes about uncertainty as a (neo-)liberal way of governing 
the self, economic activity and social relations.24 On the market, uncertainty is ap-
preciated because it leaves room for speculation that can drive the shareholder value 
and increase profit for the companies. Shareholder value measures the performances 
of companies listed on stock exchanges by, broadly speaking, comparing their finan-
cial inputs and outputs. The higher the outputs or returns for investors, the better.25
This valorisation of uncertainty can also be traced in the work of Zaloom (2004). 
She shows from her research on the Chicago Board of Trade that risk is not just a 
threat but can be profitable. Risks and risk-taking can bring rewards on the financial 
markets. She analysed the pit behaviour of traders and how in some kind of alchemy 
they turned risks into profits. Financial markets can be viewed as an uncertain en-
vironment and the behaviour of the traders is thus making use of it. She explains 
how risk taking keeps the market going, and therefore traders who do take them 
24 This liberal governance through uncertainty relies on “a creative [emphasis in original] constitution 
of the future with respect to positive and enterprising dispositions of risk taking and on a correspond-
ing stance of reasonable foresight or everyday prudence (distinct from statistical and expert-based 
calculation) with respect to potential harms” (O’Malley, 2000: 461).
25 One such performance measure is called the Return on Investment (ROI) but there are diverse 
metrics, connected to the respective consulting groups like McKinsey or Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
to measure in- and outputs. For a discussion of these consultancy metrics and the promises they carry 
see Froud et al. (2010). An investor is anyone who provides a company with financial means. If the 
investor holds a stock in the company, s/he is called a shareholder.
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are rewarded. Another perspective on stock markets is offered by Anthony Giddens 
who suggests that they actively use risks to “create the ‘future’ that is then colonised” 
(Giddens, 1991: 118).
Taking risks is also a fundamental element of the industry. The high risk and 
minimal time for reflection, which characterises the work of the rig workers, shows 
some parallels to the work of the financial traders Zaloom describes in her work 
(Zaloom, 2006, 2004).26 Risk taking is rewarded as can be seen very clearly in the 
example of wildcatters. Wildcatters are oil companies that come into a country early 
on to explore for oil when little data is available on the oil potential. These companies 
take the wildcat risk in order to profit from it. Their intention is to take on a wildcat, 
and build a good success ratio. Of course this does not always happen and miscalcu-
lated ventures can bring trouble to a rather small company. Sometimes companies 
hold licenses only speculatively, hoping maybe for the right world market price to 
sell it. Yet, the risk can also be sold on, sometimes outright fraudulently, sometimes 
more skilled and hidden.27
Mazen Labban (2010) points to the use of hedging devices in the oil industry to 
deal with risks. There is the physical hedging through hoarding or expansion into 
upstream production and the hedging through oil derivatives. Hedging devices are 
financial tools that use bets on prices to generate profits. Futures are classic hedg-
ing devices by which two parties agree on a price at which a commodity will be 
exchanged at a certain point in time. Options in turn are newer hedging devices, 
which build on futures but are only giving the holder the right, not the obligation, 
to buy or sell an asset. Options thus allow to hedge the risk posed by price volatil-
ity though at a much smaller cost. Options were at first viewed as gambling but got 
mathematical credibility once a formula, the Black-Scholes options pricing formula, 
was published in 1973. According to this formula the value of an option is deter-
mined by the volatility of the underlying asset – the more volatile, the higher the 
price (Johnson, 2015: 198–199). However, hedging as a strategy to reduce the risks 
of the market actually ends up increasing them. Labban works out how derivatives 
and hedging work destabilise the oil market because they are sources of volatility by 
becoming almost indifferent to both the trade and production of their underlying 
assets (Labban, 2010: 546–547).
Uncertainty can be manipulated by companies and even created by them for oth-
ers – investors, governments and other companies. The ability to use uncertainty for 
one’s own advantage has already been stated by Bailey who describes how uncertainty 
can be used as a trick to disorganise the opponent. It is especially appealing to create 
uncertainty for others as it makes it harder for the opponent to react when he cannot 
26 A retired oil worker describes in his autobiography the risks and velocity involved in the work on a 
drilling rig (Lynch, 1987).
27 In their monograph “Easy Money,” the historians Roger Olien and Diana Davids Olien (1990) de-
scribe the speculation and fraud going on in the booming U.S. oil industry of the early 20th century. 
Then, selling stakes in dubious or even in-existent ventures and wells was a widespread practice.
The Conceptual and Methodological Framework 45
predict one’s next move. This can be done by for instance introducing a new move 
to the game.
Victory in the game depends (among other things) upon creating uncertainty 
in the opposing team and so disorganising it. But the game can only remain 
orderly so long as this uncertainty remains slight. Order is at a maximum and 
uncertainty at a minimum if it is known that a certain move allows for only 
two kinds of riposte. […] But if a move is entirely new, then the riposte also 
must be new. Neither side can anticipate what the other will do next: the 
choices become very wide (Bailey, 1969: 116).
If one side creates uncertainty, the other side needs a new riposte. The underlying as-
sumption to this is that the game is usually orderly, that is both sides know the rules 
of the game. Uncertainty can thus be cultivated and put to use. For instance, David 
Michaels (2006) argues that “polluters and manufacturers of dangerous products,” 
(Michaels, 2006: 159) such as the tobacco industry, manufactured uncertainty in or-
der to avoid regulation of their sectors by the state. These companies invest resources 
into questioning the scientific evidence that is used to support regulation with the 
support of consulting companies. However, it is not just “polluters” who can use un-
certainty. Britt Dahlberg (2016) describes in her ethnography on an environmental 
waste site in the United States how a concerned resident sought to cultivate uncer-
tainty in her neighbours about the asbestos remains in the community through her 
actions and talks. She made people aware of how they lacked knowledge about the 
effects of the asbestos to make informed guesses about their future in close proxim-
ity to this toxic material. Uncertainty is the realisation of a lack of knowledge, as I 
described above, and thus through creating uncertainty the riskiness of the waste site 
could start to be perceived. The emplacement of risk thus hinges on the realisation 
of a potential harm and one’s lack of accurate knowledge about it. Dahlberg defined 
uncertainty as a technique of directing collective attention and to create demand for 
more knowledge. The uncertainty opened attention to future harms.
However, creating uncertainty can also be a powerful tool for causing inaction. In 
their collaborative ethnography, Javier Auyero and Debora Swistun (2008) describe 
how residents in a heavily polluted community called “Villa Inflamable” in Buenos 
Aires continue their life routines undisrupted by contamination. They call the denial, 
blindness, and misinformation on (or misunderstanding of ) the source and form 
of contamination a “toxic uncertainty,” collectively produced by the residents, state 
agents and doctors (Auyero and Swistun, 2008: 366). Uncertainty about the future 
in this understanding precludes action, unlike risk that can lead to action.
Creating uncertainty can be the ground for a risk to be emplaced in a socio-
technical network, that is to be accepted and taken into account. But as I show in 
this book, this can mean entering a vicious cycle of uncertainty since the presence 
of too many risks can be overbearing and highlight ever more strongly the lack of 
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knowledge. Risks do not just manage uncertainty but can also be used to create un-
certainty by actors who know how to harness the potential they offer.
The combination of risk and uncertainty with oil allows this ethnography to 
explore the ways people deal with and use uncertainty and risk to manipulate the 
becoming of oil and the negotiations in the oil arena in their favour. After this over-
view of my theoretical concepts, I turn to the methodological questions. Especially, 
of how and where to study oil that is in the making.
Waiting for the Oil: Research at the Interstices2.2 
Oil in a state of not-yet-ness is surrounded by uncertainties that make it complicated 
to find and delimit a field for research. Where can activities of resource-making be 
observed? Being in a village in the exploration area does not ensure data gathered will 
be actually on oil. There are very obvious field sites such as oil camps or oil compa-
nies, however these are regulated by strict access rules. Therefore, doing research on 
oil that is not yet present begets the question of how to study the immateriality of 
oil. At the beginning of my fieldwork I was struggling even though I had carefully 
thought out plans of who I wanted to talk to, what I wanted to ask, where I wanted 
to go and even ways of how to get access. But all these plans were premised on the 
idea that the oil had a physical presence in Uganda. It took some time to realise that 
it was not this simple.
Not-yet-ness draws one almost subconsciously into the act of waiting. To make 
my wait meaningful, I took up activities such as attending workshops organised 
by civil society organisations or I talked to various actors that I thought could be 
connected to the oil in one way or the other, from hotel managers to managers of 
petrol stations. But I constantly felt dissatisfied with my research: I was not even 
getting close to my topic! Eventually, I got in touch with international oil workers 
and obtained my research permission. Excited at first that finally the wait was over, I 
realised that the oil was still far away and in fact, after my first year in Uganda, many 
oil workers had been laid off and the industry went into hibernation. After all, the 
oil remained yet to come. In this section I lay out in detail the places, methods and 
challenges of my research and I want to suggest a way of engaging oil in a state of 
not-yet-ness.
I propose that it is necessary to look at the arenas where the future of the new oil 
state is negotiated. There are a variety of actors who are relevant to the petro-future 
and who have different imaginations of it. I used the multi-sited approach (Marcus 
1995) as it is well suited for doing research on oil as “[t]he essence of multi-sited re-
search is to follow people, connections, associations, and relationships across space” 
(Falzon 2009: 2). However, I do not pretend to have studied the whole of the oil 
complex nor do I think this is possible. My selection of sites was as much informed 
by methodological choice, restrictions and serendipity, as is any kind of fieldwork. It 
has been pointed out how problematic the thought of using multi-sited research to 
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understand a bigger whole by looking at various sites is (Cook et al., 2009: 47–48). I 
used multi-sited research as a methodological tool that allowed me to bring together 
the different arenas where oil was being negotiated. It enabled me to look at the risk 
experts, the ones who establish risks. These experts create visions of a petro-future 
and take part in the oil arena and are therefore especially relevant for research in a 
formative stage.
My research project on oil in Uganda started in 2011. I had decided on Uganda 
because it was expected to start production in 2012. This would have meant that 
my research would have coincided with the most active periods of the oil life cycle: 
the development and early production phase. While a lot of research has been con-
ducted in Uganda, very little has been concerned with Uganda’s oil. In 2012, I made 
a first exploratory visit to Uganda. I went back for initially five months of research 
in September 2012 and then returned in March 2013 for another six months. My 
fieldwork did not end after the first long stay in the field though. It is not uncommon 
for ethnographers to return to their fields after the analysis of their data (Breiden-
stein et al., 2013: 176). An analysis of my data had led me to risk and uncertainty 
as a theoretical framework. I found it necessary to return to the field with these new 
concepts at hand and to expand my data in this direction. I returned again for a final 
research phase of around three months in 2015. In the next sub-chapter, I present 
the sites of my research.
Research Sites
My research was mainly based in three sites: Kampala, Hoima and Pakwach. Kam-
pala is the capital of Uganda. It is the biggest city with official estimates of roughly 
1.5 million inhabitants. It is the seat of parliament and of several ministries including 
the Ministry of Energy.28 Kampala is also the headquarters for oil and gas operations 
in Uganda. Most companies active in the oil and gas sector have their offices there, 
especially the international oil companies and many service providers and even most 
of the NGOs had their offices there. Oil was also noticeable in Kampala as new train-
ing institutes have been set up, such as the Institute for Petroleum Studies in Muy-
enga. Universities offer courses that are praised as a gateway into the oil industry.29 
I conducted many interviews in Kampala, but the main part of my research was in 
the oil region, above all in the so called “oil city” Hoima.
Oil was first discovered in the Exploration Area 2 (EA2) in the Western part of 
Uganda but exploration has also been going on in West Nile and Acholi, regions 
28 Interestingly, the Petroleum Department is located in Entebbe, which is also the seat of the State 
House.
29 These institutes cater to expectations people have of getting a job in the oil industry. I elaborate on 
these hopes and the labour regime of the oil industry in the following chapters.
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in the Northwest and North of the country respectively. Together these regions are 
generally referred to as the oil region.30
30 Following this usage, I call oil region in this dissertation those districts of Uganda that have seen oil 
activity or that include exploration areas in their territory, that is or has been under license. Th is is to 
distinguish this area from other parts of the country that form exploration areas that have never been 
licensed. However, whenever possible I will refer to the district, county, sub county or village to give 
a more nuanced picture. A map with the exploration areas made by PEPD can be found online under 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120813053642/http://www.petroleum.go.ug:80/uploads/Drilled%20
Wells%20August-2012.pdf [February 2018].
Figure 3: Map of Uganda with research sites (modifi ed from http://www.d-maps.com/carte.
php?num_car=26960&lang=de [April 2018]). 
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I conducted research in the capital and across the oil region in villages that were 
neither connected to the electricity grid nor had a proper road network and in new 
district capitals like Anaka of Nwoya District. I visited prospective extractive com-
munities in Hoima and Buliisa district and lived six weeks in Pakwach.
During my research, the exploration efforts of Total shifted to inside the Murchi-
son Falls National Park. I could not follow them there without permission from the 
Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). Furthermore, I followed NGOs on their field 
trips and on various workshops or conferences they organised on oil in Kampala, 
Hoima, Masindi, Biiso, Nebbi and Arua. I start by a description of Hoima and then 
turn to my second major site: Pakwach.
Hoima, Exploration Area 2
Hoima is considered to be the oil city of Uganda. Allegedly, this name was first 
used by a radio moderator on the local radio station Spice FM but it can also be 
found in Uganda’s national development plan “Vision 2040.” Hoima is the gate-
way to exploration areas and to the area of the proposed refinery. Hoima is a town 
of roughly 100,126 inhabitants. The population has increased quite sharply from 
around 27,934 before the oil discovery in 2002. By 2014, Hoima was the eleventh 
biggest urban centre in Uganda.31 It is situated 200 km from Kampala, reachable via 
a smooth tarmac road that undulates its way through the hills of Western Uganda 
into the centre of Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom.
Bunyoro is one of the ancient kingdoms in Uganda that currently is no longer 
a political entity but rather holds a status as an officially recognised cultural insti-
tution.32 All kingdoms in Uganda were abolished under the presidency of Milton 
Obote in 1966 and were only allowed to be reinstalled under the regime of the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM)33 in 1993 although under the condition 
that they abstain from politics. The current king of Bunyoro or Omukama Salo-
mon Iguru Gafabusa was crowned in 1994.34 Banyoro35 complain of having suf-
fered from the dominance of their Southern neighbour and rival kingdom Buganda 
and Buganda’s better relations with the colonialists (Doyle, 2006: 79,93). Up until 
today, many Banyoro feel treated unfairly by the Ugandan state (Weichs, 2013: 19; 
Kiiza et al., 2011: 21–23). Bunyoro lacks industries and infrastructure in health, 
higher education and electricity (Kiiza et al., 2011: 17–18). For example, the roads 
31 See the 2014 “National Population and Housing Census” (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016).
32 For more information on Bunyoro kingdom around the time of Uganda’s independence see Beattie 
(1960, 1965).
33 NRM is the ruling party in Uganda. It formed out of the National Resistance Army (NRA) that 
fought in the civil war against President Obote.
34 For a detailed account of these processes and a discourse analysis of the concurrent changing dis-
positifs of power in Uganda see Raphaela von Weichs (2013).
35 Banyoro are the ethnic group while Bunyoro is the region or former kingdom and Runyoro is the 
language.
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to Bunyoro were improved as late as the new millennium. Based on her research 
on Bunyoro kingdom between 1999–2000 the social anthropologist Raphaela von 
Weichs (2013: 17–18) relates that the tarmac roads ended right at the borders of 
the kingdom and the roads to Hoima and Masindi were bumpy dirt roads that were 
terrible to pass. The only good road that existed during her research was the tarmac 
road up to Gulu that went through Karuma Falls and past the tourist attraction of 
the Murchison Falls national park.
Hoima is home to the Omukama and his palace. It is a rather peaceful town set 
in a hilly landscape. It has two major streets: one connecting to Kampala and Lake 
Albert, and another connecting to Fort Portal. But apart from oil-related activities, 
there is little other movement on the big roads. Hoima is neither a trading hub nor 
an industrial centre. There are no industries and no universities. It is reported that 
since the discovery of oil, its amenities have improved. Hoima now sports branches 
of several banks, restaurants, hotels of different categories, a big new market build-
ing and a forex bureau. It is on its way of losing the “up-country flair” it used to be 
associated with. The manager of a hotel told me that she thought Hoima was a place 
for “backward people,” when she first moved there for her job. However, she was 
surprised to find branches of Kampala businesses and banks in Hoima (Interview, 
2012).
During my stay in Hoima, there were few foreigners, especially few development 
workers, in Hoima compared to Kampala or Gulu, which have big foreigner com-
munities. There was an Indian community whose members ran supermarkets, a hotel 
and a restaurant. There were a couple of development workers from the United States 
of America, a few missionaries and several expatriate workers of a U.S.-American oil 
industry service provider. In the beginning these oil workers were residing at Hoima 
Resort Hotel, but later the company set up a camp for them on Kampala road out-
side of town. From time to time, Turkish men working for a Turkish construction 
company that was building the road from Hoima to Kaiso, showed up in town.36
Despite the nickname “oil city,” Hoima was only the gateway to the oil region. 
Seismic surveys and drilling were going on in communities near Lake Albert, from 
Buhuka up to Buliisa. Villages close to the drill sites in Hoima District were for-
merly hard to reach. Many lay on the shores of Lake Albert separated by the rest of 
Uganda either by water or by a steep escarpment. Roads down the escarpment had 
been opened a few years back by a South African tour operator who had established 
a wildlife reserve and lodge for hunting in Kaiso.37 Perhaps due to the steep escarp-
ment, trade and family relations with villages across the lake in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC) and in West Nile had been strong. Many of the residents in 
36 Kaiso is a village on the shores of Lake Albert that is located right next to oil wells and has seen a 
lot of exploration activity.
37 Of course, the establishment of a national park does not go unchallenged (Kesseler 2017). In the 
case of Kabwoya, the lodge owner complained of villagers poaching game and collecting wood from 
within the reserve.
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Kyehoro and Kaiso were Aluru who had come from West Nile and settled there. All 
across the district many Congolese had settled too, not only in the refugee camps of 
Kyangwali. With the oil exploration, these formerly hard to reach places were getting 
more and more connected to the rest of the country, especially to Kampala. A new 
road was built to connect Hoima and Kaiso. These days there is a daily bus connec-
tion from Kampala to Kaiso while previously there had been only one minibus per 
day starting in Hoima.
Oil so far had only temporarily impacted on the lives of people in these fishing 
communities. Tullow had financed a health centre and HIV awareness campaigns. It 
had brought temporary job possibilities to the young people in the community. And 
young men from outside, even from Kampala, moved to Kyehoro hoping to secure 
a job in the oil industry. Most of the casual workers I talked to were not originally 
from the town, but had come looking for a job and were thus renting a room in the 
village. When I arrived in 2012 the exploration activities had slowed down, jobs were 
scarce, the health centre had been handed over to the government and consequently 
the quality of service had dropped.
Pakwach, Exploration Area 1
My second major fieldwork site was Pakwach, a small town in Nebbi District just 
within the border of West Nile. It is situated 368 km or six hours by bus from Kam-
pala on a tarmac road. It lies on the River Nile, along a busy road leading to Arua, a 
trading hub in the North of the country. Pakwach faces away from the river, which 
serves as a water and food reservoir. Its most strategic feature is the bridge across 
the river, the only connection of West Nile to the rest of Uganda. Like any strategic 
bridge in Uganda it was guarded by both military and police alike and access was 
restricted.
Pakwach is a trucking hub and a popular rest place for truck drivers on their 
hauls from Mombasa to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite its small size, 
Pakwach sported a bank and had several small guesthouses and restaurants in close 
proximity to the main road. Along the road, traders of all kind could be found selling 
crafts, phone credit, mobile money services, or other goods people passing through 
might need. At night the informal sale of qat, a stimulating herbal drug, took over the 
sandy sidewalks. Pakwach had a small business school and a cotton ginnery, which 
was out of business during my stay. In 2013, Pakwach experienced a small oil boom. 
Many oil workers were lodged in guesthouses across town by their companies.
The oil boom made finding a place to stay in Pakwach difficult. I was told that 
the cost of living had risen since the exploration activities started because the newly 
rich men had money to spend and because young men and women came looking for 
jobs or opportunities to earn money. They settled down and space for renting became 
scarce. The typical mining or oil town developments of an increase in population, 
housing shortages, price increases and increase in leisure activities with the connect-
ed social and health problems fit what I saw and heard about Pakwach though on a 
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small scale (Goldenberg et al., 2010; Lynch, 1987; Yergin, 2009). Companies filled 
the lodges with their workers. And in other villages with a recent surge in activity I 
was told that landlords took advantage of the fact that oil companies were renting 
the rooms and hiked the prices. Some restaurants got to supply lunch to the workers, 
which assured them of a regular income.
The cost of living did not only rise for the new residents but was also said to have 
risen for the locals, as prices of food on the market increased. The increase in popula-
tion also increased the availability of leisure activities. While I was staying in Pakwach 
the first night club of the village, Matonge, opened. Painted all black on the outside, 
it was referred to as Sodom and Gomorrah by elders. People took to it though and 
during a night out I saw many familiar faces from all strands of town life.
Research Methodology
In the beginning of the chapter I pointed out how the not-yet-ness of oil in Uganda 
necessitated that I change my research question and adjust my research accordingly. 
The initial aim of my research was to understand how national and international 
political and economic forces influence developments in the oil region and how 
people in the area react to these influences. The idea was to capture how oil compa-
nies, communities and national authorities interacted and how they negotiated the 
(potential) impacts of the oil industry. I started by finding out who was involved in 
the oil business and how these actors related to actors in the oil region. Although 
I collected data on the few transformations that were visible, more importantly, I 
looked into what was expected to happen.
I conducted interviews with a broad array of actors from politics, churches, me-
dia, civil society organisations (CSOs), oil companies, Ugandan and international 
oil industry service providers with economic actors in the region such as farmers’ 
organisations or hotels and of course the relevant government authorities such as the 
Petroleum Exploration and Production Department (PEPD) at the Ministry of En-
ergy and the National Environmental Management Agency (NEMA). This allowed 
me to gain an overview of the relevant actors in the oil arena and what negotiations 
were going on.
I relied on the classic ethnographic methods: participant observation during 
workshops, informal conversations and interviews. I formed my research design 
based on knowledge gathered during previous fieldwork for my M.A. in Benin and 
from classic guides on ethnographic fieldwork or qualitative research (Beer, 2003; 
Burgess, 1994; Olivier de Sardan, 1995, 2015; Silverman, 2007). I conducted semi-
structured interviews according to a guideline elaborated for each set of actors and 
kept editing it according to new developments or changes in my knowledge (Flick, 
2000).38 I generally used descriptive questions of various kinds (grand tour and mini 
38 I had guidelines for oil workers, journalists, hotel managers, petrol station managers, priests, local 
politicians, local elites (in this case the royalty from Bunyoro kingdom) and for residents in the oil 
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tour, example and experience) as well as structural and contrast questions (Spradley, 
1979). For instance, I asked oil workers to describe to me their working routine. Or 
I asked casual workers to walk me through the process of getting their job. In in-
terviews with civil society actors, I asked them to describe the dynamics within civil 
society since the oil discovery and to explain what had changed. In my guideline for 
local politicians I included questions that asked them to describe what was going on 
in their jurisdiction, or I asked managers of oil industry service providers to explain 
to me the services the company was providing.
During the interviews I intuitively added further questions based on the opinion, 
knowledge or emotions of my interlocutor. I mainly used the interview guidelines 
during formal appointments, while in more informal conversations I started talking 
about a topic of concern to me and then let the conversation take its course, peri-
odically bringing it back to my topics. All interviews were then transcribed, coded, 
grouped and analysed according to major themes.
Participant observation was possible mainly during the workshops, conferences 
and activities of civil society. I followed NGOs on their activities in the oil region 
and attended altogether 22 of their activities. At these events a variety of actors were 
brought together to negotiate Uganda’s future with oil and to advance their own 
agenda. I made a point of attending other ceremonies such as the celebrations of 
50 years independence in Hoima, the coronation anniversary of the Omukama, the 
king of Bunyoro, called empaango, or the presidential inauguration of the Kabaleega 
hydro power dam near the refinery area. I also attended two meetings held by the 
oil companies. One was a conference for civil society in Hoima and another was a 
community meeting in Buliisa to inform the people of a seismic exercise due to take 
place. Furthermore, I visited Tullow’s rig camp next to Kaiso and the camp of an 
oilfield service provider in Hoima. Not all of these events yielded material I could 
directly use but they helped gain insights into the oil business and Ugandan society, 
and they helped me to develop rapport with relevant actors.
Most of these events heavily relied on speech, or speech combined with action, 
rather than action alone. Therefore, my approach partially follows the demands of 
“neoclassical fieldwork” (Meyer and Schareika, 2009a) of doing ethnography not by 
talking about the social reality but by registering actual, and especially communica-
tive, events.39 Particularly my participation at conferences and meetings was guided 
by the method of “participant audition,” which is described by Meyer and Schareika 
as follows:
region.
39 Meyer and Schareika call it neoclassical fieldwork as it builds on innovative concepts contained 
in Malinwoski’s classical ethnographic fieldwork but it also incorporates methodological advances in 
sociology back into social anthropology. It represents a theoretical departure from the platonism that 
underlies classical fieldwork.
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[L]istening carefully to what the locals speak among themselves and to how 
they perform speech acts, how they attribute meaning, how they shape, com-
ment on and explain events and phenomena in the world (Meyer and Scha-
reika, 2009b: 3).
The authors stress the advantage of recording and analysing such “natural talk” as it is 
an important part of social interaction and directed at relevant social actors, not the 
anthropologist herself as in an interview (ibid.: 15–16).
Furthermore, I followed the actors in order to cover also the before and after of 
the events. I did not just meet the activists at these conferences but also visited them 
in their offices for interviews or informal chats during a courtesy visit. I went out 
with them, joined them for a Swahili class, or received them at my home. I talked to 
them about the events and I followed dynamics, especially among civil society actors 
in Hoima. I was therefore able to contextualise the events. A major difference with 
regard to participant audition as intended by the authors is of course that most of the 
events I refer to are staged interactions in the sense that a workshop or a conference 
already implies an audience. And the language was mainly English, albeit Ugandan 
English with its own idiosyncrasies and speech patterns.
Finally, I also followed the coverage of oil issues in the Ugandan press. I collected 
materials from NGOs, state agencies and oil companies and their subcontractors. I 
used these materials in my analysis and triangulated them with my data from inter-
views and observations. My data analysis was conducted in multiple steps. Already 
during my field stay, I went through my data and tried to discern certain themes that 
kept coming up. I tried to understand or rather find new ways of asking questions 
or find new interlocutors to help me gain new perspectives, better insights or the 
chance to triangulate my data. Triangulation is an important part of anthropological 
research because it prevents the researcher from unconsciously privileging one view 
over others (Olivier de Sardan, 1995: 12).
Anthropologist have also stressed the importance of immersion in life at the field 
site which allows the anthropologist to gain insights that are harder to gain through 
other less interactive and participant methods (Olivier de Sardan, 1995: 4–5). Con-
sequently, I sought to immerse myself in Ugandan ways of life, and I chose my 
residences accordingly.
In Hoima, I rented a small semi-detached house located on a compound shared 
with the landlord and two other tenants. For my transport I used a bicycle in town 
and public bus or private motorbike-taxi for longer journeys. In Pakwach, I rented a 
room on a compound close to the central market, just off the main road, with several 
small rooms connected in a rectangular-shaped building with a central courtyard. 
There was neither running water nor electricity, as Pakwach was not connected to 
the national grid. I tried to spend as much time as possible in town, either lounging 
around one of the restaurants frequented by the oil workers, visiting the office of a 
Community-Based Organisation (CBO) I knew, or sitting in a small internet café 
when I needed power to work on my laptop.
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In Kampala, I lived in diverse types of accommodation. At the end of my long field-
work I stayed in a student hostel in Kampala. This again opened another perspective 
onto Ugandan society. The residence was one for well-situated students and was 
located close to the main gate of Makerere University. It had security guards and 
access control. In the hostel were students from Uganda and other African countries 
alike. During my final research stint in the summer of 2015 I rented a small apart-
ment together with a colleague, which was cheaper than the hostel option. Choice of 
accommodation was driven by my wish to always be as close as possible to Ugandan 
life and by finances.
Anthropological common sense has it that the researcher should learn the lan-
guage the people she works with speak and thus gain better access to social life. In 
the oil region at least four different languages namely Runyoro, Rugungu, Aluru 
and Acholi were spoken. Additionally, some of the workers in the oil industry were 
Baganda who spoke Luganda. I learned Runyoro to the level of small-talk and learnt 
greetings in Aluru. But in such a multi-lingual setting, it was not possible to learn 
all languages and I mainly relied on Uganda’s lingua franca, English. In most cases 
no translator was needed as conferences by civil society were in English and most 
of my interlocutors spoke English. Only seldom did I have to rely on a translator 
recommended by contacts in the village. For most of the activities of civil society 
organisations no assistant was needed and it would have been an additional burden 
as most of the times I travelled with the organisations in their vehicles. The advantage 
of travelling with the organisations was that I could participate in the before and 
after of such events. As the events themselves became part of my research focus, this 
enabled me to get a better understanding of the organisation of the activities and to 
foster good relations with the employees. Instead of having a key informant, I had 
friendly relationships with a diverse set of people I met regularly: be it donors, civil 
society entrepreneurs, directors and employees or oil workers.
Upon my return I transcribed all my interviews with the software programs 
F4 and Transcriptions and I started software-based data analysis using MAXQDA. 
From the preliminary analysis during the fieldwork I set up a code system with codes 
for actors of the oil complex and the significations and impacts of oil. I then went 
through my data and coded everything according to this system. Over time I had to 
partially amend the system to allow for new perspectives such as my focus on tempo-
rality and risk. I used the codes to navigate my data from either an actor or a topical 
perspective. I logged the data gathered during my second field stay into the database 
as well and coded it too. Data analysis continued and I expanded my database while 
writing on chapters to include for example more reports from oil companies or ma-
terials from civil society organisations. I analysed the narratives in these documents 
following deconstruction strategies set out by Czwarniawska (2004).40
40 I elaborate on this in the chapter on the resource curse where the results of this analysis are pre-
sented.
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Out of my theoretical framework I formed some analytical questions that helped me 
in the analysis of my data: Who or what is said to be at risk? Who is accorded the 
blame? Who communicates the risk? What knowledge is mobilised in the argumen-
tation? Who accepts or rejects the risk? What effects does the risk communication 
produce? What options to manage the risk are mentioned?
These questions helped to make sense of how actors talked about the effects of 
oil or the correct way of running the oil business. What kind of relations did the 
civil society activists or the representatives of the oil companies create and on what 
knowledge did they draw to argue for their respective risks? My analysis is not meant 
to evaluate these risks but to understand what these emplacements of risks mean for 
the actors and for the oil arena in Uganda. Incorporating a relational risk perspective 
into the study of oil tunes the attention to the role of the future in the negotiations 
in the oil arena and its role in the oil-making process. Combining a relational risk 
perspective with multi-sited research works very well as both rely on a relational 
understanding of fieldwork.
Reflections on Positionality
In anthropological fieldwork it is important to consider the person of the researcher 
as the data is deeply intertwined with and connected to the personality and position-
ality (Caplan, 1993: 178; Lentz, 1992: 335; Madison, 2011: 7–8; Olivier de Sardan, 
1995). The assignment and negotiation of roles involves a process of interaction 
between researcher and people in her field. And it is the positioning within a society 
that sets the stage for what one can see or experience and it ultimately influences the 
course of the fieldwork (Lentz, 1989: 127). A reflexive stance to my positionality 
underlay my research, my analysis, and also my writing.
Many researchers have stressed the importance of considering how gender radi-
cally influences fieldwork e.g. in terms of access or security (Bell, 1993; Clark and 
Grant, 2015; Nilan, 2002; Pollard, 2009). In studying oil, this is important as the 
oil industry is a male-dominated field, which has certain implications for a young, 
female researcher. I found access to circles of oil workers easy but maintaining ac-
cess was problematic at times due to uncomfortable advances made by some male 
informants. In order to avoid potentially dangerous situations, I chose to only meet 
those persons in company of others or to end relations altogether. In turn, with older 
oil workers I managed to have quite amicable relations but in some cases this drifted 
towards a paternalistic attitude.
One evening when I was out with the expatriate oil workers at a bar in Hoima, 
one of them tried quite aggressively to draw me into a discussion. It was during a 
birthday celebration of one of his Ugandan co-workers and everyone else was in a 
merry mood. At first he challenged me by saying that I was certainly the last born of 
the family because I was so selfish to come and do research in a place like Uganda, 
putting myself at risk without caring for the feelings of my parents. He demonstrated 
his disapproval of my research by claiming that he could do it in three minutes. He 
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remembered my research as being about the local communities and their problems. 
In an arrogant and paternalistic tone he explained to me that one look at a village 
would suffice to answer my research question: all one needed to know was that they 
did not have water and electricity.
The expatriate continued his verbal attacks on me throughout the night, get-
ting more aggressive (and eccentric), the more he drank. He started making me and 
everyone at the table feel uncomfortable. His final tirade before he went to his hotel 
room was to ask me whether I had ever seen a dead person and then asserting that 
not only had he already seen dead persons, but in fact he had actually killed someone 
before. He claimed that one time in Nigeria he had killed two attackers with his 
truck as they tried to assault him. I do not know whether this was meant as a paternal 
lecture on the risks of working in Africa or a display of his manliness. His colleagues, 
themselves surprised by his behaviour, set about to assuage me and made jokes of 
how he had had one too many.
This episode reminded me that again and again one has to negotiate access dur-
ing fieldwork and that one’s presence might not go unchallenged, especially if one 
is a young female researcher in a male-dominated field. The incident did not deter 
me from hanging out with the group and served as a joke between me and the other 
expatriates for some time.
Aside from gender, the economic and social situation with which we enter the 
field also matters. If as anthropologists we consider the impact of personality and po-
sitionality, we also have to reflect on the constraints, challenges and chances that are 
connected to the financial or other leverage with which we enter the field. I began my 
fieldwork as a young researcher who had just completed her M.A. degree. I had nei-
ther an extensive network in Uganda nor great financial means. I came not as a full 
member of a university but as a Ph.D. student, as it also read on my business cards.
At the beginning of my research I went through a period of uncertainty as to 
whether I would actually be able to move ahead with my project. A grant allowed 
me an exploratory visit at the beginning of 2012. I was a total stranger to Uganda 
and had to set my project on track. I came equipped without any institutional con-
nections, only with a letter of recommendation by my professor. Yet, I found most 
people I talked to very helpful and friendly. I managed to speak to many civil society 
organisations and researchers concerned with oil issues in order to find out about the 
situation in the oil region and the pressing issues to their view. Furthermore, I was 
fortunate to obtain an institutional affiliation from the Department of Sociology at 
Makerere University.
After the first exploratory trip, the financing of the project itself was not clear 
but then in mid-2012 a position as scientific assistant at the Institute of Social and 
Cultural Anthropology at the University of Göttingen allowed me a field stay of five 
months. After this, I obtained a scholarship for another six months and at my return 
to Germany, I got a position as a research assistant. From this position I travelled to 
Uganda again in 2015 for another research stint. While I had all necessary financial 
means to do my fieldwork, I did not have a grand budget like some NGOs or other 
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research projects that would allow employing someone or even buy equipment like 
a motorcycle or a car.
Accessing the Oil Region: Researchers as Risks
A major constraint of my research was the difficulty of gaining official access to the 
oil region, which is controlled by the state. Any oil-related activity in the region had 
to be agreed to by the state and in particular Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Department of the Ministry (PEPD).41 Indeed, PEPD or Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development (MEMD) in general are responsible for the licensing of the 
exploration blocks, the approval of field development plans and in general any oil-
related activity. According to their definition, “oil-related activity” included research 
by social anthropologists like me, or workshops by civil society organisations (which 
are clearly unrelated to any technical details of oil exploration or production). This 
made research on oil in Uganda problematic. During more than half of my stay, I 
worked under restricted conditions while I waited for my official research permis-
sion. Instead of the promised three months, it took me around nine months to 
obtain all permissions, from the Uganda National Council of Science and Technol-
ogy (UNCST), the Office of the President, and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development.
At the beginning the permit process went smoothly. A few weeks after handing 
in my research proposal, I received a letter of approval from UNCST in July 2012. 
However, the process stalled after this. Upon my return to Uganda, I enquired sev-
eral times about the status. In October 2012, I was informed by UNCST that I 
needed to clarify an aspect of my proposal. I resubmitted and followed it up again. 
In the meantime, I used the letter of approval to introduce myself to the authorities 
in Hoima. But not all were satisfied with it, especially not the District Internal Secu-
rity Officer on Oil Matters. I kept calling or visiting the UNCST officials to follow 
up on the permission. I was informed it was with the Office of the President.42 Even 
though one was not allowed to contact the office directly to enquire about the status 
of a permission, I eventually persuaded the annoyed official at UNCST to give me 
the numbers of the office.
41 The Petroleum Exploration and Production Department of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development was formed in 1991 out of the Petroleum Unit of the Geological Survey and Mines 
Department. In 2015, PEPD was renamed into Directorate of Petroleum and restructured into 
three departments: Department of Petroleum Development and Production (Upstream), Midstream 
Petroleum Department, Department of Petroleum Supply and Distribution (Downstream). Ernest 
Rubondo is the Executive Director of the Directorate of Petroleum. The Ministry of Energy is headed 
by Minister Irene Muloni.
42 Later, I learned from a former employee that this office has an intelligence department that proves 
the veracity of researcher claims, e.g. where they are getting their funding from and whether their 
affiliation is correct.
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Fortunately, the officials I talked to reacted sympathetically and after hearing how 
long my permission had taken, processed it straight away. Shortly thereafter I was 
able to collect my permission from the Office of the President, which had in effect 
been signed already in December 2012 but not been forwarded. It is not clear why 
the process took as long as it did and whether this was just an unfortunate chain of 
events. However, I was not the only researcher for whom the process of getting access 
to the field took a long time. Researchers from Leeds University working on oil also 
took a year to get all their permissions (van Alstine et al., 2014).
Although not part of the procedural guideline on seeking research permissions in 
Uganda, as stated above the Ministry of Energy also asked researchers who work on 
oil or in the oil region to seek their permission. Lawyers from civil society organisa-
tions told me that such demands had no legal basis and even state bodies such as 
the UNCST were not sure of whether or not the ministry was actually responsible. 
Nevertheless, the oil companies were not willing to cooperate with me or grant me 
interviews without a letter of approval from the ministry. Even though I had met 
some oil company employees during conferences or in hotels in Hoima, I was not 
allowed formal access. According to the then Commissioner of PEPD, anything hap-
pening in the oil region was of concern to the Ministry of Energy and thus permis-
sion must be sought for any activity within the oil area. In an interview, he explained 
to me the reason for this:
Your study is on oil. All your questions have been on oil. And those questions 
couldn’t be answered by any other ministry but the Ministry of Energy (PEPD 
Commissioner, interview, 2013).
He stated that I could not just go and do research without them knowing. Research-
ers were sources of potential harm he told me. And as I elaborated in the theoretical 
chapter, a potential harm is effectively a risk. Therefore researchers needed to be 
known in order for Uganda to be able to calculate the probability of them causing 
harm. And in order to manage this risk, there were the various institutions research-
ers had to go through: UNCST, the Office of the President and in case of oil the 
Ministry of Energy.
Once in the district, researchers had to present themselves to the government 
appointed Resident District Commissioner (RDC), the elected Chairman LC 5, 
the internal security officers and then the corresponding elected LCs of villages or 
parishes. While most of my interlocutors from state and companies either explicitly 
demanded to see the permission or only relaxed once I showed the permission of the 
Office of the President, many of these officials were themselves not aware that they 
should be demanding permission from the Ministry of Energy too. The letter of 
the Office of the President sufficed to reassure people of the legality of my research. 
Civil society activists explained that to most people the Office of the President runs 
supreme as it is the President who appoints the Minister of Energy.
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The Ugandan state was also prepared for the eventuality that someone failed to fol-
low procedure. Many times I was told that informants, referred to as “spies,” were in 
every village of the country. One hotel owner refused to talk to me on the grounds 
that this had caused him trouble before and that I should mind my paper trail. By 
this he meant that wherever I went and left traces, state security agents would come 
following up, interrogating my interlocutors and causing them trouble whilst I would 
simply get thrown out of the country. This caused me some distress in the beginning 
as I did not want to jeopardise my permission or cause harm to anyone. Although 
sometimes these stories seemed exaggerated, it was hard to ascertain how true they 
were. One researcher claimed she never obtained permission and hence had to face 
the problem of security agents restricting her movements (Agena, 2012: 23–24). 
When I presented myself to the Deputy District Security Officer of Buliisa in 2013, 
eventually equipped with my license, he told me that it was good I had permission 
because once a researcher had been sent out of the district when found working 
without permission. He explained that the government did not want people to get 
scared by the negative images the NGOs created. Considering all these statements 
I felt I had to tread very carefully in the beginning not to foreclose the possibility 
of continuing the research. Despite a rather discouraging entry, I was never stopped 
from moving around freely and I obtained all necessary permissions in the end.
It was only after the permission hurdles were taken that I could eventually focus 
on getting access to the oil companies. With the permissions, it was possible for me 
to schedule formal interviews. However, I had wished to get closer and participate 
in their activities, or at least get the information when and where activities were 
going to take place. This proved difficult but I managed to go to a couple of such 
interactions. I had to be in touch not just with the community liaison officers (CLO) 
but also with people in the area to get information on when an activity was taking 
place.
Generally, it proved easier to get in touch with the subcontractors. They would 
talk to me without the permission from MEMD and they appeared more open and 
relaxed. This might be due to the fact that they are not on the front line of public 
perception when it comes to the oil. To the oil companies, side-stepping regulations 
and demands by the state could be a risk and helping an unknown Ph.D. researcher 
was certainly not one worth taking.
It was also easier to get access to civil society. Most organisations were open and 
helpful. They invited me to their conferences or took me along on their field trips. 
It was especially my close contact to some civil society actors in Hoima that allowed 
me to know which organisation was coming when to Hoima.
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Chapter Conclusion2.3 
This chapter introduced both my theoretical framework and my methodological ap-
proach and the sites of my fieldwork. I have worked with a multi-sited approach 
as my intention was to analyse how the oil was being negotiated in Uganda. While 
this intention itself does not necessitate a multi-sited approach, and it could be even 
argued that it makes it harder to get the same depth of data as fieldwork focused on a 
single site, it was very useful to my study. I used multi-sited research to stay in touch 
with the shifting sites of resource-making in this phase of not-yet-ness. However, I 
did not abandon sites altogether once the activity of the oil industry was low but 
rather expanded to other sites.
I included a broad array of actors into my research. I participated in many con-
ferences and workshops on oil and joined oil industry companies on their cam-
paigns and in their camps. I used classic tools of ethnographic research within the 
multi-sited approach. In my analysis I included documents from the oil industry, the 
government and civil society. It captured how different actors talked about oil and 
Uganda’s petro-future. I paid attention to the words and metaphors they used and 
how they framed their talk.
It turned out that risk and risk communication were an important part of the 
oil industry and civil society discourse on oil. Risk is the binding element of the dif-
ferent negotiations of oil that I covered with my research and this book. During my 
analysis and my second field stay, I therefore focused on the oil talk as a form of risk 
communication. I take a temporal perspective on oil using the concept of not-yet-
ness. I look at how actors anticipated a future with oil and their own place within it 
by using risks. I follow a relational understanding of risk that considers the linkages 
between risk objects, objects at risk and knowledge as a basis for analysing risk com-
munication.
This chapter contained some more general information on me as a researcher 
to enhance legibility of my analysis and data. Of course, the process of positioning 
myself and a reflexive stance do not end with this chapter but continue throughout 
the book.
Figure 4: Grass-thatched houses with oil rig in background in Buliisa district (2013).
The Risks and Uncertainties of Exploring for Oil3 
The search for oil in Uganda was characterised by risks and uncertainties. In this 
chapter, I present the major developments of the exploration for Uganda’s oil from 
a risk perspective. While other accounts of the history of oil in Uganda have consid-
ered either the government’s risks (Kashambuzi 2010) or those of the oil companies’ 
(Patey, 2015), I consider risks from both perspectives. I describe some of the risks oil 
companies had to handle such as the potential discovery of dry wells or the delays 
caused by corruption scandals or decisions from the Ugandan government. At first 
it was the international oil industry that delayed engagement in Uganda, whereas 
later, it was the government – yet delays were potentially harmful for both sides. The 
government delayed the development of oil to gain expertise and set the regulatory 
framework in order to avoid the risk of getting bad contracts. This risk management 
by the government put the oil companies at risk as they needed to make fast progress 
to satisfy their shareholder demands. Other accounts of Uganda’s oil history are di-
rected towards discussing the potential consequences of the oil for Uganda’s politics, 
economy and society along the lines of the resource curse discourse (Babies and 
Pfeiffer, 2011; Vokes, 2012) and its impact on the regional economy of East Africa 
(Anderson and Brown, 2011). My account of the development process in Uganda 
shall deliver a balanced picture and give insights into the vagaries of oil exploration 
that both sides have to face.
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In this chapter, I point out that both the government and the oil companies used 
risks as resources in the negotiations. The first part of the chapter is on the history 
of exploration and it follows a chronological order.43 After that I turn to an analysis 
of the use of delays in the exploration process and to the special case of corruption 
scandals.
History of Oil in Uganda3.1 
Uganda is currently preparing for the development phase and thus at an early stage 
of becoming an oil producer. It has passed the first round of explorations and mas-
sive changes are just around the corner and Uganda is expected to start production 
in 2020, over ten years after the first big discovery. Moving slow as Uganda does, it 
is still years away from producing its oil. This seems a long period especially consid-
ering that the time span from first commercially viable discovery to first produced 
oil has been considerably shorter in other new oil producers. In Ghana for example, 
it only took three years. It could be asked why the urgency argument, according to 
which poor states rush to produce oil, did not apply to Uganda although it is a fairly 
poor country that relies heavily on foreign aid (cf. Jones, 2009: 6).
Reasons for variations between the development time span can be assumed to lie 
in the individual context of each country and the specific shape of the oil complexes 
(Watts, 2008). A comparison between Uganda and Ghana shows that the duration 
of the development process is related to the political intentions and the capacity of 
the involved government authorities, in these cases the petroleum authorities (Hick-
ey et al., 2015a). Certainly, Uganda is not the only country that is moving slowly. 
Countries such as São Tomé and Príncipe seem to be equally stuck in the process and 
are thriving only on the economy of expectation of the oil (Weszkalnys, 2011, 2014). 
There are four major phases I distinguish; the early phase when Uganda was still a 
high-risk project, the phase after the first discoveries, the pause in developments to 
set the legislative framework and finally, the recent activities of the oil companies.
The Early Phase: Uganda, a Wildcat
Oil exploration in Uganda dates back to the end of the 19th century when oil seep-
ages on the shores of Lake Albert, especially in Kibiro, were reported to the colonial 
authorities. The Banyoro claim to have known even before colonial times that there 
was oil in those areas (Kiiza et al., 2011: 6). Since little is known about this period, 
I start the history of oil from the colonial exploration activities, i.e. from the time 
43 Information on the history is compiled from literature on oil in Uganda (Kashambuzi, 2010; Kiiza 
et al., 2011; Miirima, 2013; Patey, 2015; Vokes, 2012) as well as presentations and materials from 
MEMD and PEPD and news reports. I have followed news reports on oil issues in Uganda since the 
end of 2011.
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when oil was turning into the important lifeblood of first the Western and by now 
the global economy.44
A first camp was established in Kibiro in 1913 but it was abandoned with the on-
set of the First World War. In 1938 the first well was drilled by the African-European 
Investment Company from South Africa. However, exploration stagnated again with 
the onset of the Second World War. After the war, between 1948 and 1951 several 
unsuccessful wells were drilled. Then in the 1950s new big oil discoveries were made 
in Angola and Nigeria while in Uganda the only activity was the passing of the Pe-
troleum Act. Under President Milton Obote exploration rights were given to Shell 
and Kirkwall Associates and Collin Oil and Gas but in the following period of Idi 
Amin’s regime and the second one of Obote, referred to as “Obote II,” the explora-
tion process stagnated again. With the end of Obote II in 1985, the World Bank 
gave Uganda credit to improve the capacity of the Geological Survey and Mines 
Department (GSMD) and to assist in the promotional effort to attract companies. 
GSMD formed a Petroleum Unit (PU) which was the precursor of the Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Department.
Exploration in Uganda was halted in the mid-1980s by new leader Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni who later explained this intervention as a way to ensure Ugandan partici-
pation in this nascent sector. This was meant to prevent Uganda from getting a bad 
deal. The government set the first legal framework for the promotion and negotiation 
in 1985 with the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act. The staff of the Petro-
leum Unit were sent abroad for training programmes and petroleum geosciences and 
Uganda started lobbying for investors, trying to persuade them of the potential. In 
his book The Story of Petroleum Exploration in Uganda 1984–2008 (2010), former 
PEPD Commissioner Reuben Kashambuzi relates his struggle and that of PEPD 
(and its precursors) to grow Uganda into an interesting investment destination for 
the international oil industry. In a passionate and detailed insider description, he 
writes about the hardships, the derision, the obstacles, and most of all the lack of 
funds to the operation of PEPD.45
44 Though it might be possible to date back the knowledge about the oil to times before colonialism, 
the oil as a resource probably had a significantly different form of “being” as a resource because usages 
and significations of resources change over time in conjunction with the development of technolo-
gies such as the combustion engine in the case of crude oil. While it would be interesting to look at 
changes of perception of the oil over time, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
45 A detailed overview of activities is given in the 2013 annual report of MEMD. Including informa-
tion on the individual well testing and the seismic surveys. Apparently there have been smaller delays 
due to the discovery of unexploded grenades and “disagreement on compensation rates” (Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Development, 2013).
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The first production sharing agreement (PSA)46 was signed with Petrofina47 in 1991. 
The government had been in negotiation with Shell, Esso and Petrofina since 1988. 
By 1991, all but Petrofina had dropped out of the negotiation, which, according 
to Kashambuzi, heightened the sense of urgency on the Ugandan side and the fear 
of losing a potential investor. But he also notices that the oil companies were more 
seasoned negotiators and knew how to push the Ugandan government to a corner 
by pointing to faster moving negotiations in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
for their part of Lake Albert and by referring to the “risk of doing business in an 
environment that lacked convincing data” (Kashambuzi, 2010: 3). The risk meant 
here is that of not finding oil, which would of course mean a financial loss for the 
company. It would also weaken the government’s negotiation position with other oil 
companies interested in exploring for oil in the country.
Uganda did not get a good deal because the Ugandan negotiators were not ex-
perienced enough and they had insufficient evidence, i.e. geological data, to counter 
the company’s position that Uganda was a wildcat. A wildcat is an oil well on which 
there is no or insufficient geological data.48 One could add that the bad deal was 
also related to Uganda’s oil being situated in a landlocked country without adequate 
infrastructure in place to explore and produce it, which made its oil more expensive 
for the oil companies and hence less attractive at a time when the crude oil price 
was below 20 US dollars a barrel. This was the background for the bad deal with 
Petrofina, which however passed without Petrofina fulfilling their work program ob-
ligations. Hence the license was reverted to the government two years later. As much 
as PEPD celebrated the end of this deal, they knew that the departure of Petrofina 
meant that the promotion of Uganda’s prospects was to be even harder than before 
(Kashambuzi, 2010: 4).
46 Production sharing agreements are made between an oil company and a mineral rights owner, 
usually the government, on the production of petroleum. The agreement stipulates the terms of the 
production of the oil and encompasses the definition of cost and profit oil. Usually, exploration costs 
are paid by the company upfront and then recouped later if production starts but at a fixed rate and 
for a fixed period of time. Cost oil refers to a portion of the produced oil that is set aside for the op-
erator to use it to recover costs made during exploration, as specified in the production sharing agree-
ment, before having to share revenue with the mineral rights owner. Profit oil, in turn, is the amount 
of production, after cost oil has been deducted, that will be divided between the participating parties 
and the host government. A risk for the oil company is that it will not recoup costs if exploration is 
not successful (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013: 59; Downey, 2009: 86).
47 The Belgian Petrofina merged with the French Total to TotalFina in 1999 and then a year later with 
the French Elf Aquitaine to TotalFinaElf, which was renamed to Total in 2003.
48 Additionally, Uganda could be considered a wildcat because its regulatory framework was not in 
place. That means it is likely to change, leading to readjustments in the agreements with the company 
or court cases (Patey, 2015: 20). I discuss this part of the wildcat risk in the section on corruption 
scandals.
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Making First Discoveries – De-Risking the Wildcat
After a period of no activity, the breakthrough came with the signing of a production 
sharing agreement with Heritage Oil and Gas Ltd. for exploration area 3 in 1997. 
In 1998, the seismic surveys by Heritage brought positive results. In 2001 another 
production sharing agreement was signed with Hardman Petroleum and Energy Af-
rica for exploration area 2. The first exploration well of Heritage was drilled in 2002. 
A year later, Heritage sold 50 percent of its license to Energy Africa, which in 2004 
was bought by Tullow. Tullow Oil Uganda Ltd. is a subsidiary of Tullow Oil PTY, an 
Irish oil and gas exploration and production company listed at the London, the Irish 
and the Ghanaian stock exchange.49 The company was founded by current Chief 
Executive Officer Aidan Heavey in 1985 and has been mainly active as a wildcat-
ter.50 It has assets in 21 countries out of which 11 are in Africa and employs 1,403 
people. The general manager of Tullow Oil Uganda is Jimmy Mugerwa. With the 
purchase of Energy Africa, Tullow thus gained 50% rights to exploration areas 2 and 
3. Heritage kept expanding, gaining working interest in exploration areas 1 and 3A. 
2004 also saw the signing of another production sharing agreement with Neptune 
Petroleum.
 In 2005, Hardman made a first discovery at Mputa-1 and in 2006 Tullow/
Heritage made discoveries at Waraga-1 in Kaiso-Tonya and Kajubirizi-1 in Hoima 
district (Petroleum Exploration and Production Department 2014).51 By the end of 
2006, Tullow announced it would take over Hardman Resources for 1.1 billion US 
dollars and thus gained access to their licenses as well. Finally in the new millenni-
um, with the first oil discoveries made and after years of struggling, Uganda became 
a promising prospect (Kashambuzi, 2010).
The oil discoveries meant the real breakthrough for Uganda’s oil industry. PEPD 
Officer, Catherine Bekunda described the promotion effort of PEPD on a confer-
ence in 2013 as follows:
49 Tullow’s top three main shareholders in the company are Capital Group Companies (11.98 per-
cent), Genesis Asset Managers (8.01 percent) and Oppenheimer Funds (4.96 percent). In 2017, Tul-
low was rated B by Standard and Poor’s and B2 by Moody’s with a negative outlook. In recent years 
Tullow’s market capitalisation collapsed from 14 billion pounds to 1.5 billion. In 2016, it reported a 
post-tax loss of 600 million US Dollars. It has 58,400 barrels of oil equivalent per day (roughly 21.14 
million barrels of oil equivalent per year). 
50 Tullow describes its business as finding oil and then monetising it through production or the sale of 
assets. Exploration success is paramount for generating value. For more on their business strategy see 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170217123127/http://www.tullowoil.com/about-us/business-model 
[February 2018].
51 As usual in oil exploration, also gas reserves have been found. Their amount is estimated at 12 bil-
lion standard cubic feet, i.e. 3.4 million cubic meters (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 
(n.d.)).
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Previously […] our geologist did geological mapping, they carried out gravity 
and geological data. So they would package it, take it to conferences in Amer-
ica, take it to conferences in South Africa and South America, everywhere and 
tell people ‘Here is our data, please come and look at our Albertine Graben. 
There is potential for oil’. And people would always brush us aside ‘Aah aah, 
that is a place where not to look for oil’ […] But when we did, when Hard-
man made the discovery, they de-risked, they de-risked the entire Albertine 
Graben and now its people who were coming, rushing ‘Please, can you give 
us acreage. Can you give us acreage?’ But then we said ‘No.’ Now that we are 
a beautiful girl with our oil, we are not going to license anymore until we 
have a mechanism to provide for competitive bidding. Because now we know 
our beauty, the other time we were still there with worries (PEPD Officer, 
conference by the Rural Initiative for Community Empowerment-West Nile 
(RICE52), Nebbi, 2013).
As Bekunda pointed out, oil discoveries are de-risking, they are reducing the risk 
that comes with a wildcat. De-risking is not just done by proving that there is oil 
but rather wells with oil finds are counted and measured against dry wells to get a 
success ratio which is then used again in the promotion effort. Exploration failure is 
a risk to oil companies since it means the absence of oil, the loss of capital and the 
connected loss in shareholder trust.53 To date, it is not possible to predict with a hun-
dred percent accuracy where commercially viable wells are located. This risk is being 
countered by improving prediction methods and through continuous improvement 
of seismic and drilling methods. But it cannot be fully controlled. Potentially, a com-
pany can still hit a dry well that is a well that does not have any or at least does not 
have sufficient quantities of oil. Also, something could go wrong during the drilling, 
blocking the well.
In promoting oil wells it is crucial to have the right arguments to make the risk 
look attractive to wildcatters. When they come in and explore for oil, they are the 
ones making the discoveries and hence creating the success ratio. Wildcatting be-
ing a risky business, these companies seek to make a profit and do not stop short 
of fraudulent methods. I learned from an industry insider that the tricking of com-
petitors through miscalculating, manipulating or “salting” probes from oil wells is a 
known practice. These practices give the risk a face-lift to make it look more attrac-
tive in order to hand it down to another company. However, even the companies 
buying licenses from other companies know about these strategies of deceit.54 The oil 
52 The Rural Initiative for Community Empowerment West Nile (RICE-WN or RICE) is a Ugandan 
community-based organisation registered in 2005 and based in Arua in West Nile in the northwest of 
Uganda. 
53 The role of shareholders is discussed in the chapter six on the debate around national content.
54 A connected practice of overrating reserves was exposed in 2014. Shell admitted that it had over-
estimated its proved reserves by 20 percent by moving probable reserves into proved reserves in the 
books. The amount of reserves impacts on a company’s stock market value. They do this because the 
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industry creates uncertainty through this alteration of probes from an oilfield or by 
withholding information on oilfields. Oil companies keep their measurements of oil 
reserves and hence their knowledge of oil fields confidential.
The geological processes that make measurement so uncertain are the source 
of the extraordinary profits that oil producers can earn. As oil becomes more 
difficult and more expensive to find, the geological complexity of its location 
requires even greater amounts of capital investment. The potential for profit 
and the increasing size and vulnerability of investments make oil companies 
unwilling to publicise those measurements […] the knowledge of oilfields has 
not become a political field, or even a unified science, in the way the study 
of climate change has managed to do. The measurements are conducted pri-
vately and held separately, field by field, by rival companies, or by oil service 
firms contracted to private or national oil-production companies (Mitchell, 
2011: 244–245).
It is thus hard for companies, investors and even countries to know what is on the 
ground and to make an informed decision about their investments. This lack of 
transparency leaves room for speculation. Speculation that promises profit in a finan-
cialised economy. Many oil companies are registered on stock exchanges and depend 
on the market to get capital. It is financial analysts who mediate between companies 
and investors by measuring company performances and creating stories to attract 
investors.55 Financialisation refers to the ever-growing importance of finance for the 
economy and even society as a whole. Ronald Dore (2000: 10) describes it as an 
economy that is centred on “the stock market as the measure of corporate success and 
on the stock market index as measure of national well-being.”
The oil companies do not know what technologies will be invented and how 
much oil will then be found and recovered. In the end, nobody knows for sure where 
the oil is and how much a well yields. One could say everybody knows the rules and 
the stakes of the game. And while this is common knowledge, the real skill of the oil 
companies lies in presenting themselves as if they had that knowledge, as if they did 
guard the secret to the oil reserve, and this is used in negotiations with governments 
as a leverage mechanism.
Speculation seems to have been the predominant activity in the beginning in 
Uganda when not much activity was noticed in the exploration areas. Petrofina and 
then the U.S. company Uganda Works and General Engineering Company had held 
licenses but abandoned them without fulfilling their obligations. Also Dominion 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission considered only the proved reserves. By overbooking Shell 
increased its value and hence also its ability to attract investors. With the adjustment Shell looked 
weaker compared to its rivals, according to a Bloomberg News report (Carey et al., 2004).
55 For ethnographic insights into how these analysts create their stories see e.g. Wansleben (2012, 
2013) or Leins (2013, 2018).
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Petroleum did some exploration work but failed to find oil. Licensed in 2007, they 
pulled out in 2012 after allegedly facing difficulties with the government.56 To these 
early risk-takers, risk is an opportunity that they can turn into profits.
The increased activity in the early 21st century can be attributed to a recent rise 
in energy needs and in fuel prices. The rise in fuel prices on the stock market has 
made it economically sensible to start exploring the potential of formerly unattract-
ive prospects.57 Likewise oil prices influenced the exploration activities in Uganda 
(Patey, 2015: 5). Furthermore, the movements of the oil price were also used by the 
oil industry and the government to renegotiate terms, in busts or booms respectively 
(ibid.: 21).
In the theoretical chapter, I already noted that the oil markets and subsequently 
oil prices have been impacted by financialisation (Labban 2010).58 There are actually 
two oil markets: the physical one and the financial market. The price of oil on the 
financial market is not directly connected to its physical supply. While the volume of 
trading on the financial market is independent of the physical market, prices on the 
physical market are informed by the ones on the financial market (Labban, 2010: 
547).59 Despite the importance of the spot market, production of oil remains impor-
tant and oil companies do invest money in it as it is the basis for physical oil being 
traded and hence for all the financial market activities around it.
The oil price is dependent to some extent on the material qualities of the oil. The 
material qualities of the oil are meaningful to its ranking within world oil reserves 
and what price it could fetch on the world market. Uganda’s oil is sweet but of a 
waxy consistency.60 It is heavier than light crude oils such as Brent and West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) that serve as a benchmark for the oil price market but still 
lighter than heavy crude oil.61 As an approximate for the price Ugandan oil could 
fetch, one has to look at these light crude benchmarks. The characteristics of the oil 
also influence how the oil can be extracted, processed and transported. Uganda’s oil 
56 This information is from a well-informed news blog on oil in Uganda (Young, 2012).
57 After 2006, crude oil prices increased from below 30 US dollars to above 60 US dollars, which 
made “tough oil” (Klare, 2012) more attractive. Tough oil lies deep underground, highly landlocked 
outside of Western territories, far offshore, in complex geological formations like shale rock or in the 
Arctic. Oil in landlocked countries such as Uganda thus became more interesting as the age of easy oil 
was over.
58 I discuss the role of the financialisation for the oil industry in more detail in chapter 6.
59 So oil price crises are not to be explained mainly by physical aspects of the oil such as reserves or 
demands but rather by the financial logic ruling the market. However, researchers from the Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, which is sponsored by big oil corporations such as Total or BP, see no 
causal link between the financialisation of oil futures markets and oil price volatility for a period 
between 2003 and 2008 (Fattouh et al., 2012).
60 It has one of the lowest sulphur contents worldwide. It is medium with American Petroleum Insti-
tute (API) gravity ranging between 24–33°. It becomes viscous at over 40 °C.
61 While there is some variation in the definition of light oil, with some sorts, especially U.S. ones, 
being lighter than others (e.g. Canadian, European, Mexican and Middle Eastern), heavy crude is 
below an API gravity of 25°. For more information on crude oil see Downey (2009).
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is difficult in two ways; it is found in a landlocked country and it is not possible to 
move it without either processing it or building a heated pipeline because to achieve 
mobility its temperature has to be kept at not less than 60 °C (Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Development, (n.d.)).
Setting the Legislative Framework
More oil discoveries were added in 2008, which catapulted Uganda to a point of 
international interest.62 Officials from PEPD stressed that the exploration in Uganda 
has had a very good success rate that hence ameliorated the government’s negotiation 
position. Uganda used this new interest, as noted by the PEPD official cited above, 
to take a step back and review their legislative framework. Licensing of new acreage 
was halted in order to prepare for competitive bidding rounds and the government 
and the Parliament started developing a legislative framework before delving into oil 
production. To the dismay of the oil companies this caused delays in the develop-
ment process of the oil, as I show below.
In 2008, the National Oil and Gas Policy was formulated and stated as its goal to 
use the oil to eradicate poverty and create value for society (Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development 2008: viii). It was henceforth the guideline for the industry 
until the creation of oil legislation. There have been prolonged negotiations of the 
“Petroleum Bills” in and outside of the Ugandan Parliament. In February 2012, two 
oil bills namely the “Exploration, Development and Production Bill” and the “Refin-
ing, Gas Processing and Conversion, Transportation and Storage” were placed before 
the Parliament (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2012a,b). They were 
passed in December 2012 after long-drawn consultations.
There had been debates in Parliament and media and many interventions such 
as conferences and workshops from national NGOs that were especially directed at 
changing “clause 9” on the “Functions of the Minister” which gives the Minister of 
Energy the right to grant and revoke licenses and to negotiate and endorse petroleum 
agreements.63 This was dubbed the creation of a “super-minister,” as s/he would have 
too many powers to influence anything to do with oil, even though s/he might lack 
the technical knowledge required to make such decisions. To civil society actors and 
journalists this meant that the minister was exposed to corruption and ultimately, 
since the Minister was appointed by the President, this meant that it would be the 
62 According to the Ministry of Energy, foreign investment in the oil sector picked up considerably 
after 2006. From 12 million US Dollars in 2005 to 352 million U.S. Dollars in 2010. These figures 
are from a 2012 powerpoint presentation of the commissioner Ernest Rubondo. 
63 The clause reads in full: “The Minister shall be responsible for (a) granting and revoking licences; 
(b) initiating, developing and implementing oil and gas policy; (c) submitting draft legislation to 
Parliament; (d) issuing petroleum regulations; (e) negotiating and endorsing petroleum agreements; 
(f ) approving field development plans; (g) promoting and sustaining transparency in the petroleum 
sector; (h) approving data management systems; and (i) any other function incidental or consequen-
tial to his or her functions” (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2012a, clause 9).
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President who would be in charge. Civil society activists and donors repeated over 
and over that now was the time to influence what oil in Uganda would amount to. 
Clause 9 was therefore brought up in conferences and the participants were asked to 
provide feedback to their Members of Parliament (MP).64
After many discussions on the bill and lobbying by civil society and MPs, includ-
ing those from the ruling party that were subsequently labelled “Rebel MPs,” the 
clause was revised. It was changed to give the powers over licensing and field devel-
opment plans to the Petroleum Authority. However, just a few days later, a motion 
was advanced by the ruling party to move the original clause back into the bill. This 
motion met resistance from parliamentarians and civil society actors who had sup-
ported the altered version. The Parliament was supposed to vote on the recommittal 
of the clause by end of November 2012. The day before the vote, NRM held a caucus 
meeting and the president allegedly called MPs to make sure they vote according to 
the government’s wish.
The matter came to a heat on the day of the vote. There was an uproar of Mem-
bers of Parliament and visitors from NGOs that lead to the adjournment of the vote. 
The parliamentarians who caused the uproar had wanted to debate further on the oil 
bill. The Rebel MPs and civil society actors asked for a suspension of the vote. NGOs 
and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs)65 had decided to go and protest at the 
Parliament on the day of the vote. On the day of the vote, police deployed anti-riot 
units in front of the Parliament that stopped activists from entering. The police had 
also declared any demonstration as unlawful. Through the intervention of a popular 
bishop, the actors of the NGOs and CBOs were eventually allowed into the public 
gallery of the Parliament.
The atmosphere inside was described to me by those who took part in it as heated. 
The debate turned chaotic when one parliamentarian said that the Parliament would 
not be turned into a “voting machine” and another MP asked his fellows to stand 
up. In the ensuing commotion, one section of the MPs and the visitors chanted “No 
vote. Our oil” while another section shouted “Let’s vote.”66 Eventually, the Speaker of 
Parliament Rebecca Kadaga was reported to have fled the room and the Parliament 
premises through the backdoor. She left it to her deputy to chair the vote the fol-
lowing week. The civil society actors I spoke to were exhilarated and expressed their 
enthusiasm about doing the right thing and trying to play their role in preventing 
harm from Uganda.
However, the bills were passed end of 2012 and later signed by President Mu-
seveni in March and June 2013.67 I received the news of the passing of the bill 
64 The debate is part of the negotiations of the oil in Uganda structured by the resource curse dis-
course, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter four on the resource curse.
65 For a description of civil society in Uganda compare chapter four.
66 See newsblog article “MPs Revolt Against Creation of a ‘Super’ Oil Minister” (Oil in Uganda, 
2012a).
67 The agitation around the bills and the formation of an opposition to the government from within 
their ranks, e.g. in the Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas, has put Museveni and the NRM under 
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together with some civil society actors at a dinner during a conference in Nebbi. 
They expressed their frustration at the passing and commented that the oil compa-
nies would be happy, as now their deals could move ahead. Indeed, Tullow signed 
a production-sharing agreement with the government, which paved the way for a 
farm-down deal of two thirds of Tullow’s concession to CNOOC and Total E&P at 
the end of 2012.68
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation is a Chinese national oil com-
pany founded in 1982 and listed on the Hong Kong, New York and Toronto stock 
exchanges.69 The Chinese state is the largest shareholder with around 65 percent 
while other investors hold percentages around or below one percent. President of 
CNOOC Uganda is Xiao Zong Wei.70 CNOOC is active in 20 countries outside of 
China, with six in Africa, and it is part of several joint ventures. Forming joint ven-
tures is part of China’s business strategy for its multinational corporations aimed at 
gaining on a managerial and technical level and getting a foothold in a new country 
(Alden and Davies, 2006: 87).
Total E&P Uganda Ltd. is a subsidiary of Total E&P, a multinational integrated 
oil company, which has its roots in France but has a worldwide presence. The com-
pany emerged from several mergers with Elf Aquitaine, Total and Petrofina. Total 
is listed on the Paris and New York stock exchange. 5.1 percent of Total’s shares are 
held by group employees, 7.8 recent are owned by individual shareholders and 87.1 
percent by institutional shareholders.71
greater pressure. The issue of oil in relation to Museveni’s power struggles is briefly discussed by Vokes 
(2012). In 2013, the “Rebel MPs,” were expelled from the NRM and afterwards had to fight to main-
tain their seats in Parliament.
68 According to Patey, Tullow was not able to get the $10 billion needed for the development of the 
oil fields (Patey, 2015: 9).
69 In 1998, before entering the World Trade Organisation (WTO), China started a restructuring of 
its formerly purely state-owned companies in order to prepare them for international competition and 
to develop China’s oil and petrochemical industry more efficiently (Meidan 2016, 28). The restructur-
ing was necessary to allow the companies to get listed on international stock exchanges for fund-
raising and improving their management skills with regard to accounting and reporting of (financial) 
performance (Meidan, 2016: 29). 
70 According to its company profile CNOOC has 4.32 billion barrels of oil equivalent. It has 20,585 
employees and its current directors are Yang Hua and Yuan Guangyu. In 2015, it reported a profit of 
20,246 million RMB (2.76 billion Euros). In 2017, credit ratings for CNOOC were A+ from Stan-
dard & Poor’s and Aa3 by Moody’s with a stable outlook. 
71 Total’s major shareholders are the group employees and Black Rock with 5.5 percent. In 2015, 
Total reported an adjusted net income of 10.5 billion US Dollars. In 2016, Total has been rated 
A plus/A-1 by Standard & Poor’s with a negative outlook. Total has 2.347 million barrels of oil 
equivalent per day (roughly 8.49 billion barrels of oil equivalent per year). The company has a total of 
96,019 employees. 
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Busts and Other Recent Activities
The year 2013 saw a lot of activity by Total, with the drilling of 23 wells, which 
added more discoveries to Uganda’s portfolio. Tullow was less active with only one 
appraisal well, while CNOOC did not drill wells but secured a production license 
for the well Kajubirizi-1. In February 2014, after two years of negotiating, Uganda 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the joint venture partners, 
allowing the companies to move along their schedule towards production. In 2014, 
more discoveries were made that boosted the reserves to 6.5 billion oil barrels (bbl), 
with an estimated 1.2 to 1.7 billion bbl recoverable reserves.72 By the end of 2014, al-
together 116 wells (80 appraisal wells and 36 exploration wells) had been drilled out 
of which 112 encountered oil and/or gas. All in all, 21 discoveries73 have been made, 
17 of these have been appraised and four discoveries reverted to the government.74
However, in 2014 a massive downsizing in the industry took place and persisted 
in 2015. This downsizing was related to a fall in the global crude oil price starting 
in mid-2014. International subcontractors such as Halliburton, as some of my in-
dustry contacts informed me, had almost completely withdrawn from Uganda while 
Total and Tullow had laid off a considerable amount of staff (cf. Patey, 2015: 12). 
This downsizing was also connected to the drop in oil prices. Interesting about the 
falling prices is not that activities are reduced (usually momentarily) but rather how 
this is used as a risk in negotiations by the industry. Patey argues that a price boom 
allows the government to renegotiate more favourable terms while a bust allows oil 
companies to renegotiate (Patey, 2015: 21). In a bit of a surprise move, Total sent 
the general manager of Total E&P Uganda back to France at the end of 2014. Alleg-
edly, it was sending a signal of impatience to the Ugandan government (Tumusiime, 
2015). Total took eight months to appoint Adewale Fayemi, a Nigerian national, as 
the new manager of Total E&P Uganda.
72 In comparison, Nigeria has 37.5 billion bbl. An oil barrel contains about 159 litres. According to a 
presentation held by the commissioner of PEPD in 2012 less than 40% of the Albertine Graben had 
been evaluated so far. And there are still other exploration areas in Uganda (Hoima basin, Moroto 
basin, Lake Kyoga, Lake Victoria and Wamala basin).
73 Discoveries count for fields and several wells can be drilled to obtain further information about one 
oilfield, hence the difference in numbers.
74 For more information see a map of drilled wells and discoveries in Uganda online at https://web.
archive.org/web/20120813053642/http://www.petroleum.go.ug:80/uploads/Drilled%20Wells%20
August-2012.pdf [February 2018]. The statistical report of MEMD from 2014 shows slightly differ-
ent numbers though. According to it, 118 onshore wells have been drilled, 83 of which were success-
ful (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2014). There seems to be a diverging way between 
MEMD and PEPD to measure the success of wells. Possibly, PEPD’s higher success number counts 
in all shows of oil and gas and not just the discoveries of sizeable quantities. The numbers also do not 
indicate whether these wells contain enough oil or gas to produce them commercially. To use higher 
numbers makes sense, as it makes the success rate seem better, which is of course in Uganda’s interest 
in order to de-risk its assets and to attract investors.
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While the oil price was in crisis in 2014, the price has always been very volatile, 
which means that it will increase again. Oil companies usually try to paint a picture 
of scarcity to keep the price up. However, they have to walk a tight rope as too high 
a price and too scary a scarcity scenario might be another reason to send consumers 
and governments searching for alternative fuels and energy sources. Besides, the oil 
price is also about competition between international oil companies and national oil 
companies. It is assumed the latest drop was due to members of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) refusing to lower their output, hence 
putting U.S. shale gas out of profitability and securing its own market. Especially 
Saudi-Arabia can do this, as its production costs are very low.
Having established that oil price changes are not unusual, the claim that the 
latest dip of 2014 caused the downsizing can be put into perspective. While during 
the time of the first big discoveries, the price was booming in 2008, with the onset 
of the financial crisis, the oil price dropped by around 100 U.S. Dollars on the spot 
market from 133 to 39.75 Yet this development did not stop exploration activities by 
the oil companies in 2008 and afterwards, they only led to measures to reduce risks 
and increase efficiency. In Tullow’s yearly report the Chairman Pat Plankett referred 
to 2008 as an outstanding year:
2008 was another year of record achievement for Tullow. Exceptional explo-
ration and appraisal results, strong production, profitable portfolio manage-
ment and the recent successful fund-raising underpin our ability to continue 
to grow (Tullow Oil PLC 2008a: 8).
In comparison, the bust of 2014 meant a less drastic drop of around 50–60 U.S. 
Dollars on the spot price market. This seems less grave but was countered with sim-
ilar measures of risk reduction and efficiency improvements. Additionally, it was 
more prominently remarked on in Tullow’s annual report. Another Chairman of 
Tullow, Simon Thompson, explained the drop in oil prices and Tullow’s reaction to 
this. They decided to reduce future expenditures on complex deepwater operations 
as long as the costs are high. With the fall in mid-2014 they reduced the overall ex-
ploration budget from $0.8 billion in 2014, to approximately $0.2 billion in 2015 
and refocused on low-complexity offshore and the lower-cost onshore. However, in 
an apparent attempt to assuage shareholders, Thompson also stated that the industry 
was cyclical and that the cutback by majors and independents was creating the con-
dition for a price increase again.
The combination of high costs and falling prices means that the whole indus-
try faces a significant margin squeeze until operating and capital costs can be 
reduced to more sustainable levels, a process that is already under way. […] 
75 Crude prices for WTI and Brent from 1986 to date see are available online at www.eia.gov/dnav/
pet/PET_PRI_SPT_S1_M.htm [February 2018].
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The oil industry is cyclical. As majors and independents alike cut back or 
defer capital investment in new production in response to lower prices, the 
industry is already creating the conditions for a revival of the oil price (Tullow 
Oil PLC, 2014a: 4–5).
In 2015, the oil industry in Uganda was still laying low, as Total and Tullow were 
waiting for the government’s approval of their field development plans, which are 
also the basis for the award of a production license.76 In August 2016, Tullow and 
Total were granted production licenses. Subsequently, Tullow sold the majority of its 
shares in the licenses to Total. This farm-down of 21,57 per cent of the license owned 
by the joint venture for 900 million US Dollars included Tullow’s retreat from the 
operation. The company remains in the country but as a non-operating partner. This 
move comes after Tullow had just recovered from a crisis initiated by the slump in oil 
prices in 2014. According to Bloomberg news, Tullow’s market capitalisation has fol-
lowed the oil price closely (Rascouet 2017).77 This sale could possibly be understood 
as a gradual return to its old strategy of monetising rather than producing assets.78 
For Total this meant a boost of its interest in the project to 54.9 per cent.
Up to this point, I have given an overview of the history of oil in Uganda from 
the beginnings in the early 20th century up to recent developments. This section has 
shown how throughout exploration relations between the oil companies and the 
government have not been smooth. The reason might not just be the change in oil 
prices but also the government’s attitude towards oil. Instead of rushing to produc-
tion, the Ugandan state took its time to move ahead. In the following I relate these 
strategies of delaying.
76 Total’s website offers little information on its Ugandan project (www.total.com/en/uganda [Febru-
ary 2018]).
77 The share prices of other oil companies like CNOOC and Total also follow the oil price but not as 
closely as Tullow’s does. 
78 Furthermore, the founder and long-time CEO of Tullow, Aidan Heavey, is stepping down and 
preparing the company for his retirement in two years.
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Risky Delays3.2 
This sub-chapter discusses the delays within the development of Uganda’s oil from a 
risk perspective. It considers how the slow process presented a risk to the business op-
erations of the oil companies and how they tried to deal with this. Already in 2013, 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum79, 
Irene Nakalyango, asserted in an interview with me that the delay had started to 
frustrate the oil companies and their subcontractors:
They [the oil companies] have invested and there is no activity to back the in-
vestment. And they also need to make money. Government tries to learn but 
they can learn from other countries. So it shouldn’t take them so long (CEO, 
Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, interview, 2013).
During my research, I heard expatriate oil workers complain that things were not 
going as smooth as they were ‘supposed’ to. The Country Manager of a subcontrac-
tor told me the oil industry in Uganda was stagnant as the companies were not get-
ting the permits they needed to drill. Asked why the government was withholding 
them, he told me “This is Africa.” Supposedly, government officials were interested 
in money and were waiting for bribes. In Uganda, he continued to explain, politi-
cians and officials in the ministries were being difficult as they thought they were 
now the “big boss” of the oil industry. In Kenya, however, it was no problem to get a 
“go ahead”80 and since Tullow had had several political problems in Uganda and had 
already lost a lot of money, they had started to orient themselves to Kenya (Country 
Manager, international drilling and cementing company, field notes from informal 
conversation, 2013).81 The same was mentioned by two other expatriate managers of 
another international oilfield subcontractor. They thought that the government was 
79 This industry chamber was founded in 2000 as Uganda Chamber of Mines and in 2010 expanded 
to the oil industry. Among its council members are Total, CNOOC and Tullow. It has its offices at 
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. According to its own definition it is an NGO 
that represents the interest of the mining and petroleum industry in Uganda. Among its activities, 
it counts the creation of an arena for stakeholders to meet and share information; the facilitation of 
business and hosting of networking events, workshops and conferences. Furthermore, it has a quar-
terly magazine that can be found online at www.ucmp.ug/ [February 2018].
80 While Uganda was the first country in East Africa to announce commercially viable reserves of oil, 
oil and gas reserves were also discovered in Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya. And 
the prospects in Kenya are said to be promising as well with an estimated 750 million bbl from the 
first discoveries.
81 This statement was made during an after-work meeting. Throughout this thesis I anonymise my 
interlocutors if they made controversial statements in an informal conversation, which could be harm-
ful to them or their company/organisation. I consider interviews as official statements, which do not 
request anonymisation unless it was requested. Interviews and conversations used in this thesis were 
based on the consent of my interlocutors and their knowledge about my research project.
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annoying the oil companies and that these companies were thus contemplating to 
leave Uganda. According to them, the companies had already started bringing people 
to Kenya (Managers, international drilling company, interview 2013).
The subcontractors are also concerned by the dealys because such risks of oil 
exploration are not just borne by the oil companies but also by the service providers. 
Contracts with service-providers usually include stand-by clauses that reduce costs 
for the oil companies. According to the contracts, the oil companies can cancel these 
at short notice. The Human Resource Manager of a logistics company with contracts 
in the oil industry said in an interview that they could tell the subcontractors to 
mobilise or demobilise the same day. At the time of the interview in February 2013, 
the company was on stand-by. They did not have any contracts and were planning 
to divert away from depending on just one sector (Interview, 2013). To the subcon-
tractors, stand-by times are not good as they in turn are also not making the profits 
they promised their shareholders to whom they are accountable (Country Manager, 
international rig operating company, interview, 2013).
These arrangements are typical for “supply-chain capitalism” (Tsing, 2009) where 
the contracting company dictates the terms to the service-provider and thereby exter-
nalises some of its business risks to the service-provider.82 All companies in the com-
modity chain are bound to the chain albeit as independent enterprises (ibid.: 148).83 
This affected both national and international service-providers but the international 
service-providers usually had projects in other countries to fall back on while some of 
the Ugandan companies had just started realising that they needed to diversify.
The managers of the oilfield service companies framed the delays the government 
imposed on them not as a matter of an informed and cautionary approach to the 
development of oil but rather as an arrogant “big boss” behaviour that was solely 
focused on generating bribes. Rumours of Tullow leaving the country and orientat-
ing its business towards Kenya can be understood as a sort of risk management, 
away from investment-unfriendly conditions to more stable ones. The possibility of a 
withdrawal from the country or just the threat of it must, however, also be viewed as 
a power resource the oil company used in the negotiations with the government. The 
companies wanted the government to move fast to enable them to move at their own 
pace without further interference. This desire of the companies for creating smooth, 
meaning undeterred, operations has been described as disentanglement work (Appel 
2012a) or enclave operation (Ferguson, 2005).
82 For more on this topic see the chapter on national content.
83 Based on a study of Walmart’s business model Anna Tsing (2009: 150–151) shows how an analysis 
of supply-chains appreciates the bigness of capitalism without homogenising it. She describes Wal-
mart as the latest influence on our understanding of the bigness of capitalism after the influence of 
Fordism in production and the franchise model: “Walmart is a food and general merchandise retail 
chain that has prospered through two basic strategies: first, cutting costs; and second, dictating condi-
tions to the suppliers of its products” (ibid: 156).
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The Risk of a Bad Investment Climate
A limited amount of money goes after the best investment opportunities. 
What we have been trying to say is that you need to create the best invest-
ment climate. If you have the best investment climate, you get the money 
in. If you get the money in, you get jobs, services, employment, indus-
try, and the whole standard of living rises (Interview with Aidan Heavey, 
Tullow, Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, [2013]a: 10).
This comment conjures up magical qualities of the oil in creating development that 
have already been deconstructed by scholars working on Nigeria, Venezuela or Ga-
bon (Apter, 2005; Coronil, 1997; Yates, 1996). It is a matter of debate whether it 
is crucial for Uganda that the money comes in as I show in the discussion of the 
resource curse in the next chapter. However, the money is certainly important to 
the oil companies. What will happen if it does not come in soon, was a matter of 
speculation.
Many commentators did not exclude the possibility that in the end, the oil com-
panies might leave altogether without developing Uganda’s oil potential. This would 
mean for the government that they will not get any revenues out of their oil any 
time soon. The companies tried to present this as a risk to the government, seeking 
to improve their own bargaining position. But it is not entirely certain that the gov-
ernment recognises this risk. President Museveni also suggested an end could be put 
to the working relationship if no agreement could be reached (Hickey et al., 2015b: 
20). Putting the other party at risk is a power resource each party tries to deploy in 
the negotiations. The withdrawal threat, however, also causes uncertainty for Ugan-
dan companies as they might not be able to prepare properly, e.g. get the bank loans 
to invest in oil-related activities (Operations Manager, Ugandan logistics company, 
interview 2015).84
The Ugandan government did not accept the risk of not having the best in-
vestment climate. Rather, it went ahead and filed court cases over tax evasions that 
could further harm its image to investors. With this move it effectively prioritised 
the actual damage of tax evasion over the risk that the companies had constructed. In 
September 2012, Tullow sued the government at the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes based in the USA on the imposition of value added tax 
on goods and services bought for the oil exploration. The case was resolved in 2015 
in a settlement outside court.85
In another tax dispute, the government demanded Tullow should pay Capital 
Gains Tax for the farm-down deal with CNOOC and Total. To Tullow this was a 
84 The difficulties Ugandan companies face is dealt with in more detail in chapter 6 on national 
content.
85 For the procedural details but not the agreement see the website of the centre: https://icsid.world-
bank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/13/25 [13.11.2017].
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breach of agreement signed with the former Minister of Energy. Chief Executive 
Officer Aidan Heavey claimed that Tullow had spent over $2.8 billion in exploring 
for oil in Uganda in the last 10 years based on their understanding that the agree-
ment would be honoured. The agreement included important incentives that were 
given to a company that takes the wildcat risk.86 In July 2014, Uganda’s Tax Appeals 
Tribunal ruled against Tullow and ordered it to pay 407 million U.S. Dollars to the 
Ugandan government. Tullow threatened to challenge the ruling at the High Court 
in Uganda and to seek international arbitration. A year later, it reached a settlement 
with Uganda whereby Tullow would pay Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) 250 
million U.S. Dollars.
Seeking international arbitration may take a case to neutral grounds but it also 
involves high costs as the government noticed in the Heritage case (Hickey and 
Izama 2017: 178). The ability to seek international arbitration was one of the main 
points of disagreement between the oil companies and the Ugandan government in 
the negotiation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as I detail later in this 
sub-chapter under 3.2.3.
From a company’s point of view, these tax issues increased the risk to operate 
in Uganda as they couldn’t be sure whether the contracts would be honoured. The 
unsettling effect of changing rules is that they force all players to make new calcula-
tions. Regulatory instability is part of the wildcat risk. Uganda did indeed change 
the petroleum legislation and was also improving the regulatory regime in line with 
international standards of the oil industry.87
In Uganda, the companies were resentful that the government had halted the 
process many times and by different means: officially stopping licensing or simply 
delaying giving out licenses and work permits. To the oil companies, delays at this 
stage can put their profits at risk as potential investors might get cold feet if govern-
ments put too many restrictions on companies and their activities. The delays pose 
a threat to the company’s profits and market value. Delays lead to stand-by times, 
which consume a lot of money, as everything needs to be kept available without any 
success or development to show.
The Argument for Fast Development
The CEO of Tullow, Aidan Heavey, commented on the urgency of advancing the 
process of developing the oil in an interview printed in the newsletter of the lobby 
organisation of the mining industry in Uganda, Uganda Chamber of Mines and 
Petroleum.
86 For further information see Kigambo (2014).
87 The Ministry of Energy is very intent on moving the Ugandan standards with regard to the oil in-
dustry up to the levels set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (Official from 
UNBS, interview, 2015). I discuss the standard question in more detail in chapter six.
The Risks and Uncertainties of Exploring for Oil 81
What is important for Uganda is how quickly you can produce that oil. The 
reason as to why countries want to develop oil quickly is because technology 
is changing quickly. There is a possibility that in five or six years’ time some-
body can invent some gadget where someone doesn’t need fuel in the car. 
That happens, the oil loses value (Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum 
newsletter, [2013]a: 10).
This quote from Heavey points to the temporality of oil and the future of the re-
source. While technological developments can improve the production and render 
more oil recoverable, it could potentially also render oil obsolete, as Heavey notes. 
According to him, if oil could be replaced by another resource, just like oil replaced 
coal, this would change the game for Uganda. Hence, he argues that Uganda should 
be in a rush and that it was the oil-replacing technologies that urged countries to 
produce fast and not the wish to have revenues as fast as possible. His argument im-
plicitly includes the oil companies who are assisting in the production. The oil com-
panies would lose their business and importance with new technologies and such 
changes are more or less unforeseeable. These changes constitute an uncertainty for 
the oil companies as there cannot be enough knowledge to manage this or to subject 
these future possibilities to calculations.
One way the oil companies handle this uncertainty is to focus on short time 
horizons. This relates to oil exploration and production in such a way that it be-
comes important and economically sensible to produce as much, as fast as possible. 
To produce while the oil still has value and while the oil business is still profitable. 
However, such statements should also be read carefully. To date, there are still many 
untouched oil reserves and oil companies are also still withholding reserves from the 
market. It is still part of the business to maintain certain licenses and to manage the 
risk of price gluts and overproduction that have been so common in the oil industry 
ever since its inception.88 The risk of such developments are more imminent and 
measurable and are certainly very important in the way companies act. Then again, 
uncertainty in the exploration can also pose a chance rather than a challenge. View-
ing uncertainty not as something that needs to be avoided but as something that can 
bear fruit, is quite helpful to understand the oil industry. Uncertainty and risk are 
put to speculative profit in the future oil price market where oil price volatility can 
be used to generate profit.
Widening the horizon to the uncertainties of the future, as Heavey does in the 
above quote, can be read as a tactical move in the negotiations with the government. 
If the oil loses its value, both the oil companies and the producing country would be 
88 Attempts at market regulation by the industry include agreements such as the “Red Line”- and 
the “As Is”-Agreement. And before that it was John D. Rockefeller who saw a risk in price fluctua-
tions and devised the integrated oil company as a tool to manage the risk of a free fall in oil prices 
after a major field discovery. The successful management of this risk (among others) led Rockefeller’s 
Standard Oil to be the most influential oil company of its time. For more information on the history 
of the oil industry see Yergin (2009) or Sampson (1975).
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affected negatively. Instead of laying the focus only on why it makes business sense for 
a government not to delay the activities of the company, Heavey uses a narrative in 
which both company and country stand to lose and according to which they have the 
same interest: moving ahead faster – clearly meaning the government should speed 
up its processes. Moving fast possibly means doing things hastily, which could cause 
harm to the government. Good legal frameworks cannot be put in place, contracts 
cannot be negotiated properly and the government runs the risk of getting a crude 
deal. So moving slowly at times, as the government has done, is essentially a good 
risk management by the government (Humphrey et al., 2007: 15). Notwithstanding 
the risk of departure of the oil companies, the government did not move faster.
Negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding
In this section I take a brief look at how risks were used in the process of negotiating 
the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding on the plan for the commercialisation of 
the oil between the government and the oil companies. Each party defined the risks 
to themselves and in light of this assessment tried to drive the best bargain. A recent 
article reconstructs the negotiation process from interviews with people from both 
sides who were present at the negotiations (Hickey et al., 2015b). The government 
was represented by officials from PEPD, the Ministry of Energy, Uganda Revenue 
Authority, Bank of Uganda and the Ugandan Investment Authority and the oil com-
panies, Total, CNOOC and Tullow, were represented by national staff, lawyers and 
international technical and legal experts (Hickey et al., 2015b).
The authors name three main points of contention: the use of international ar-
bitration, the approval process of field development plans and the refinery. While 
the oil companies wanted to secure the ability to seek international arbitration, the 
government officials rejected it as it involved “too many unknown variables” (Hickey 
et al., 2015b: 18). International arbitration brings in many new and unknown ele-
ments and makes it harder to identify potential sources of harm. This is one of the 
uncertainties for the country. The government failed to get its view approved and the 
oil companies succeeded as they pointed out that international arbitration was an 
industry standard.89
With regard to the oil field development plan, the oil companies wanted an 
integrated development or basin-wide approach, which would mean all the develop-
ments, including the refinery and the pipeline, would be integrated in one plan and 
approved and operationalised together to achieve economies of scale. The government 
only acquiesced partially, allowing the possibility for it to be included in the MoU 
with the oil companies but maintained it was more interested in a non-integrated 
approach, so that delays in one area would not hold up the whole development of 
the oil and projects like the refinery could move ahead as soon as possible (Hickey et 
al., 2015b). In an ironic twist, in this case it was the government officials who were 
89 In chapter six I discuss in detail the companies’ use of international standards in negotiations.
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referring to the risk of delayed development, not the oil companies. The refinery was 
indeed a project of the government that they were intent on realising. Establishing 
the refinery was a cornerstone of the government’s attempt at creating Ugandan par-
ticipation in the oil industry and avoiding the negative impacts of a resource boom 
on the national economy, commonly referred to as the ‘Dutch disease.’90 While the 
oil companies eventually accepted the refinery after some negotiations, they stressed 
the importance of transport. Aidan Heavey, the CEO of Tullow, commented on the 
refinery issue that it was not possible to have an oil industry without a pipeline, while 
it was possible to have one without a refinery. The logic being that if oil companies 
invest money, they want to be sure they get returns which is easier if they can pump 
the crude out (Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, [2013]a: 10).
The discussions between the government and the oil companies also revolved 
around the parallel project of creating a heated pipeline for crude oil export. For the 
crude export pipeline, different routes were debated such as one that would con-
nect from Hoima on to the port of Lamu, Kenya called the Hoima-Lokichar-Lamu 
route. The pipeline coming from Hoima would connect to the LAPSSET (Lamu 
Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport) corridor at Lokichar, which is meant to 
involve highways, railways and airports. It is Kenya’s second large infrastructural cor-
ridor, next to its Mombasa corridor, to connect to South Sudan and Ethiopia. This 
route makes sense for Kenya where oil has been found in the Turkana basin adjacent 
to this corridor.91 Another option was a southern route, going from Hoima through 
Eldoret to Lamu or Mombasa.
Yet another option discussed a little later was to connect through Rwanda to 
Tanzania. To define the most viable route for the pipeline, the oil companies on the 
one side and Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda on the other had conducted surveys. The 
Tanzania option was favoured by Total as it feared the closeness of the other route 
to the Somalian border and thus to acts of terrorism by the Salafi-oriented group 
al-shabāb.92 Total accused Tullow of having a twisted interest in the Kenya route, as 
Tullow also has assets in Kenya. The proposal for the Tanzanian route was rejected 
by Uganda as apparently Kenya had made several concessions to Uganda to win 
its favour. In August 2015, President Museveni and the President of Kenya, Uhu-
ru Kenyatta, declared their intention of following through with the Kenyan route. 
However, Uganda continued negotiations with Tanzania and then in March 2016, 
President Museveni and John Magufuli, the President of Tanzania, issued statements 
that they would build the Tanzanian route, preferred by Total while Kenya was left 
90 The impact being that the thriving resource sector hurts other sectors in the country. I explain this 
causal mechanism in the chapter on the resource curse. The refinery case is discussed in detail in the 
chapter on national content.
91 For more information see the project’s website: www.lapsset.go.ke/ [February 2018].
92 The full name of the group is ḥarakat al-shabāb al-mujāhidīn. For further information on al-shabāb 
see Loimeier (2016: 288–292). Loimeier calls al-shabāb a “jihād-minded” group that does not care 
much about doctrine (Loimeier,2016: 35).
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to itself to continue its pipeline project.93 These negotiations reveal how the ability to 
set one’s risks on the agenda is a resource in bargaining. The finishing of the pipeline 
deal also meant that developments could move ahead.
From the above I derive that the better one party can prove its risk claims, the 
better its bargaining position. It seems that thanks to their high level of technical 
knowledge on oil and the oil industry, the Ugandan negotiators were very adept at 
getting their risks, such as the risk of suffering from the Dutch disease without a 
refinery, acknowledged and hence getting what are alleged to be some of the best oil 
deals in Africa (Hickey et al., 2015a,b).
After all these delays, in the beginning of 2015 the government opened the bid-
ding process for six blocks: Turaco, Kanywataba, Taitai, Ngassa, Ngaji and Nvule. 
No major company showed interest in the licenses, although the Ministry of Energy 
estimates that another 8 billion barrels are yet undiscovered. From the active compa-
nies, only Tullow threw in its bid. The government then shortlisted 16 companies, all 
of them were smaller or independent ones. Some argue that the disinterest of major 
companies was caused by Uganda’s approach to the oil industry. Though de-risked by 
the good success ratio and the presence of major companies, it could be that Uganda 
being tough in the negotiations in conjunction with the drop in oil prices stifled the 
interest of the oil companies. However, four companies proceeded to negotiation 
stage and in September 2017 the government signed a PSA with Armour Energy 
(Ssekika, 2017).
In the past section I have focused the attention on how the delays of the ex-
ploration process have posed a risk and been a matter of negotiation between the 
oil companies and the government. In the following section I take a closer look at 
delays caused by corruption allegations and more disputes over taxes between the 
government and the oil companies. I set these delays apart from the general history 
to ensure the readability of this chapter. There are parallel activities and negotiation 
strands running through the history of oil in Uganda, which could be confusing to 
present in a purely chronological order.94
93 For a more detailed analysis of the pipeline negotiations see Patey (2015).
94 For a chronology of events I refer to the table on the oil history in the appendix.
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Corruption Scandals3.3 
Further delays in the oil project resulted from the unravelling of corruption scandals, 
which I consider here in their complexity and effects. Over time, Uganda has been 
ridden by very many corruption scandals and therefore the scandals that evolved 
around the oil deals do not stand out.95 Oil companies identify corruption allegation 
as risky because they could lead to court cases in the USA and costly fines under the 
Dodd Frank Act if the company is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Further-
more, they could damage the company’s image, also leading to financial losses. The 
allegations themselves do already cause harm to the company, as countering these 
allegations binds resources and they at least momentarily impact negatively on the 
perception of the company.96 One way to manage this risk, is to avoid corrupt prac-
tices, which is for instance what Tullow lays out in its business standards.
In the two cases that I discuss below, corruption allegations were an attempt 
by one set of actors to cause harm to another party. In the first case an opposition 
politician put ministers under pressure and tarnished the government’s image. In the 
other case one oil company tried to harm another one by bringing up corruption 
allegations during a court trial between the companies. The outcome of the first cor-
ruption scandal was a moratorium on the signing of further agreements with the oil 
companies.
In 2011, Ugandans witnessed the uncovering of a corruption scandal surround-
ing the sale of Heritage shares to Tullow. This scandal involved some high-ranking 
politicians, as well as the oil companies ENI and Tullow. Back in 2009, Tullow was in 
a joint venture with Heritage. Heritage decided to offer its shares in the exploration 
areas 1 and 3A to the Italian oil company ENI. Tullow made use of its pre-emption 
right and bought the shares in January 2010. In 2011, the MP Gerald Karuhanga97 
alleged that ENI had bribed then Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi and President 
Museveni while the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sam Kutesa and the former Minister 
of Energy Hilary Onek had been bribed by Tullow to get government’s approval of 
the sale.98
95 For an overview of corruption in Uganda including analysis of a broad range of scandals see 
Asiimwe (2013) Tangri and Mwenda (2013, 2003). For a general analysis of corruption in Africa see 
Bayart (1993) or Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006).
96 In Rachel Boynton’s documentary Big Men (2014) one can see how Anadarko leveled such allega-
tions against Kosmos Energy, in what appears to be some sort of dirty trick. Anadarko reported Ko-
smos to the U.S. Authorities for a possible violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Although 
the U.S. Authorities closed the case without filing charges, the allegation did have consequences for 
Kosmos: a reshuffle in the board of directors and management, the loss of a sales deal with Exxon and 
a severance in relations to the Ghanaian government.
97 Karuhanga was then Western Uganda Youth representative and not member of the ruling party 
NRM.
98 These allegations can also be found in cables from U.S. embassy officials that had been leaked on 
wikileaks (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA1401_a.html [February 2018]).
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President Museveni refuted the allegation saying that it was contempt of the highest 
order to accuse him of taking money from a mzungu, meaning European in Swahili. 
Mbabazi responded that those documents had been forged. The Attorney General 
Peter Nyombi also dismissed the documents as being suspect and said their admis-
sion was illegal as they had not been verified before submission to the Parliament. 
The Parliament instituted a commission of inquiry that was to investigate the claims. 
They also demanded a halt to any oil deals, affecting the farm-down-deal between 
Tullow, CNOOC and Total.99 Tullow also responded to the allegations, contesting to 
the parliamentary ad hoc committee in April 2012. Then executive director, Graham 
Martin, brought documents from the Metropolitan Police, the UK Serious Fraud 
Office and the Maltese police along to disproof the allegations.100 He is quoted by 
the newspaper Daily Monitor as saying:
‘The allegations affected Tullow deeply not only in Uganda but the entire 
world. We have a 25 year history of zero tolerance to corruption and we will 
prove to you that they [the documents] were false and I think the local media 
is starting to appreciate that’ (Imaka 2012).
In the end the ministers and Tullow were cleared of the allegations by a parliamen-
tary commission. Despite the exoneration, the scandal tarnished Tullow’s image and 
the result of this scandal was a hold on the issuance of further licenses and signing of 
contracts, meaning the companies could only work under existing licenses (de Kock 
and Sturman, 2012: 45).
During this scandal it also surfaced that the license Heritage sold had been due 
to expire in February 2010, unless a production license had been sought by then, 
which apparently Tullow failed to do. The then Minister of Energy Onek wrote to 
Tullow and Heritage in August 2010, alerting them to the fact that they had failed 
to apply for the production license and that the license under which they were active 
in exploration area 3A had actually expired. He informed them that the Kajubirizi 
Discovery Area therefore ceased to form part of the Petroleum Exploration Area 3A 
under Tullow’s license.101
It thus transpired that the sale of an almost expired license had drawn various 
parties into a big corruption scandal. Heritage, however, made a handsome profit 
as it gained 1.45 billion U.S. dollars out of the transaction and boasted in a 2010 
report of having paid its shareholders a dividend of 100 pence per share through the 
monetisation of assets, that is the sale of an asset (Heritage Oil Plc, 2010: 9). In this 
99 The commission claimed they came upon difficulties trying to trace the money due to the com-
plexity of the investigation, several complications with institutions in Uganda and limitations of the 
parliamentary investigations overseas.
100 Investigations in Uganda and Britain found that the documents proving bank transfers from Tul-
low to the ministers were forgeries. It was not resolved though who made the forgeries. For more on 
the scandal see Mwenda (2011).
101 Excerpts of the letter were cited in a newspaper article (Obore, 2011).
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annual review the CEO of Heritage Oil, Anthony Buckingham, also highlights the 
strategy of “gaining a first mover advantage” (ibid.: 16). The interest of Heritage is 
to make a profit by monetising assets and to thereby generate value for shareholders 
and thus increase the shareholder value (ibid.). This first-mover advantage is what I 
described earlier on as the wildcat risk.
Despite the exoneration uncovering the details of this sale of Heritage’s license, 
this still makes the oil deals in Uganda seem to be the classic murky deals of the oil 
industry. The transaction proved to be a longer struggle between the three parties 
as the government refused to approve the transaction without the taxes being paid. 
In the tax dispute, the Ugandan government claimed Heritage had left the country 
without paying their capital gains tax for the sale.102 In order to get the taxes it de-
manded, the government used Tullow’s need to get the license renewed.
Tullow thus came under considerable pressure: it had to pay taxes (and maybe 
even bribes) for a license that was about to expire and whose renewal was depend-
ing on the goodwill of the government. Getting a renewal was important because if 
Tullow would have had to get the license through new negotiations, it would have 
possibly increased in value. The prize for Tullow was exclusive access to the most 
promising oil fields in Uganda and also a primary negotiating position to bring in 
new partners. At the time of the sale it is alleged that Tullow was in negotiations with 
ExxonMobil though it appears they lost interest later on (Browne, 2011).
So Tullow set out to appease the government and in October 2010 agreed to pay 
$121.5 million to the Uganda Revenue Authority and to put the rest into an escrow 
account and set about seeking legal redress with Heritage. After this settlement, the 
license was renewed.103 This paved the way for the signing of the 2014 Memorandum 
of Understanding between the oil companies and the government. When the scandal 
erupted in 2011, Tullow was already in negotiations about a farm-down-deal with 
CNOOC and Total. The moratorium the Parliament had put in place that was sup-
posed to halt any further negotiations with oil companies, affected the farm-down 
102 The case was at first dealt with by a Ugandan court but was then relegated to the international 
arbitration court in London. Heritage argued that paying the tax was not part of its contractual 
obligations as it claimed that Tullow did not pay any tax on their acquisition of Hardman Resources. 
Furthermore, they argued that the sale of assets took place on the Channel Islands and was hence 
not taxable in Uganda. The Ugandan Tax Appeals Tribunal challenged this argument by pointing out 
that the sale was of assets located in Uganda and the consent of the government was needed for the 
sale to go through. Heritage eventually lost this case to the government with the latest ruling from 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law dating from February 2015. This success 
of the Ugandan party caused a scandal in 2017 when it was made public that Museveni had thanked 
the responsible government agents with what was termed a “golden handshake,” giving each several 
million Ugandan shillings.
103 For more information see Mutaizibwa (2013). According to another media report the British High 
Commissioner, Martin Shearman, got involved in the negotiation and called up President Museveni 
in August 2010 to lobby on Tullow’s behalf. The report adds that at the time Shearman’s wife was an 
employee of Tullow Oil suggesting a conflict of interest on the side of the British (Butagira, 2013).
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deal. Nonetheless, the NRM caucus and President Museveni decided to continue 
with the negotiations according to a news report (Obore, 2011).
Tullow then sued Heritage for its refusal to pay back the tax money to Tullow. 
Heritage had refused on the ground that the payment was not made by Tullow out 
of legal obligations but rather out of commercial motives. The issue was taken to 
court and in June 2013 the High Court in London ruled in favour of Tullow. This 
court case brought another round of corruption allegations against Tullow. During 
the court case the legal counsel of Heritage pointed out that in August 2010 Tullow’s 
exploration director suggested in a group email to pay Museveni 50 million U.S. 
Dollars. Heritages’s counsel is reported as saying that Tullow toyed with the idea of 
funding President Museveni’s election campaign for the election in early 2011. The 
NRM MP Theodore Ssekikubo told a Ugandan tabloid about these revelations that 
they had unprecedented and unaccounted for money in the election campaign (Red 
Pepper, 2013).104 The allegations were refuted by the Office of the President. In its 
final judgment though, the High Court in London cleared Tullow of the corruption 
allegations made during the trial. Such trials are problematic for the oil companies as 
they pose the threat of reduced profits which is not in the interest of the shareholders. 
These trials caused further delays. They affected the smoothness of the exploration 
process and the completion of Tullow’s farm-down-deal to Total and CNOOC.
From the above it can be derived that corruption is a double-edged sword for 
the oil companies as it contains two different kinds of trouble which both affect 
the value of the company negatively: while paying bribes could have legal and im-
age consequences, not paying bribes could lead to delays and both affect profits 
negatively. The negative impact though depends on how public the company is. 
Not every company stands to suffer as much from corruption. For instance, I heard 
bribery allegations connected to the 2015 licensing round. I was told by an industry 
insider that one of the bidding companies had given President Museveni money for 
his 2016 campaign.
According to Tullow’s risk assessment, corruption is a risk because the company 
could get sued which would mean image damage and impact negatively on the mar-
ket value of the company. Management of this risk involves a company and ethic 
codex as well as regular evaluations and reports. Using the example of corruption I 
want to highlight how risks are negotiated. Corruption started to be a problem for 
oil companies since legislation condemning corrupt practices had been passed. Un-
der the concept of the resource curse, scientists and activists have widely discussed 
the influence of corruption on the state and society. And the blame is not just put on 
corrupt officials but also on the oil industry (Corrigan 2014; Carmody 2009; Hum-
phrey et al. 2007). Tullow highlights that they are bound by international law, espe-
104 These statements should also be read against the background that Ssekikubo along with other 
“Rebel MPs” was called to a disciplinary council of the ruling NRM party in February of the same 
year and later on expelled from the party. However, they were invited back into the party in 2015 
ahead of the 2016 elections.
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cially the UK bribery act.105 Furthermore, there are international initiatives like EITI 
(Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative), which Tullow has signed and Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP) that lobby for transparency in the oil industry and whose 
agenda is supported by many NGOs.106 Corruption scandals pose the risk of more 
delays to oil companies, which means more time and more money spent reducing 
the overall profitability of the asset.
Chapter Conclusion3.4 
In this chapter I have described the general development of oil in Uganda by focus-
ing on its risks and uncertainties. The overview of the exploration process has shown 
how exploration is a process of negotiation and re-negotiation between parliament, 
government and oil companies. The negotiation of oil takes place in various forums 
such as media, parliament, and conferences or behind closed doors. Risks are an im-
portant element of these negotiations. Government and oil companies manoeuvre 
according to the risks they perceive and they can use risks by either putting the other 
party at risk, for instance by delaying the progress of the project, or by putting their 
risks on the agenda such as in the case of the refinery.
In the following chapter I turn to the gloomy future civil society activists warned 
their fellow Ugandans about. This negotiation of oil within civil society circles went 
along the line of the resource curse narrative that holds no good promises for Ugan-
dans.
105 See their code of business conduct online at https://web.archive.org/web/20170218025020/www.
tullowoil.com/about-us/corporate-governance/code-of-business-conduct [February 2018].
106 More on this is discussed in the next chapter.
Figure 5: Conference on Oil and Gas, Hoima District (2015).
Oil as Risk: Anticipating the Resource Curse4 
Is oil a blessing or is it a curse? I have heard this question innumerable times during 
my research and I take it as a starting point to consider one sub-arena of the process 
of oil-making in Uganda: the resource curse. In this chapter, I explore the predomi-
nant discourse on oil in Uganda, which is structured to a great extent along the nar-
rative of the resource curse. Whether government or state officials, civil society activ-
ists, journalists or even workers in the oil industry – they all anticipated a future with 
oil according to the structure of the resource curse narrative, although with different 
conclusions. Civil society actors in Uganda explained the resource curse by using a 
plain equation: oil plus bad governance equals bad outcomes for Ugandans.107
At a donor workshop in Kampala in April 2014, the organiser was trying to 
make the attendants from NGOs and the government aware that each of them were 
wearing „specs“ that either coloured everything in great and bright colours or made 
the future look all dark and gloomy. The workshop had been organised to overcome 
what was conceived by this donor agency as a stalemate between the curse and the 
blessing side. I understand the resource curse discourse as a risk narrative. It is an 
anticipatory practice employed by civil society actors who staged the resource curse 
107 A similar observation has been made by Gisa Weszkalnys (2011) for São Tomé and Príncipe.
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as an, in Ulrich Beck’s term, anticipated catastrophe (Beck, 2007: 29). At its centre 
is a powerful narrative that enjoys support from international donors.
I show how civil society activists translated the concept of the resource curse from 
its usage in academia, mainly economics and political science, to the Ugandan con-
text. The new risk influenced how various actors talked about the oil and how they 
anticipated a future with it. Even the oil companies and the Ugandan state, who are 
blamed in the curse narrative, referred to it and thereby helped establish it as a risk, 
while emphasising that appropriate risk management was already in place. I argue 
that the successful translation of the resource curse concept to Uganda opened a new 
brokering space to civil society actors. In fact, civil society actors used the risk of the 
resource curse as a power resource in the oil arena to gain this space for brokerage. 
Notably, a space to exert influence on the oil-making process and very importantly, 
to seize opportunities for earning a living.
This chapter looks at the narrative of the resource curse, the actors who promote 
it, and the benefits they derive from it. I start out by introducing the civil society ac-
tors and their ways of doing business in more detail. Then I examine the narratives of 
the resource curse and the resource blessing, which are basically two sides of the same 
coin because resources are argued to be only a blessing if they are extracted in the 
‘right’ context and in the ‘right’ ways. After the analysis of this risk narrative itself, I 
turn to the question of how civil society actors, who established the risk, benefited 
from it. Here, I show that while they can be understood as a strategic group with 
regard to the oil itself, a look at the controversies among these “development brokers” 
(Bierschenk et al., 2000, 2002; Mosse and Lewis, 2006) shows that the development 
aid targeted at combatting the resource curse was another kind of spoils in the oil 
arena.
Civil Society in Uganda4.1 
Generally speaking, Uganda has a vibrant civil society, which encompasses organisa-
tions at national level based in Kampala and those at regional level. Organisation 
types vary from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs), Faith-Based Organisations and Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs). I understand these organisations as part of a strategic group with a common 
position with regard to the oil. NGOs in Uganda are either local chapters of interna-
tional NGOs, such as Transparency International or International Alert, or national 
NGOs, such as National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE)108, 
108 All acronyms are explained at first mention. I kept usage to a minimum. With regard to the names 
of NGOs I think the acronyms increase legibility. In Uganda, these acronyms are usually read like a 
name and not spelled out. For example, the organisation RICE is pronounced rice like the food and 
not R.I.C.E. It is thus easier to read the acronyms than the long and bulky names they represent. 
Only when the full name is generally used, I will also use the full name.
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Africa Institute for Energy Governance (AFIEGO), Global Rights Alert or Water 
Governance Institute, that obtain funding from international donor agencies, with 
some also getting project-related funding from Ugandan government agencies. I will 
give more details on these organizations in the course of the chapter.
The strategic group “civil society” could be seen as encompassing more actors 
usually not considered as part of civil society, such as Bunyoro Kingdom or the local 
government, because they also assumed a critical position towards the government 
and the oil project. Based on his research in the Kingdom of Buganda in central 
Uganda, Mikael Karlström (1999) argues that institutions such as the clan system 
or kinship more generally, the monarchy, and the local government system, which 
are not included in conventional definitions of civil society, are in fact mediating 
state-society relations. Thereby, Karlström questions the analytical advantage of defi-
nitions of the term ‘civil society’ that exclude organisations with linkages to the state 
or to ethnicity or religion.109 Kingship and local governance have been reformulated 
since the NRM regime took over to “develop new and more satisfactory ways to con-
ceive and enact relations between local populations and the state” (Karlström, 1999: 
117). Following this argument, Bunyoro Kingdom can be considered as part of civil 
society as a strategic group. However, I focus my discussion on CSOs because they 
have been more central to my research than Bunyoro Kingdom.
Most members of civil society portrayed themselves as a counter force towards 
the industry and the state. Indeed, during my research, the government had probed 
several NGOs, accusing them of conspiring with foreigners against the government 
or the state. As such, leading NGOs of coalitions on oil had come under pressure 
from the government. In a Parliament speech in early 2012, President Museveni 
accused the organisations ACODE (Advocates Coalition for Development and 
Environment)110, AFIEGO, NAPE and Global Rights Alert of acting on behalf of 
foreign interest and of crippling and disorienting the development of Uganda’s oil. 
Around the same time ACODE’s bank accounts were investigated by the Central 
Bank of Uganda. These frictions reveal that for the government the NGOs were 
political actors that were engaged in political manoeuvres. Yet, the government’s ac-
tion against NGOs were evoking images of an embattled civil society and therewith 
re-enforcing civil society’s and donors’ perception of a clear distinction between the 
state and civil society.
Concerns among CSOs and donors about the freedom of expression and speech 
were also aroused by two bills the Parliament passed in recent years, which portray 
a trend towards stricter state control. In 2013, the “Public Order Management Act” 
109 For a discussion of the history and diverse usage of the term and idea of civil society, see also 
Comaroff and Comaroff (1999).
110 ACODE is a research institute and think tank based in Kampala and registered as an NGO in 
1999. On its website it describes its core business as “advocacy-driven public policy research and anal-
ysis on contemporary and emerging public policy and governance issues that have a significant impact 
on national development” (http://www.acode-u.org/About_Us.html [February 2018]). Its current 
executive director is Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha. In 2004, ACODE was also registered as a company. 
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(Republic of Uganda 2013a) was passed, which stipulates that any public meeting 
with the intention of discussing political issues has to be authorised by the police.111 
It came after a shutdown of several news outlets including two major independent 
newspapers, due to criminal investigations in relation to them printing a controver-
sial statement by the Army General David Sejjusa.112 In 2015, Parliament passed the 
“Non-Governmental Organisations Bill” (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2015), which 
was criticised – already before the passing – for curbing the freedom of NGOs.113 
Many contested provisions were removed before passing the final bill, but a disputed 
section, stipulating an organisation can be dissolved if the NGO board considers it 
necessary in the public interest, remained in the bill signed into law by President 
Museveni in 2016.
Despite these developments and the necessity to maintain an apolitical image 
for CSOs in Uganda, it should be noted that clear-cut differentiations into spheres 
of state or government, economy, and civil society are problematic because there is 
something profoundly misleading about these categories. They are not self-evident, 
“natural” categories, but exist in relation to each other and help each other carve out 
their space as a way of structuring society:
We must take such distinctions not as the boundary between two discrete 
entities but as a line drawn internally, within the network of institutional 
mechanisms through which a social and political order is maintained. The 
ability to have an internal distinction appear as though it were the external 
boundary between separate objects is the distinctive technique of the modern 
political order (Mitchell, 1999: 77).
Drawing on Mitchell’s analysis, Karlström notes that “an excessively sharp distinc-
tion between state and society derived from a particular phase of European history” 
(Karlström, 1999: 115), which could not easily be translated to the African context. 
Ferguson (2007) challenges the conception of the state being above and civil society 
being below. He calls for a rethinking of this vertical power topography and shows 
how both the bottom and the top have been transnationalised. He explains how 
after the nation-building approach to African states, a new paradigm took over that 
emphasised “the local” and civil society and looked on the state with scepticism. This 
paradigm was a reversal of the first and it was connected to neoliberal economic ap-
proaches (Ferguson, 2007: 387–392).
111 The Deputy Africa Director of International Alert described it as a “serious blow to open political 
debate” (Amnesty International, 2013).
112 In a letter to the media, he alleged that Museveni was planning the assassination of opponents in 
an attempt to install his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba as his heir to the presidency; thus, establishing a 
political monarchy in Uganda – the so-called “Muhoozi project.”
113 Human Rights Watch (2015) claimed the bill would “subject groups to such extensive government 
control and interference that it could negate the very essence of freedom of association and expres-
sion.”
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[W]e are dealing with political entities that may be better conceptualised not 
as ‘below’ the state, but as integral parts of a new, transnational apparatus 
of governmentality. This new apparatus does not replace the older system of 
nation-states […] but overlays it and coexists with it. In this optic, it might 
make sense to think of the new organisations that have sprung up in recent 
years, not as challengers pressing up against the state from below but as hori-
zontal contemporaries of the organs of the state – sometimes rivals, sometimes 
servants, sometimes watchdogs, sometimes parasites, but in every case operat-
ing on the same level and in the same global space (Ferguson, 2007: 392).
There is a parallel between NGOs and businesses that should be noted here as well. 
International NGOs heavily rely on management methods of the business world 
and act like private companies in competition with each other and “this competition 
encourages them to seek good positions (and why not, good victims) to provoke 
donors’ favours” (Abélès, 2008: 249). Abélès explains this with the recruitment of 
personnel from the top management of companies and large international organisa-
tions (ibid.: 249). The business character of NGOs can also be noted in the opera-
tion through projects.114 The duration of the project is not necessarily coupled to the 
duration of the problem though, as Meinert and Whyte (2014) show for the fight 
against the AIDS epidemic in Uganda. CSOs are thus more or less successful enter-
prises run by people who depend on them for their livelihood. They generally have 
no resources of their own:
[They] have a very broad and diffuse substantive orientation. The primary aim 
of the NGO founders […] is to find a remunerated position on the market 
for development services, and the promotion of their own jobs (Bierschenk, 
2014b: 83).
In fact, several organisations, such as ACODE, are not only registered as an NGO 
but also as a company. According to one of my informants, registration as a company 
allows the director to maintain a better grip on the organisation. As an NGO the 
organisation is open to internal contestation that may see a director lose his or her 
position and therewith the ability to enjoy the fruits of his/her work. This double 
registration as NGO and company showcases the business character of Uganda’s civil 
society. Applying these insights to my research, I analyse civil society in Uganda not 
as a neutral group of actors advising uninterestedly ‘on the side-lines’ of the oil proj-
ect. Rather, I discuss them as important actors in the oil arena. In the next sections, 
I look at CSOs working on oil matters, the coalitions they formed and the activities 
they undertook.
114 Modern project management has been dated to industry and military projects starting around the 
1950s (Stretton, 2007).
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Civil Society and Oil Matters
With regard to oil, informants from civil society attested to me that the percentage 
of NGOs dealing with oil has grown over the past decade. With the discovery of oil 
in Uganda, NGOs started adding oil and gas advocacy to their portfolios. However, 
quantifying this process was difficult. The NGO Board at the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, which is supposed to oversee NGO (or CSO) activity, informed me that 
they did not have any information on the number and names of NGOs working on 
oil. I was only given a brief list of NGOs that in over a year of fieldwork I had never 
heard of before and that were not publicly active. While only a handful of NGOs 
registered with the NGO Board as working on oil and gas, the most active ones were 
not formally registered for these issues. Apparently, NGOs active in oil advocacy had 
just taken up this subject after registering with the NGO board and did not include 
it when renewing their registrations.115 This is not unusual as most CSOs do not 
have a single agenda but promote various endeavours, ranging from water safety to 
gender equality. CSOs tend to expand their portfolios to include topics that are en 
vogue with the donors.
Another development with the prospect of oil in Uganda was the formation of 
NGO networks working on oil at both the national and the regional level. The cre-
ation of these coalitions was presented to me as a way of pooling resources such as 
knowledge, expertise, and personnel to obtain better access to international donors 
and to shield individual organisations from state pressure. At the national level there 
were the Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas (CSCO, pronounced as Cisco), 
Publish What You Pay, and the Oilwatch Network. Publish What You Pay Uganda 
is chaired by Global Rights Alert. Its agenda was aligned with Publish What You Pay 
International. Publish What You Pay is an international coalition of CSOs that calls 
on extractive companies to disclose their financial transactions to host governments. 
It was also launched in 2002 by six London based organisations including Global 
Witness, Oxfam and Transparency International.116 Global Rights Alert (GRA) is a 
Ugandan civil society organisation founded in 2007 and based in Kampala. It fo-
cuses on natural resource governance with regard to gender, transboundary resource 
governance, transparency and accountability, and citizen’s participation through re-
ligious institutions.117
115 According to a friend at a donor organisation, the stance of the NGO Board was precisely that 
they did not have a clear overview over who was doing what. Nevertheless, one officer at the Board 
stated he had more information but only divulged names of NGOs that were very vocal about oil in 
the media such as AFIEGO.
116 For more information see the website www.publishwhatyoupay.org/about/history/ [February 
2018].
117 Global Rights Alert is directed by Winfred Ngabiirwe. Aside from hosting the PWYP coalition 
Uganda chapter, it is also a member of CSCO. For more information see www.globalrightsalert.org/
what-we-do [February 2018].
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The Oilwatch Network was formed by two NGOs, NAPE and AFIEGO. AFIEGO 
is a Ugandan NGO based in Kampala with a regional office in Hoima. It is focused 
on public policy research and advocacy. It is a very vocal NGO that has challenged 
government in court over the disclosure of the Production Sharing Agreements and 
was preparing a court case over the refinery resettlement action plan.118 NAPE is a 
Ugandan NGO founded in 1997. NAPE works from Kampala and with organisa-
tions in their project areas. It receives funding from international donors. Among its 
activities NAPE counts research and community sensitisation. NAPE is working on 
environmental issues, water governance, land grabbing, gender issues and oil extrac-
tion.119
CSCO is an initiative of Ugandan CSOs and NGOs. It describes itself as a non-
registered network open to any CSO committed to CSCO’s objectives and with a 
portfolio relevant to the oil and gas sector. At one point, its status as ‘non-registered’ 
caused frictions with the government. The Ministry of Internal Affairs branded all 
non-registered coalitions illegal. However, the former Chairman of CSCO explained 
to me that there was no need to register because each organisation in the coalition 
was already registered individually. The coalition itself was just a loose network oper-
ating on the constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. 
This would allow member organisations to express themselves more freely without 
fearing government intervention, because without registration it was not a legal en-
tity and thus could neither be sued nor “crushed.” According to the Chairman, the 
government was fighting this ability of the coalition to function as a shield for its 
members (Director Water Governance Institute, interview, 2013).120
In Bunyoro, there were the Bunyoro Albertine Petroleum Network on Environ-
mental Conservation (BAPENECO), which was formed in 2010, and the Bunyoro 
Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas (BCSCO), the Bunyoro chapter of CSCO, 
which was formed in 2012, and the Bunyoro Coalition on Oil and Sustainable Live-
lihood (BUCOSA), led by Caritas Hoima. BCSCO was chaired by Kitara Heritage 
Development Agency (KHEDA). KHEDA is a Ugandan civil society organisation 
with its seat in Hoima town. It was founded in 2006 by the lawyer Shem Byakagaba, 
who also directed it during the time of my research. The organisation held several 
sensitisation workshops and conferences on oil and gas. Its activities were limited to 
Bunyoro, which includes Hoima, Buliisa and Masindi district. For its oil program 
118 AFIEGO’s chief executive officer is Dickens Kamugisha. AFIEGO is part of the Civil Society 
Coalition on Oil and Gas, Publish What You Pay and the Oilwatch network. It has three programs, 
all focusing on energy: electricity democracy, extractive industry governance and renewable energy 
efficiency. The objective of the oil project is to promote good governance through research and advo-
cacy. For more information see: www.afiego.org/about-us/who-we-are.html [February 2018].
119 NAPE’s executive director is Frank Muramuzi. For more information see http://nape.or.ug [Febru-
ary 2018].
120 For more information on the coalition see the website http://csco.ug/# [February 2018].
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KHEDA received funding from International Alert.121 I am not aware of similar 
networks for other regions such as West Nile or Acholi. However, there were active 
civil society organisations like RICE122 from Arua, which also received funding from 
International Alert under the same programme as KHEDA.
The oil networks followed different approaches and were intent on maintain-
ing their distinctiveness from each other. However, many organisations were part 
of several networks and especially local CBOs were part of more than one network. 
Despite the overlaps, the networks did not coordinate their activities in the oil region 
and often also failed to do so within the same network. This lack of coordination 
included donors who up to 2012 provided funding for the networks without rigor-
ously crosschecking applications (van Alstine et al., 2014: 53).
Funding for oil sensitisation campaigns was provided by different organisa-
tions and donors such as International Alert or the Democratic Governance Facility 
(DGF). International Alert is an international NGO focusing on peace-building. 
It has been active in Uganda since 1987. It focuses on the economic dimensions 
of peace and conflict, the new oil industry and the recovery process in Northern 
Uganda.123 DGF is a basket fund from several European embassies endowed with a 
substantial amount of money to support, amongst others, good resource governance 
in Uganda. They provided funding to several of the organisations mentioned in this 
book and were instrumental in facilitating the Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas, 
which included the so-called “Rebel MPs” and was vocal in the oil bills debate men-
tioned in the history chapter.124
121 KHEDA also hosted an essay writing competition sponsored by Tullow Oil, which is discussed 
in the next chapter. For more information see https://web.archive.org/web/20140102005329/http://
khedakitara.org/ [February 2018]. 
122 They are working in West Nile, Acholi and Bunyoro on community health (HIV/AIDS and 
malaria), environment and natural resources (oil), sustainable agriculture, governance, human rights 
and peace (land rights), and economic empowerment. They have received funding from national 
and international donors and organisations. They cooperated with International Alert from 2011 to 
2014. And from 2013 to 2016, RICE had their own oil project “Bringing Uganda’s oil to the surface, 
Increasing community capacity to handle oil resource effectively” funded by an international donor. 
For more information http://riceuganda.org/about-rice-westnile/ [February 2018].
123 International Alert’s current country manager in Uganda is Richard Businge. It has three major 
programs in Uganda: Business for peace (funded by SIDA), the Advisory Consortium on Conflict 
Sensitivity (funded by UKAid) and oil in Uganda called “Harnessing the Potential of Oil and Gas to 
Contribute to Peace & Development in Uganda” (funded by UKAid and Irish Aid). International 
Alert funded organisations in the oil region such as KHEDA and RICE. It carried out research, set 
up oil information centres and engaged the oil companies. It hosted several conferences in Kampala 
and the oil region, including one on national content in Masindi that is discussed in the chapter on 
national content. For more information see: http://www.international-alert.org/projects/5126 [Febru-
ary 2018].
124 DGF was established by Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the European Union with the aim to “strengthen democratisation, protect human 
rights, improve access to justice and enhance accountability in Uganda” (https://www.dgf.ug/what-dgf 
[February 2018]). I was in contact with the manager for the resource governance program, who 
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Overall, civil society actors in Uganda could be described as doubt-mongers be-
cause they tried to impress the extractive communities with scary images. Unlike the 
doubt-mongers Albert Ogien (2015) describes, civil society actors in Uganda did not 
direct the doubts at science but rather used results from social sciences to sow doubt 
about the future with oil. CSOs were part of the oil arena, not as mere spectators, 
but brokers, creators and performers in the process of oil-making. In the next sec-
tion, I give an overview of civil society activities, especially those events at which the 
resource curse narrative was explained and discussed.
 “Sensitisation” Events on Oil
The main events where CSOs spread their visions of the future with oil – the curse 
and how it could be avoided – were conferences, workshops and sensitisation cam-
paigns held in communities located in the oil region. The conferences usually took 
place in one of the luxurious big hotels of Kampala or the better hotels of towns in 
the oil region. Conference participants were mainly from other NGOs, oil compa-
nies, and the government. For community meetings, CSOs usually drove to the tar-
get village, stayed a few hours, held presentations, showed their respective documen-
taries, handed out information material, and gathered comments on the situation in 
the community in a discussion round.
Some of these meetings included puppet theatres, as in Figure 6, which were a 
favourite choice of community intervention tools during my research. These theatres 
were used to draw public attention and were found to be easily accessible for people 
in the village. The puppeteers usually wrote the play script based on information 
given by the CSO.125 The play was surrounded by dance and live music, both referred 
to as “traditional.”
Usually, community meetings took place directly in the affected villages and in-
cluded a broader range of actors than the conferences. They also included some in-
formation material or incentives, for instance free food and beverages or allowances. 
The necessity to pay allowances could be related to the fact that CSOs usually came 
according to their own programme to gather information or carry out sensitisation, 
rather than on a request by the community.126
shared with me his experiences with and opinion on the on-goings in Uganda’s civil society working 
on oil matters.
125 The theatre group had considerable freedom how they termed the message. On one occasion, one 
of these groups claimed oil company men would come and infect the community with HIV. The 
CBO that had contracted the group disapproved of this and members complained about it in the car 
as we left the venue.
126 A local politician of Kyehoro explained to me that politicians were the ones who had started 
paying allowances to people who showed up during their campaigning and that this system was later 
taken up by NGOs. By the time I did my research, NGOs claimed it was not possible to draw atten-
dants from communities if they did not offer at least some refreshments. Allowances varied between 
different locations, whether village, town or the capital, and they varied according to the financial 
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The conferences served different purposes. First of all, they provided a forum for 
CSOs to present themselves and their work, and to offer information on oil to the 
participants while also gathering information from them. Some of these events also 
promoted a dialogue between community members, officials from the Ministry of 
Energy, officials from the local governments, and the oil companies. They thereby 
offered a platform for participation of the extractive communities in the resource-
making.
For the organisation of the events, NGOs from Kampala relied on their partners 
in the communities to organise workshops or meetings, and to make sure that mo-
bilisation of participants goes well. These events were not always planned long-term, 
but at times organised ad hoc when a project was ending and money still needed to 
be spent. The trips were popular among the CSO staff as they included per diem 
payments, which were appreciated as a salary supplement.
Most national NGOs operated mainly from their offices in Kampala and only 
went occasionally on field trips. Most CSOs, be it national NGOs or CBOs, only 
have a minimal presence in the affected communities. According to a recent study 
by researchers from Leeds University, oil governance in Uganda by both state and 
non-state actors was ad hoc and fragmented with four major gaps:
leverage of the CSO hosting the meeting as well as according to who was attending. Ministers, parlia-
mentarians, or guests of honour received higher allowances than (elected) representatives of villages.
Figure 6: Puppet theatre play on oil exploration, Masindi District (2012).
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[L]ack of coherence among civil society organisations (CSOs); limited civil 
society access to communities and the deliberate centralisation of oil gover-
nance; industry-driven interaction at the local level; and weak local govern-
ment capacity (van Alstine et al., 2014: 49).
Based on a comparison of activities noted in the register of the Chairmen LC 1 of 
villages in the oil region, they discovered that NGOs and the local governments were 
less often in the village than oil companies or the (central) government, and that the 
latter engaged with the communities only on a need basis for example for seismic 
surveys. There has been more activity on the national level, especially around the de-
velopment of a legislative framework due to the way the state controlled and at times 
obstructed CSO’s access to the region (van Alstine et al,. 2014: 54–56.).127
The low frequency of interactions with local communities meant that they might 
have been left for long spells with the pessimistic images NGOs created, without any 
further information on oil activities. In the communities, sensitisation activities of 
CSOs were viewed ambivalently. While some appreciated the work of the CSOs and 
the information they distributed, others believed the CSOs were just doing busi-
ness. During a group discussion with (former) casual workers of the oil industry in 
Kyehoro, one of them claimed that CSOs did not come to the village to help, they 
rather came to serve their own interests. He was supported by the others who said 
that CSOs were just doing their business and that it was right for them to pay people 
allowances for the information they gave to the NGOs (Casual workers and Chair-
man LC 1, group interview, 2012).128
In turn, CBOs were normally based in the district capital and therefore closer to 
the affected communities than national NGOs but they also did not live in the com-
munities they claimed to represent. Most CBOs suffered from a lack of financial and 
operational resources, most of them continuously lacked even phone credit to find 
out what was going on in the communities. CBOs only visited communities along 
with national NGOs, as most of them did not have a travel budget of their own. 
Instead, I saw community members visiting CBOs in their office in Hoima, while I 
was there on courtesy visits. As one of the leaders of a national NGO explained to 
me, it was only when national NGOs (normally sponsored by international NGOs) 
moved to the district that local CBOs and CSOs got the resources to visit communi-
ties. In addition, national NGOs sponsored trips of CBO members to Kampala so 
that they may participate in conferences or events such as the protest at Parliament 
on the passing of the petroleum bills. The connection between NGOs and CBOs can 
be interpreted as a patron-client relationship (cf. Bailey, 1969).
127 I commented on those difficulties for researchers and activists in the methodological framework.
128 The Director of KHEDA also mentioned during a dialogue between NGOs, PEPD, and the oil 
companies organised by International Alert that the community leaders told his organisation that 
people were tired of all the meetings and talking to researchers when they did not see any results 
(International Alert conference, 2012).
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To sum it up, one can say that CSOs were rarely based in the communities they ad-
vocated for and did not even visit them on a regular basis. None of the CSOs I got to 
know during my research had a wide base of members or supporters. Taken together 
these characteristics are in line with Ferguson’s claim that civil society in Africa is 
not as grass-roots as it claims to be but is closely linked to national and transnational 
entities (Ferguson, 2007: 391). However, the grassroots claim is important to the 
self-image and business of civil society, because they derive their legitimacy from be-
ing perceived as representatives of and lobbyists for (disenfranchised) people. In the 
next sub-chapter, I turn to the discourse civil society spread on oil.
The Resource Curse: A Risk as Travelling Model4.2 
New discoveries of natural resources in several African countries – in-
cluding Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique – raise an impor-
tant question: will these windfalls be a blessing that brings prosperity and 
hope, or a political and economic curse, as has been the case in so many 
countries? […] Resources should be a blessing, not a curse. They can 
be, but it will not happen on its own. And it will not happen easily.
(Joseph Stiglitz, Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, [2013]a: 50–51)
The remark by the renowned economist Joseph Stiglitz, printed in a magazine of the 
Ugandan lobby organisation Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, is actually 
a typical plea made by organisations promoting action against the resource curse. 
Civil society circles spread narratives of the risk of the curse and the potential rem-
edies. In this quote, Stiglitz first creates uncertainty by posing the question whether 
the oil windfalls will be a blessing or a curse, breaking the assumption that they are 
something positive. He then takes a normative stance by saying that resources should 
be a blessing. However, the way to get there requires action. The resource curse is a 
concept developed by economists and political scientists, which has been translated 
to the Ugandan context by civil society.
Weszkalnys refers to the discourse surrounding the resource curse as an “antici-
patory apparatus” that creates uncertainties and suspicions and tries to instil the 
‘proper’ kind of anticipation in people (Weszkalnys, 2014: 231). This discourse is 
building on knowledge generated elsewhere, from experience in other countries and 
from social sciences trying to understand these experiences. The new knowledge is 
presented to the people mainly by civil society organisations. Not only does it show 
people how little they know, but it also shows the many potential dangers that could 
arise and would have otherwise gone unnoticed.
In her research on oil in São Tomé e Príncipe, Weszkalnys (2011: 356) looks 
at the repercussions of the resource curse concept and criticises it for being a black 
box. According to her, unlike black boxes of science and technology studies, which 
are analytic devices cloaking the functioning of a technological complex (Latour, 
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1987; Winner, 1993), the resource curse concept masks the failure of economists to 
explain the paradox of plenty with their common tools and data. The resource curse 
concept covers these gaps and it “works” even though “nobody knows quite why or 
how” (Weszkalnys, 2011: 356). Social scientists have tried to fill the black box with 
explanations, yet so far with only limited success.
From its origin in economics and political science the concept of the resource 
curse was turned into a travelling model by civil society (Reyna, 2007; Weszkalnys, 
2011). It is not unusual for scientific or academic knowledge and concepts to get 
adapted and promoted by laymen as Jamison (1996) shows with regard to the role of 
NGOs in the global environmental agenda. Travelling models have been described as 
“an analytical representation of particular aspects of reality created as an apparatus or 
protocol for interventions in order to shape reality for certain purposes” (Behrends et 
al., 2014: 1–2). The models do not diffuse from one place to the other, rather they 
travel through translation – translation meaning they are conveyed or interpreted 
(ibid.).129 The models are de-territorialised, that is disconnected from a setting, and 
then re-territorialised in another setting, which includes a process of creative inter-
pretation (Behrends et al., 2014: 3–4). Remadji Hoinathy and Andrea Behrends 
(2014) have analysed the World Bank model of revenue-sharing, employed in the 
oil producer Chad, as a travelling model. Measures to prevent the resource curse in 
Chad and to avoid conflict failed – not the translation of the model. In fact, it was 
adapted or re-territorialised to the rationalities in the Chadian setting.
In the following, I first look at the concepts of the resource curse and the rentier 
state as well as the criticism levelled at it within academia before I address how the 
concept has been translated to the Ugandan context.
The “Original” Resource Curse
In this section I give some important background information on the resource curse 
as an analytic concept. In academia the resource curse concept is meant to explain 
the developments in petro-states. In the 1970s, several studies emerged on the im-
pact of oil on petro-states in the Middle East. These studies considered oil as a rent 
that dominates the economy and is centrally received by the government (Beblawi 
and Luciani, 1987; Mahdavy, 1970).130 Rather than viewing the successful develop-
ment of their potentials as a mere question of the ‘right’ developmental politics, these 
studies showed that it is necessary to consider the specific economic characteristics 
of oil as a traded consumer good and the technological structure of its production 
(Bierschenk, 1984: 154, 156).131 Oil states or petro-states (Karl, 1997, Soares de 
129 For a concept of translation of ideas (and not language) see Czarniawska and Joerges (1996).
130 For a good overview of the rentier state concept including its development and usage see Ross 
(2001).
131 The concept is connected to a debate in economics about how the world economic system impacts 
negatively on developing countries and more specifically how the terms of trade between resource-
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Oliveira, 2007) are defined as rentier states as their economy generally depends on 
one resource, which generates an external rent. In economics, rents are generally 
understood as a kind of unearned income because it is generated without the input 
of capital or labour. The rents are external as they accrue from the extractive activity 
of international oil companies and the sale of the resource on the world market. As 
a result, the revenues of the state are connected to the world market price of oil and 
therefore also subject to its volatility (Yates 1996: 22).
The resource curse concept starts with the realisation by a development economist 
that windfall gains can have negative effects on a country (Gelb 1988). It was used 
mainly in economics and political science to explain the “paradox of plenty” (Karl, 
1997: 4), which challenges the assumption that resource-rich countries performed 
better economically than resource-poor ones due to the revenues they get from the 
resource. Instead, resource-rich countries were found to perform worse economically 
and regarding political stability than resource-poor ones (Auty. 1993). Most impor-
tantly, oil or other mineral resources are said to impede democracy (Ross, 2001) and 
to correlate with lower economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997). The revenues are 
considered to have a negative effect on institutional capacity, which in turn negatively 
impacts on growth (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Furthermore, resource-
rich countries were found to have greater inequalities in wealth distribution, higher 
levels of poverty and corruption, and were often associated with despotism, political 
instability and internal or even international conflict (Humphrey et al., 2007: 5–6, 
Kaldor et al., 2007; Klare, 2004, Ross, 2001, 1999; Strüver and Wegenast, 2011; 
Yates, 1996). The three major causalities explicated in the resource curse concept 
are therefore that oil leads to economic decline, conflict and authoritarianism. How 
could resources have such negative impacts?
The major macro-economic explanation of the resource curse is a phenomenon 
called the Dutch disease. The term was initially coined for the negative developments 
in the Dutch economy after the gas boom in the 1970s, when an inflow of rents 
from the resource resulted in an appreciation of the exchange rate. Imports became 
cheaper and exports more expensive leading to a decline in the productive sectors (cf. 
Heinrich and Pleines, 2012: 445). With the Dutch disease only the resource sector 
and the service sector thrive when fed by the resource income, which increases rent 
dependency and discourages diversification of the economy (ibid.: 445). For petro-
states, the dependence on the resource is further increased by the enclave character 
of the industry. Enclave character means that the industry necessitates technology, 
which is not available in the country and therefore gets provided by foreign compa-
nies. A technology transfer does not take place, the profits are expatriated, and no 
linkages with other sectors available in the country are created.
There are different explanations for the causal links between resources and con-
flict. One study suggests that as an export commodity, oil is subjected to price vola-
rich, developing countries and industrialised countries develop in a way that is not favourable to the 
developing countries (Heinrich and Pleines, 2012).
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tility that triggers the onset of conflict (Kaldor et al., 2007: 12, 24) while another 
sees the reason for conflict in the availability of finance for rebels through the export 
of resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This is also referred to as the “greed and 
grievances” approach (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999, 2002, 2004; Collier, 2001). James 
Fearon (2005: 503–504) in turn argues that it is rather the weakness of such states 
that spurs conflict. Macartan Humphrey (2005) considers greedy rebels, greedy out-
siders, grievances, a weak state and sparse networks as motives for conflict while he 
sees the feasibility, i.e. the availability of rebel finance as an opportunity for civil war. 
While Michael Watts (2008) argues that it is the distribution of the oil rent that 
sparks conflicts.
Finally, the connection between oil and authoritarianism has been explained with 
the rentier state theory. An effect of the oil on society is that while the state is depen-
dent on oil as a rent, it is independent of the citizens’ tax payments. This is said to 
reduce people’s representation in politics; hence, undermining the legitimacy of the 
state. The lack of legitimacy is compensated by distributive policies, which allow the 
state to use the rents to co-opt opposition by purchasing consent (Yates, 1996: 33). 
The state focuses on distribution rather than production of wealth. Additionally, it is 
said to lead to the development of a class of rentiers, a circle of people directly profit-
ing from the rent and frequently involved in corrupt activities. Hence, high levels of 
corruption are also described as a characteristic of rentier states. Yates connects this 
to the development of a rentier mentality that is focused on consumption rather than 
production of wealth. As rents are unearned income, they sever the usual connec-
tion between labour and reward, challenging the liberal ethos of hard work (Yates, 
1996: 18). Where allocation policies fail, repression takes over and some rentier 
states start spending heavily on security to ward off any democratic pressures. Next 
to the rentier and the repression effect, the modernization effect has been identified 
as another causal mechanism. It is derived from modernisation theory, which con-
nects democracy to social and cultural changes including occupational specialisation, 
urbanisation and higher educational levels caused by economic development (Ross, 
2001: 336). In a quantitative analysis of oil’s effects on democracy, Ross found the 
link between the lack of occupational specification and a low demand for democracy 
to be evidenced by his results (Ross, 2001: 356–357).
Notably, all three causal explanations offered by the resource curse concept have 
come under criticism, which complicates the picture of the resource curse. Overall, 
the supposedly negative effects of oil revenues have been questioned. While in 1999, 
one of the major proponents of the curse, Michael Ross (1999: 297), claimed a cor-
relation between resource-abundance and negative economic and societal impacts, 
he later criticised himself and admitted that little evidence supported claims that 
“extracting oil leads to abnormally slow economic growth, or makes governments 
weaker, more corrupt, or less effective” (Ross, 2012: 3).
Studies attesting slow economic growth had not considered the high volatility 
in growth-rates in resource-rich states that is caused by unpredictable price fluc-
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tuations (Ross, 2012: 189–194).132 Nevertheless, Ross insists that since the 1980s 
oil-producing countries in the “developing world” had become less democratic and 
more secretive, and that already authoritarian governments were less likely to turn 
into democracies if they had oil revenues (Ross, 2012: 71). However, the connection 
between oil and authoritarianism has also been questioned (Haber and Menaldo, 
2011; Herb, 2005).133
Other scholars have suggested that rather than solely focusing on oil as a revenue, 
it was also necessary to look at the social and political context (Basedau, 2005), the 
ownership structure in the export sector (Di John, 2011) and the international link-
ages (Watts, 2008) in order to understand the dynamics in resource-rich states.134 
Michael Herb (2003) objects to the causal linkage between representation and taxa-
tion claiming it derives the importance of taxation for democracy from the role of 
parliaments as tax collectors in European history. Thereby, it mistakenly assumes 
the European democratic process to be universal.135 A straightforward connection 
between the availability of revenues from oil and conflicts has also been contested 
(Basedau 2007; Basedau et al., 2010; Basedau and Lay, 2009; Basedau and Richter, 
2011; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Le Billon, 2008, 2001).
Some authors even suggest that resources might be a blessing but that too little 
attention has been paid to social and political factors that favoured development in 
resource abundant countries, while too much emphasis had been given to the pathol-
ogies of oil (Rosser, 2006). All this criticism illustrates the lack of consensus among 
economists and political scientists as to how oil affects the economic, political, and 
social development of a country. However, as the next section shows, these studies 
have not lifted the spell of the curse – on the contrary, it remains popular within the 
Ugandan and international civil society. The resource curse concept’s complexity was 
simplified in the translation and certain elements were emphasised and related to 
the Ugandan context. The resource curse concept had a strong narrative appeal and 
worked as an “interpretive frame” (Boholm, 2003: 175), defining the elements of the 
negotiation: oil could either be a blessing or a curse.
132 Some studies suggest that oil price volatility has a negative effect on economic growth (Cavalcanti 
et al., 2011; Leong and Mohaddes, 2011). Yet, only significant price shocks could have a macroeco-
nomic effect while the financial market could already be affected by minor changes and therefore oil 
companies are sensitive to volatility on the oil market (Oberndorfer, 2014: 68–69). Ramsay (2011) 
also suggests that world oil prices, strategic cartels, and drilling and environmental policies in the 
“developed” world can have a short-term effect on the political development in resource states (ibid.: 
526–527). To van Robays (2012) in turn it is high macroeconomic uncertainty that causes oil price 
volatility. 
133 Herb (2005) found rentierism to be no more harmful to democracy than other variables pertinent 
to the Middle East.
134 Di John (2011: 969) notes that in order to understand the rent-seeking behaviour of politicians it 
is important to consider how they came to power.
135 Furthermore, there are always reasons other than taxation, for citizens to demand accountability 
from their governments (Herb, 2005).
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The “Translated” Resource Curse
In this section I discuss how the resource curse narrative was presented to Ugandans. 
In the translation of the concept to the Ugandan context, NGOs highlighted how the 
three major causalities, explicated in the academic concept, were relevant to Uganda. 
I first look at the relevance of the causal links before I turn to the narrative.
The risk of suffering from a Dutch disease was considered likely because Uganda 
does not have a very strong industrial sector and the most common economic ac-
tivity is farming, which would become unviable in a Dutch disease scenario. The 
government tried to control this risk by creating forward linkages to the processing 
of the oil through the construction of a refinery. The government also stressed the 
necessity of national content to initiate a technology and knowledge transfer and 
NGOs assisted in this effort by holding dialogues on national content.
The possibility of oil to spur conflict has been stressed in Uganda as people of 
the oil region have already expressed demands to get their share of the revenues. 
Both Banyoro and Acholi have demanded to get ten percent of the oil revenues. 
Furthermore, Uganda has a troubled past with civil wars, conflicts and terrorist at-
tacks within the past 40 years. Although the government emphasises the peace it has 
brought to the country since the 1980s, the North has only very recently returned 
to stability. Aside from the internal conflicts, Uganda is also involved in conflicts in 
neighbouring countries such as South Sudan and the DRC (Tangri and Mwenda, 
2013). With the DRC there have been border disputes on Lake Albert that ended in 
several deaths. A relapse into conflict seemed a possibility and the organisation In-
ternational Alert hosted a cross-border conference in Hoima in June 2013 to further 
discuss and assess possibilities of cross-border initiatives and to develop recommen-
dations for peaceful oil exploitation.
With regard to the link between oil and authoritarianism, the same president 
has been ruling Uganda for 30 years and a multi-party democracy was introduced 
as late as 2005. The country has been described as a “hybrid regime” (Tripp, 2010), 
in which both authoritarian and democratic characteristics are present. Many civil 
society actors found it worthwhile to ask what would happen with the new oil rev-
enues and whether Museveni was holding on to power because of them. The past 
three elections have often been described as violent or at least marred by irregularities 
and civil society actors related this to President Museveni’s desire to stay in charge of 
the oil wealth.
The Narrative
The resource curse narrative was brought up and discussed in various forums like me-
dia publications, or conferences, workshops, and publications by CSOs. In general, 
national NGOs had their own publications, which were available on the internet or 
disseminated during their events. Funding for these publications was secured from 
various donors, who also seemed to be the main audience. In the villages I have not 
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encountered copies of long NGO reports but mainly brochures, posters, or calen-
dars. However, some CBOs like KHEDA had copies of reports available at their 
office libraries to be read there. For my analysis of the resource curse discourse, I 
considered a panoply of publications, news articles and speeches from civil society. 
These texts represent the narrative, which in this case includes images, while the dis-
course includes the actors and the way they produced, presented and consumed the 
narrative. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) show how discourse analysis distinguishes 
between text, discursive practice, involving text production and consumption, and 
social practice namely how discourse influences the order of the discourse. I have 
chosen to focus this discussion on the documentary “Blessing or Curse? Oil and 
Uganda’s Future.” It is representative of the rhetoric and images used in the discourse 
about the oil, exploring whether it is a blessing or a curse. I use the documentary to 
stress important elements of the resource curse as a risk narrative.
The documentary was produced for the Ugandan NGOs NAPE and AFIEGO. 
It was funded by Publish What You Pay and was screened at workshops, community 
meetings, dialogues and conferences organised by different CSOs. The documentary 
was produced for the two NGOs with the intention of putting oil on the agenda for 
the 2011 elections, as one of the directors of the production company told me. From 
my observation it was used more widely afterwards as a means to inform people 
about oil.
The documentary raises the question of what will happen to Uganda with the 
newfound oil. In the video, the oil exporter Nigeria is taken as example for the 
negative effects of oil and compared to the diamond exporter Botswana, a showcase 
example in which supposedly everything went right. In Botswana, the revenues from 
the diamonds were invested in education and building of vital infrastructure for the 
country. The movie skilfully plays out the dichotomy of blessing-curse/Botswana-
Nigeria. The following description of the film is a mixture of direct quotes and para-
phrases. Although focused on the text, it includes some emblematic pictures. The 
documentary is cut together from different materials such as archive clips, TV clips 
and animations, which, as can be noticed in the stills displayed below, have different 
qualities and different styles. Some parts of the documentary must have been shot in 
Kampala for the purpose of the documentary though. The documentary uses a lot of 
images but not all are clearly connected to the text.
The documentary starts with people who state their expectations for Uganda, 
ranging from education, health care, a stronger farming sector, markets for their 
produce, employment, electricity, or good governance to development. After this 
the narrator starts speaking and suggests that people have to learn about oil no mat-
ter what their hopes for Uganda’s future are. He then gives basic information about 
Uganda’s oil, such as the amount, what products can be gained from it, and how 
much money it will likely generate. The speaker also points out that the oil belongs 
to all Ugandans and not to a private person or company. He enumerates the positive 
developments that could arise from the new income such as the improvement of 
schools, hospitals, and of roads and electricity, which will spur business growth and 
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thereby create jobs. The oil money would free Uganda from foreign aid donors and 
allow Ugandans to determine their own destiny. He then continues with a warning 
about the negative effects of oil:
But natural resource wealth, the money earned from things like oil or dia-
monds, or gold is very strange money. If not handled very, very carefully, in-
stead of making a country richer, instead of improving the lives of its people, 
it can make them much poorer. Instead of being a blessing, it can be a curse. 
Here are the stories of two countries, one cursed by natural resource wealth, 
the other blessed by it. With the oil money Uganda’s future will be like one of 
these countries. We do not yet know which one.
The documentary turns to the first country example: Nigeria “the curse of natural re-
sources”. It points out that despite 600 billion US Dollars from the oil, there is sick-
ness, poverty, and war. The images, seen in the stills above (Figure 7 and 8), convey 
this image of dereliction and conflict. It lets Nigerians speak who contemplate how 
the fish and water were better before the oil came. They complain about a colonisa-
tion by a Nigerian elite and the oil corporation, about the lack of food and infra-
structure and about a lack of interest by the companies in the humans in the Delta. 
A man claims they have had 369 oil spillages per year in the Niger Delta.136 The final 
quote comes once again from a man who claims that this situation was brought upon 
them by the Nigerian government whose politicians had broken their promises. The 
narrator then tells the viewer Nigeria’s story of environmental destruction, conflict, 
corruption and poverty.137 It claims the death rate of children to be among the high-
136 This seems a moderate estimate since according to Amnesty International there were 553 oil spills 
in 2015 (Amnesty International, 2015).
137 It claims that seven out of ten Nigerians are poor today while twenty years ago only half of the 
people were poor. This estimation of the poverty rate matches data from the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
Figure 7 and 8: Niger Delta (Stills from documentary “Blessing or Curse?”: 7:14, 7:26).
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est in the world.138 The documentary describes the causal mechanism of how oil rev-
enues can hurt the economy through the Dutch disease phenomenon.
When a lot of foreign money floods into a country, there can be a big change 
in the exchange rate. Imports become cheaper and exports become more ex-
pensive making it harder for local producers, especially farmers and factories 
to compete.
The documentary then turns to the positive example: Botswana – “the blessing of 
natural resources.” In Botswana, the narrator explains, revenues from the diamonds 
were invested to improve the overall status of the country with four times the aver-
age income than Uganda.139 The documentary shows images of mines and orderly 
cities (Figure 9 and 10). It then gives voice to some Batswana who praise how the 
diamond mine has helped build the country because its revenues were invested in 
development.
The documentary continues by reflecting on the differences between Botswana 
and Nigeria and points out the rarity of Botswana’s trajectory.
[February 2018]. However, the World Bank reports 46% poverty in 2009 (http://data.worldbank.org/
country/nigeria [February 2018]).
138 The child mortality rates are decreasing but not as fast as in other countries. For an overview see a 
statistic from the World Bank on the child mortality rate in Nigeria: http://data.worldbank.org/indi 
cator/SH.DYN.MORT?locations=NG [February 2018]. 
139 The documentary clams the average person in Botswana earns 6400 U.S. Dollars. This estimation 
is similar to the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of 2011 (cf. www.tradingeconom 
ics.com/botswana/gdp-per-capita [February 2018]). What this estimation leaves out is that Botswana 
also has a very high income inequality (www.worldbank.org/en/country/botswana/overview [February 
2018]. Uganda’s nominal GDP per capita was 646 US Dollars in 2011 and therefore Botswana’s was 
almost ten times higher (cf. www.tradingeconomics.com/uganda/gdp-per-capita [February 2018]). 
The comparison must have been between Botswana’s nominal and Uganda’s GDP per capita adjusted 
by purchasing power parity, which is 1649 US Dollars in 2011 (www.tradingeconomics.com/uganda/
gdp-per-capita-ppp [February 2018]).
Figure 9 and 10: Botswana (Stills from documentary: 11:22, 10:41).
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We all wish our country’s future will be like Botswana and not like Nigeria. 
But we must take careful note, Botswana is the only resource-rich African 
country to escape the curse. The story of Nigeria has been repeated again and 
again. Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sudan. All of these countries suffer from some part of the curse. We 
don’t want Uganda to be next. What made Botswana so different from the 
other countries? What must we Ugandans do to follow Botswana’s path to 
avoid the curse and reap the blessing?
The documentary cuts to a speech from Barack Obama, introduced as the president 
of the United States, on the issue of transparency in the extractive sector, claiming 
that corruption was the “single greatest barrier to prosperity” in many places and a 
violation of human rights. Corruption is illustrated with an animation as shown in 
Figure 11 and 12.
The documentary continues with different Ugandans saying they wish their gov-
ernment would fight corruption and get democracy to end the political instabilities. 
The documentary then lists some of the latest corruption scandals in Uganda such as 
the one around the Commonwealth Head of Government Meeting:
The same may already be happening to oil. Government cannot or will not say 
how it has used the bonus money paid by the oil companies. If government 
continues to act in this way, then Uganda will surely suffer the curse.
Another cut follows to another speech of President Obama where he stresses that 
development depends on good governance and that good governance could unlock 
Africa’s potential but that this was the responsibility of Africans.
Government will not change by itself and the outside world will not change 
it for us. But we Ugandans can change the way government behaves. We will 
not have a better future simply by wishing for it. We can have a better future 
Figure 11 and 12: Animation on corruption (Stills from documentary: 7:44, 7:55).
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if we all work to make government accountable. […] Which Uganda will you 
work to create? […] We must all work to create a bright future for Uganda. 
We must insist that government not simply talk about ending corruption but 
take serious action. We must no longer give our votes in exchange for prom-
ises or small gifts but for deeds. If the people and Parliament of Uganda act 
together, we can make government handle the oil money openly and honestly. 
If we choose to do this we can reap the natural resource blessing. If we do not 
do this we will be doomed by the curse.
The last sentences are underlined with the animations depicted in Figure 13 and 14 
that visualise the two futures by a man either crying or laughing (AFIEGO, NAPE, 
PWYP, Documentary, Blessing or Curse (n.d.)).
Let us take a closer look at the narrative by analysing the documentary with some 
deconstruction strategies (Czarniawska, 2004: 97).140 Czarniawska suggests disman-
tling dichotomies, examining silences, attending to disruptions, focusing on the ele-
ment most alien and interpreting metaphors or even reconstructing the story by 
changing the main elements. I explore the first five points in the following section.
Deconstructing the Narrative
Several dichotomies are noticeable: blessing/curse, Botswana/Nigeria and corrup-
tion/good governance. Blessing/curse and Nigeria/Botswana are also metaphors used 
to describe the effects of the oil. The documentary uses the sketches of two African 
countries to paint the picture of Uganda’s petro-future. It ends on the question, 
which way Uganda would go: the Nigerian way, or the Botswana way. This is one 
140 I am aware that my analysis only focuses on two aspects of the documentary, namely the text 
and the pictures and leaves aside other elements such as sound or cut. This is in line with my overall 
analysis, which is focused on images and narratives.
Figure 13 and 14: Animation on future for Uganda (Stills from documentary: 17:39, 17:45).
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element of the resource curse discourse that can be found throughout: there is always 
a negative and a positive example.
In the documentary Nigeria was portrayed in dark pictures showing pollution 
and dereliction, accompanied by melancholic music. The example of Nigeria was so 
popular that Nigeria became a metaphor for all that is bad about oil. The Director of 
the national NGO Water Governance Institute (WGI)141 answered as follows when 
I asked him what Nigeria stood for:
A basket case. A bad story about oil. And yet, those who visited Nigeria know 
that oil is not the only resource there. But in the minds of people, oil can be 
a disaster. Oil is bad. Oil kills. Ken Saro-Wiwa. You remember those stories, 
right? So that’s what Nigeria portrays to many in Uganda (Director, WGI, 
interview, 2013).
Accordingly, many times Nigeria was equated with corruption, bad governance, oil 
pollution, greedy oil companies, and politicians and widespread poverty.
The documentary also polarises between Ugandans, mainly referred to as “we” 
and the government. The government is not included in the group of Ugandans and 
is rather associated with corrupt leaders. The text switches twice from “we” to “you,” 
once at the beginning and once at the end. It thus creates a disruption in the text 
flow. With “you” the speaker addresses the audience directly, saying that they should 
learn about oil and gas and that they should know which Uganda they wish to create. 
By allowing other Ugandans to speak, the documentary gives itself legitimacy to use 
the “we” as a representation of the general public. However, the viewer does not learn 
the names or profession of those filmed. They remain anonymous faces with voices, 
sometimes even just voices.
The same switching between a collective “we” and “you” was employed by the 
Director of WGI during a sensitisation campaign in a village near the refinery area. 
Promoting the NGO’s tool for monitoring oil-related activities in the oil region, the 
Director emphasised the responsibility people have:
 It is your responsibility to make government listen to you. Government 
doesn’t care about you. But government is there to do things on our behalf. If 
these people do not listen to what the people say, nothing will be done. You 
need to talk. Government world over only listens to numbers: the voters. […] 
And remember, we are dealing with people that are super rich. People that 
have access to power. But you must know what you are fighting for and [have] 
141 Water Governance Institute is a Ugandan NGO based in Kampala and directed by Henry Bazira. 
It was established as an NGO in 2008 and as a company in 2009. Bazira was the chairman of the 
Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas from its beginning up to 2012. WGI is working on water and 
environment issues and has also taken up oil on its portfolio. For more information see http://www.
watergovinst.org/test/index.php [February 2018].
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resolution. Don’t fight your wars alone (Director, WGI, NGO community 
meeting, Nyahaira, 2012).
In his speech he asked people to fight together. He kept changing between the pro-
nouns of “you” and “we” and positioned the “we” group against the people with pow-
er and money. The director of another NGO that also participated in this campaign 
left no doubt about the legitimacy of that richness. He accused the government and 
the oil companies of being thieves, who were stealing from the people.
Czarniawska (2004) suggests looking at what is silenced, which in this case are 
the voices of the oil companies and of the government of Nigeria and Uganda while 
the Presidents Mogae and Obama were quoted. Despite their important role in the 
narrative, they are not commenting on it. Strangely absent is also the wider econom-
ic setting. The oil or natural resource wealth is the most alien element, as it is new to 
the Ugandan setting and it has wondrous characteristics. It could bring prosperity 
but also sickness, poverty and war.
Another important element of the narrative is the imagery employed: the docu-
mentary shows flames, polluted environments, derelict buildings, and cartoons of 
corrupt and evil officials. It contrasts this with images of prosperity and happy peo-
ple. It creates a scenario in which oil in the hand of evil and corrupted people poses a 
threat to Ugandans and their livelihoods. Similar pictures were used in presentations 
and leaflets that can be seen in the two examples depicted in Figure 15 and 16.
NGOs stressed the importance of swift action highlighting the imminent threat 
posed by any oil activities.
Looking at our current legal framework, you will appreciate that Ugandans 
are sitting on a time bomb and to avert this imminent danger, there is need 
to overhaul the current legal regime and usher in an all inclusive legislation 
that is people centred. Addressing the sharing of revenues from oil sales, es-
tablishing a mechanism of adequate accountability and transparency in all 
oil deals should be the pride of every Ugandan in their respective capacities 
(Kamugisha, 2010: 5).
In this quote Kamugisha, the Director of AFIEGO, speaks of a “time bomb” and an 
“imminent danger” while in other publications activists complain about a “danger,” 
“peril” or “doom.” Like the sensational text metaphors, the imagery was also rather 
sensationalist. NGOs claimed that this was meant to warn the public of the threats 
and help demand a prosperous future for all from their government. Some claims 
even went as far as making it appear certain that oil would pollute the waters in the 
oil region – an area where many people depend on fishing for their livelihood. One 
national NGO widely used pictures of fire explosions and polluted rivers in the 
Niger delta, subtitling them e.g. “Polluted Ogoni River – Oil in Uganda if not well 
managed, will pose a threat to community livelihoods” (NAPE, 2012a: 7).
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The negative language combined with the portrayal of careless leaders and horror 
scenarios from other countries created an infernal picture of Uganda’s future with oil. 
During an interview with the Chairman LC 1 of Kaiso, I noticed a poster on the wall 
of his house, hung in between calendar posters of President Museveni and President 
Kabila of the DRC. The poster, shown above, was from NAPE and pictured an oil 
rig flaring gas. Asked about it, he explained to me that the poster was making them 
worry because of the fire burning. He said they worried it might look like that in 
their area at some point (Chairman LC 1 Kaiso, interview, 2012). When I asked him 
about the activities of NGOs and whether they were helping them, he said that they 
didn’t see any change. The NGOs just came and taught the people a few things, leav-
ing behind books and posters like this and thought this was enough but they neither 
really helped nor changed anything, nor told people how to get help. According to 
the Chairman LC 1, they just came, dropped information and disappeared again, 
leaving the local people behind with new worries and a sensation of “not feeling at 
home” (Chairman LC 1 Kaiso, interview, 2012). This discomfort might not just be 
connected to these horror images but also to the terms, in which the new risk was 
expressed.
Figure 15 and 16: Cover page of NGO publication (NAPE 2012a), Sticker from oil coali-
tion likening oil in Uganda to Nigeria (Oilwatch Network).
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The Meaning of Curse
Translating a concept from Western-dominated academia to Uganda comes with its 
intricacies, as the following quote shows. The Chairman LC 5 from Nebbi accused 
NGOs of overlooking the good effects oil could have and creating undue fear by us-
ing the notion of a curse.
Some agents whenever they come here, they ask the question is oil a curse or 
is it a blessing? Now, what do you answer? When they talk of the cursing part 
of it they say that oil is a curse because of ABCD. […] Now, when does oil 
come, what are we going to do? You begin looking at your community. You 
think of digging your own grave. When the oil comes you bury yourself. Some 
people don’t talk about the good part of oil. But when you hear about other 
countries, you will find out they are living vis-à-vis the oil production. If it is 
a curse, why are those people not dying? (Chairman LC 5 Nebbi, RICE-WN 
conference, 2012).
The Chairman LC 5’s statement raised the question, which sort of connotation the 
word “curse” may have. In the Western academic context, it was connected to nar-
ratives like that of King Midas (Karl 1997). Typically, in the re-territorialisation a 
travelling model can get adapted in unintended ways because some elements of the 
model might refer to something, which is not present in the new setting or at least 
not in the initial way (Behrends et al. 2014: 4). In Uganda, a country where witch-
craft beliefs are not uncommon, calling the oil a curse can be viewed as a very real 
and menacing threat (cf. Behrend 2007). The curse metaphor should therefore be 
considered in the context of existing discourses.
The Chairman LC 5 quoted above was from Nebbi District in West Nile, a re-
gion that has experienced conflicts and an uneasy relationship with the central state 
and is most infamously known for its offspring Idi Amin. Mark Leopold (2005a) de-
scribes how people in West Nile talked about being cursed in the turbulent times of 
his fieldwork in the 1990s. The curse they referred to was claimed to date back to the 
cruel Belgian rule and was cast on those collaborating with the government. Through 
rituals to lift the curse and historical narratives, elders in West Nile attempted to rec-
oncile and change the perception of West Nile from both inside and outside. In such 
a context talking about a curse could indeed, as the politician suggested, give the idea 
that once again conflict and violence would return to the region. Thus, alongside the 
mobilisation of academic knowledge within the discourse on oil new interpretations 
and meanings can get connected to this knowledge as in this case where the LC 5 
draws a clear connection between curse and death. Knowledge is always embedded 
in a specific context; it is intertwined with its environment and both feed back into 
each other. Hence, a translation of the resource curse into a new context transforms 
the new context as much as the context alters the concept.
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The concept leaves two questions to be asked: who can curse and why? Whether in 
a biblical sense or in a Runyoro understanding of a curse, the basic principle behind 
it is one of responsibility and blame. Resource curse is translated into Runyoro as 
omukyeno gwa amafuta, which literally means “curse of oil.”142 According to different 
sources, omukyeno is a curse that torments somebody who has done evil, like killing 
someone or abusing her or his parents. It was conferred by those who have the power 
to curse like parents, elders or victims and cast on someone who has done something 
wrong or evil. Curses open up a space for assigning responsibility; thus, enabling 
people to blame misfortune on someone (Reynolds Whyte, 1997). In general, the 
logic of blame inherent in curses and witchcraft is connected to risks, which by 
revealing relations between risk objects and objects at risk also allows for assigning 
blame.
Blaming itself is a political activity directed at community-making (Douglas, 
1992: 8). Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) describe how blame varies according to the 
gravity of the harm: “for a total disaster, responsibility is located at the top” (ibid.: 
39). As such, when a whole country suffers from the resource curse, the leader(s) 
of the country must be responsible. The NGOs tried to assign responsibility for a 
potential disaster to the political head, namely to the government, and thus – in a 
democracy – ultimately to the people. Everyone must be vigilante to prevent the 
curse and any suffering would hence be the people’s own fault.
Seen in this way, the resource curse concept places the responsibility on the states 
and the people suffering from the curse. It confines the resource curse to a national 
debate and disregards the influence of international forces and other states. How-
ever, going further than the resource curse concept, the CSOs in Uganda also as-
signed blame to the oil companies putting them at times above, at times on par 
with the government. While the government was “quick-fixing” oil governance, the 
oil industry was “making a kill” and their activities were called a “scramble,” or “oil 
bonanza.”
So far, I have established the elements of the narrative and shown how the re-
source curse was used to assign blame. The next section explores further how the 
resource curse can be understood as a risk narrative.
A Successful Risk Narrative
Resource curse is a catchy term that seems effective in conveying the seriousness of 
what is at stake, and it allows civil society actors to assign blame and convey their idea 
of what is right and wrong behaviour. In their publications, the NGOs presented the 
resource curse as a risk and offered possible solutions to manage it. The wellbeing of 
Ugandans, especially those residing in the extractive areas was put at risk by the gov-
ernment of Uganda and most especially the corrupt members of the government for 
inviting economic havoc that jeopardised the wellbeing of the citizens. To make this 
142 Sometimes it is also called omukyeno gwa amagita, but the meaning remains the same.
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causal connection, the narrative draws on knowledge from diverse sources: concepts 
from economics, political and social science, statistics from bodies such as the World 
Bank, previous corruption scandals in Uganda, and concepts from developmental 
and civil society discourse, such as good governance. In this sub-chapter, I consider 
the level of success of this narrative.
The Resource Blessing
So far, I have shown that the curse is a powerful narrative that draws on striking 
examples, such as Nigeria, and plays out a dichotomy between the good and the 
bad, the blessing and the curse. In the following, I look at the counter-argument that 
resource wealth could indeed be a blessing.
The “governance curse” (Pegg, 2006), a variation of the resource curse, stipulates 
that a country only suffers from the curse, if there is poor governance hindering 
transparency and accountability. It blames governments in the producing countries 
for how they handle the resource and revenues from it. Regarding armed conflicts, 
it was criticised that international organisations like the UN have put too much fo-
cus on the greed of rebels, rather than on controlling the resource mismanagement 
by governments (Vines, 2006). Since the turn of the century, the governance curse 
concept has been taken up by non-academic and non-governmental actors, such as 
Global Witness or Transparency International (Weszkalnys, 2011: 355–356). Later, 
also international institutions like the World Bank became involved in the famous 
“Doba-model” in Chad. Despite doubts over the efficacy of fighting the curse, as 
raised for the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project (Pegg, 2006), the governance curse 
is influential outside of academia and has exponents in civil society and the govern-
ment in Uganda. The major question in Uganda was how to put the right gover-
nance structures in place to make oil a blessing for the country.
Proclaimed solutions to the resource curse that may help turning the oil into 
a blessing include: oil should remain in the ground until the country has set the 
right policy and governance framework; civil society and international corporations 
should try to influence developments in the oil sector; resource extraction should 
not be left solely to the private sector; good contracts should be negotiated and 
sound investment strategies developed; incentives should be explored to prevent ac-
tors from rent-seeking behaviour; and finally transparency and accountability should 
be pursued (Humphrey et al., 2007: 15–18). These have been widely picked up by 
civil society actors.
In Uganda, CSOs managed to create a threatening scenario through the doc-
umentaries, publications, and posters, which left no doubt about responsibilities: 
without good governance and transparency, the government officials will allow the 
curse to happen, making them responsible for putting Uganda’s people and environ-
ment at risk. However, the resource curse was presented as a risk that could be man-
aged, given transparency, good policies, and good governance were in place.
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Oil is a blessing to Uganda. It is a curse only when it is badly managed. Petro-
leum wealth has the potential [of ] lifting millions of Ugandans out of poverty, 
but it also runs the risk of plunging them further into abject poverty and 
[into] the resource-curse syndrome much touted in the resource-rich develop-
ing countries like Uganda. In order for oil to continue being a blessing, it re-
quires a robust legislative and institutional framework that provides transpar-
ency and accountability in the management of the sector (Bazira, 2012: 2).
Several civil society actors I interacted with were in touch with academics from 
around the globe and were invited to workshops held by international NGOs or 
worldwide initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
and Publish What You Pay that promote better and more transparent resource ex-
traction. EITI is an international organisation describing itself as a “global standard 
to promote the open and accountable management of natural resources.”143 On its 
board are implementing and supporting countries, as well as representatives from 
civil society, the industry, and institutional investors. Since its foundation in 2002, 
countries and companies have been able to sign up to the standard, and thus commit 
themselves to publishing information on the oil and gas operations.144 These initia-
tives set out to help any new or prospective oil producing state to avoid the pitfalls of 
the resource curse. Uganda has a Publish What You Pay chapter and EITI has been 
trying to get the government’s commitment – albeit without success so far.
While the governance curse indirectly declares the government as a risk object, 
the people are considered a crucial element for managing this risk. CSOs encouraged 
the audiences at their events to actively participate in the resource management and 
take responsibility for shaping Uganda’s future with oil. Just like the narrator at the 
end of the documentary I cited above, attendants of conferences and community 
meetings were repeatedly asked how the oil could be turned into a blessing, how its 
benefits could be harnessed and how the curse could be avoided. The solution for 
turning the oil into a blessing or “harnessing” its potential was applying the “inter-
nationally recognised mechanisms for managing such impacts” (International Alert, 
2011: 13) as developed by international experts. The negative assessments described 
in the sub-chapter of the resource curse were balanced by comments about the “po-
tential” to “reap” the benefits of oil if the right mechanisms were employed.
The panaceas prescribed to make oil extraction a successful endeavour in Ugan-
da included accountability, transparency, capacity-building and good governance. 
Thandika Mkandawire (2010: 267) points out how “good governance” was initially 
an input of African scholars to the World Bank stressing that the main challenge to 
development was the establishment of state-society relations that are democratic, 
respectful of citizen’s rights, socially inclusive, and maximising economic growth. 
143 See the EITI website at https://eiti.org/about/who-we-are [February 2018].
144 For a critical analysis of the effectiveness of EITI see Corrigan (2014) and Kasekende et al. (2016). 
According to both studies, EITI has failed to reduce corruption scores.
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However, it has been incorporated simply as a technocratic term or perhaps one 
could say, as an ingredient needed for the economic policies of the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund to work, in other words, “one more instrument 
for ensuring the implementation of adjustment programmes” (Mkandawire, 2010: 
267). Used in this way good governance was less about state-society relations than 
state-world economic system relations, as it left little room for governments to act 
according to their democratic mandate but judged them according to the implemen-
tation progress of these institutions’ policies.
Overall, the cures can be viewed as a reflection of current beliefs in the develop-
ment sector. The words of the development discourse, such as transparency or good 
governance, have enjoyed increasing popularity because of what they promise, their 
ability to establish consent, and ultimately because of their “feel-good factor” (Corn-
wall and Eade, 2010: 6).145 Thomas Bierschenk notes that such reforms have often 
failed, characterising them as “the full-scale transposition of organizational models 
developed somewhere else as solutions to specific problems found elsewhere” (Bier-
schenk, 2014b: 82).
The resource curse is a risk narrative that sets out what is at stake: the wellbeing 
of people in the country and especially the extractive communities and national se-
curity. And it points to what is threatening it: greedy persons in the country and in 
international corporations. The curse offers a way to handle this risk: by following 
international best practice. With the translation of the resource curse as a travelling 
model to Uganda “local ideas of development” (Bierschenk, 2014b) or visions of 
(un)desireable futures are produced.
A Bright Future
The resource curse narrative caught on beyond the circles of civil society, with rep-
resentatives of the oil companies and government and state officials also positioning 
themselves within the resource curse debate claiming oil to be a blessing if managed 
well. In line with images raised in the resource curse narrative, Nigeria served as 
a point of reference also for oil companies and government officials when talking 
about the oil curse and worries about Uganda’s future. The CEO of Tullow, Aidan 
Heavey, declared the oil a blessing for Uganda in an interview with the magazine of 
the Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum.
Uganda has a great opportunity. It is first in the queue for a lot of oil devel-
opers in East Africa. And the whole of Uganda needs to get behind the oil 
project and stop being very critical of the same. To say that oil is a curse really 
means that Uganda can’t handle its oil. Uganda is very well able to handle its 
145 A collection of critical essays surrounding development discourse deconstructs many of the words 
used in it (Cornwall and Eade, 2010). For further critical analyses of concepts of the development 
discourse see the “development dictionary” (Sachs, 1992).
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oil. Everybody should be supportive of the industry […]. Unfortunately, the 
whole oil industry has a bad name. That name was quite right 20 years ago. 
Everybody for instance points at Nigeria to see what a bad name it had. But 
you can’t look back 20 years ago and say that is what the oil industry is. The 
companies are responsible today, there is transparency. There might not be 
transparency in some of the countries, but there is transparency in the compa-
nies because they are obliged by the stock exchange rules. Our books are open 
(Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, [2013]a: 10).
In this interview quote, Heavey acknowledges that what happened in Nigeria created 
a bad image of the oil industry, but he tries to project the image into the past as if all 
that caused Nigeria to become a metaphor for the negative effects of oil has ceased to 
be true. He stresses how the oil industry had changed, how it had grown in terms of 
responsibility and transparency and attributes this change to the influence of share-
holders and financial transparency required by stock exchanges.146
In other publications Tullow speaks more clearly of a resource blessing (e.g. Tul-
low Oil PLC, 2015: 11). The CEO also applies the language of good governance and 
transparency, commonly used in NGO circles. He clears companies of corruption 
while blaming governments for it. He therefore appropriates the travelling model 
of the governance curse as it deflects blame from the oil companies to the govern-
ment.
He stresses that Uganda can handle its oil and asks everyone to support the proj-
ect, knowing that a lack of support could lead to a situation similar to the develop-
ments in the Niger delta. Thus, he promotes a view of the Ugandan government as 
autonomous and functioning, clearly taking a different position than many NGOs 
that lamented government’s lack of transparency and incapacity to deal with the oil 
industry. It is not surprising he makes these claims, as the government’s legitimacy is 
connected to the legitimacy of the contracts his company is holding.
The government of Uganda joined the oil companies in promoting oil as a bless-
ing. However, it also found that this was only possible if properly managed. One of 
the government’s initial plans related to oil was the National Oil and Gas Policy in 
2008, which aimed at using the oil revenues to eradicate poverty, create value for 
society, and to avoid the oil curse:
It [the policy] also recognizes that if the country’s petroleum resources and 
revenues are not well managed, the sub sector [sic] has the potential to have 
the most negative impact on society, ‘The Oil Curse’ or the paradox of plenty. 
The oil curse is the negative effect of oil and gas resource utilization leading to 
economic stagnation, environment degradation and increased poverty. The oil 
curse can and should be avoided (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Develop-
ment, 2008: x).
146 The rise of shareholder value is discussed in more detail in the chapter on national content.
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The National Oil and Gas Policy advises that high expectations of the public with 
regard to the oil should be managed and anxieties reduced through a “constructive 
dialogue” between all stakeholders (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development 
2008). The 2008 policy functioned as the industry guideline until the creation of 
dedicated oil legislation in 2013. The policy stresses the need to mitigate expecta-
tions and disseminate information in order to deal with concerns raised by the public 
– very similar to many civil society publications.
Subscribing to the resource curse hypothesis, many state and government officials 
positioned their arguments within the curse/blessing dichotomy framework by por-
traying Uganda to be in a prime position to enjoy the blessings of oil. During a civil 
society workshop, the District Community Development Officer (CDO) from Arua 
district also reiterated this point of view.
With industrialization and urbanization we will see big business come to our 
country. How do we achieve this? Definitely these things will come, as the 
country grows, as the country realizes its own revenues. And the revenues will 
come from the oil. The oil revenues shall be invested in infrastructure and 
social services and then everyone will benefit. So oil is not a curse. You have 
heard yesterday that if it is a blessing or a curse, I am saying it is a blessing 
(CDO Arua, RICE workshop, Arua, 2013).
Countering the gloomy projections from the CSOs, the officer suggested that easily, 
almost naturally, wealth and development would flow from oil. Rather than refut-
ing the curse/blessing dichotomy established by civil society, government officials 
stressed what they had achieved for Uganda, and their commitment to continuing 
their dedicated service to the country. Government representatives used the resource 
curse frame in their public speeches like the Chairman LC 5 of Buliisa during a civil 
society workshop held by the Buliisa Initiative for Rural Development Organisation 
(BIRUDO).
We don’t want to run away from treasure. We don’t want to be sad when 
we should be happy. Everybody wants to talk of the oil as a curse. As if it is 
a rule. Oil curse is not a rule. Oil becomes a curse only where there is bad 
governance. And I think the concern of Uganda especially from 1986 to date 
has been a positive trend toward good governance (Chairman LC 5 Buliisa, 
BIRUDO workshop, 2012).
The statements from the chairmen LC 5 and the legislation texts show that the re-
source curse risk has been established in the public discourse. While the state officials 
did accept the risk of the resource curse, they did not see the same chances for a nega-
tive outcome as CSOs. In fact, both government officials and oil companies created 
visions of a bright future for Uganda.
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In his 2012 state of the nation address, President Museveni proclaimed: “With our 
oil, matters will be easier. We shall be able to fund the roads, the railway and the 
power stations easily using our own money” (Museveni, 2012). Oil would enable the 
fulfilment of the development plan “Uganda Vision 2040”. This plan envisages “a 
transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country 
within 30 years” (National Planning Authority, 2013), seeing Uganda develop from 
a predominantly low income to a competitive upper middle income country. In his 
2015 state of the nation address, Museveni stressed that the government had long 
made major accomplishments with limited financial resources, and suggested that 
with oil and gas revenues, they could achieve even more.
Oil revenues are central to the government’s Vision 2040 as they would be in-
vested in the development of the country’s infrastructure and education system. The 
hope stated in this vision is that oil and gas would present opportunities for eco-
nomic growth by creating employment and fostering technology transfer. To “effec-
tively harness the opportunity” (National Planning Authority, 2013: 48) that oil and 
gas provide in stimulating economic growth, good governance would be essential, 
otherwise these opportunities would be missed and the resource curse would unfold. 
Therefore, efforts should be focused on the development of infrastructure, technol-
ogy, and human resources as well as guaranteeing peace and security.
Based on the assumption that it would add value to the oil by creating forward 
linkages to other industries, the government demanded the construction of a refinery 
in Uganda. To further stimulate industry linkages, the government also planned to 
offer capacity building and establish local area development funds for local busi-
nesses. Towns would be upgraded to cities, and Hoima would become the oil city of 
Uganda. The cities would get public transportation, airports, (inter)national referral 
hospitals, as well as science and technology parks. The Vision 2040 also postulates 
that the government would strengthen the legal and institutional framework of the 
sector providing transparency, environmental protection, and good governance (Na-
tional Planning Authority, 2013). Altogether, the document stipulates a grandiose 
vision for Uganda.
The grand vision of using the anticipated oil wealth to elevate the country to a 
better overall status are reminiscent of the glorious futures other petro-states such as 
Nigeria and Venezuela once proclaimed. Yet, they failed to deliver on their promises 
and subsequently served as the empirical grounds for the resource curse. They fell 
into the trap of the rentier state: they thought modernity was a commodity to be 
purchased instead of a process; they believed the allocation of oil rents was the same 
as real development (Yates, 1996: 173–174). Coronil, in turn, calls representatives 
of the state tricksters and magicians who “embodied the myth of progress and gave 
it a specific form” (Coronil, 1997: 369). They tried to use oil money to buy develop-
ment, but because money was not productive they could only simulate development 
with it (Coronil, 1997: 389). Rather than delivering development, the states merely 
performed development and modernity (Apter, 2005). Yet, such performances are 
an essential element of politics, as political anthropologists working on rituals have 
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shown (e.g. Kertzer, 1988). Visions and plans can also be seen as political perfor-
mances of modernity and development. Planning has been described as a future-
directed activity that is a performative promise between actors perceived as corporate 
entities, e.g. the state and the citizenry (Abram and Weszkalnys, 2011). As such 
performative acts, these plans may work even if they do not deliver the modernity 
they promise.
Unlike their former Nigerian and Venezuelan counterparts, the Ugandan state 
officials considered the grand failures of other countries in their grand visions for 
the future. The acceptance of the resource curse risk is a major feat for civil society, 
because once a risk is accepted, it can be used to influence future developments by 
opening up a space to voice questions of blame and how the risk should be man-
aged. The successful emplacement of a risk considerably shapes the future of any 
socio-technical network (Hilgartner, 1992: 52). If the risk object was not accepted, 
there would be no grounds for discussion (Hilgartner, 1992: 48–50). The risk of a 
curse and the promise of a bright future influenced the anticipation of oil and how 
people perceived their future with oil production close to their homes. Effectively, 
in Uganda, the establishment of the resource curse risk changed the oil arena and 
created a need for certain actors and institutions, such as CSOs, to engage in risk 
management and to prevent the resource curse. The risk calls for management, poli-
cies, and institutions to deal with it. The next sub-chapter looks more closely at the 
ways in which this risk narrative was relevant to civil society actors and their work.
Crude Brokering: Profiting from the Resource Curse4.3 
The resource curse was promoted with donor money and this donor money could be 
viewed as part of the revenues circulating in the oil arena or in fact as constituting its 
own sub-arena. In a way, resource rents and development rents are similar, since both 
are unearned income and states dependent on aid could also be considered as rentier 
states (Bierschenk, 1999). The major difference is that rents from aid come from dif-
ferent sources and always need to be lobbied for. Paul Collier (2006) also thinks that 
development aid could be considered as a rent but to him the key difference lies in 
the fact that development aid, at least from European or North-American donors, is 
usually tied to conditions.
From this vantage point, Uganda has been a rentier state for some time since 
it has been highly dependent on international capital in form of development as-
sistance (Jones, 2009: 9). Jones (2009: 6) cites a background report of the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning according to which donor assistance to the gov-
ernment represented more than 50 per cent of the country’s total budget between 
1985 and 2005. Uganda has been described as the “poster child” (Jones, 2009: 1) of 
liberal approaches to economic and social development in Africa with initiatives of 
deregulation of the economy and decentralisation of the state (ibid.). The aid money 
was also important for actors within civil society. Here, I focus on their effects on 
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civil society. I consider the benefits civil society actors could gain from promoting 
the resource curse.
The economy of expectations developed its own dynamic and money granted to 
civil society to fight the negative effects of oil revenues turned out to have controver-
sial effects. Rather than uniting and strengthening civil society, it broke up alliances. 
To understand these developments it is necessary to consider the role of civil society 
actors in the oil arena.
Creating Space for Brokerage
In social anthropology, the role of a broker was described by Jeremy Boissevain 
(1966) in his study on patronage networks in Sicily. This “man in the middle” has 
many dyadic relations that put him in “a position to place two people, possibly 
unknown to each other, into a mutually beneficial relationship from which he de-
rives profit” (ibid.: 24–25). The Ugandan civil society brokers I write about did not 
just link two people, but two sets of actors to one another. Civil society actors in 
Uganda presented themselves as the linkage between communities and the govern-
ment. They are comparable to brokers in a Baileyian sense, who mediate between 
different structures and systems and have a rather ambiguous standing (Bailey 1969: 
167). Civil society brokers did not just mediate between the state and its citizens in 
faraway villages, they also mediated between international organisations and these 
communities. Thus, they did not just broker between two structures, but rather vari-
ous interlacing structures or systems.
Brokerage has been adapted to the development context with the term “develop-
ment brokers” (Bierschenk et al., 2000, 2002; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). Develop-
ment brokers function as mediators between target groups and their assumed needs 
and donors. They translate between different culture codes and they mobilise exter-
nal funds for the social arena in which they play a more or less direct political role.147 
The Ugandan civil society actors are best described as such “development brokers” 
who know how to gain, maintain and use the rents from donor aid available in the 
“economy of expectation” (Weszkalnys, 2011).
The work of brokers is based on patron-client-relations (Bailey, 1969; Bierschenk 
et al., 2000, 2002; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). In Uganda, the CSO directors chan-
nelled resources like a “sensitisation workshop” or an invitation to a regional or 
national conference to leaders in the community and obtained their cooperation 
in return. Cooperation meaning that those leaders “mobilised” the right kind and 
number of people in their communities, so that the organisation could achieve its 
outreach targets and the sensitisation workshops were considered a success by the do-
nors. Maintenance of these relationships was necessary to ensure continued flow of 
147 In a recent article, Bierschenk (2014b) distinguishes further between the brokers and the “norm 
entrepreneurs” that are active in “watchdog NGOs” and part of the translation of travelling models of 
the global “social engineering” (ibid.).
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donor money. Thus, the community support, these development brokers depended 
on, was connected to the broker’s ability to create patron-client-relationships.
In order to get access to funding that allows building such relationships they 
needed to create a space for brokerage and present themselves to both donors and 
communities as the go-to person (Bierschenk et al., 2000, 2002; Mosse and Lewis, 
2006; Murphy, 1981). Brokers do not just respond to needs but provoke them them-
selves (Bierschenk, 1999: 65). This is done by portraying communities in ways that 
demand the broker’s intervention and neatly fit their expertise.
CSOs in Uganda gained their broker space in two ways. First, they established 
the resource curse as a risk, as shown in the previous sub-chapter. Being able to estab-
lish a risk, means influencing not only the outlook to the future but also the future 
itself. CSOs argued that good governance was needed to prevent the resource curse. 
Good governance could not only be entrusted to the state but necessitated an active 
civil society as checks and balances. Second, CSOs argued people lacked knowledge 
about oil and needed to be informed about their role to demand good governance 
from the state, and they established that CSOs were best suited to carry out these 
sensitisation campaigns.
According to CSOs, communities in the oil area lacked basic knowledge about 
oil and were therefore unable to formulate their demands and effectively communi-
cate their grievances. One organisation described communities as “grappling in the 
dark” and being ignorant and uncertain about the environmental effects of the oil 
industry (NAPE, 2011: 12). Indeed, a lack of information was decried by people in 
the oil region who lived far from the political and economic centre of the country. 
Again and again, people stressed to me how they did not know about oil and felt 
generally left out. While people wanted information, there seemed to be no steady 
and reliable information flow from the companies or the state.148 I also heard civil 
society activists talk about misperceptions people had about oil. According to them, 
people were wondering whether oil flowed like a river, or thought they could fetch 
oil from the well with their jerry cans like they do with water, and thereby become 
instant millionaires.149
I have rarely encountered such high expectations during my fieldwork. Maybe 
this was a disillusionment resulting from the successful work of CSOs, media, and 
the government to reduce expectations. Another explanation would be that such 
148 The relatively free, open and vibrant media in Uganda does cover the developments around the 
oil but does not publish exact and timely information on when and where drilling or seismic surveys 
start. Furthermore, access to media is limited in the more distant places of the oil region where news-
papers and magazines do not reach and only radio or online news, if a digital device is at hand, are 
available. While I collected all oil-related newspaper reports, I could not follow all the local radio sta-
tions. NGOs did use them though during their sensitisation campaigns, buying time on air to deliver 
information, gather feedback and hold discussion rounds.
149 Though with Uganda’s high inflation rate, one can already be a millionaire with the equivalent of 
around 270 Euros.
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expectations were dramatised by CSOs and used to demonstrate the need to sensitise 
the communities.
They [people in Hoima and Buliisa] believe the presence of the industry will 
affect their moral and cultural integrity of the local communities and worsen 
the climate change situation in the region. The team’s perception is that where 
oil activities are occurring, people are relatively aware of the oil industry’s pres-
ence and operations. They have received some information about the industry 
but still consider that information inadequate (Water Governance Institute, 
2012: 4–5).
Displaying the ignorance of communities was useful to the CSOs because it turned 
information dissemination into a necessity if the risk of the resource curse was ac-
cepted. A need that could be addressed by CSOs. Hence, ignorance and lack of 
agency of communities were essential for the CSOs to legitimise their work. Once 
created, the broker space was defended against infringements from other brokers, as 
the next section elaborates.
Manoeuvring within Oil Coalitions
There are differences in strength among brokers; with strength being measured in 
resources (e.g. personal, financial, knowledge) they have access to. Brokers can move 
in and out of the broker zone depending on their network skills to maintain their 
broker position or their ability to ‘upgrade’ it to a better position. Just like the bro-
kers Bailey described these activists were helping people to make demands but they 
also directed money from different structures to their own organisation and hence 
to their own resources. Several times, the management style of directors from CSOs 
came up as a problem in coalitions that had formed around the oil. I discuss these 
struggles below, because they further substantiate the broker argument, highlighting 
how the actors manoeuvred within coalitions to gain a better position and therefore 
access to the funds.
With a new wave of donor money, several oil coalitions were riven by rows about 
the allocation of these revenues. During my stay, I witnessed three different struggles 
within civil society surrounding the allocation of donor money and positions, which 
I will briefly discuss here. They all highlight how gaining and maintaining broker 
space and control of funds is essential for development brokers. There were two big 
scandals around the leadership of the coalition within the national networks and 
both originated from the same development broker. Donors who provided funding 
to these networks were exasperated by the capability of one individual to usurp coali-
tions and render them immobile.
Publish What You Pay Uganda was the first to come under this sort of inside 
attack. The said broker raised suspicions in some members regarding the way funds 
had been used by the coalition’s leadership. Accusing the leadership of a lack of ac-
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countability, this group of organisations split from the network. They started lobby-
ing for funds themselves while continuing to use the name of Publish What You Pay, 
thereby claiming ownership of the coalition. A DGF manager told me they stalled 
this controversy over ownership of the coalition by not dealing with the split-off 
section and by Publish What You Pay International coming in to solve the issue. In 
October 2013, Publish What You Pay held a workshop trying to find out how the 
process of re-instituting the network and solving transparency issues was progress-
ing.
CSCO also came under pressure from the same broker (actually then the Vice 
Chairman of CSCO), who after having left or being forced to leave Publish What 
You Pay, continued to be part of CSCO. He riled up other members by alleging that 
the Chairman of the coalition reverted coalition funds to his own organisation and 
lacked transparency in his dealings. Allegedly, the Vice Chairman apparently tried 
to convince leaders of local CBOs to vote for him, promising them money from 
the funds that were going to be released by donors after the election. The donors 
weighed in though, making it clear that they would release the funds only under the 
condition that none of the parties involved in this struggle were going to become 
Chairman. In the end, the incumbent Chairman was not nominated in the election 
and a third party assumed the leadership role.
In both cases the organisations were involved in schemes to access oil-related 
money from donors, reducing the networks to arenas for rent-seeking. This opinion 
was held by the DGF representative who was disappointed to see how the money of 
his institution failed to support civil society and instead incapacitated it by increas-
ing internal fights. At one point, he seemed at a loss to know where to spend the 
considerable amount of money available, as he feared it would either foster corrup-
tion or weaken instead of strengthen civil society.
At the regional level, a process comparable to that in the national oil coalitions 
unfolded. The Hoima NGO Forum, which was not primarily focused on oil, got 
stirred up by a quarrel between two opposing factions within its network. Once 
more, the alleged misappropriation of funds and allocation of project positions was 
at the core of the argument. The NGO Forum’s members were dissatisfied with the 
lack of transparency in the use of new funds. The leadership of the forum comprised 
founding member organisations that had contributed in building this association. 
They were annoyed that people only talked about transparency once funds were 
available.150 Funds that the founders claimed they themselves had brought to the 
coalition. The leaders were “ousted” by other organisations in an unconstitutional, 
not orderly called, general assembly of member organisations. These organisations 
then formed an interim board, taking over the leadership of the network. The parties 
tried arbitration, involving first the national NGO that had brought in the funds, 
and then the Chairman LC 5 of Hoima district. I was friends with people on both 
150 The money was from a research project on oil from Leeds University. In this sense money from 
research projects could also be counted as revenues of the oil arena.
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sides of the split and heard passionate accounts of betrayal from both sides. In an 
interview in 2013, the Chairman LC 5 explained the case to me as follows:
Our civil society here is still young. It needs nurturing. And people are not 
in these NGOs on principle. They are there to […] earn a living. And this 
recent fight has been about resources. People fighting over some little money, 
which came from a certain funder, and then people struggling to say who now 
controls it. Then taking arbitrary steps to push out others so that the others 
can enter office and be in charge of this fund. And it has ended up in court. 
That’s why I’ve said that we have no serious […] civil society to talk about yet. 
It’s just in its formative stages. Because behind it all people are looking for 
survival (Chairman LC 5 Hoima, interview, 2013).
As these arbitrations failed, the ousted board sued the interim board and eventually 
won the case. They were re-instituted as board and the interim board was convicted 
to pay indemnities, which they failed to pay in full.151 While the case eventually got 
settled, it destroyed the Hoima NGO Forum. Once again, this conflict reveals the 
extent of competition over resources and prestige that emerged in the wake of new 
revenues oil had brought to Uganda.152 The case involved a variety of actors and 
displayed many conflicts, and personal issues between the members. It can be viewed 
as a competition for leadership and access to resources. Different tricks were used to 
gain leverage. While the board used legal language referring to the constitution, the 
interim board orchestrated an attack based on claims of intransparency and corrup-
tion.
The struggles within these rather young networks might be more than cases of in-
dividual mistakes. The confrontations emerged with the availability of donor money 
for researching the impacts of oil or fighting the resource curse. In all cases, there 
were irregularities in procedure at the base of the allegations reminding of patronage 
and lack of transparency. If we look at these struggles from a broker-perspective, we 
can say that the oil money, and here I mean donor money, represented new spoils in 
a Baileyian sense.
For CSOs the first goal was to get those spoils because only once they gained 
access to this money, they could use it to pursue other goals such as the pronounced 
objectives of the organisation, or making a living, gaining status and power, and 
perhaps also creating a (political) following. In order to get followers, organisations 
needed to be able to redistribute resources as pointed out above. Donors and Ugan-
dan organisations were active in the same development game. International organi-
151 The weight of this debt was hovering over them for over a year after the ruling as they were still at 
risk of getting arrested for failing to honour the ruling.
152 My research project and me were part of the arena. However, as indicated in the methodological 
framework, my project was very small and I could not provide any regular funds for any person or 
organisation.
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sations determined some of the rules in this game, i.e. what language needed to be 
used, what style needed to be employed in proposals and organisation management, 
or what issues should be addressed. However, they did not control the game and 
the context it was embedded in. They could not control the intentions of other ac-
tors and how the donor money allocated to oil governance could be used in other 
arenas.
Development brokers mobilised these funds, and adopted ideas and rhetoric from 
international organisations to attain their own goals. The donor money itself was an 
arena, in which actors fought over access to resources and power. United as a strategic 
group in opposition to government and oil companies, civil society struggled with 
each other in the arena of development aid.
Chapter Conclusion4.4 
This chapter was concerned with how actors within Uganda’s civil society, interna-
tional donors, and the Ugandan state tried to influence the anticipation of Uganda’s 
future with oil. Even though it had not yet materialised, oil was present in donor 
money for sensitising communities and mobilising against the resource curse. Oil 
had already become a relevant stake in an economy of expectation. With the re-
source curse narrative, CSOs alerted Ugandans to a new risk. According to this risk, 
Uganda’s political leaders could potentially harm the country and its people in so-
cial, economic, and environmental terms, because of the poor management of the 
resource wealth. CSOs successfully established the resource curse as risk shaping 
interactions in the oil arena and influencing the constitution of the oil complex. 
Civil society actors used the resource curse concept as an interpretive frame to guide 
negotiations regarding oil’s significations. The concept created a specific anticipation 
of a petro-future: oil could either be a blessing or a curse. To turn the oil into a bless-
ing, internationally recognised mechanisms were presented as risk management that 
required civil society. Hence, the development brokers secured themselves a space 
for brokerage. Development brokers were thus deeply implicated in the process of 
oil-making.
The resource curse as a risk narrative was connected to a sense of uncertainty in 
the oil region. Generally, it is said that risks reduce uncertainty, but this was not the 
case in Uganda’s oil region. Paradoxically, showing people in the oil region the risk 
along with the means to manage it did not reassure them or eliminate uncertainty, 
but rather aggravated it. For new risks to get established a sensation of uncertainty 
needs to arise for instance from the experience of changes or an ever-shifting envi-
ronment (cf. Dahlberg, 2016). With this knowledge, the risk can be established and 
ways identified to manage this risk. As a result, the uncertainty is turned into some-
thing manageable. Yet, this anticipatory practice goes along with the recognition of 
the limitations of one’s knowledge, which can lead into a state of uncertainty again.
Oil as Risk: Anticipating the Resource Curse 131
As the next chapter shows, the resource curse information promoted by CSOs was 
received ambivalently in the exploration areas. On the one hand, people feared losing 
their homes or livelihoods, while on the other hand they also hoped to profit from 
the oil. They positioned themselves in the framework set by the resource curse and 
used Nigeria as a metaphor for the negative effects of oil. The resource curse narra-
tive painted the picture of a possibly gloomy future. Managing uncertainty via the 
resource curse narrative did not create certainty, because it demonstrated to people 
how little they knew and how little influence they had. The risk further opened the 
horizon to unforeseen uncertainties, making life in the extractive areas appear risky 
beyond any management options.
The following chapter examines in detail the effects of both the resource curse 
narrative and the oil exploration on communities in the oil region. I show issues that 
were relevant in the oil region during the time of my research, such as job opportu-
nities, security concerns, road construction, and most importantly struggles around 
land acquisition, and the use of land during exploration activities.
Figure 17: Halliburton trucks helping another truck on a murram road, Hoima district 
(2012).
Living with Uncertainty in the Oil Region5 
The wait for oil was filled with hope and expectations. In the introduction I cited a 
politician from the oil region who compared the wait for oil to a pregnancy. With 
time, Uganda’s wait for oil has turned out to be a pregnancy beyond the expected 
birth date; the pregnancy has become indeterminate. Tangible changes were mainly 
experienced by those most directly affected by the oil. The slowness of moving from 
exploration to production that I described in the chapter on the history of oil, disap-
pointed Ugandans I spoke to in the oil region. Instead of enjoying new wealth, new 
risks and uncertainties had started to cloud their outlooks. A sense of uncertainty 
appeared to pervade life in the exploration areas. Politicians, fishermen, farmers and 
entrepreneurs seemed unsure how oil would affect their lives. They stressed their lack 
of knowledge about the oil, and felt generally left out of its development: they had 
heard about the oil, but they had not seen it. They only learnt about activities when 
the companies actually started working, and even then, they did not know or un-
derstand what the companies were doing. Many interlocutors’ statements reflected 
an unease about the future, an uncertainty about whether the oil would come and 
whether their way of life could resist the changes oil would bring. Even those who 
were lucky to work as casual labour in the oil industry found their future somewhat 
uncertain; they could lose their jobs overnight.
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Anticipation of the oil in the oil region oscillated between fears and hopes, high ex-
pectations and discouraging experiences. A donor-funded study on expectations and 
information Ugandans have on oil (Grossman et al., 2015) concludes that Ugandans 
in the oil region are better informed about oil including expected revenues and the 
resource curse than others, but are less likely to exert political demands based on this 
knowledge. Rather, people were not inclined to “rock the boat” (ibid.: 7); a finding 
the authors thought to be alarming with regard to the governance of oil and the 
likelihood of a resource curse in Uganda.153
In this chapter, I show how people in the extractive communities experienced 
the wait for oil by looking at how they anticipated it and the future with it. I show 
that the resource curse risk had a vital influence on these anticipations. I describe the 
uncertainty and how people lived with it. I look at the experiences people in the oil 
region have made with the oil, how they talked about it and how they reacted to the 
changes that came with the exploration activities of the oil companies. These changes 
were still minor compared to what is expected to happen in the development phase, 
which will necessitate the construction of more infrastructure and consequently a 
greater availability of work.
In this chapter, I combine observations from the oil region with comments in-
terlocutors made to me, NGO reports and essays written by pupils in an essay com-
petition on the impacts of oil and gas on Bunyoro organised by a community-based 
organisation in November 2012 in Hoima and funded by Tullow Oil.154 I start this 
chapter by putting this uncertainty in context with other experiences of uncertainty 
in Uganda. Then I look in more detail at the expectations people have: the resource 
curse, a moral decline due to immigration, and insecurity concerns. Finally, the 
chapter turns to the sub-arena of land issues: the construction of a refinery and a 
road, land use during seismic surveys, and the contested destruction of cultural sites. 
Cultural sites here refer to places of worship or burial grounds that are not neces-
sarily easy to make out as even stones and trees can be considered important sacred 
places. Through this case I show how people in the oil region, the ones with the least 
resources available to them, also tried to influence the resource-making in Uganda, 
and potentially gain benefits from the oil by emphasising their own risk frames. 
People attempted in various ways to create linkages to the oil industry, or put dif-
ferently, to make themselves contingent on the oil companies (Reynolds Whyte and 
Etyang Siu, 2015).
153 The study contributes to research and advocacy work geared at understanding and preventing the 
resource curse in Uganda.
154 In this essay competition, students from primary and secondary schools in Hoima town were 
asked to discuss the positive and negative impacts of oil on Bunyoro. Before the competition the 
teachers were informed about the likely effects of oil and gas and in their turn taught their pupils. 
Accordingly, essays from one school have greater similarity among them than with others. There is 
sufficient difference in the essays though that it can be assumed that they include reflections of the 
pupils.
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Uncertain Past5.1 
In a way, an uncertain and insecure environment is nothing new to Uganda. The 
country has seen a lot of violence with several civil wars – the latest lasting up to the 
point of oil discovery. The horrible and fear-inspiring years during the governments 
of Idi Amin and Milton Obote in his second turn at governing, referred to as “Obote 
II,” ended with the take-over by Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA). But 
war ended only in the central parts of Uganda, a civil war raged on in the North, 
especially Acholi and Lango, up until the new millennium with millions who lost 
their land or were (temporally) displaced to camps for IDPs (Internally Displaced 
Persons). Chris Dolan (2009) has referred to this crisis as “social torture,” highlight-
ing the painful and uncertain situation of Ugandans in a part of the country without 
a safe haven as they were torn between atrocities committed by the rebels as much 
as by the military.155 In the Western region and in West Nile other terrorist groups 
caused unrest that was contained by the government (Leopold, 2005a,b; Weichs, 
2013). In the 1990s, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) had been a widespread 
security threat in the Western region with recurrent attacks on civilians in Hoima 
and Kibaale that alienated the local population and furthered support for the central 
government (Weichs, 2013: 43). The alienation of the local population contributed 
to ADF’s defeat at the end of the millennium.156 This latent sense of insecurity dif-
fered from the civil war that was going on in the districts of Acholi and Lango (We-
ichs, 2013: 44).
Conflict was not the only cause of insecurity and uncertainty. The neoliberal re-
forms that started in the 1990s supervised by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) aimed at a basic restructuring of society (cf. Kuteesa et al., 
2010).157 The political scientist Jörg Wiegratz (2012, 2010) describes how Ugandan 
society has been deeply impacted by the neoliberal turn. In his case study on rela-
tions between smallholder farmers and market traders in Eastern Uganda, he notes 
that the restructuring was intended to create a market society with corresponding 
norms and behaviours at the expense of a pre-existing set of moral codes. The neolib-
eral restructuring did not only target political but also moral economies by “drying 
155 For the history of this conflict and the after-effects in Acholi see Behrend (1993, 1995, 1998), 
Finnström (2008) or Vorhölter (2014).
156 Since its defeat is has been based on the Congolese side of the Ruwenzori Mountains. The group 
is composed of fighters from different groups and is nominally Muslim but has been attributed a lack 
of a clear ideological or religious agenda; the only goal being the overthrow of the NRM government. 
For an analysis of the history and ideology of the group see Titeca and Vlassenroot (2012). The group 
resurfaced with attacks in Uganda in 2014 but its leader was captured and put on trial in 2015.
157 For analyses of the structural adjustment program see Ochieng (1991), Mugyenyi (1991), Lateef 
(1991). Privatisation as a development policy has been analysed by Tukahebwa (1998). The more 
recent relationship between Uganda and the World Bank, which is based on a rhetoric of partnership 
rather than the previously more coercive methods has been analysed by Sande Lie (2015).
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up the sources of power” of those who did not conform to neoliberalism (Wiegratz, 
2012: 68). He argues that with structural adjustment in Uganda, fairness had ceased 
to be a business principle and cheating business partners had become acceptable 
under neoliberal restructuring. He notes that the reforms of the 1990s kept the old 
insecurity and uncertainty, known from years of conflict, in place and even endorsed 
it and unleashed new ones because insecurity and uncertainty are core characteris-
tics of neoliberal life worldwide (Wiegratz, 2010: 128). Such processes have been 
described by David Harvey (2005) as neoliberalisation, which refers to neoliberal-
ism being a pervasive discourse and a process of “creative destruction” of not just 
the political framework but also of social relations and everyday life (Harvey, 2005: 
3).158 In a similar vein the political scientist Graham Harrison (2010) understands 
neoliberalism as social engineering of the state and society at large and not just the 
economy (ibid: 32).
Another source of uncertainty that ran parallel to these developments was the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. The virus ravaged through Uganda and at its height the “slim 
disease” killed thousands of Ugandans. Chances of contracting it were high and not 
much was known in the beginning of how the disease developed, how it spread and 
how it could be defeated. It was a silent killer and nobody could be sure they were 
not in danger. The ones closest to a person could turn out to be the traitors that bring 
death. The ones supposed to deliver care, like doctors and hospitals, could also bring 
death – by reusing needles or transplanting blood without testing (Fireman, 2016). 
Heike Behrend (2011) has linked horror stories of cannibals to the ravaging of AIDS 
in Uganda. Left without explanations and ways to manage this risk, people felt an 
uncertainty that found expression in such stories. Behrend makes clear that these 
stories did not circulate as explanations for HIV but were rather a symptom of the 
overall uncertainty of life in that time. Rumours of witchcraft and cannibalism still 
persist today as I also show in this chapter.
Oil thus entered a country with a long history of uncertainties. The oil was con-
nected to new risks that once again aroused uncertainties about life and livelihoods. 
There have been several transformations in the oil region and in Uganda in general. 
The last chapter described how Uganda’s future was anticipated within the frame-
work of the resource curse concept, that oil was either a blessing or a curse. So far, 
various actors created visions of a future with oil and the expectations created also 
needed to be managed. During a district dialogue organised by the CBO KHEDA, 
the Deputy Resident District Commissioner (D/RDC) Wantimba from Hoima dis-
trict, also pointed out the importance of managing and controlling the expectations 
and the excitement that according to him, the politicians themselves had raised:
158 David Harvey (2005) defined neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that pro-
poses that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets and free trade” (ibid: 2).
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It is now our duty to go down [to the village level] and remove the excite-
ment. Because it is us who caused it and is us who have to remove it (D/RDC 
Hoima, KHEDA district dialogue, Hoima, 2012)
From the impression I got during my research in the oil region, the combined effect 
of both the oil companies and the government delaying developments, left people in 
a state of suspension and ended their hopes of betterment. They were not employed 
and received only small compensation sums. Thus the excitement was removed – 
whether intentionally or not.
Expectations and Changes in the Oil Region5.2 
This sub-chapter explores the ways people in the oil region anticipated a future with 
oil and the experiences they had made during the exploration for oil. The discovery 
of oil evoked both hope for a better future, and discomfort and doubts. People in the 
region hoped for employment and improved infrastructure, while fearing an influx 
of foreign men, a rise in “immorality” and Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) 
rates, and a loss of land and “local culture.” Their statements reflected the resource 
curse narrative. The politicians, casual workers and cultural leaders159 I talked to, 
expressed to me feelings of distance to the government and the oil companies. Many 
people were quite critical of the government and resigned to think that the new rev-
enues from oil would be drained by corruption anyhow.
We keep our fingers crossed but with our government… Because oil is poli-
tics. They are drilling oil on our land but we will not be the first beneficiaries. 
People say that they will drain the oil underground to the big man’s home-
land. Where the big man hails from they will set up the refinery (Former ca-
sual worker, interview 2013)
People did not just wonder whether they would profit from the oil but also worried 
whether it might have negative repercussions for them. On my trips to villages in the 
159 I use this term as one that was used by my interlocutors to refer to persons who have some 
superior knowledge and are considered custodian of the traditions of their respective community. 
They represent and guide their community on matters of tradition. Furthermore, the category 
encompasses people with ascribed spiritual and healing powers. The cultural leaders I talked to could 
more concretely be described as traditional healers or spiritual leaders in order to differentiate them 
from the cultural leaders such as the Omukama. The „Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders 
Act“ (2011) considers as cultural leaders those who derive allegience from birth or decent (Republic 
of Uganda, 2011: 5, 1). The role of the cultural leaders is defined as promoting and preserving “the 
cultural values, norms and practices which enhance the dignity and well being of the people where he 
or she is recognised as such” and furthermore to promote “the development, preservation and enrich-
ment of all the people in the community” (ibid.: 9).
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exploration areas I targeted mainly casual workers and politicians for interviews as 
they were the ones to be most directly in contact with the oil industry. I found many 
to be sceptical about the glorious petro-future since the oil discovery had brought 
tensions to the oil region and many didn’t seem to know whom to trust.
Farmers, fishermen and even politicians in villages situated in exploration areas 
expressed their lack of knowledge about the oil and how it would affect their liveli-
hoods: “Because we don’t know what may happen in the future. […] We just see 
things changing” (Elderly resident of Kaiso, interview, 2012). A local politician of 
Kaiso described quite diffuse fears that were caused by the exploration activities. 
Fishermen feared losing their right to fish and some worried they might have to leave 
the area altogether (Politician, interview 2012). Farmers worried they might lose 
their land and thus their livelihood. Relocation was a major and threatening issue to 
the people – one of the most important ones with regard to oil. This is a major fear 
and one that is related to experiences made during the exploration activities and the 
construction of a new road.
In the essays from the aforementioned essay competition organised by KHEDA 
the overall top three expectations were work, roads and resettlements.160 They por-
tray the ambivalent picture of expectations being both negative and positive. Other 
widespread positive expectations in the essays were a better overall standard of living 
including schools, hospitals, better transport and a market for local produce and 
an industrialisation of the region. There were roughly as many negative as positive 
expectations but most essays drew a hopeful conclusion.161
The hopes for improved infrastructures were partially answered by the construc-
tion of new roads, health centres and schools and many new and more exquisite 
hotels in Hoima town since the oil came. However, the bright future the government 
painted and that was reflected in some of these hopes was counterbalanced by im-
ages of the resource curse risk civil society brought to the oil region. Concurrently, 
the essays did mention worries as well such as forced resettlement, pollution of the 
air, water and the environment in general, overcrowding, diseases, desertification, an 
increase in criminality, deforestation, a decline in agriculture, and cultural change. 
In the following, I show how people also drew on metaphors from the resource curse 
narrative to express their experiences and worries.
Reflecting the Resource Curse
The preceding chapter showed how civil society made people aware of risks attached 
to the oil and hence also the very uncertainty of their future. As Britt Dahlberg 
(2016) described it, making people aware of their uncertainty is an important step to 
get wider acceptance of the risks one perceives. And indeed, people pronounced their 
160 I did a qualitative content analysis. I generated a list of topics from the essays and then counted 
frequencies.
161 Potentially, this might be due to the fact that Tullow Oil was sponsoring the event.
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lack of knowledge and their inability to make informed guesses about the future on 
which they could act. Uncertainty is the presence of absent knowledge. The oil talk 
of a resource curse along with the experiences residents made fuelled an uncertainty 
about their future in a petro-state.
During seismic activities people’s houses and fields were destroyed and fishermen 
were prevented from fishing by a temporary ban because of the use of explosives – 
both experiences that were often remarked on. People in the villages on the shores of 
Lake Albert mostly relied on fishing for their livelihood and access to the lake is im-
portant for them. Just as land and access to it is important for communities around 
the refinery area, where people rely on agriculture and herding. In a chat with a local 
politician from Kyehoro he highlighted the importance of fishing to the community 
and the fear people had:
Fishing is the livelihood of the people. All are fishermen. Even I go fishing. 
And the shop owners, the bars, [the] video hall, they are all for the fishermen. 
We depend on their money. It is our fear that the oil could interfere with this. 
They shouldn’t spoil what is on my plate. The oil is good, it is for all Ugandans 
and it will benefit the economy and bring development to the country but the 
big pot is not the same from what is on my plate (Local politician, field notes 
from informal conversation, Kyehoro, 2012).
The quote points out that there is a difference between the wellbeing of the nation 
and the individual. The politician rejected the idea that what was good for the coun-
try was good for everyone in the country. The spoils might not be shared equally and 
what reaches someone in the village might be very different from what is available to 
the state. The quote could also be read as a fear that oil activities would pollute the 
lake, which would have direct repercussions for the fishermen who would lose the 
base of their existence while not profiting from the overall development. This is of 
course a possibility that has been raised again and again by the civil society activists 
who visit the communities carrying their pictures of destroyed environments. Many 
other statements also suggested an uneasiness regarding the future, an uncertainty 
about whether the basic cornerstones of their lives will resist the oncoming of the oil 
industry and the curse.
We hear from countries like Nigeria and the bad thing of drilling, so that is 
another fear. What about the next generation? It might be better without oil 
(Politician of Kaiso, field notes from informal conversation, 2013).162
In fact, leaving the oil in the ground has also been considered a possibility if the 
‘right’ governance structures were not in place (Humphrey et al., 2007: 14; Ross, 
162 The other fears he mentioned were about resettlement and compensation and whether people will 
benefit from the oil.
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2012: 235). During conferences held by civil society the audience reacted to the calls 
for engagement and joined them in the pleas for good governance of oil. After hav-
ing seen the documentary “Blessing or Curse?,” some participants asserted their wish 
to prevent in Uganda what had happened in Nigeria: „We shouldn’t go the Nigerian 
way which is called the oil curse. Let’s go the Botswana way“ (CNOOC-Tullow con-
ference, 2012). At another conference on the impacts of oil on the youth organised 
by the CBO RICE in Arua, a participant said:
In some countries oil is a curse because the management of this thing is not 
what they have been planning for. If we manage it wrong, the oil will become 
a curse. If we manage it well, it will be a blessing (Youth Dialogue RICE-WN, 
2013).
Another participant in this youth dialogue said that she was wondering when they 
would be right to refuse having any oil production in Uganda.
At first, as we were waiting for our facilitator we were introduced to a film 
[documentary described in chapter 4.1.3.] that we saw up there. And it was 
so scaring to me that I saw no benefit of oil exploration. That was why the 
Nigerians were objecting it. They said ‘No’, they don’t want it at all. Now may 
I know from our facilitator what methods are this people going to employ 
in Uganda? Are they going to consider the environmental effects? If not, if it 
happens that […] it is like that one of Nigeria shall we be right to say no to 
evil so? (Youth Dialogue RICE-WN, 2013).
People repeated that if things were to go wrong with the oil, it was Ugandans who 
would be to blame for it. These remarks are close to the risk frame and the language 
set up by civil society. Nigeria was the metaphor for the horrors of oil. Saying no to 
evil, that is avoiding it, is one possible reaction to uncertainty, to being confronted 
with something one lacks accurate knowledge about. Other reactions would be cal-
culation (weighing benefits against harm), having trust in those managing the risk 
or precaution (Boholm, 2015: 83–84). I suggest another option is to engage this 
uncertainty and to participate in the negotiations of the oil arena like these people 
did. These claims of ignorance are positionings by the actors who make them in the 
oil arena. People saw that donors were funding organisations promoting the resource 
curse risk. It was obvious that revenues were not just available in the oil industry but 
also in the economy of expectation. The statements convey an awareness of the new 
funding opportunities that came with the oil. People declared their lack of knowl-
edge or their support for the cause of an NGO and thereby positioned themselves as 
active participants in the economy of expectation using those opportunities the oil 
had brought, including sensitisation campaigns on the resource curse.
Some of these statements were directed at me, a researcher from Europe, whose 
affiliations might not have been clear to everyone, although I always introduced my-
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self as a Ph.D. student and stressed that I was not working for an NGO or any of the 
oil companies. Displaying a lack of knowledge and hence playing the part the NGOs 
have given to communities of being in need of knowledge, may help bring more 
interventions to the community or invitations to workshops with per diems. Openly 
displaying a lack of knowledge thus opened the chance to partake in the spoils of the 
oil arena. Playing their part, they can hope to garner support from either a researcher 
like me or a CSO. I understand these complaints as both worries about a future and 
a way to deal with this worrying uncertainty. Another opportunity was seen in the 
employment by an oil company as I discuss in the next section.
Employment Opportunities
Initially, it was said people in the oil region and even other parts of Uganda had the 
hope there would be employment opportunities in the oil industry. In an economy 
where a high percentage of the population is jobless and especially the youth fail to 
find a job and thus gain the basis for having their own family, economic opportuni-
ties are a major hope. The expectations were fuelled from different sides: civil society, 
the oil companies and government took part in expectation management, that is 
creating the right expectations. Managers of Total and Tullow tried to channel the 
expectations towards the development of infrastructure and services and away from 
a focus on the oil production and the oil companies. The former General Manager 
of Total Uganda, Loic Laurandel, stressed how Total would work together with the 
people of Uganda towards sustainable development in the oil and gas sector, which 
would lead to development in the infrastructure and social amenities as well (Uganda 
Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, [2013]b: 38–39). And his colleague at Tullow, 
Aidan Heavey, expanded the expectations even further by talking of a big boom and 
billions of dollars.
People look at selling oil and gas, and the profit from that. But actually the 
single biggest input in the country is the investment in the infrastructure and 
the services that support the oil industry. […] There is going to be billions of 
dollars spent here. If you look at the countries that have found oil and gas in 
the past, the big boom to the economy was in the development stage (Inter-
view with Aidan Heavey, Tullow, Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 
[2013]a: 10).
In a speech given at a conference by International Alert in Hoima, the Minister of 
State for Bunyoro Affairs, Ernest Kiiza, encouraged Banyoro and Ugandans to hope 
to benefit from the oil sector.
With the dawn of the petroleum industry, there is a lot that Ugandans can 
benefit from the sector. These include: Employment opportunities for skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour in the sector. The companies are encour-
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aged to recruit casual labour from within the local communities where opera-
tions are taking place. Semi-skilled labour is primarily sourced from within 
the region while skilled labour is advertised competitively with Capable [sic] 
Ugandans being given first priority (Minister of Bunyoro Affairs, Cross Bor-
der Dialogue, quote from a distributed copy of the speech, 2013).
Indeed, young men moved from the capital to remote villages on the shores of Lake 
Albert hoping to find a job as a casual labourer. Other men spent days waiting in 
front of the gate of a subcontracting company hoping to get hired. Others lounged 
around trading centres where recruitments were supposed to take place. The Chair-
man LC 3 of Pakwach sub-county told me that it was not announced in advance 
when the recruitment was to take place or rather on such short notice that young 
men had decided to hang around trading centres, waiting for the recruitment teams 
to arrive, instead of helping out on the fields (Chairman LC 3 Pakwach, interview, 
2013).163
While some of these young men did get employed by an oil company or one of 
the subcontractors at least for a short period, for most Ugandans the expectation of 
jobs was barely fulfilled. The ones recruited usually entered at the lowest, the entry 
level and payment for unskilled workers in the industry did not always match the ex-
pectations, although it tended to be better than other low-skilled jobs. It was usually 
around 10,000 Ugandan Shillings (3 Euros) per day worked while e.g. a waitress in a 
small restaurant in town can earn around 100,000 Ugandan Shillings (30 Euros) per 
month.164 Most of the workers I talked to felt that the money was little but there was 
no unionisation or something similar to push for a better pay.165 The migrant work-
ers struggled to pay for rent and sometimes even a family as they stayed in a place 
that wasn’t their home and where they couldn’t stay on family land for free.166
The ones who got a job in the industry reported to me that there were many risks 
they were taking, especially when working on a risk, and no less uncertainty. Yet, the 
jobs offered little in terms of security. From the comments I heard on several confer-
ences, work for the oil industry was perceived as being risky, even life-threatening, 
by many people. A man at a youth dialogue organised by RICE claimed that: “Some 
parts of the jobs are very risky, so let our people be killed by other things and not by 
this job.” (Youth Dialogue RICE-WN, 2013). Indeed, work on an oil rig is risky as 
163 Details about the recruitment process are discussed in the next chapter.
164 The oil industry workers are generally divided into three categories: unskilled, semi-skilled and 
skilled. Between the different type of workers are spatial and visual hierarchies such as accommoda-
tion or uniforms.
165 This could be related to the temporary nature of the labour contract, which is a common feature 
of the flexibilisation of the workforce in contemporary capitalism (Garsten, 2008).
166 The unskilled ones are usually not accommodated in the camps, they rent for themselves in the 
village. The companies assume they are recruiting locals who usually have family land they can live on. 
While in fact the casuals are oftentimes not from that particular village or even area.
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it involves working with heavy machinery and chemicals under high pressure – both 
time and well pressure.167
When I talked to several casual workers, they complained to me about the un-
certainty associated with their jobs – not just with regard to the riskiness of the tasks 
but also regarding the overall economic situation of few well-paying job opportuni-
ties especially in the rural areas of Uganda. They complained that they could not do 
any jobs on the side. I overheard some casual workers speak out during their lunch 
that the money was little and that back home they could have businesses on the side 
instead of only earning money from this job.168 I was also told that if fishing was 
good, a fisher earned more than a casual worker. Only that fishing was not a stable 
income (Casual workers, interviews 2012, 2013). So sometimes it happened that the 
workers got frustrated and left their job, as one Ugandan Human Resource Manager 
of a Ugandan logistics company told me.
The first time we employed was in Buliisa. So we got locals that are not edu-
cated. After three months, they started working bad, calling in sick, refusing. 
Then they wanted to stop and after a month, they wanted the job back. And 
after a year they want to earn money like the expats (Human Resource Man-
ager, SLL Logistics, interview, 2013).
She interpreted it as a laziness and unreliability of the locals. However, there could be 
a connection between the workers leaving the job and other seasonal, or short-term 
lucrative income opportunities such as fishing when catches at the time are good. 
Once they have left or lost the job, some of these men still hung around the villages, 
waiting for another opportunity. Others took up a business, reverted to fishing or 
left the place to look for a job elsewhere. The hiring practices of the oil industry espe-
cially with regard to casual labour did not allow for long-term planning. The workers 
had to cope with this uncertainty and taking a more lucrative job for some time, 
might well be one of them. The hiring practice is a classic outsourcing or externali-
sation of supply-chain capitalism. The companies expected people to accept being 
employed, laid off and recruited again whilst they themselves did not allow people to 
move freely in and out of the labour pool.
There are striking similarities among many different workers in the industry, I 
interacted with, in terms of how the rhythm of the oil industry influenced their lives: 
the ups and downs of the industry were reflected in the insecurity of jobs. Once the 
Ugandan oil project slowed down, subcontractors laid off staff. Some became un-
employed, some started being on stand-by and some got posted to another country. 
Being on stand-by means less pay for the expatriate workers who told me they only 
earn well when they are on a project abroad. Letting go off workers during busts is a 
167 For an autobiographic description of the work conditions on a rig see Lynch (1989). 
168 It is quite common in Uganda to have different sources of income like a business or a farm next to 
a formal employment.
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common practice in the oil industry since its inception. Of course such hire-and-fire 
practices are not only common in the oil industry. Temporal work is a widespread 
phenomenon with specific recruiting agencies.169 Furthermore, the conditions for 
casual labourers were very constricting while they left a lot of flexibility to the em-
ployer: the workers could not call in sick without losing their pay, they could not 
take time off to attend to family matters as the monthly salary was based on the 
actual days worked. They are recruited as human work machines and not as social 
human beings.
The oil project imprints its rhythm on the lives of its workers even in times when 
the project is active. Expatriate workers for example were on back-to-back cycles 
with one other person for the same position. They stayed in Uganda for several weeks 
at a stretch, during which they worked usually 12-hour shifts but were 24 hours on 
call for emergencies. During afterwork beers with them, some confided in me that 
it had a serious impact on their family and love life and that once back home they 
felt out of place.
Despite the risks and instability of the jobs, the hope for employment persisted 
and people from other regions moved to exploration areas to secure a job. The arrival 
of job-seekers was conceived as a risk by people in the oil region because it would 
make competition tough and it was expected to lead to a decline in moral and cul-
tural values as I discuss in detail in the next section.
Rising Immorality
A recurring complaint in interviews and conferences was about the sudden increase 
of population which resource booms usually cause. This population increase was 
viewed critically since it meant an influx of foreigners. People feared these foreigners 
would bring their own cultural practices that might challenge the local or ”tradition-
al” ones. In her essay, a pupil from Senior one said she expected cultural change:
Many people will come from different areas of the country and outside with 
their own cultures where by [sic] the culture of Bunyoro will be changed loos-
ing their value (Essay, Pupil, Senior Secondary S1).
Others feared that the influx would lead to intermarriages that would further threat-
en the traditional order. However, the oil discovery was not the first time that the oil 
region experienced an inflow of people from other regions or countries. There have 
been immigrations from other parts of Uganda, such as West Nile, and also from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. I often heard complaints that the 
young, (and mainly non-local) men who got a job in the oil industry were spending 
their salary on food, drinks and women. I was told that elders in Panyimur, a fishing 
169 For an ethnographic insight, see Christina Garsten’s ethnography on the temping agencies and the 
people who work for them as a “temp” (Garsten, 2008).
Living with Uncertainty in the Oil Region 145
village on the northern shore of Lake Albert, complained that with these fortunate 
young men around, the local men could not find women to marry anymore. Stories 
of oil workers taking young women or even other men’s women abounded. One 
resident of Pakwach and former casual worker I talked to, was resolute that he would 
not let his wife work for an oil company. He himself had made enough money as an 
unskilled worker to start a small business in Pakwach town. Not because of the hard 
work but because he would fear the boss could harass or charm her. He explained the 
behaviour of “these guys” as follows.
These guys have the money but they don’t mind. The ladies come from the 
village, put on make-up and ‘aah!’ […] The situation guys have brought on is 
alarming, immorality talking. Marriages are breaking up. They have gone as 
far as snatching settled wives. Several marriages have broken because of these 
guys (Former casual worker, interview, 2013).
I heard a similar assessment from an unmarried Ugandan oil worker. He had worked 
for an international subcontractor in Pakwach and explained to me how the women 
were running after the men with money. He called them “stupid and villagers” for 
going with those men while the men did not consider them as their girlfriends but 
only as their “by the ways,” meaning the men were just interested in having affairs or 
prostitutes. Asked about the prevalence of HIV in Pakwach he summed up the situ-
ation with a blunt “that place is fucked up” (Casual worker, interview 2013). When 
I told these complaints of oil guys taking away the women and girls from resident 
men with less money to one of the older expatriate oil workers in Hoima, he laughed 
and said that it was the same everywhere in the world “no money, no honey” (Field 
notes from informal conversation, 2013).
Repeatedly, I was told that many women and girls from the surrounding villages 
came to Pakwach on market day and then simply stayed on instead of going back 
home. The community development officer of Pakwach explained to me that these 
girls hoped to find a man or in the end at least customers. They resided in mud huts, 
usually sharing one with several girls. These huts were referred to as “lodges” and 
could be rented by the hour. And even though Pakwach has had prostitution before 
due to being a sleepover place for truck drivers coming from Kenya or Congo, she 
told me the situation worsened when the oil activities started as many young men 
moved into the area (CDO, field notes from conversation, 2013).
I mainly interacted with oil workers in Pakwach and hence captured their per-
spective on the situation. Of course, the women involved in this might have a very 
different perspective. Prostitution could for instance also be considered a form of 
debrouillardise (Homaifar, 2008). However, I was not able to establish good contact 
with any of the women that would have enabled me to bring out this sensitive topic. 
A study on “something-for-something-love” in Uganda shows that the motivations 
for women to enter sexual relationships with a man based on him giving her gifts are 
complex (Samara, 2010). Economic, family or peer pressures as well as curiosity or 
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interest in luxury goods are among the factors that can (alone or combined) make 
a woman participate in this kind of relationship. It is not stupid but rather appears 
as a calculation women make and a risk they take in order to attain other goals 
such as education or social standing (ibid.). Such calculative attitude of women is 
also referred to as “detoothing” in Uganda where a woman uses her sexuality or the 
promise of sex to extract money and gifts from a man (Sadgrove, 2007). Romance 
and finance are connected in intricate ways and money flows in relationships foster 
sexual identities for both men and women (Mills and Ssewakiryanga, 2004).170
A problem connected to the rise in prostitution is the prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
in Uganda. Local government sources have noted an increase since the oil activities 
started, although no data is available. It has to be noted here that fishing villages in 
Uganda and “trucker” places like Pakwach have always had high HIV-rates.171 The 
arrival of the oil industry was perceived as a risk by the people who feared that with 
the arrival of foreigners a loosening of morals and a concurrent increase of the HIV/
AIDS rate would ensue.172
Security Concerns
People in the exploration areas complained about the effects the increase of foreign-
ers in their region might have not just on the morality but also on overall security 
with a rise in offences. Having an economic driver such as the oil industry in the 
region could have a downside, as it would attract people to the region where not all 
could get a job and would hence turn to crime. A pupil wrote in the essay competi-
tion that job scarcity would lead to idleness resulting in moral decay and crime.
The possibility of finding job opportunities will encourage many people to 
migrate to the region leading to swelling [sic] of population and as a result 
jobs will become scarce. The idle population will turn to crime and other 
immoral acts leading to moral decay within the region (Essay, Pupil, Senior 
Secondary S4).
170 It would be interesting to consider the statements made in the oil region further within the wider 
discourse of gender relations and changing gender roles in Uganda but this is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. For further analyses of gender relations see e.g. Parikh (2005); Vorhölter (2014, 2012) 
or Wyrod (2008). In a recent book Parikh (2016) anaylses the regulation of romance in times of HIV 
and the agency of youths in this regard.
171 An analysis of fishing communities and HIV/Aids in Uganda was done by Westaway et al. (2007).
172 Overall in Uganda, the rate of new infections has been dropping with the general trend still being 
a yearly increase in people living with HIV. For more information see “The HIV and Aids Uganda 
Country Progress Report 2014,” (UNAIDS 2014). The prevalence rate in 2015 was at 7 percent 
among those aged between 15–49 (World Bank Statistics on HIV prevalence in Uganda, online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.AIDS.ZS?locations=UG [February 2018]).
Living with Uncertainty in the Oil Region 147
At a civil society conference, the District Police Commander (DPC) of Buliisa asked 
for a better security system so that they might deal with the “oil boom offences:” 
among which he named land conflicts with murders or assaults, smuggling across 
borders and fuel theft. All of which however are neither new nor exclusively related 
to oil-production.173 He complained that people lacked access to justice in Buliisa 
and had to go to court in Masindi.
In Buliisa we don’t have cells to keep someone […] We need the DPP [Direc-
torate of Public Prosecution] and we need also the chief magistrate court. […] 
Two years from now, three years this baby will be born. Oil will bring a boom. 
[…] We need a new prison. That prison there cannot handle the oil boom 
offences (DPC, BIRUDO workshop, 2012).174
The Ugandan state was also concerned with security in the oil region. In 2014 there 
had been an attack on army and police posts by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 
rebels in Bundibugyo in Western Uganda near the oil region. In 2007 a border 
dispute with the DRC ended in Congolese soldiers shooting a member of a seismic 
exploration team of Heritage close to Rukungiri island on Lake Albert which was 
claimed as territory by both Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Maybe 
due to such security issues, none of the oil companies has ventured into drilling on 
the lake itself.175 In November 2012 again, Ugandan newspapers reported exchanges 
of gunfire between Congolese militia and Ugandan police on Lake Albert.
Uganda increased its security measures in the oil region in four ways. First of all, 
in the districts with oil exploration there were special security officers on oil matters 
who were concerned with the security of the oil sites. These officers reported directly 
to the minister of internal affairs. They were also interested though in knowing about 
any oil-related activity and for my research I was also asked to inform this officer. 
Secondly, the police created a special oil force.176 Thirdly, extra military was deployed 
in the area and the military was planning to build new barracks in Kyangwali in 
Hoima District.177 And fourthly, the presidential guard brigade was protecting the 
oil wells, which raised suspicion as the presidential guard was led by Museveni’s son 
Major General Muhoozi Kainerugaba. This was controversial because of the afore-
mentioned Muhoozi project around which a scandal erupted in May 2013.
173 For instance, fuel-smuggling operations by the “Opec boys” in West Nile (Titeca and Lecoutere, 
2007).
174 Buliisa was still a small town of roughly 28,000 inhabitants.
175 Although this might also be related to technical issues. I was told by some engineers from Hal-
liburton that the water of the lake was as unpredictable as a sea and therefore the rig would need to be 
as stable as the ones in the North Sea, which of course involves more costs than an onshore rig.
176 See the website of the Uganda Police Force: www.upf.go.ug/index.php/about-us/directorate [Feb-
ruary 2018].
177 Reportedly, the army was also planning to institute community security committees to report 
suspicious incidents (Oil in Uganda, 2012b).
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Some commentators thought it was a bad omen that security in the oil region was 
closely connected to the president’s inner circle. The presidential guard lead by Presi-
dent Museveni’s son was protecting the oil wells and the private security company 
Saracen, allegedly owned by his brother Salem Saleh, was responsible for the oil com-
panies’ security.178 I brought up the issue of security in the oil region in an interview 
with then commissioner of PEPD and now Acting Director of the new Directorate 
of Petroleum Ernest Rubondo. Asked about future threats in the oil region he said:
I don’t think there are any [threats]. We don’t see it being a problem. Get the 
people informed and that is being done. So they know the activities that are 
being done. Tell them the benefits and deal with the challenges. So as long as 
this is dealt with, there will be no threats. […] There is value in the area so you 
need security in the area. Security needs to be strengthened so that nobody 
takes advantage (PEPD commissioner, interview 2013).
The statement points to the importance of adjusting people’s expectations and giv-
ing them information, albeit state officials usually emphasised that it should be the 
“right” information. A disgruntled population poses a risk because if they feel cheat-
ed, they might resist the appropriation of their land and thus threaten the progress of 
the oil project. The increase in security measures helped the state to gain information 
and monitor any oil-related activity in the oil region.
Another source of uncertainty, which was more closely connected to experiences 
made, was the fear of losing their land. Some villagers confronted this uncertainty by 
voicing their grievances with the assistance of CSOs and the media. In the following, 
I discuss the question of land dispossession in more detail.
Uncertain Grounds5.3 
This sub-chapter looks at the fear of land loss whether through dispossession or land 
grabbing and at the complications caused by the temporary use of land e.g. during 
seismic surveys. It also considers the ways in which people deal with the oil activities 
in their homeland; how they confront the uncertainty. I describe a case that I view 
as a creative way to deal with the uncertainty by trying to establish one’s own risk. I 
analyse how people made use of their knowledge to establish risk relations that pres-
ent both the companies and their cultural heritage as being at risk. I place this case in 
the context of various claims of land loss or land grabbing and the disruptions people 
experienced on their own land due to seismic surveys.
The uncertainty of a petro-future extended to an uncertainty about the land the 
people were living on. In the oil region land issues emerged in connection with the 
178 See a report by the NGO Global Witness (2010). For an analysis of the militarisation of Uganda 
that looks at different facets of the phenomenon see Kagoro (2015).
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oil developments: roads were constructed to link the exploration sites to the capital 
and land was acquired by the state to build a refinery or to be temporarily used. 
Sometimes things on it got destroyed during seismic exploration activities. Some 
residents had already lost (parts of ) their land and possessions like houses or crops 
due to the construction of the Kaiso-Tonya road or of the refinery and compensation 
rarely lived up to what people had hoped for. Sometimes compensation was not even 
the actual worth of the land at the time of the compensation. Yet people had very 
limited means of negotiating their dispossession. They took what the government of-
fered them, even if the rates were too low and compensation took too long. They had 
to face the uncertainties that were caused by the many delays and the negotiations 
between the government and the oil companies. As I show in the case of the refinery, 
the developments meant long spells of waiting and uncertainty for the residents of 
the area.
Hedda Askland (2016) emphasises an understanding of displacement as a condi-
tion of loss with regard to the present, past and future. She uses a triad of concepts 
to address these different temporal dimensions of loss: nostalgia for the past, “solas-
talgia” (Albrecht et al., 2007) for the present, and her own concept of eritalgia for 
the future. As she describes it eritalgia points to the “embodied sense of displace-
ment that may occur when there is a rupture between lived realities and imagined 
emplaced self.” While the displacement of people in Uganda’s oil region had not yet 
taken place (or might never happen for some people), they already felt the (potential) 
loss of a future on their land. They might no longer live on the land they cultivated 
and where some had buried their ancestors – the projection of their current self into 
the future has been interrupted by the presence of oil. In the following, I first give 
a brief overview of Uganda’s land system and then I lay out the problems that came 
in the wake of the oil discovery and the reactions of the farmers, fishermen and local 
businessmen and women to them.
Generally, there are four different types of land tenure in Uganda: customary, 
leasehold, freehold and mailo land, a special land category whose origin lies in agree-
ments between the Kingdom of Buganda and the British government during colo-
nialism (Joireman, 2007). According to statistics from Uganda’s National Planning 
Authority from 2010, customary land is with around 41 percent the largest category 
followed by unregistered freehold with around 36 percent and leasehold with 16 per-
cent while mailo only accounts for around 8 percent of land nationwide (Hundsbæk 
Pedersen et al., 2012: 14–15). The distribution varies greatly though once split up 
into regions: in the central region, which includes the capital, less than one percent 
are customary whilst in the Northern region customary land is at around 76 percent 
(ibid.).
Since independence Uganda has seen three land reforms: the Land Reform De-
cree under President Idi Amin in 1975, the 1995 constitution and the Land Act of 
1998 under President Museveni. This land act provided for customary land to be 
recognised and titled. It also created tenure security by recognising squatters, who 
had occupied and utilised a land for at least twelve years and had not been challenged 
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by the registered owner, as bona fide occupants (Joireman, 2007: 470). The act also 
stipulates as lawful occupants those who have entered the land with the consent 
of the owner and those who are customary tenants. Both bona fide and lawful oc-
cupants can even apply for a certificate of occupancy (Coldham, 2000: 66). Rights 
to land in Uganda are therefore not exclusively tied to ownership of land. Indeed, 
much land in Uganda has not been formerly registered. According to the govern-
ment, 95 percent of landowners do not have a land title (National Development 
Plan 2010/11–2014/15 from the National Planning Authority cited in Hundsbæk 
Pedersen et al., 2012: 14). In this setting land conflicts are quite common, especially 
on customary land (Hundsbæk Pedersen et al., 2012: 24).179
After the oil discovery, a big problem in Bunyoro was that the government had 
verbally banned the issuing of land titles. While intended to avoid land grabbing, 
people complained that it was the rightful landowners who failed to get their land 
titles while persons in the government were profiting from the ban as they could 
circumvent it and process land titles anyhow even if their claim to the land was not 
recognised by the community. This was problematic, as the value of the land re-
mained lower without a title than with a land title. When I talked to a local politician 
in a village in an exploration area, he explained to me that the ban and the rumours 
had instilled fears in the people that they might get evicted from their land without 
proper compensation.
Since oil was discovered here in 2006 by Hardman, now the deepest worry 
even up to date is eviction. Because eviction, what I mean by eviction, that 
people may be chased away from here minus compensation. Or people the 
superior people in the government may come and even chase people away 
forcefully and retain the what, the land. That’s the people’s fear. […] That’s 
the most important thing. What everybody is fearing. Even though we are 
living here but we are not living in peace. After the oil discovery. […] what 
brings us that picture that […] we will be evicted in future [is] that we’re ever 
getting information, verbal information, that the president has stopped from 
2006 that nobody is allowed to get a land title for his land in this Albertine 
area […] where the oil business is going on. So that one clearly shows us that, 
we are like not the rightful owners of the land. Because if I’m the owner of the 
land and why do you instruct me not to get the title for the land? And then 
how do I call myself the rightful owner of the land? So that is our fear (Local 
politician, interview, Kyehoro, 2012).
By emphasising that people did not know what would happen and did not live in 
peace anymore after the oil discovery, the politician expressed a sense of uncertainty. 
To the politician and other residents affected by the ban on land titles, it was a nega-
tive sign. Statements such as this one decry a lack of knowledge to assess their place 
179 For more on the land tenure system and land rights in Uganda see Coldham (2000).
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in a petro-future and a sense of being left out and taken advantage of. With his state-
ments in the interview, the politician made me see his lack of knowledge about the 
oil and its contingencies. And he was not the only one to express these sentiments of 
uncertainty. People talked to me about it and I read about these concerns in many 
of the essays pupils wrote in the aforementioned essay competition. Many expressed 
their fears with regard to resettlement. In their analysis on the social impact of oil 
exploration in Uganda, Petrus de Kock and Kathryin Sturman (2012: 33) noted that 
rumours about displacement were widespread and that land insecurity fomented 
uncertainty. Patey (2015: 35) states that land insecurity has become exasperated with 
the first oil discoveries.
The Uncertainty of a Refinery
During the time of my research, negotiations were going on about a refinery between 
the government and the oil companies. They involved the question of who would 
succeed in making a better case of the risks involved with it. For affected people in 
the gazetted area the negotiations were not accessible and they had little means to 
influence them. While to the government and the oil companies the refinery was a 
question of financial or economic risks that were negotiated, for the people in the 
refinery area it was the very basis of life, namely their land, which was at stake.
Development projects such as the refinery, in general are not just success stories 
but have reverberations beyond the positive development rhetoric: The social anthro-
pologist Valerie Hänsch (2012) discusses the uncertainty people experienced from 
a development-induced displacement around the Merowe dam project in Sudan. 
From a relational perspective of risk, it can be argued that with this move towards 
implementation, the refinery, rather than being an object of hope and expectations, 
had started to be a risk object for residents in the refinery area. They were put at risk 
of losing their land and thus their livelihood and the realisation of this lead to an 
atmosphere of uncertainty.
In 2012, the government mandated a Ugandan consulting company called Stra-
tegic Friends International (SFI) to conduct a survey of the area and to draft a Re-
settlement Action Plan (RAP) for the 29.6 square kilometres of land needed. But the 
process was going slow and residents were complaining that they had no certainty 
of what would happen. The RAP process was marred with irregularities from the 
beginning: land owners complained that they had not been registered or that their 
land was too small. When I arrived in Hoima in October 2012, plans showing the 
demarcation of the lands were hanging in the foyer of the local government.180 These 
were the result of the survey SFI had conducted to assess the land size and land 
owners. After this, SFI was also given the mandate to do the resettlement or the 
compensation exercise. This, many NGOs claimed, was a conflict of interest. Some 
180 This publication of the maps was meant to allow everyone to raise objections. But the refinery area 
is an hour’s drive from Hoima town and the seat of local government is outside of Hoima town.
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alleged this was the case because the company was connected to a “senior” official in 
the government.
In general, most people preferred to get compensated as earlier on rumours had 
been going around that they would be resettled to Karamoja, a very remote and poor 
region in northeast Uganda. Other rumours, spread in civil society circles, had it 
that this misinformation had been given out by SFI on purpose so that people de-
cided for compensation. The “resettlement to Karamoja”-rumour spread the fear of 
a dire future and people did not know where or when they would be resettled once 
the government took their land. Typically for rumours, it is not clear who started it 
and why. But no matter the source of or motivation behind the rumour, it had the 
effect of making the resettlement look risky and eventually more people opted for 
compensation than resettlement.
From the demarcation onwards, it took over a year before eventually the RAP 
kicked off. Journalists and civil society organisations reported that people claimed 
they had been left in limbo. A retired politician in Buseruka sub-county, who lives 
not far from Kabaale and at whose house I was staying for a brief period, mentioned 
in a conversation with me that the farmers in the refinery area were left thinking they 
should not grow crops after harvest because resettlement would take effect shortly 
after that. With the process dragging on and little information reaching the farmers, 
their discontent grew further. The lack of ability to assess the behaviour of the gov-
ernment, of SFI and of the oil companies, created an uncertainty in the communities 
of the refinery area. They vented their feelings of uncertainty and anger in the media. 
By the end of 2013, the compensation exercise started. But the compensation was 
done in a peculiar way: people were urged to sign receipts for money they had not 
yet received. This was not only claimed by NGOs but also intimated to me by a land 
officer responsible for the resettlement at PEPD. He explained to me the procedure 
was done this way because the government feared that by the time they were to release 
the compensation they might not be able to relocate the citizens anymore to make 
them sign for the money received (Land Officer at PEPD, interview, 2013).181
In the wake of these developments, resistance formed in the area aided by a na-
tional NGO. Refinery area residents mounted demonstrations helped by AFIEGO, 
an NGO from Kampala. The worry of AFIEGO was not so much that the people 
would never see the compensation but that with the high inflation rate in Uganda 
the compensation would have considerably lost value by the time it would be paid. 
Another discussion revolved around the effect the compensation would have on the 
people economically and socially. Claims were made that the farmers would not 
know how to deal with the compensation money and spend it all instead of putting 
it to sound use. Other voices feared that men would act unwisely, get more wives and 
leave their family homeless and without any means. Hence the RAP brought uncer-
tainty to the refinery area as a social community and to the individuals.
181 This contrasts with the image of a state full of spies that may know your every move that I often 
encountered as I described in the methodological framework.
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During my field trip in August and September 2015 I found that CNOOC had 
already started acquiring land for a pipeline that would connect its Kajubirizi well to 
the refinery. Also in 2015, almost 3 years after the resettlement programme started, 
most people had received their compensation but the resettlement was still to take 
place and construction of the refinery was still not under way. The people who had 
opted for resettlement had still not been resettled. These residents claimed that they 
lived in a deserted or bushy surrounding as their neighbours had moved away, which 
posed a threat to their security. Furthermore, their children could no longer go to 
school (Director AFIEGO, conference, Hoima, 2015). In 2015 then, it was deter-
mined where they would get land and detailed plans were made public. The plans of 
their new homes were shown to the residents, who accepted them after some revi-
sions. I found that the RAP, which is a rather open process of land acquisition by 
the government, was often discussed in conjunction with the issue of land grabbing, 
be it in the refinery area or elsewhere, which frequently outraged NGO activists and 
participants in conferences.
In 2015, I visited the refinery area to meet with a former oil rig worker, whom I 
got to know in 2013. While I was back in Germany, he had been laid off due to the 
low activity in the industry and was now running for the office of district councillor. 
He showed me around the trading centre of Kabaale, to the boundary of the refinery 
area where only bush was to be seen. As we were driving around he pointed out to 
me land that had been bought by big politicians, such as Amama Mbabazi, the for-
mer Prime Minister and later contestant of Museveni for the Presidency in the 2016 
elections, or even the President himself. While I am not aware of how these politi-
cians acquired the land, in general there were many rumours of rich businessmen 
or politicians “grabbing” land in the oil region that further fuelled sorrows about 
dispossession.
Land Grabbing
Land grabbing has been defined as land acquisition that involves deceit, violation of 
human rights and the lack of informed consent, transparency, democratic planning 
or thorough assessment, although in some countries with corruption a formally and 
legally correct acquisition is not necessarily a fair deal for the former landowners 
(Ansoms and Hilhorst, 2014: 2). For Uganda, it is suggested that land grabbing was 
enabled by civil violence and authoritarian rule (van Leeuwen et al., 2014). I use 
the term here as it was brought up by actors in the field. Land deals were a conten-
tious issue and they were being related to the prospect of oil in the region (Augé and 
Nakayi, 2013: 12).182 I had heard a lot about cases of land grabbing especially from 
civil society organisations and the media. It is usually alleged that a businessman 
182 However, struggles over land were not just common in the oil region but happened in other parts 
of Uganda too (Kandel 2016). Not even all struggles in the oil region did arise from oil. Some were 
related to other developments such as the creation of a refugee centre in Kyangwali.
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from Kampala comes to the village and tells landowners scare stories about how 
they would lose out once the exploration started. Yet people lacked information and 
knowledge to prove these claims and indeed sometimes, due to the lack of transpar-
ency with which the exploration process was handled, simply had no chance to ob-
tain them. As a reaction to this uncertainty, some people were said to have sold their 
land for too little money. These stories engage the image of the poor, hard-working 
farmer versus the rich, fraudulent businessman with the morale of the story being 
that knowledge is power. Here, I do not concern myself with the (legal) veracity 
of each of these claims. Rather, I look at them together as ways people react to the 
changes brought in the wake of oil development. They indicate a wide perception of 
a new uncertainty of land tenure in the oil region.
A 2011 study by the NGO consortium Uganda Land Alliance claims that 42 
percent of respondents had reported land encroachment and land grabbing and that 
land disputes had increased by 27 percent due to oil discovery (CRED (Civic Re-
sponse on Environment and Development), 2015: 5). They present four cases that 
include scenarios that people in the oil region fear such as the damaging of their 
houses and crops without compensation, eviction or the appropriation of commu-
nity land through government officials. In one case, it is alleged that district level 
politicians and land board officials in Hoima grabbed community land and then 
demanded payments from Tullow that had been active in this area (CRED, 2015).
The Diocesan Secretary of the Church of Uganda in Hoima explained to me that 
when people in higher places, meaning either in business or the government, knew 
that there was going to be the oil business, they came and spent a lot of money on 
buying land. And people sold their land and happily bought motorcycles only later 
realising that the price of the land had increased and they could not get land again.183 
He said that now these people regretted having sold their land but that it was their 
own fault. While the offer, maybe as little as 1 million shillings, had sounded a lot 
to these farmers, it was not enough to buy another land or house in the oil region 
(Diocesan Secretary, Church of Uganda Hoima, interview, 2012).
In Pakwach, there was a problem about different claims on land between the 
Jonam and the Acholi. The Jonam had left their land in Purongo sub-county during 
the conflict in the North and Acholi had settled there. After the end of the conflict, 
Jonam started demanding back their land, which they claimed had been grabbed by 
politicians and military officers. The conflict intensified with the installation of oil 
related infrastructure, such as camps and warehouses, by Total E&P, which was at 
that time conducting seismic surveys in nearby Murchison Falls National Park.
On a workshop in Hoima organised by Tullow and CNOOC, one of the devel-
opment brokers spoke out vehemently about the issue of land grabbing. He talked 
about compensation with regard to the rates and how it was done for the Hoima-
Kaiso-Tonya road before turning to the issues with the refinery. As he was shouting 
183 I do not have statistics on land prices but claims of price increases for land and housing in the oil 
region were widespread.
Living with Uncertainty in the Oil Region 155
the following statements, he was advancing from the back of the room towards the 
podium where representatives of Tullow and CNOOC were seated.
The thing you have to look at is who is owning land currently in Albertine 
region. I’m giving you an example of an area gazetted for what? For refinery. 
[…] Who are you compensating? A new title today is saying the right owner-
ship of land is by that person who registered it. Meaning if you have been on 
land without registration and someone has registered it, it is his land and he is 
to compensate you. What if you go to compensate that person with the title 
now and I am an existing bonafide owner of that land and I refuse to leave. 
And I organise chaos. We collect ourselves and we burn the pipes. […] There 
is […] a historical perspective of Banyoro fighting for that resource [land] 
since time immemorial. Nyangire 1 and Nyangire 2. You may find yourself 
in the situation of causing Nyangire 3 if you don’t consider the issue of land 
appropriately (Representative of the Bunyoro Local Oil and Gas Advocacy 
Group, CNOOC-Tullow conference, 2012)
Nyangire, which means “I have refused” or “refusing” in Runyoro, refers to the resis-
tance of Banyoro against the imperialist Baganda and Britons around 1900. Nyangire 
1 was the war between Britain and Bunyoro under Omukama Kabaleega from 1894 
to 1899 and ended in defeat for Bunyoro. Kabaleega was exiled and only allowed 
to return in 1923, but he died on his way before he reached his former kingdom. 
Nyangire 2 or also known as Nyangire Abaganda, which means “I have refused the 
Baganda,” was in 1907 when Banyoro chiefs rose against the imperialism from the 
Baganda and momentarily threw the Baganda from the posts the British had assigned 
to them. They also fought to obtain back the so called lost counties of Buyaga and 
Bugangaizi, that had been taken from Bunyoro and given to Baganda by the British 
high commissioner Henry Colvile in 1893 for their service in the former war and 
that returned to Bunyoro by referendum in 1964 (Weichs, 2013: 20, 129–134).184
Connecting the current struggles to earlier struggles against external domination 
and to the grandeur of the former Kingdom, may sound like a rallying cry to fight 
back. His speech did not seem to be perceived as very threatening as many in the 
audience were laughing. It has not been followed by action so far and while I have 
often heard the worry that conflict might spring up due to these grievances, a recent 
study has found the prevalence of a rather cooperative “don’t rock the boat” attitude 
in the oil region (Grossman et al. 2015).185 The threats can be read as a very open 
184 For more information on the rebellion see Steinhart (1993). In 2013, the warriors of Nyangire 2 
were awarded medals by the Omukama. Raphaela von Weichs (2013: 85) also speaks of a Kabalega 
myth that came up in the twentieth century and that she understands as a counter discourse to the 
dominance of Buganda.
185 At another conference the NRM secretary general of Hoima suggested very calmly that Banyoro 
should have two groups to push for their issues: one cutting down oil pipelines and one creating 
dialogue (KHEDA Regional leaders dialogue, Hoima, 2012).
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reminder to the oil companies and the government that their operations are at risk 
if they do not meet the expectations of the people in the region. The statement also 
highlights very clearly the dire importance of land and the critical attitude towards 
the government, as people wonder whose interest their government serves. The next 
section looks at another land issue: the impact of the construction of a new road.
Road Construction and Vampires
One of the perks of oil production is claimed to be infrastructural development 
according to civil society activists and state officials. And indeed, new roads were 
constructed in the oil region or were in the planning. A road has been constructed 
between Hoima and Kaiso186 and in 2016, CNOOC finished work on the access 
road for the Kingfisher discovery, an area that was up until then only reachable cross-
country or via Lake Albert. Another tarmac road is meant to be constructed up to 
Buliisa, which is a small town in the oil region and capital of Buliisa district that was 
created in 2006.187 It had seen a lot of oil activity and it was also one way, though 
underused, into the national park. In 2013, Buliisa still had the feel of a drowsy 
town to it. The town was very sprawled out and the major T-junction in the middle 
of town was always almost empty – except for a few cyclists and goats nibbling on 
small roadside bushes or discarded plastic bags. The oil activities in these areas were 
mainly within the park, albeit some seismic activities extended beyond the borders of 
the park. There were plans to connect Buliisa to the national grid and in 2013 I saw 
how the masts for power lines were being erected.
However, these developments were not geared at improving lives of people in 
the region but at ameliorating the transportation of goods and machinery to the oil 
sites with the side-effect of improving transport for all. Roads have been discussed as 
common visual of modernity, which is imitated in a kind of infrastructural fetishism 
even if few cars for the road exist (Dalakoglou, 2010).188 During my research the 
construction of Hoima-Kaiso road was going on and allowed me to witness some of 
the processes, improvements and disillusionments connected to the road construc-
tion. It is important to notice that the experiences people made during the road 
construction influenced their outlook to a future with oil.
Rather than being a pure blessing to residents of the area, the road from Hoima 
to Kaiso-Tonya sparked a lot of controversy. People along the road complained they 
were not compensated properly. The compensation came late and people found it 
unfair because the compensation was not enough to build a new house to replace 
the one demolished for the construction. The compensation rates were an issue of 
186 Kaiso and other villages along the road were reachable via a murram road before the road con-
struction.
187 Up to the writing of this dissertation Buliisa can be reached via a murram road that gets close to 
impassable in the rainy season with parts of the road flooded.
188 For an overview of anthropology’s contribution to the study of infrastructure see Larkin (2013).
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contention all over the oil region. Compensation rates were set by the chief govern-
ment valuer and then passed by the district land boards. Several times I heard that 
old compensation rates had been used, which, given the level of inflation in Uganda 
and the increase of land value in the oil region, resulted in compensation sums that 
could not buy new land. I obtained the Hoima compensation rates for 2012 accord-
ing to which a “good and mature” mango tree was compensated at 100,000 Ugandan 
Shillings (UGX), then around 30 Euros, while a simple grass-thatched hut with mud 
and wattle walls and a bare floor was compensated at 30,000 UGX per square me-
ter. A tin roof raised the amount by 10,000 UGX, around 3 Euros, (Compensation 
Rates for Hoima District approved 18.9.2012 by Mugisha Andrew, District Valuer). 
However, according to informants the prices for constructing houses had increased 
over time, which made this too little money to construct a new hut. Currently, I was 
told tin sheets go for around 16,000 to 21,000 UGX per sheet and a hut of around 
two square metres would use about 5 sheets for a roof. With the mud bricks for the 
walls being at around 50,000, the price of a self-constructed and cheap hut with tin 
roof would be around 130,000 UGX rather than the 80,000 UGX the compensation 
rates allow for.
The construction of the road had a wider impact than improving transport. It 
also changed life on the side of the road. The road now paves its way past home-
steads and through fields and trading centres. While the dirt road that existed before 
allowed easy access from a homestead or field to and across the road, the new im-
maculately smooth tarmac road reduced this access. On both sides of the road is now 
a deep trench and at first only few access bridges or branch-offs were constructed. 
Many homesteads were thus temporarily stripped of their direct access to the road. 
Hence, the people who live literally right next door to the infrastructure improve-
ment and development, were temporarily cut off from it. The road construction was 
finished in 2014.
The construction of the road was accompanied by a lot of dirt and noise from the 
big machines and by interactions between the workers of the Turkish construction 
company and the people along the road. The presence of the Turkish construction 
workers was accompanied by stories, gossip and complaints. Several times people ex-
pressed to me their indignation at the Turkish men’s behaviour towards the women: 
sleeping with many women and with sex workers in Hoima and sexually harassing 
female casual workers at work.
Another more chilling rumour depicted the Turkish men as some kind of vam-
pires. As the road work was going on in front of the house of the former Chairman 
LC 3, with whose family I stayed for around two weeks, his grandchildren were 
standing with me by the side of the road watching the progress of the work. I noticed 
that they watched the Turkish workers and the big machines with great interest but 
maintained their distance. The oldest told me that their parents had warned them to 
not go too close to the Turks. They had heard that the Turkish workers would lure 
children with money, then abduct them and drink their blood. According to another 
child, they would not drink the blood but spill it on the road. Their grandfather con-
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firmed that these stories circulated but said they were just the imagination of people 
and that the Turkish men would only sacrifice goats not humans for the road. They 
followed the by-now familiar motif of the foreign men, be they from Turkey or from 
other parts of Uganda, who come and “steal” the jobs and the women.
The relationship between rumours and uncertainty is interesting in this regard 
as a rumour contains some information but usually the recipient does not know 
where the rumour came from and how reliable the source of that information is. 
In a context of insufficient information, rumours sow doubts and they gain a social 
significance. When I heard the rumours I was reminded of the “lionmen” stories that 
circulated in Chad and in which Exxon oil workers were eaten by lionmen (Reyna 
2011). Comparing it to the old English epic of the Beowulf, Reyna argues that this 
story was a narrative way to respond to fears of people in the Doba basin caused by 
the arrival of the oil industry. It created distrust and resistance against this imperial 
domination.
In general, such rumours and horror stories are far from limited to the context of 
oil exploration. With their concept of “millennial capitalism” the Comaroffs (2000) 
have shown the connection between witchcraft stories and capitalism.189 Already in 
1993, they connected the rise of the occult to the spread of capitalism (Comaroff 
and Comaroff, 1993). Witchcraft and cannibalism can thus be perceived as a ‘mod-
ern’ phenomenon rather than archaic remnants of traditional beliefs (Behrend 2011, 
Geschiere, 1997). Such stories were also widespread in Uganda and they can be con-
nected to massive social changes. I have heard stories of cannibals living in Kibaale 
district who had a big hole covered by a carpet in their living room, on which they 
would ask visitors to sit so that they fall into a pot that was in the hole and could be 
cooked. Or friends told me stories that they had seen with their own eyes a house 
with dead bodies of children on the roof. Heike Behrend describes similar stories of 
cannibalism for Uganda and relates them to the horrors of the first wave of HIV/
AIDS and the fortifying effect of Christian Churches’ fight against witchcraft (Beh-
rend, 2007, 2011).190 Luise White (1995, 2000) connects vampire stories in neigh-
bouring colonial Kenya to the massive social changes brought by colonialism.191 Sim-
ilar rumours with a cannibal note were analysed by Pamela Schmoll for Niger, where 
soul-eaters were said to take the form of uncanny animals, surprise their victims and 
capture their souls in order to eat them out of greed or jealousy. She understands 
these stories of soul-eating as an expression of the stressful situation brought on by 
the monetisation of society (Schmoll, 1993). In an article on witchcraft accusations 
in Acholi, Tim Allen (2015) analyses the case of “Mr. Red,” who had been accused of 
189 Furthermore, it has been incorporated into new Christian movements as Birgit Meyer (1999) 
shows for Ghana.
190 A connection between AIDS and witchcraft was also made by Bawa Yamba (1997) for Zambia.
191 For a broader and cross-regional discussion of rumours around witchcraft, cannibalism and sor-
cery see Stewart and Strathern (2004).
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witchcraft and subsequently subjected to mob justice, as practices of moral populism 
by politicians and elites to maintain their authority.
Building on these studies, I suggest the stories of blood-drinking construction 
workers are an instantiation of the uncertainty people in the oil region felt. The 
rumours can be viewed as reactions to the massive changes that suddenly arrived: 
big machines ploughing through the landscape driven by foreigners who do not 
even speak a familiar language like English. These horror stories show a level of 
distrust towards the foreigners that come to the oil region and from whom children 
and women, as I wrote earlier on, were supposed to keep or be kept away. In this 
perspective, the rumours also function as a means of control of children and women. 
Furthermore, the stories reveal mistrust towards the companies or more especially 
their workers. A participant in a multi-stakeholder dialogue claimed that people were 
being “bulldozed” by Total with regard to land issues:
We are new in the industry. We know nothing almost. And we have our sons 
and daughters who are now with the Total, multinational oil company. It is 
unfortunate they are in the pocket of the company and not looking at their 
land. […] The issue of acquisition of land we are being bulldozed by the 
Total. Because of ignorance, because we know nothing. […] Total they know 
their way of how they work out their interest (Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue by 
RICE-WN, Nebbi, 2012).
Mistrust was rife – on the side of the affected people in the oil region and more sur-
prisingly also on the side of the oil companies as I show in the next section.
Relations of Mistrust
This section highlights community-company relations that always contained an ele-
ment of mistrust. Mistrust or the inability or unwillingness to believe how things 
are presented to be aggravates uncertainty. The interactions between people in the 
oil region and the oil companies (and even some of the subcontractors) were han-
dled by their Ugandan Community Liaison Officers (CLO). They were in charge 
of communicating dates of activities, company policies regarding compensation or 
recruitment, receiving complaints and guiding the compensation and the recruit-
ment process. They were the brokers between the company and the locals, the one 
to translate the company’s intentions. They enjoyed a certain prestige in their area 
of activity (by their position and the money they earned), which was not necessarily 
their home area. The interactions were interspersed though by frictions and mistrust 
that do not fit the great narrative of creating bonds, in which Tullow describes the 
activity of its CLOs.
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Tullow is very keen to listen to and receive feedback from the community. We 
have a dedicated Community Liaison team whose responsibility it is to talk 
to community members and receive their feedback on a day-to-day basis. We 
also hold regular community engagement sessions to ensure the community 
has a platform to air their views about any issues they might have (Tullow Oil 
PLC, (n.d.)).192
The feel-good image of an ethical company barely covers the power relations at work. 
The oil companies intended to regulate the interactions as far as possible and hence 
to manage any risk the community could pose to their activities. By offering these 
platforms and allowing people to speak about their grievances, the oil companies 
appeared approachable. However, at times this interactive approach rather takes the 
voice from the people than give it to them, turning these platforms of engagement 
into mere “theaters of dissent” as Boholm (2015) argued in her analysis of consulta-
tion meetings during an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of a railway tunnel 
project in Sweden.193
Activities of the oil companies were according to their necessities and not on 
a regular basis but at least they always came to inform people “before the big cars 
come,” meaning the vehicles of the oil companies that transport machinery for ex-
ploration activities (Representative of the Beach Management Unit Kaiso, interview 
2013).
The exploration activities were taking place in areas that were populated, however 
sparsely this may sometimes have been. Especially before and during seismic surveys 
there was a lot of interaction with the population. In general, seismic surveys are 
done in order to discover possible oil deposits in the ground and to determine where 
it would be viable to start drilling for oil. It involves recording the underground 
vibrations from detonating explosives along set lines through a certain area. The 
explosives are buried in the ground either following a line or a grid. If an explosive 
should be ideally put where a house is, the engineer has to go around the house. 
While generally houses are avoided, gardens can get partially destroyed, but then 
compensation needs to be paid. The companies needed to interact with the local 
communities in order to inform them about a planned seismic survey and to settle 
compensation claims.
A lack of information and irregularities in the compensation process were often 
mentioned as grievances in the conferences I attended. Generally, compensation was 
192 This is from their booklet “Frequently Asked Questions.” The question to the answer was: “Does 
the community have a genuine voice? For example, how can our concerns be addressed and our views 
taken into account?”
193 While the railway planners invited the people affected negatively by the project to participate in 
the dialogues, air their views and get information, this did not make the people feel included in the 
decision-making process. Boholm describes these dialogues as “two sets of monologues, separated by 
a coffee break” (Boholm, 2015: 123), because the railway representatives failed to engage with the 
complaints of the people and rather re-stated the project’s reasons.
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planned as a process, in which people had to prove their right to the land through 
a certificate or a letter from their chairman LC 1. The landowners would then be 
informed of potential damage and had to give their approval. After the use of the 
land e.g. for a seismic survey, an assessment of the actual damage was to be done. 
At the end of the process the landowners would sign a form with the companies, 
which would state the receipt of the money and point out the prospected amount 
and the actual amount of land used and the number of plants destroyed. During a 
stakeholder engagement meeting of Tullow and CNOOC in Hoima, a development 
broker from Buliisa, raised the story of a man under whose land the Kasamene-1 
well had been found. At first Tullow had taken some land, saying they would use it 
only temporarily. But four years later Tullow was still on the land and had allegedly 
even extended the land used without consulting the man. He therefore asked the oil 
companies to explain how long temporary was (Representative Buliisa Initiative for 
Rural Development Organisation, CNOOC-Tullow conference, Hoima, 2012).
Didas Muhumuza, the Stakeholder Engagement Manager (SEM) from Tullow, 
acknowledged that the definition of temporary was a serious issue and explained that 
this man had been paid for a temporary disturbance during the seismic survey. No 
land had been taken yet and so far only crops and property had been compensated 
for. It was not yet determined which land would eventually be acquired by the state 
for production wells as the field development plans were still under planning. He 
emphasised that the oil and gas industry was a project of the government of Uganda 
and that the government had to set the framework for compensation of the value of 
land (SEM Tullow, CNOOC-Tullow conference, Hoima, 2012). This man was left 
hanging at the interstices of the oil life cycle as a potential production well was situ-
ated under his land but neither was it determined yet whether the well would be a 
production one nor how much he would get paid in that case.
In the following, I describe an information meeting from the subcontractor 
BGP194 and Total for residents of a community in Buliisa on seismic surveys due to 
take place sometime in the following weeks. The companies decided when and where 
to start for instance the seismic activity but this process was not very transparent to 
the local community. Dates for the seismic to start were announced but not necessar-
ily adhered to. Though I had been calling the CLOs many times to ascertain the date 
of the meeting, I learned about it taking place only one day in advance from a mem-
ber of a community-based organisation in Buliisa who said he had also just been 
informed.195 At the meeting, two CLOs of BGP and one of Total were present.
The meeting was held on an open court in front of the house of the Chairman 
LC 1 in Kabandindi (see picture). The meeting was set for 2 pm. Before 2 pm people 
194 This geophysical service company that assists in seismic surveys belongs to the China National Pe-
troleum Corporation. There is no explanation for the acronym (www.bgp.com.cn/ [February 2018]).
195 Of course it is possible that the community had been informed, while the information did simply 
not reach me. But this was not the impression I got from talking to very many people about how such 
interactions generally proceed.
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started gathering but left again as they saw that the representatives had not yet ar-
rived. The representatives of Total and BGP then arrived only 15 minutes late for 
which at the end of the meeting they were nevertheless admonished by the Chairman 
LC 1. They arrived in a green BGP pick-up, three men and one woman; one man 
being the CLO of Total.
The procedure of the meeting at first followed the usual protocol: the Chairman 
LC 1 welcomed the guests, a prayer was said and introductions started. However, 
the people of the village were not asked to introduce themselves, as according to 
one of the CLOs from BGP “They are many.” Then one CLO started talking in 
Rugungu, explaining the process of the seismic: from pre- to post-assessment and 
what people should do. He also informed them that they were going to need workers 
and will let them know when recruitment was taking place. He told them the salary 
(10,000 Ugandan Shillings/3 Euros per day) and how the recruitment process was 
done through the ballot system. Afterward, the other CLO translated to Aluru. Then 
the CLO from Total also talked to the people. However, because he was an Acholi, 
he addressed them in Acholi claiming the people would understand him. Still it was 
translated later on. He stressed transparency and how it would not be possible for 
anyone to steal from someone who should get compensated.
After the speeches a question and answer session started. It got interrupted by 
rain though and the meeting was rushed to a derelict community hall. The hall basi-
cally consisted of mud walls that were partially already coming down. There were 
only a few plastic chairs, which were reserved for the guests. The village people were 
standing or sitting on mats. Most questions were concerned with who can get a job, 
when the interviews will be held and what will or will not be compensated. One 
man asked whether they also compensate for cultural sites. To that question the CLO 
from Total replied that some people had tried to forge cultural sites and that people 
should refrain from doing that because the company would find out about it.
While the CLO of Total started answering the questions one part of a wall col-
lapsed causing a short uproar. However, the meeting simply continued afterward. 
After the CLO had replied to all questions the Chairman LC 2 spoke up saying that 
when Tullow did the seismic there were some problems because people, especially 
those ones whose land the survey was on, did not show up for the meetings. But he 
asked people to come to the meetings so that they do not fail to get their compensa-
tion. While the Chairman LC 2 was still talking the CLO of Total already started 
packing up. Lastly, the Chairman LC 1 spoke and stressed that they all are Bagungu 
and should be aware of the survey. While he was talking someone started distributing 
biscuits Total had brought and as some started enjoying the biscuits, others started 
to get restless as they also wanted some. In the mounting unrest, the Chairman LC 1 
called the end of the meeting and while he was still talking the CLO of Total waved 
at the people and rushed out of the hall seemingly in a hurry to leave the place. Even 
though the CLOs were in a rush to leave the meeting, they still took their time to 
talk to me before they drove away to another meeting in Paraa in the Murchison Falls 
National Park.
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The meeting was structured by the presence of the oil company and its subcontrac-
tor. Their arrival started the meeting and their obvious intention to leave ended the 
meeting. The question of who waits for whom reflects power relations (Loimeier, 
2012: 15). Waiting and more especially keeping someone waiting can be considered 
a form of temporal politics: In an ethnography of the experience of waiting in im-
migration offices of Buenos Aires, Javier Auyero (2012) describes clients as “patients 
of the state” and argues that the waiting reproduces the political subordination tem-
porally. Here, manipulating the time of others is seen as a governmental technique. 
In this case it is the representatives of Total and the seismic company who can let 
the people in Kabandindi wait. Certainly, it is interesting though that everybody was 
very punctual and that 15 minutes was noticed, which generally is not a noteworthy 
delay in Uganda – especially in the rural areas. The reproach of the local chairman 
could thus also be understood as a reaffirmation of his position in relation to the 
companies.
It was the community liaison officers’ decision not to have the people introduce 
themselves and thus remain unknown as individual community members. This was 
apparently done due to time constraints, as they had to go to another meeting as 
well. Still it kept the community members fixed in a mass of farmer-villagers. How-
ever much though the meeting was initiated and directed by the company, the or-
ganisation was left to the Chairman LC 1. He had to provide chairs and space and 
inform his people. The meeting also shows that even though the seismic was done by 
BGP, it was not done under its own banner but under Total’s represented by its own 
CLO. Total thus tried to keep control of (at least some of ) the interactions between 
the communities and its subcontractors.
The community in turn was left in a rather uncertain situation. As already the 
organisation of the meeting was communicated late to the community, the same can 
be said for the seismic. Although a date had been given, I was continually calling the 
CLOs and informants in the area to find out whether the seismic was taking place 
as planned but it was again and again postponed without the communities being 
informed.196
The most interesting aspect of this vignette is the reference to the forgery of cul-
tural sites or graves. In accusing the people of forging cultural sites in order to get 
more compensation, the CLO revealed a level of mistrust from the company towards 
the community. He stylised the company as a victim of forgery but also threatened 
the people that they had means to find out.
As noticed earlier, the mistrust was mutual. Much as the companies themselves 
seemed to be mistrustful of the population, the people were mistrustful of them. 
196 Curiously, in terms of safety this meeting does not align well with the overall emphasis on safety 
within the oil industry that I describe in chapter 6. This meeting can be contrasted to a conference 
held by CNOOC and Tullow in Hoima. Whilst collapsing walls in the village did not seem a reason 
to re-consider the venue of the meeting or even break it up due to safety concerns, in Hoima there 
was even a safety instruction comparable to the one given on an airplane, informing the attendants of 
the location of the emergency exits.
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Ugandans blamed the oil companies for just being profit-orientated and not really 
concerned with the needs of the people.
Here we are dealing with business people. Those people are out here, even 
when they sit here, they are calculating on how much profit they are going to 
get out of oil. […] And even if it was me, that’s what I would be doing if I’m 
here for business, I would play my cards so well such that I get huge profits 
out of it (Representative of Empagi-za-Bunyoro, CNOOC-Tullow confer-
ence, Hoima, 2012).197
People in the oil region remained mistrustful of the oil companies. Several times 
I heard someone wonder whether the oil companies were being honest about the 
progress of the exploration process. Many suspected them of secretly stealing the 
oil. During a district dialogue in Nebbi, a volunteer of RICE mentioned that people 
could not believe there was no oil in West Nile. They did not believe Total had not 
found any oil, rather they thought the explosives used during seismic surveys made 
the oil move to another part of the country (RICE conference, 2013). In answer to 
197 In her comment she equally lashed out at the government complaining about the integrity and 
work of NEMA, the local government and the district land board. She expressed her disbelief that 
these agencies would keep Banyoro safe and help them benefit from the oil.
Figure 18: Information meeting on seismic survey by Total and BGP, Buliisa District (2013).
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that the local government official and the PEPD representative briefly explained the 
technicalities of exploring for oil with explosives. Both used the image of scanning, 
like the scanning of a pregnant woman’s womb, to make the attendants understand 
that by the seismic activity, the oil companies were trying to get an image of the 
subsurface. Once again, pregnancy served as an analogy for oil developments. Many 
times the way politicians and state officials explained the oil by reference to what 
people ‘in the village’ are expected to be familiar with such as local beer or pregnancy. 
They bring images to the oil talk that are familiar and turn oil into something be-
nign, something that gives joy and that can be understood by anyone.
Curiously enough, Total’s CLO was talking to them in Acholi and not in Eng-
lish, although most people did not speak Acholi and it had to be translated into 
Rugungu. So why did he not speak English? I would view this as a means to create 
trust by showcasing his Ugandaness: He was not talking English, the foreign lan-
guage, but was one of them, a fellow Ugandan. At conferences sometimes Ugandan 
representatives of oil companies tried to use their ‘Ugandanness’ in order to create 
a “we”-sensation with the audience. They portrayed themselves as being on the side 
of Ugandans:
There seemingly appears to be quite a lot of suspicion that the public may 
have in regard to the operators and all that. But one thing that we all should 
appreciate is that all of us are Ugandans and all of us really at the end of the 
day carry the country wherever we are. If I was white or I’m from wherever 
maybe that would warrant some suspicion but what we are trying to do is, 
we are trying to do in the best interest of our country. Because at the end of 
the day where do we go? We shall remain, I remain in Uganda, you remain in 
Uganda and everyone will be in Uganda so we should really try to appreciate 
that. And criticism is good but if its constructive then it becomes quite valu-
able (CNOOC representative, CNOOC-Tullow conference, Hoima, 2012).
National content had another advantage for the company by giving their operations 
a Ugandan face: A Ugandan face to remind Ugandans that they too can benefit.
In her study on railway planning in Sweden, Boholm (2015) analyses the fail-
ure of risk communication at community dialogues as an inbuilt problem because 
participants are bound to be either agents, that is the ones making a decision, or 
patients, the ones suffering from that decision (Boholm, 2015: 129). As Ugandans 
aired their mistrust, so did the CLO air the company’s mistrust. Not only had the 
communities to deal with a new and powerful international player who was backed 
by the government but they also could not be certain when he would leave, what he 
would destroy and whether they would get compensation for it. Many times I heard 
people struggling to know whether they could plant their crops and what would be 
compensated how and when. And in the end, they could see that the compensation 
could take very long, be too little to set up a new life or be altogether refused because 
the claims were not accepted.
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This section has shown that the relations between the oil companies and the extrac-
tive communities were rife with mistrust, which was expressed in accusations and in 
rumours. The mistrust can be seen as furthering the uncertainty in the oil region. 
In the following, I go into more detail of a case where cultural sites were claimed to 
have been destroyed. I show with this case the agency that people have despite being 
“patients” in Boholm’s sense.
The Cultural Sites Controversy5.4 
So far, I have worked out how people in the oil region are living vis-à-vis a petro-
future they cannot assess well. Lacking the ability to calculate the future or being 
patients to the resource curse risk does not mean they were stripped of their agency. 
In the theoretical chapter, I highlighted that agency is the capacity to act (including 
making decisions) and to pursue one’s projects. While the people in Kaiso were not 
free to decide whether or where the oil companies drilled, they did have the capac-
ity to mobilise their social networks and other powerful agents to pursue their own 
goals.
Here I present a case, which I consider a creative way of dealing with the uncer-
tainty that comes with the exploration for oil. On the surface, it was just a negotia-
tion between people from a village next to an exploration well and the oil compa-
nies about the compensation for their destroyed cultural sites.198 Yet this was also a 
negotiation about the participation in the oil project. It highlights the uncertainties 
involved for people in the oil areas during the exploration process. In this process the 
oil companies had to interact closely with the communities of the oil areas. Although 
such communities, a term that bundles together all people residing in villages close 
to oil sites, are quite often portrayed as powerless in this encounter, due to a lack of 
knowledge of oil or financial resources, I use this special case to highlight the agency 
they have or rather the means they have to pursue their own intentions. I show that 
people from the oil region also tried to set their risks on the agenda. They tried to 
convince the government and the international community that cultural heritage 
was at stake and that the oil companies put themselves at a risk they did not even 
recognise; the wrath of the spirits of the lake.
Cultural Sites as Risks
In Kaiso, a fishing village on the shores of Lake Albert, the Ngassa wells (Ngassa-1 
and -2) had been drilled by Tullow in 2007 and 2009 respectively because it was 
expecting a major find in this area. In 2009, the Abayaga and Abayagakati clan of 
the village started claiming officially that Tullow had destroyed some of their cultural 
sites, among them one called after its spirit “Ijomuka.” Cultural sites are supposed 
198 For a detailed account of this destruction see Agena (2012).
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to be compensated. The first oil bill states that a licensee shall not exercise any rights 
under a license if he does not have the written consent of the relevant authority if 
the land has been granted as a culture site (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Develop-
ment, 2012a: clause 132, 1a). However, it does not specify the need to compensate 
for cultural sites. It stipulates only that compensation shall be paid to the landowner 
for damage to the surface of the land or to crops, trees, or buildings (Ministry of En-
ergy and Mineral Development, 2012a: clause 136, 1). A PEPD officer pointed out 
during a conference in West Nile that the companies were not supposed to disturb 
people or their cultural sites and that if they did, they should compensate people “up 
to the level of the disturbance” (RICE Conference, Nebbi, 2013).199
The people from Kaiso had complained many times to the oil companies and 
were advised to complain officially. I first heard about this case from the news (Sse-
buyira, 2012) and later from one of the complainants (Interview, 2012). I first met 
the complainant at a function by the NGO WGI in Kaiso where he was one of the 
few attendants. Later I was told by the Principal Private Secretary of the Omukama 
that he was very knowledgeable in all the medicinal plants of the area down at the 
lake. He also participated in a study on the cultural sites by the Kingdom of Bunyoro 
and the national NGO NAPE.
End of 2012, I talked to this complainant and the respective cultural leader and 
he explained to me that the destruction had enraged the spirits and yet the lead-
ers were not able to perform rituals to appease the spirits as the site was fenced off. 
The claimants wanted Tullow to restore the site and compensate them. They were 
not happy that Tullow only sent what they thought were mere messengers and not 
people who could make decisions. They wanted the top management of the oil com-
pany to come and negotiate with them. The complainant showed me two complaint 
letters they wrote to Tullow, one in July 2009 and one in November 2011 about the 
destruction of nine cultural sites, i.e. places of worship or of spiritual value.200 The 
second letter had the NGO NAPE and the Prime Minister of Bunyoro Kingdom as 
co-recipients. However, according to him, Tullow kept quiet. The claimant explained 
to me the problem of the destruction: the spirits of the lake were angry. The spirits 
appeared to the cultural leaders in their dreams. At the end of October two people 
had died when their boat capsized on the lake, one of them being a cultural leader 
(Interview, 2012). The Chairman LC 1 from neighbouring Kyehoro confirmed this 
story to me that the destruction of the cultural sites had caused accidents on the lake 
because it had disturbed the spirits. He described that people had died in the shal-
low waters even without being drunk (Chairman LC 1 Kyehoro, field notes from 
informal conversation, 2012).
199 Someone had complained that the oil company Heritage had destroyed cultural sites without 
compensating the people.
200 The sites are called Nsonga Ijomuka, Mukogi mukoto, Kibaale kya Kiberekimu, Mwija mboga’s 
house, Mukogi mutaito, Jjwaliro lya ijumuka, Kibaale kya mulindwa, Jziba lya ijumika, Nyanuhanga 
iboona.
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Yet the destruction was not just bringing mishap to the Abayaga and Abayagakati. 
The complainants claimed that the anger of the spirits was also the reason why the 
company had trouble with the well (Interview, 2012). And indeed, Tullow had en-
countered some difficulty in drilling the Ngassa well. A first well (Ngassa-1) had to 
be abandoned and the new well (Ngassa-2) had to be drilled from another location 
(Tullow Oil PLC 2007a: 27). The deaths of people in the lake and the difficulty Tul-
low was facing during the drilling of the well were explained by the complainants 
with the characteristics of the spirits that are able to kill and manipulate if not paid 
attention to.
When I asked Kaiso’s Chairman LC 1 about the sites, he said they did not ex-
ist. In fact, he had given the go-ahead to the drilling. This denial another politician, 
a chairman of the NRM party residing in Kaiso, claimed was related to religious 
beliefs, the traditional religions versus the (born-again) Christians.201 This politician 
stressed that the oil companies did not consult the people, but only the Chairman 
LC 1, and just drilled the well thereby destroying the cultural site. He alleged that 
the Chairman LC 1 had taken money from the oil companies. He told me that the 
oil companies thought the claim of spirits haunting the destroyers of their shrines 
was a joke but they would suffer the negative impacts. If they did not let the cultural 
leaders perform the rituals, they would not get the oil (Field notes from informal 
conversation, 2013). This politician then helped me talk to the cultural leaders and 
translated for me. The cultural leader of Kaiso described the situation as follows:
They destroyed the cultural site, so now there is no fish, people are dying. I 
wanted them to rebuild the cultural site but they refused. The site consisted 
of a certain stone and a pot that was put there long time ago. It was destroyed 
and removed but we don’t know where. I am very annoyed about the destruc-
tion. Every night I dream about that destruction […] Tullow thinks they are 
doing the best thing. They got a security man to protect the Ngassa-2 well but 
then the man fell sick and died when he was taken to Kampala. The man said 
he was there one night guarding the well when two men came and asked him 
for cigarettes. He asked them who they were and picked his gun inside. When 
he came back out, they were gone. But they were not people but ghosts. And 
after that incident the man fell sick. But Tullow does not take it seriously. It 
will keep being like that. Those things will keep happening. Until they come 
and respect, no oil will come and no machine will work. […] There is oil there 
but they will not get it out. The machines will always block unless they fulfill 
the demand […] They [the oil companies] overlook me. They think I am a 
small man. In Nigeria, they ignored the cultural leaders and where is Nigeria 
now? But if they give me what is mine, if they give me respect, if the place is 
201 In her ethnography on youth and cultural change in Acholi, Julia Vorhölter also notes that her in-
terlocutors reported a dismissive stance against or even ban of “pagan” cultural practices by Christian, 
particularly Born-again, churches (Vorhölter, 2014: 163–164).
Living with Uncertainty in the Oil Region 169
rebuilt then the oil will come. But if they don’t respect me, no oil will be there. 
Millions will be wasted (Cultural leader Kaiso, interview, 2013).
With this statement the cultural leader tried to conjure up a risk for the oil compa-
nies, warning them of the failure of their exploration efforts if they proceed without 
his and the spirits’ consent.
These stories resemble the involuntary sacrifices attributed to angered roadside 
spirits told by Mawri in Niger that Adeline Masquelier (2002) describes. She analyses 
these stories about bloodthirsty spirits of the road, that kill people in road accidents, 
as cultural articulations of violent experiences in the past and troubling encounters 
with modernity. In these stories the spirits could trick and then kill their victims for 
example by taking the form of a harmless looking foreigner. Such stories translate the 
opportunities and dangers or violent forces of modernity to local belief systems.
I suggest looking at these stories not just for what they represent but also for what 
the people telling them do with them. It is insightful to look at these stories from a 
risk perspective and to consider what linkages the narrator creates and what effect 
the risk would have if established. The cultural leaders offered a new causality for the 
accidents in and around the lake and the exploration sites. It was the anger of the 
spirits that caused deaths and accidents and that hindered the exploration process. 
The leader threatened not only the oil company but also painted a dark picture for 
Uganda, invoking the image of Nigeria. If he was not respected and not enabled to 
appease the spirits, there would not be any oil. The failure of the oil company was 
made comprehensible as the failure to find oil was likened to the failure to catch fish. 
When fish are scarce, it is due to the spirits, the cultural leaders told me. So when 
there is no oil and when people die it is also because the spirits had been angered.
This time the usual option of appeasing the spirits was no longer available be-
cause people were not allowed to the sites. The leader thus challenged the oil com-
panies and the government to take the risk of not getting any oil because they had 
angered the spirits and failed to pay what was due to them. As mentioned earlier, 
a risk can only be perceived if the knowledge of causal links between an event and 
outcome (like smoking and cancer) exists and is accepted. However, the causal link-
ages the cultural leaders established were not grounded in science or visible things 
but on local customs and beliefs. This different kind of knowledge, which would be 
referred to as traditional in Uganda, was not widely accepted though. This becomes 
apparent as the cultural leader himself points out that the Chairman LC 1 did not 
support their claims.
I also talked to another cultural leader from Mbegu. He claimed sites from Tonya 
up to Mbegu had been destroyed by the Chinese who were doing the seismic survey 
for Tullow.202 He said they destroyed traditional things with bombs on the water. 
They had closed off those areas, dropped bombs on the lake, probably the explosives 
202 He did not specify the company but it was most likely BGP as they are the only Chinese company 
I know of doing seismic surveys in Uganda.
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used during seismic surveys, and destroyed, what he called places of spiritual power. 
Only on the island (where the Ngassa well is) they were not successful. There they 
could not succeed and instead it started chasing them. The cultural leader from 
Mbegu explained that the Chinese came with their own power to fight the tradi-
tional power here but that in the end the Ugandan spirits were stronger and prevailed 
and the Chinese spirit died.
The coming of foreign spirits is not a new phenomenon as there have been spirits 
attributed to the Europeans such as Enjungu (Weichs, 2013: 91). In her ethnogra-
phy, Weichs (2013) describes three overlapping categories of spirits that are known 
to Banyoro: the embandwa, emizimu and cwezi. Embandwa personify nature’s pow-
ers, diseases and unusual events and the spirits reside in nature and they can take 
possession of human, terrestrial and material bodies and manipulate or kill them or 
make them tremble and burst. The term embandwa encompasses a concept of agency 
that ranges from protection to attack and the term contains the fathomable and the 
unfathomable (Weichs, 2013: 92). Historically, some of these spirits were attributed 
to certain families and clans as protective spirits and every family had a medium 
that could get in contact with the embandwa through diseases that were treated in 
ceremonies including rhythmic music, songs, prayers and e.g. the smell of tobacco. 
The spirits assist the healer in diagnosis and treatment and build a lasting relation-
ship with the sick person. This distinguishes the embandwa from other ancestral 
spirits, the emizimu, which manifest themselves in dreams, visions and diseases and 
have to be appeased to go away (Weichs, 2013: 89–90). Finally, the cwezi are hybrid 
spirits that combine characteristics of emizimu and embandwa and are assigned su-
pernatural powers. They are ancestral spirits of the kings and their clans of a former 
dynasty that are associated with health, prosperity, success and purity (Weichs, 2013: 
93–94).
Equating the arrival and activities of the oil companies with a war between local 
and foreign spirits could be seen as a reflection of the substantial disturbance and 
uncertainty caused by these activities. The expectation of a loss of traditional culture 
is picked up in this narrative, yet the traditional comes out victorious. The cultural 
leader from Mbegu told me the spell could be broken by a donation of two mil-
lion Ugandan Shillings to hold a ritual involving gifts such as a goat and to hold a 
gathering of the cultural leaders from along the lake shore (Cultural leader Mbegu, 
interview, 2013).
Living with Uncertainty in the Oil Region 171
Reactions from Oil Companies and Government
The oil companies did not respond to this risk as the leaders had hoped for. Com-
pensation for cultural sites was for the oil companies not a way of managing the risk 
angered spirits posed but rather the risk an angered community could pose to their 
“social license” to operate.203 And more importantly it was part of their agreement 
with the government.
And while the issue had been reported in newspapers and letters of complaint 
had been written, it seemed to be rather ignored by the government. I talked to 
the already mentioned Stakeholder Engagement Manager of Tullow who told me 
they were aware of the issue but that it was down to the government to verify the 
destruction of the cultural sites. He stated that they did not note this site during the 
pre-assessment and that in the end it was the decision of the government whether the 
claimants would be compensated.
This is a government of Uganda project. Before that site was assented to, a lot 
of consultations were done through ESIA [Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment] consultation processes and the like and no one mentioned it. Yes, 
it is true. This side was decades ago a cultural site where they would go and 
perform their cultural stuff. And that sort of behaviour, those cult-like […] re-
ligion was abandoned. But with the advent of oil and gas they try to say ‘Aah, 
this used to be our site.’ There is nothing, which was found there anyway. But 
they’ll always tell you that ‘This was desecrated’. First of all, the people ascribe, 
who belongs to that community, they all don’t agree with the sort of approach. 
But the matter was received and handed over to the government of Uganda 
to handle. And there is a cultural heritage policy in Uganda, there is a whole 
ministry and the department of community development in every district 
links with that. The issue was very simple. You know if Tullow is going to pay 
money for compensation of such things, it’s a recoverable cost, government 
has to approve it. But besides that there is real need to have genuine claims. 
We have worked at previous sites where real tangible things are seen and […] 
the people have been supported to transfer their valued what? Items. There 
was nothing to transfer that site, ok? Just to claim that ‘We used to go there,’ 
that’s it. […] The issue is we keep engaging with these people. We’ve discussed 
these issues several times. When I was a CLO there, we used to discuss this 
thing at every meeting. I said ‘Put your claims in writing’. They put their 
203 The social license to operate is not an actual license issued by an institution but a concept that 
refers to the acceptance of the company where it operates and the image it holds. It has been defined 
as “the demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that emerge from neighbourhoods, en-
vironmental groups, community members, and other elements of surrounding society” (Gunningham 
et al., 2004: 308).
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claims in writing and it was handed over to government (Stakeholder Engage-
ment Manager, Tullow, interview, 2013).
The reaction of the Stakeholder Engagement Manager has to be read against the fact 
that it was only a faction in the village that supported the claim while others (includ-
ing the Chairman LC 1) did not. Noticeable is his attitude towards “traditional” 
beliefs, which is a widespread discourse in Uganda where these beliefs are considered 
backward, harmful or even criminal.204 The reluctance to accept claims of cultural 
sites can also be seen in the remarks of the CLO who visited the community in Ka-
bandindi. Apparently, the companies assume that often these cultural sites do not 
really exist and that people just make them up so that they can get a higher compen-
sation. The view that there is “nothing there” would be challenged by an adherent of 
the “traditional” beliefs. As the Principal Private Secretary to the Omukama pointed 
out to me that the cultural sites in Africa are not comparable to European ones:
Our cultural sites are not of stones like cathedrals in Europe. People know to 
which stone to pray to. African history is not in ruins or rubble. Our shrines 
have continued until today. While the Roman and Greek shrines have van-
ished, African shrines still exist. African history is in those natural stones 
(Principal Private Secretary to Omukama, interview, 2012).
As the sites are not easy to make out, it is hence difficult to verify claims for an out-
sider since they cannot be seen like Christian churches. Masquelier (2002) speaks of 
a “mystical geography,” in which physical landmarks are not neutral but constitute 
“a complex phenomenal reality anchored in people’s active involvement with the 
invisible forces that surrounded them” (Masquelier, 2002: 839). However, only that 
which is considered in the impact assessment will be compensated. The composition 
of participants in these assessments impacts on the evaluation of the land. Potentially 
in the case of Kaiso the group involved in the assessment was not balanced enough 
to account for differences and factions in the village.
In the end the question of the veracity of the sites needs to be negotiated between 
the government and its people, as it is the government that pays for the compensa-
tion. I asked the Chairman LC 5 of Hoima, in whose constituency Kaiso lies, to 
explain to me the government’s position on the case.
Yeah, I’ve heard it [cultural sites case]. But I’m hoping also it is not specula-
tion. People trying to position themselves to make some quick money, yes. 
[…] they are saying ‘We had a cultural site here and we want’. You could, 
if you allow even that now you could end up with a thousand cultural sites 
coming up with every small house becoming a cultural site. So you need to 
204 Nevertheless beliefs in witchcraft or cannibalism are widespread and serve as explanation for mis-
fortune and disaster (Behrend, 2007) as elaborated earlier.
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go slow over that to really establish which one, which one exactly where. […] 
But with the advent of Christianity also many of those former old cultural 
practices have died out. And the young generation, people don’t know much 
about all these things. […] So we have to assess really and be sure that when 
somebody talks of a cultural site, he really means that and he is not trying to 
position himself to make some quick money (Chairman LC 5 Hoima, inter-
view, 2013).
The government and the oil companies were expressing the same position: cultural 
site claims had to be scrutinised for their veracity since they perceived these claims to 
be more about the money than about the beliefs and traditions.
Negotiating with Cultural Sites and Risks
Viewed through the lens of a relational theory of risk, the cultural sites were de-
stroyed because no value had been attached to them and they had not been recogn-
ised as objects at risk during the impact assessment. Hence, the sites were destroyed 
during exploration activities. A study on the destruction of a ceremonial landscape 
shows how Native American people failed to get their sites acknowledged before the 
construction of a Hoover Dam bypass bridge across the Colorado River (Stoffle et 
al., 2004). In re-analysis of this case, Boholm and Corvellec (2011: 184) illustrate 
how the definition of what is a risk is contingent on what is considered of value. The 
Native Americans had failed to convince the public authorities of the value of their 
ceremonial landscape and therefore failed to construct it as an object at risk.205
In the present case however, the Abayaga have shown that destruction does not 
put an automatic end to value or risk construction and thus to claims. They sort of 
inverted the roles. They emphasised how the sites in their destroyed state are a risk 
object: for the community as the spirits caused people to drown in the lake and for 
the oil companies as the spirits threatened their success at the well. The sites were 
thus converted to risk objects since “riskiness” is not necessarily a characteristic of the 
object but something attributed to it. Possibly it could be said that all objects have 
the ambivalent potential to become object at risk and/or risk objects as the cultural 
sites can either be at risk of destruction or a risk themselves.
From the viewpoint of the oil companies what was really at stake was the effi-
ciency of their activity. To them the risk was not the spirits or the destroyed cultural 
sites but the people who claimed them. For one, accepting more cultural or sacred 
sites would mean more entanglements with the communities and with the govern-
ment. Too many entanglements as suggested by Appel (2012a) are not desirable, as 
205 The “Standing Rock protest” about the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline is a similar case 
that was a hot issue in the U.S.A. in 2016. The Standing Rock Sioux tribe was lobbying for the stop 
of a pipeline construction close to the Standing Rock Indian Reservation in North Dakota, which to 
them threatened to destroy sacred sites and to pollute the Missouri River.
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they reduce the company’s ability to act solely focused on profit. Furthermore, the 
proliferation of cultural sites was a risk to them because more cultural sites would 
mean more compensation and more delays or a halt to further exploration altogether 
as there were also intentions to turn the whole of Lake Albert into a sacred site.
Communities in Hoima and Buliisa districts of Bunyoro region, Uganda, are 
reviving their traditional practices and customary governance systems for the 
protection of sacred natural sites around Lake Albert. Accompanied by the 
National Association for Professional Environmentalists (NAPE), these com-
munities are defending their ancestral lands from mining, commercial fishing, 
a game reserve and other activities which directly impact on and restrict access 
to the sacred sites, undermining their cultural and spiritual practices. […] 
Work is underway to develop a legal precedent that will secure recognition of 
the rights of local custodian communities to govern and protect Lake Albert 
as a sacred lake. This would be another first in Africa, affording legal protec-
tion to an ecosystem based upon recognition of the customary governance 
systems of local communities (Chenells and Nadal, 2015: 26).206
Claims of compensation for cultural sites have come up elsewhere as well. The King 
of Bunyoro, the Omukama, himself also raised a claim. He and a group of locals 
with the assistance of NAPE even made a map of cultural sites and they listed several 
trespasses on shrines and the drilling of the Waraga well on royal ancestral burial 
grounds including the tomb of Omukama Isaza Nyakikooto Waraga Rugambnabato 
from the eleventh century, a place of prayer and sacrifice (NAPE, 2012b: 12–14).
These claims can be viewed as staking claims in the idiom of oil (Schritt, 2016; 
Watts, 2008). What is interesting in this case is the versatility of claims drawing 
on the idiom of oil and of the cultural. Reference to culture can be used as power 
resources in dealing with the oil companies because of an international context that 
promotes human and cultural rights and the protection of cultural sites or cultur-
al landscapes through the UNESCO (Hauser-Schäublin and Bendix, 2015). The 
UNESCO recognises as cultural landscapes sites that represent the “combined works 
of nature and of man” (UNESCO, 1972, Article 1). The “UNESCO operational 
guidelines for the implementation of the World Heritage convention” (2008) dis-
tinguish between landscapes designed and created intentionally by man, organically 
evolved landscape and associative cultural landscapes that can be inscribed on the 
World Heritage List based on “the powerful religious, artistic or cultural associations 
of the natural element rather than material cultural evidence, which may be insignifi-
206 This report was submitted to the African Commission in a call to act on the feared loss of the 
cultural sites. The report was funded by the European Union.
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cant or even absent” (UNESCO, 2008: 86).207 The latter category could encompass 
the kind of site claimed to exist in Kaiso.
The cultural leaders tried to establish a new risk in the oil arena.208 For the com-
munity, if acknowledged, the claim could bring compensation while for the oil com-
pany a disrespect of culture could put their social license to operate at risk. The rhet-
oric of the cultural leaders took on the big oil companies, rendered them vulnerable 
to the actions of their spirits. However, the knowledge they used to build the linkage 
was not accepted and thus could not be used as a power resource in the negotiations. 
The construction of the sites as being at risk also failed in the first step but as the 
recent study shows, there are attempts that move beyond an individual well and in 
that case would threaten the progress of the whole oil project.
Epilogue to the Controversy
In 2014, Tullow decided to abandon the well, claiming it to be uneconomic due 
to complex geology. Even though it had had high expectations and had spent $67 
million on the well. In August 2015 when I visited the village again, the well had 
been closed and already restored.209 An online news blog on oil in Uganda assumed 
that maybe the bigger problem was the proximity of the community and hence the 
risk of big damages in case of an oil spill (Nalubega, 2014). In the end it seems the 
prophecies became true and the spirits won back their realm. However, the cultural 
leaders had received no compensation for the destruction. I was told that the cul-
tural leaders had not performed any ritual on the site even though it was now open 
to public access again. Some say the cultural leaders had then also abandoned their 
compensation claims.
This case has shown another way of how people in the oil region reacted to the 
destruction that comes with the oil exploration. As I have not been long enough in 
the village to note all the dynamics involved in this negotiation, I therefore focused 
my analysis on the claims that were made. Some people in the community tried to 
create a new risk, and hence created relations between the activities of the oil com-
panies, themselves, their grievances and belief systems by warning the companies of 
a negative outcome. It shows that establishing risks is not just a way the “powerful” 
can influence negotiations in the oil arena. Finding the right arguments and alli-
ances, it can also be mustered by those presented as the “weak” in the oil encounters. 
They may have failed in their attempt of getting the compensation but in an ironic 
207 For a discussion of the UNESCO concept of cultural landscapes and the dynamics around the 
nomination of such sites see Bergs and Peselmann (2015).
208 I would like to stress though that as much as risks can be used as leverage in negotiations or to 
stake claims, this does not imply that the linkages the actors construct are not of importance to them.
209 The withdrawal of the oil companies was witnessed by people in the community. Tullow also kept 
the Chairman LC 1 of Kaiso informed about the closure of the well and the shutdown of operations. 
He remembered that they told him that big trucks would come to take away the pipes (Chairman LC 
1 Kaiso, field notes from informal conversation, 2015).
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twist the cultural leaders’ prediction of the company not getting oil at this site was 
ultimately confirmed.
Beyond being power resources in negotiations these claims also reflect a way to 
deal with the uncertainties that come with the oil industry. They can be viewed as 
translating what is not quite fathomable, the oil industry and its workings, into local 
terms. They are a way of incorporating all the changes and uncertainties the oil com-
panies have brought. They allow the cultural leader to reach certainty in otherwise 
quite uncertain outlooks.210
Chapter Conclusion5.5 
The wait for oil was not a uniform or unifying experience in Uganda but expressed 
power relations of who can let whom wait. The fishermen and farmers in the com-
munities or the young men willing to work as casual labour were not the ones to 
decide when the waiting for the oil should end. It was the government and the oil 
companies that could influence the length of the wait. The choice people in the com-
munities had was to ignore the oil – despite being continuously reminded of the risks 
and uncertainty.
This chapter was concerned with different facets of life in the oil region since the 
oil discovery. The chapter portrayed topics and issues that were relevant during the 
time of my research. Many times I have heard and read that uncertainty was preva-
lent in the oil region. People did not really know what to expect from a future with 
the oil. They did see some changes – some positive, some negative but they also saw 
that things moved slowly. Stranded between ad hoc activities from the oil companies, 
civil society organisations or government agents, who were following their own time 
schedules and interests, and long passages without any sign of oil, the ability to make 
informed guesses was reduced.
The chapter looked closely at land as a sub-arena in which people in the explo-
ration areas took part in the negotiations of the oil arena. The case of the refinery 
showed that for the people directly affected, the developments and negotiations at 
national level are a source of uncertainty. In the course of oil exploration activities 
people’s homes and fields were destroyed or they were asked to relocate like the re-
finery area residents. There have been many claims of insufficient compensation and 
of land grabbing, but one case stood out for me: the destruction of cultural sites. To 
me this case was special as it did not just position the community as the ones at risk, 
as is usually the case.
Knowledgeable brokers from the community with the help of a national NGO 
aired their claims for compensation building on an international and Ugandan in-
terest in the protection of cultural sites and presenting the communities’ sites and 
210 For the use of divination to understand misfortune and to move from uncertainty to certainty that 
is performed by diviners see Reynolds Whyte (1990).
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livelihood as being at risk from the oil companies. Interestingly, the cultural leaders 
argued that the destruction of cultural sites had already angered the spirits of the lake 
and that this also put the oil companies and their business at risk from their wrath. 
The cultural leaders thus turned compensation claims into a service they offered the 
company: if they get money to perform a ceremony and appease the spirits, the oil 
company gets the oil.
This case shows the agency that actors maintain in the face of uncertainty: they 
can bring their own ideas and knowledge of the world into the oil arena and try to 
influence how the process of oil-making is progressing. People in the oil region did 
not remain passive but found ways to deal with uncertainty and make the changes 
intelligible through rumours of cannibalism, threats of rebellion and through other 
risk constructions. Of course, one has to be careful not to romantically overstate 
their agency as ultimately the oil companies have more resources to draw on. Yet it 
shows that people creatively make use of the new opportunities that come with the 
new developments – be it from the oil companies, NGOs, the kingdom or research-
ers like me – to eke out their own living and/or wellbeing. The case of the cultural 
sites shows that resource-making cannot proceed in a disconnected or disentangled 
way, like the oil companies try to as I show in the next chapter. Rather entanglements 
are abundant and people forge connections through demands for employment or 
compensation.
The next chapter turns to more attempts of creating connections to the oil indus-
try through national content, which is another sub-arena where the petro-future was 
invoked and shaped.
Figure 19: Closed well with safety warnings, Hoima district (2012).
Challenging Standards:  6 
The Intricacies of National Content
Sharing in the spoils of the country’s oil is a major expectation of people in Uganda. 
People hoped to find jobs or get contracts from the oil companies. The government 
has encouraged the participation of Ugandan companies and has motivated people 
in the exploration areas to seek opportunities in the service sector. There have been 
training sessions to explain to people about national content and the nature of the 
industry and where and when opportunities could be expected. During a conference 
in Nebbi in the oil region held by the community-based organisation RICE, one of 
their programme officers explained business opportunities for the people as follows:
This oil thing is like a mango [tree]. […] When the mango fruits are com-
ing most of them are around the outside. When somebody is inside you may 
think he has the best access to them, yet most of the fruits are outside. Inside 
is the oil money for Uganda. But that money is little compared to the oppor-
tunities that are around it. They are like those outside fruits. They can be even 
like a 100 times of what government is getting from oil (Program Officer, 
RICE, RICE-Conference, Nebbi, 2013).
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However, getting the outside fruits is not as easy as it may seem at first glance. 
Ugandans soon found out that the oil industry had a regime of international stan-
dards that their service providers had to adhere to and to verify through certificates. 
Remaining with the tree metaphor, the problem was that people were told that they 
could not pick the fruits how they used to. In line with best international practice, 
they would need an expensive device, which was hard to come by. The special ‘pick-
ing device’ was the knowledge of standards and the know-who in the industry. While 
the knowledge of standards seemed to be a straightforward training problem, I argue 
in this chapter it is more than that. As all sides are trying to profit from the oil proj-
ect, it is an example that reveals the intricacies of national content.
This chapter is concerned with the debate around the implementation of nation-
al content in Uganda. Based on observations from a conference on national content 
and interviews with the relevant actors, I show in this chapter that national content 
was a sub-arena of the oil arena where the oil companies, Ugandan companies and 
people from the exploration areas negotiated how the oil would be produced. This 
chapter shows how risks were mobilised as resources to gain a better position in the 
oil arena: the oil companies used standards in health and safety to exert their influ-
ence in the oil arena while Ugandan companies raised the risk of enclave production, 
which is producing oil in as disconnected a manner as possible from the country 
setting.
The oil companies’ regime of international standards manages key risks in the 
oil industry, such as major industrial accidents or human accidents. These standards 
were challenging to Ugandan entrepreneurs as they were higher than the Ugandan 
ones and most Ugandan companies did not reach them. Ugandans insinuated unfair 
play and challenged the standards and the way the oil companies emphasised them as 
effectively preventing them from partaking in the new opportunities of the oil indus-
try. Ugandan business owners were outraged, as the reference to the standards by the 
oil companies seemed like a see-through manoeuvre aimed at exploiting Ugandans. 
I argue that maintaining high standards and thereby angering Ugandans and forfeit-
ing cheaper local services still made business sense for the oil companies because it 
allowed them to keep risky connections to the Ugandan context at a minimum.
I start this chapter by introducing the concept of national content and the role 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in mediating necessary connections to the 
extractive communities and the country. Then I relate the state of national content in 
Uganda, including the plans for a refinery before turning to a debate about national 
content. In a second step, I take a closer look at the positions of four strategic groups, 
the government, the oil companies, Ugandan companies and the extractive com-
munities. I give special attention to the oil companies because it is their standards 
that set the tone. Finally, I analyse this debate as an establishment of a “technological 
zone” (Barry 2006).
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National Participation and CSR6.1 
This sub-chapter introduces some necessary theoretical background knowledge 
about national content and a connected new “ethical” wave of corporate social re-
sponsibility. National or local content refers to the integration of national (in this 
case Ugandan) workers and companies into the foreign extractive industry (Ovadia, 
2016: 21). It is supposed to prevent the dreaded enclave nature of the extractive 
industries from wreaking economic havoc on a producing country. National content 
has been described as being part of a change in corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
as a way of handling community relations by extending “cheap to give” opportuni-
ties rather than tangible assistance (Rajak, 2016). According to Blowfield and Frynas 
(2005), CSR is a concept with diverse definitions that can be narrowed to three 
main principles: companies have a responsibility for their social and environmental 
impact; companies are responsible for their business partners; and companies need to 
manage their relationship with wider society (ibid.: 503). A crucial point is that CSR 
is voluntary. The idea of CSR is that sustainability and social welfare are being inte-
grated as forms of profit maximisation into the capitalist system. CSR is not a coun-
termeasure against the bad effects of capitalism (Rajak, 2011: 10–11). It is either a 
way of managing external threats and thus part of risk management or a chance to 
benefit from new external opportunities (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 512).
The business case for CSR was prominently made by the economists Michael 
Porter und Mark Kramer (2002).211 Much research, academic or activist, has been 
dedicated to estimating the impact of such activities (e.g. Blowfield and Frynas, 
2005; Frynas 2005; Reed, 2009; Rogers, 2012; van Alstine and Barkemeyer, 2012; 
Wiig and Kolstad, 2010). CSR is intended to create new consumers among the poor 
and make the company more attractive to consumers, investors and governments 
and hence pay back the company in more dividends (Rajak, 2011: 11; Welker, 2009: 
145).212 Jedrzej Frynas identifies four reasons why oil companies engage in CSR: 
obtaining a competitive advantage because government favours a socially active com-
pany; maintaining a stable work environment; managing external perceptions and 
keeping employees happy (Frynas, 2005: 583–586). There is continuity between 
CSR and older forms of philanthropy, but its real rise came in the 1990s (Rajak, 
2011: 10). The rise of CSR can be connected to the stakeholder movement where 
stakeholders put pressure on companies. Through CSR the companies could man-
age this pressure and project an image of a socially responsible and ethically minded 
business (Garsten, 2010: 57).
211 For an overview of research on CSR see Kolk and van Tulder (2010).
212 For a brief description of the rise of the CSR industry see Welker (2009: 145–146). Welker also 
points out in this article that against the logic of CSR helping to improve relations, her fieldwork 
in Indonesia has shown that it can also produce “fresh zones of struggle and new forms of violence” 
(Welker, 2009: 148).
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Ethics and responsibility have come to be “en vogue” in business and can be viewed 
as a business strategy to adapt to new market conditions (Garsten and Hasselström, 
2003: 263). With an increased perception of companies as corporate citizens, the 
companies can be pictured as responsible for how they interact with greater society 
(Garsten and Hasselström, 2003: 261). Highlighting the importance of responsibil-
ity, Garsten and Hasselström thus connect risk and CSR. Human or environmental 
scandals involve high costs for the company – costs that have to be avoided to please 
the shareholders and to maintain a good shareholder value. The risk of environmen-
tal pollution has been defined by environmentalists and put on the agenda of the 
public. In combination with this rise of ethics in business, they obliged the compa-
nies to take responsibility. Shareholder movements such as the “socially responsible 
investment” (Welker and Wood, 2011: S57) have changed the dynamic between 
shareholders and companies. They created an image of shareholders who were not 
just focused on profit but who also wanted to take social responsibility.
CSR is also a mechanism companies use to maintain their corporate power. CSR 
“provides corporations with a moral mechanism through which their authority is 
extended over the social order” (Rajak, 2011: 13). Meaning that corporations re-
frame social problems in a way that is in line with their business agenda and in this 
manage to enlist actors with potentially divergent interests such as NGOs or com-
munity leaders. CSR can also be used though to distance the company from the 
surrounding communities like Chevron tried to disconnect itself from the Bengali 
population with “empowerment” initiatives (Gardner, 2015). However, this attempt 
failed because the moral economy of disconnection of Chevron met with a moral 
economy of connection in Bangladesh, that did not allow Chevron to establish itself 
as a partner to the people but accorded it the role of a patron – albeit one that did 
not live up to its obligations.
While the oil companies present national content as part of their corporate social 
responsibility, it is usually a requirement by the corresponding national governments. 
National or local content is an arena of negotiations and challenges opened by ex-
porting countries. Oil-producing countries have tried to increase the participation 
of their national companies in the extractive sector through tariffs and legislations 
or through assistance to local industries. Historically, oil was extracted by a foreign 
oil industry until producing countries tried to increase their share of the profits 
from oil by nationalising industries, indigenising the workforce or joining together 
in organisations like the OPEC (Ovadia, 2016). However, the policies of nation-
alisation and indigenisation were mainly successful as a way for the elite to capture 
the oil rents (ibid: 22). The rise of local content started at the beginning of the new 
millennium, but already the effectiveness of new local content regulations has been 
cast into doubt. For Nigeria, the political scientist Jesse Ovadia (2013) concludes 
that it was an “elite-led attempt to increase its own power and wealth” (Ovadia, 
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2013: 338).213 Although Ovadia sees a positive overall economic effect from national 
content for the country, it is not the majority who will benefit but the top percent 
– the well-situated individuals.214 Contributing to Ovadia’s argument, a comparison 
of Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda states that national content primarily helps 
the ruling elite as they are faster to capture the local content market (Hansen et al., 
2014). It shows that local content is the unregulated or non-scrutinised spoils of the 
extractive sector and the key arena of rent-seeking (Hansen et al., 2014: 21).
In Uganda, the CSR and national content activities of the oil companies were 
also contested as not delivering enough connections to the Ugandan economy and in 
fact rather reducing connections through the insistence on high international stan-
dards. After this general overview of CSR and national content, I turn to a discussion 
of national content in Uganda.
National Content in Uganda6.2 
National content in Uganda is an arena in which the participation of Ugandans in 
the oil industry in the present and future is negotiated. National content in Uganda 
was foremost driven by the government. First, I look at the set-up of national con-
tent by the government and then its inclusion into CSR by the oil companies.
Government’s National Content Policy
In the national oil and gas policy emphasis is put on national content in oil and gas 
activities to make use of employment opportunities and to help Ugandans acquire 
skills that can be transferred to other sectors (Ministry of Energy and Mineral De-
velopment, 2008: 2). It states that national content through shareholding in licenses 
and the provision of goods and services will stimulate value creation in the country. 
However, it acknowledges a lack of financial and technological capacity as a major 
impediment for Ugandan entrepreneurs to participate in the oil sector:
The extent to which the country’s private sector and its entrepreneurs can par-
ticipate in oil and gas activities is currently limited by their financial capacity, 
together with their management and technological skills. It is therefore neces-
sary for the country’s private sector to acquire and develop the skills necessary 
to participate in this sector of development, and where possible, for it to be 
provided with the opportunity to participate (Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development, 2008: 17).
213 Ovadia makes the same argument of national content helping elite accumulation for the case of 
Angola (Ovadia, 2012).
214 The positive macroeconomic effect of local content in Nigeria has also been noticed by Adedeji et 
al., (2016).
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Highlighting the skills limitations, the policy stresses the importance of capacity 
building to enable Ugandan participation in oil and gas activities. The oil and gas 
sector shall thus contribute to “sustainability, endurance and prosperity” (ibid.: 21). 
The policy prescribes capacity building for both national institutions and entrepre-
neurs. It postulates an expectation towards the oil companies of contributing to ca-
pacity building and technology transfer (ibid.).
In the Petroleum Acts national content is laid out in different clauses. First of all, 
a National Oil Company was created.215 The participation of the state in the indus-
try is secured through joint ventures (Republic of Uganda, 2013b). The provision 
of services by Ugandans is supposed to be prioritised unless the goods or services 
cannot offer quality and availability comparable to international offers.216 It is not 
mandatory but it is said that the licensee shall give priority to “citizens of Uganda 
and registered entities owned by Ugandans in the provision of goods and services.”217 
Furthermore, the licensees shall have programmes for the recruitment and training 
of Ugandans.218 These clauses are meant to guarantee employment of Ugandans and 
technology transfer.
Since early on, a refinery was considered a crucial part of Uganda’s strategy to 
handle the oil revenues, to participate in the oil project and to prevent the Dutch dis-
ease. Construction of a refinery was also included in the National Oil and Gas Policy 
from 2008 (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2008: 24–25; Hickey 
et al., 2015b: 15–16). Even though the wish of the government to build a refinery 
was accepted by the oil companies, the size of it had been a point of contention. A 
feasibility study on the refinery was done by Foster Wheeler, a former Swiss consul-
tancy agency that was taken over by its competitor AMEC in 2014. It suggested that 
a refinery with a capacity of up to 180,000 bpd was cost-effective and economically 
productive for Uganda and that there was enough oil to have both pipeline and refin-
ery (Hickey et al., 2015b: 17). The study had also compared different possible sites 
for a refinery and suggested Kabaale in Buseruka sub-county, Hoima District, which 
is close to the biggest discoveries so far made.
There had been a longer quarrel with the oil companies over the refinery because 
the oil companies wanted to export the crude oil. Generally, oil companies prefer 
exporting crude oil because it is cheaper and can be more flexibly adjusted to market 
demands. The government though had several arguments as to why the construction 
of a refinery was rational and necessary. In a presentation at the already mentioned 
conference by RICE-West Nile in Nebbi in 2013, the invited PEPD Officer listed 
the following reasons in her presentation on the status of the oil and gas industry in 
215 See Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Act (Republic of Uganda 2013b: clause 
43–46). The company was registered in June 2015 and one year later the board of directors appointed 
Dr. Josephine Wapakabulo as CEO.
216 See Republic of Uganda (2013b: clause 125).
217 See Petroleum Refining, Gas Processing and Conversion and Transportation and Storage Act 
(Republic of Uganda, 2013c: clause 53).
218 See Republic of Uganda (2013c: clause 54–55) and (2013b: clause 126–127).
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Uganda: The refinery is supposed to ensure the supply of petroleum products and 
boost the region’s refining capacity. It shall also help to improve the country’s balance 
of payment by reducing the petroleum products import bill. She said that PEPD 
considered a refinery a rational exploitation of the resource by promoting sustain-
able development. Furthermore, the products of the refinery would contribute to 
the country’s growing energy requirement and mix. Also PEPD expected a refinery 
to create jobs for Ugandans and to be a way to transfer technology in refining and 
associated industries. She concluded her argument by pointing out that the refinery 
would increase the competitiveness of Uganda and East Africa in general.
In listing these benefits, the government displays an awareness of negative eco-
nomic effects such as the Dutch disease, which can affect a country if the oil indus-
try proceeds with enclave production. The government thus mobilised knowledge 
generated in the economic and political literature on the resource curse to argue for 
a refinery as a matter of prevention. The government succeeded in its demands for 
a refinery.
However, the refinery posed a risk to the oil companies, as it would divert crude 
into a possibly unprofitable project, which could reduce their ability to profit from 
the oil. Therefore, while the question of whether or not a refinery would be built 
was decided in favour of the government, the size of the refinery and the pace of its 
development vis-à-vis the pipeline were the main points of disagreement between the 
government and the oil companies in the negotiations of the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding in 2013 (Hickey et al., 2015b). The government envisioned a refinery 
that would start relatively low at around 20,000 bbl, then pass a mid-stage of around 
60,000 bbl and then reach 120,000 bbl at peak production. The oil companies in 
turn wanted no refinery at all or only a considerably smaller one.
After a year of disagreements and negotiations, the final MoU between the gov-
ernment and the oil companies was signed in February 2014.219 The government had 
successfully pushed for a refinery although with a starting capacity of only 30,000 
bpd but with the option of an expansion and a first call on new resources. The gov-
ernment had also successfully rejected an implication of future licensees in the refin-
ery supply obligations as demanded by the oil companies. This would have reduced 
future input from the joint-venture partners into the refinery (Hickey et al., 2015b: 
18–19). Early in 2014, the government started looking for partners to develop the 
site and operate the refinery. At the beginning of 2015, it was announced that the 
Russian company RT Global Resources with the partners Tatneft, a Russian oil com-
pany, and the Russian VTB Capital, a globally active financial service provider, won 
the tender to build the refinery. In May 2015, RT Global Resources announced that 
it would take four and a half years to build the refinery once the agreement with the 
government was signed. Hence the refinery will not start production before 2020.
219 Allegedly, some diplomatic pressure was applied by Britain, China and France to make Museveni 
eventually sign the agreement (Patey, 2015: 17).
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National Content Initiatives of the Oil Industry
After discussing the government’s strategy, I now take a look at the national content 
initiatives of the oil companies. I focus the discussion on Tullow because they had 
been active for longer and were more accessible for me. All joint-venture partners, 
Tullow, CNOOC and Total, had their own policies and departments or employees 
to take care of national content framed under CSR. National content gave the com-
panies the “social license” to operate. Employing Ugandans made them partake in 
the business and benefit from the oil and hence less likely to strike or cause problems 
to the oil company (National Content Advisor Tullow, interview, 2015). This indi-
rectly lowered costs for security thereby boosting profits and the attractiveness of the 
company to shareholders.
The social license to operate and the consent of government are important pil-
lars of success. If these actors deem the company’s behaviour unfit for their inter-
est (which of course may differ starkly between communities and government), the 
company may well lose the very material basis for its operation and value-creation: 
the access to the actual oil. In its corporate responsibility report, Tullow makes this 
point quite clear by referring to the effects a neglect of environmental and health and 
safety risks would have: “delays, potential disruptions, increased costs and a reduc-
tion in the value of our projects” (Tullow Oil PLC, 2014b).
The oil companies and subcontractors alike prided themselves in the percentage 
of local workers and employees they had. According to Tullow, in 2013 88% of its 
177 employees in Uganda were Ugandans (Tullow Oil PLC, 2013).220 In its com-
pany structure, Tullow had the national content department under supply chain but 
in a restructuring of the company it was shifted and renamed to public affairs and 
national content. It is curious that this restructuring happened after the rather heated 
debates around national content in 2013. In 2015, after a serious scale-down of op-
erations, there was one national content advisor plus the head of the department for 
public affairs and national content (Interview, 2015).
Tullow’s approach to corporate social responsibility has changed over time from 
a more philanthropic approach to one centred on investment, as the Stakeholder 
Engagement Manager explained to me:
[T]he paradigm is changing. You know CSR is really philanthropic as it were 
but we are calling it social investment. And it’s a transformation from CSR to 
social investment. So it’s not different but one and the same. But building on 
the existing blocks. […] going forward much more emphasis will go towards 
alignment with the business objectives and management of impacts (Stake-
holder Engagement Manager, Tullow, interview, 2013).
220 No numbers were obtained for Total or CNOOC.
Challenging Standards: The Intricacies of National Content  187
The philanthropic approach had not been very successful as the CSR projects were 
not sustainable. Criticising the construction of a cultural centre for Bunyoro King-
dom in Hoima town, the Principal Private Secretary of the Omukama told me that 
CSR was peanuts and did not mean taking a share in the oil revenues.221 This concern 
is not unfounded if one considers that some of Tullow’s projects in Kaiso and Kye-
horo have become inefficient within a short time of being put in action.222 Generally, 
Tullow’s CSR in Uganda was not aligned to the development plans of the districts; 
hence, putting their sustainability into question (van Alstine et al., 2014).223
After 2013, another rebranding to “creating shared prosperity,” (CSP) which was 
still in use in 2016, took place. An analysis I did of CSR reports between 2007 and 
2015, showed that these developments took place within the time span of a few years 
(Tullow Oil PLC, 2007b, 2008b, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014b, 2015). 
The first shift occurred in 2010 with a change from corporate social responsibility 
to corporate responsibility, which included responsibility to shareholders. CSR was 
rebranded as “socially responsible investment,” at first partial and then full replace-
ment took place in the 2012 report. On their website they described their social in-
vestment as “focused on business objectives, efficient, compliant and sustainable.”224 
From 2013 onwards it was referred to as “creating shared prosperity” and included 
national content, transparency and business ethics. Unlike earlier descriptions of 
empowerment and support, the new paradigm foresaw the fostering of business rela-
tions with community members.
Tullow’s overhauled corporate social responsibility strategy places emphasis on 
the business sense rather than philanthropy. Tullow used its national content policy 
to further its image of a responsible company interested in creating what they call 
“shared prosperity.”
221 At first the Kingdom had only built a fence for 100 million Ugandan Shillings (30,300 Euros) as 
the secretary alleged. At the end of 2013, Tullow sent a manager to help finalise the project and in the 
end, a cultural centre was constructed.
222 A new health centre collapsed as it could not withstand the local conditions. It was built on a 
hill and the area is rocked by earthquakes of different strengths every day. Though most of these are 
mini quakes that cannot even be felt and are only visible on the seismograph. In a group chat, casual 
workers complained that once Tullow stopped paying the schoolteachers and government took over, 
teachers reverted to not showing up at the beginning of the term (Interview, 2012). Also the lake 
rescue centre that had an operating crew while Tullow was sponsoring it was unattended when I saw 
it in 2012.
223 In comparison, Total took a firm stance of not funding activities that were not aligned with the 
district development plan and backed by a majority. At a dialogue meeting hosted by RICE in Nebbi, 
a Total representative emphasised that they would not allow “shopping lists” of individuals but would 
only contribute to community projects and not fund them completely or give out free things. He 
stressed that Total would not replace the government as this was not sustainable (RICE dialogue, 
Nebbi, 2012).
224 By now this information is no longer available online.
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At Tullow, we talk about ‘Shared Prosperity;’ this relates to the reciprocal pact 
made between us and the people of Uganda. Our success as a company is 
only as good as our ability to make a lasting, recognizable contribution. By 
aligning with the Government’s priorities, we are investing in skills and ca-
pability which will one day contribute to developing a diversified economy 
where local and international enterprise can be allowed to flourish. We have 
no intention to simply set up in Uganda and then disappear. We want our 
legacy to be measured according to what we have helped make happen while 
we were here and what continues to flourish when we have left (Tullow Oil 
PLC, (n.d.)).225
Tullow had set up a not-for-profit company that was supposed to help local farmers 
improve their farming and to forge business ties between Tullow’s caterers and the 
farmers. Traidlinks’ mandate was to help Ugandan farmers to raise standards, in or-
der to benefit from the myriad opportunities it proclaimed existed around oil and gas 
exploration. During my research the effectiveness and reach of Traidlinks was quite 
limited. The only cooperation it had set up was between the local farmers’ association 
and a catering company delivering food to Tullow’s camps.
The rebranding is not just a change of name but of strategy. From offering assis-
tance in the form of hospitals, schools, education campaigns or scholarships Tullow 
started viewing the relationship with the community more as a business relation, 
hence refusing the philanthropy implied in CSR. Curiously enough though the two 
acronyms used to describe these very different strategies are very similar. They are not 
even a full letter but only a small line apart. CSP manages the risks the communities 
pose but it also improves the public image and allows even ethically conscious share-
holders to consider investment. The redirection of Tullow’s approach is potentially 
also a way to disengage themselves from the image of the paternalistic company by 
stressing the business relations.
Despite these efforts from the government and the oil companies, analysts from 
social sciences are not very optimistic about the success of national content in Ugan-
da. The political scientist Anne Mette Kjaer (2013) postulates that Uganda’s econo-
my was not likely to benefit from investments in the oil as it lacks capacity and so far 
has few linkages to the international industry (Kjaer, 2013: 9). Another impediment 
lies in the political situation in Uganda with an increasingly fragmented ruling party, 
which they claim results in a focus on short-term political survival, rather than long-
term policies and a concurrent politicisation of the oil by the ruling elite (ibid.: 12). 
Ovadia situates Uganda in a wave of local content, in which the regulations have 
become more pro-business and less clear on definition and measurement of local 
225 This is an answer from a booklet on “Frequently Asked Questions.” The question to this answer 
was “How is Tullow living up to its promise of making a long-term, sustainable contribution to 
Uganda? What does this mean in practice and what evidence will there be when Tullow leaves?”
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content (Ovadia, 2016: 29).226 Another study sees two major difficulties for national 
content in Uganda: one, the political context which drains rents from the sector to-
wards the political elite and accordingly to its political survival and second the weak 
capacity in terms of manufacturing that is done by small companies with low levels 
of technology (Hansen et al., 2014: 21).
The studies on local content in Uganda reflect widely held positions in the coun-
try that Ugandan companies lacked capacity to profit from the new opportunities. 
These representations reflect concerns raised in the resource curse debate, I discussed 
in the fourth chapter. Overall, most of Uganda’s economy is based on micro to me-
dium scale enterprises out of which many operate in the informal sector (Mawejje 
and Okumu, 2016: 442). There were few companies that could easily compete with 
international oil field service providers. Therefore, they failed to get contracts from 
the oil companies.
In the next sub-chapter, I turn to the debate about national content as it shows 
the opportunities, problems and challenges of national content as perceived by the 
various stakeholders that I see as forming four major strategic groups: the interna-
tional oil industry, the Ugandan government, national oil companies and last but not 
least the extractive communities.227
A Conference on National Content6.3 
Mid-2013, International Alert Uganda organised a conference in Masindi, in the oil 
region, to bring together local companies and entrepreneurs, all three oil companies 
(CNOOC, Tullow and Total), ministry officials and the lobby group Association of 
Ugandan Oil and Gas Service Providers (AUOGS). The lobby group was formed at 
the national level by bigger national companies that joined together in an attempt to 
enlarge their share in the oil business. The creation of this association was stipulated 
in the National Content Policy with the intention of developing suppliers’ capacities. 
In their work, the association stressed the indigenousness of a company in order to 
qualify as Ugandan and thus benefit from the national content legislation.228
In the first part of the conference, presentations were held by a representative of 
the Ministry of Energy and a policy consultant on energy law of the consulting com-
226 This is his conclusion from a comparison of local content provisions across different countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. His brief discussion on the state of it in Uganda is based mainly on the studies 
cited above and reports from MEMD (Ovadia, 2016).
227 It is untypical from an anthropological perspective to talk of extractive communities as a collective 
actor because it hides the factions and struggles within communities and problematically freezes actors 
in their position as community members. Still, I use this label as it was taken up by residents of the oil 
region when speaking out on the issue of national content.
228 AUOGS includes the following companies Eagle Air, Richflo Lift Services, Bemuga Forwarders, 
Threeways Shipping and Quantum Associates. The group is led by Prof. Charles Kwesiga.
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pany Bridge Consult229, a representative of Tullow and the spokesman of the lobby 
group AUOGS. After the presentations there was time for questions from the ple-
nary. In the second part, after lunch, participants formed three groups to discuss dif-
ferent elements of the policy draft of Bridge Consult and offer recommendations.
The atmosphere at the conference was quite tense and the oil company represen-
tatives got attacked both by the spokesman of AUOGS and by the audience. The 
discussion at the conference between the oil companies, Ugandan companies and 
people from the extractive communities centred on standards in the oil industry. In 
the following, I present statements made during the conference that are representa-
tive of the positions held by each of these strategic groups. In subsequent parts of this 
sub-chapter, I go into a detailed analysis of these statements to contextualise them 
by analysing e.g. why the oil companies enforced international standards. I relate the 
observations from the conference to other data I collected in my research and thereby 
expand out from this single event towards a more generalisable statement about these 
positions.
During the conference, a European local content projects manager from Tullow’s 
supply-chain department explained to the audience Tullow’s National Content Poli-
cy. He presented the oil life cycle, pointing out at which phases of the cycle, demand 
would be high and local companies could offer their services to the industry as long 
as they reached Tullow’s minimum standards for product quality and operational 
safety. Faced with an irritated audience, he denied allegations of unfairness and ar-
rogance by stressing the importance of the standards. In turn, he lamented over the 
divergent expectations levelled at the oil companies:
There have been discussions in many countries about standards, international 
standards. Many people feel that those standards have been high and that 
they’re abused to exclude the local people from working in the oil and gas 
industry and other industries. That’s not true. We have to comply with these 
international standards. We are an international company. We borrow our 
money that we invest in exploration, appraisal and development from interna-
tional organisations […] If you borrow money from [these organisations] you 
have to perform to their performance standards. If we were not implement[ing] 
international standards in the way we did with our work for example in health 
and social, we would be criticised […] by exploited Ugandans and expecting 
Ugandans because we are not looking after their health and we’re not looking 
after their safety because of cheap. Our argument that well, we’re trying to 
work with the improvements, doesn’t wash. So we have been squeezed at times 
that people expect us to perform to international standards and we have this 
229 This is a Norwegian consulting company. The company has also assisted in drafting a 2011 study 
on national content for the Ministry of Energy. Norway has been very active in helping Uganda 
develop institutional capacity on oil and gas matters (Kashambuzi, 2010; Miriima, 2013).
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problem the other end of getting local companies up to the standard where 
they can work for us (Local content projects manager Tullow).
The representative pointed out the two stakeholders that are important for the com-
panies to consider with regard to national content: on the one hand stakeholders 
in Uganda who want to participate but do not qualify and on the other hand, the 
institutions that lend the company money for its operations. Tullow relies on its 
“operating cash flow,” which is money generated from the business operations and 
external sources including commercial banks, multilateral project financing230, and 
debt capital markets.231 Without these funds, Tullow (and to a lesser extent the other 
companies) could not be doing its business. The expression he used of them be-
ing “squeezed” denotes a feeling of unfairness of being torn between opposing de-
mands.
Fairness also came up on the side of the Ugandan companies when the AUOGS 
spokesman attacked the oil companies in his presentation:
Previously, local companies cooperated well with the international oil com-
panies but this has changed […] They sounded so friendly, they sounded to 
have a good will but at the end of the day they remain business people and 
they showed us their colour. They started leaving us by the roadside. They 
started talking about standards. Standards, standards, we didn’t know what are 
standards. Where? And what the word standards meant. We thought that they 
had changed the meaning of the word standards. […] We are asking for fair-
ness. That’s what we’re asking for. We’re not asking for preferential treatment, 
we’re asking for fairness. […] When we are debating we need to have a clear 
definition of what local content is. We need to have a clear definition of what 
a local company means. […] We should not compromise on those things. 
Otherwise, this oil that we’re having in our country […] it’s going to enrich 
other economies that are not Ugandan (Spokesman AUOGS).
Such statements turned the standards and the question of who gets to define them 
into an issue to be discussed. Reference to international standards was taken to be 
unfair play directed against the Ugandan companies. The AUOGS spokesman re-
ferred to a different treatment of other international companies. Oil companies were 
accused of being arrogant, lacking transparency and blocking the access to the indus-
try for Ugandan companies. The spokesman was accusing the companies of favour-
ing foreign companies. He mentioned the connection to the wider participation of 
230 An example of multilateral project financing in the extractive sector is the International Finance 
Corporation, which is an arm of the World Bank and according to the journalist Tom Burgis accounts 
for most of the World Bank’s spending on oil and gas (Burgis, 2015: 154).
231 See: https://web.archive.org/web/20170218100208/www.tullowoil.com/investors [February 
2018]. On capital markets long-term capital (e.g. in form of bonds) can be acquired with the assis-
tance of investment banks that broker between companies and investors.
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Ugandans in the spoils of the oil and thereby drew on risks known from the resource 
curse discourse. Also, it was a clear appeal for a legal framework to protect Ugandan 
companies. Furthermore, he stressed that it should be clearly defined what a Ugan-
dan company is, with the intention of keeping out companies that were set up by 
foreigners in Uganda.
Representatives of the Ministry of Energy and the Petroleum Department sup-
ported the oil companies. The representative of MEMD asked the audience not 
to blame the oil companies but to deliver their suggestions because this was what, 
according to her, the dialogue was about. A senior geophysicist of PEPD and the 
current head of the national content unit at the Directorate of Petroleum, exclaimed 
that he did not know why Tullow did not stand up and point out that their general 
manager was a Ugandan. They suggested that people should look for the “little” op-
portunities in the oil industry like doing the catering. Furthermore, they emphasised 
that jobs were only given to Non-Ugandans if the knowledge they have could not 
be found among Ugandan applicants. They reminded everyone that the creation 
of AUOGS was a suggestion by the government aimed at creating a link between 
itself and the oil industry that would help monitor the implementation of national 
content.
In turn, many people from the extractive communities joined together with 
AUOGS against the oil companies. A lady from a CSO focused on women empow-
erment from Nebbi asked the oil companies whether they could reduce their stan-
dards “to feed the local communities”. The very limited negotiability of the standards 
annoyed and irritated people. A radio journalist from Hoima complained about the 
claim of lacking skills:
And the talk of we don’t have the skills. Which skills? We have the skills. But 
maybe we are only at a certain level. Only that we need to be improved. You 
talk about the welders. We have the welders. They are welding. You talk about 
electricians. They are there (Radio journalist from Hoima).
He acknowledged though that the local welders and electricians would need to be 
“improved.” It has to be noted here that while the invited community members did 
join in the criticism of the oil companies during this conference, the issue of national 
content also put people from the extractive community at loggerheads with the na-
tional companies: these were perceived as taking the job opportunities away from 
the people in the oil region. Furthermore, sentiments in the community reflected 
the notion that it is mainly the elite who captures the profits from national content 
(cf. Ovadia 2013).
At the conference it thus seemed that there were two big factions: the ones oppos-
ing the international standards (the extractive communities and AUOGS) and those 
backing them (the government and the oil companies). Why were the standards so 
important for the oil companies that they accepted angering Ugandans in the capital 
and in the extractive communities? And why are the same standards not relevant to 
Challenging Standards: The Intricacies of National Content  193
Uganda companies? The following sub-chapters analyse and contextualise these posi-
tions in more detail.
The Position of the Government
During the conference the government supported the oil companies and their insis-
tence on the international standards. In general, the government was actively push-
ing for national content though. With the national content regulation, elaborated 
above, the government intended to further linkages between the companies in the 
oil industry and Ugandan companies and Ugandan people. The companies had to 
employ a certain percentage of Ugandans and build capacity among Ugandans to 
achieve a skills transfer. In an interview, the Commissioner of PEPD Ernest Ru-
bondo related to me the government’s approach to national content:
You need to approach local content holistically: By having the industry we 
now have opportunities for companies that didn’t exist before. There are al-
ready Ugandan companies working for the oil companies. I am surprised by 
the extent to which Ugandans transport, drill, do catering and provide air 
travel. You also need to recognise that the industry needs standards. The big-
gest thing now is to build the standards in Uganda. The effort spent in the de-
bate should be dedicated to identify the gaps and how to build the companies 
[i.e. help them bridge the gaps]. I’d rather want to go to a successful company 
and find what they do good to copy it. And government is already doing that. 
Government has done a study on local content. […] The study recommended 
that an association should be built and that happened. It recommended that 
government should have a special unit and it is in place. It recommended a 
policy should be done which is in progress. You need an organised framework 
for local content and government is doing that but while building it you 
should go for the low-hanging fruits and ensure that we get that much of local 
content which is possible (PEPD Commissioner, interview, 2013).
The study he referred to was conducted by the Ministry of Energy on the state of 
local content in 2011. It found that up to 2009 14 percent of foreign investment 
was retained in Uganda and 35 percent of contracts were between Tullow and Ugan-
dan companies. The figure was given with the caveat that this could include shell 
companies, which are companies without active business operations or significant 
assets (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2011: 19). In the interview 
the Commissioner pointed to the standard gap, meaning the difference in standards 
between Ugandan companies and the demands of the oil industry. In order to bridge 
the gap his department and the Ministry of Energy in general were interested in 
aligning the Ugandan standards with international ones.
In an interview with an Information Officer at the Ugandan National Bureau 
of Standards (UNBS) in 2015, he mentioned that the ministry was very interested 
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in moving forward what he called the “indigenisation” of standards, meaning the 
adoption of international standards through UNBS. The ministry was facilitating a 
technical committee on oil and gas by financing the meetings or even the adoption 
of standards from the American Petroleum Institute (API).
An alignment of Ugandan standards with international ones means that the pur-
chase of certificates becomes cheaper for Ugandan companies because they do not 
need to seek certification from expensive international agencies that are authorised 
or accredited (e.g. by the International Accreditation Forum) to perform certifica-
tion.232 This helps bridging the pronounced ‘standard gap.’ In the interview the of-
ficer also told me that the standardisation process was done by consensus and com-
panies could choose to have representatives on board. Asked about any challenges in 
the process, he told me:
We have not had much of that [controversies around standards]. I think main-
ly because [the] Ministry of Energy actually understands our obligation to be 
able to use requirements which are accepted internationally, yes. So we’ve not 
had much challenges. We had a challenge to do with… I sat in a meeting of 
the service station. We had a challenge. […] We picked a South African stan-
dard and we were trying to customise it for Uganda, make it indigenous. So 
a couple of areas were rejected by the industry like ‘No, this is not for us. It’s 
for, you know, the developed world’ (Information Officer, UNBS, interview, 
2015).
Ugandan companies active in the downstream sector of the oil industry influenced 
the adoption of standards they thought were too high for them to achieve. While 
UNBS sets the standards in Uganda, international standards are set by standards or-
ganisations such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or with 
special regard to the oil industry also the API. The ISO defines risks and how they 
should be managed or avoided, i.e. what standards should be applied in different 
industries. ISO is a non-governmental membership organisation, which forms tech-
nical committees consisting of representatives of industries, NGOs, governments 
and other stakeholders. Uganda is a member body of the ISO.233 Standard setting is 
a process without a final endpoint. The way the standard-setting organisations work 
232 For more information on certification bodies see the websites of the International Organization 
for Standardization (https://www.iso.org/certification.html [February 2018]) or that of the American 
Petroleum Institute (http://www.api.org/products-and-services/standards/purchase [February 2018]). 
233 For developing standards, member bodies, i.e. national standard organisations, can decide to par-
ticipate fully or just be an observer to the technical committee. The committee creates a draft, which 
is then voted on by the ISO members. If it reaches consensus the draft becomes an ISO standard, 
otherwise it goes back to the technical committee for further editing. See the ISO website: www.iso.
org/iso/home/standards_development.htm [February 2018]. Publication as an International Standard 
requires approval by at least 75 percent of the member bodies casting a vote (www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso 
:std:iso:31000:ed-1:v1:en [February 2018]).
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allows for outsiders to initiate a review process in which standards are being negoti-
ated.
For the government, national content was important because it offered a chance 
of (further) developing Uganda and generating employment opportunities for its 
people. In chapter four, I presented the government’s position that they understood 
the oil as a future blessing because the ‘right’ governance mechanisms were in place. 
National content regulations fall under this governance because they aim to prevent 
negative economic effects of the oil industry such as enclave production and Dutch 
disease. While the Ugandan government demanded national content on the one 
hand, it recognised on the other that it had to meet international standards. The 
indigenisation of standards was a means to lower the threshold for Ugandan com-
panies, but problems of offering training institutions that can deliver up to the stan-
dards remained. In a way, the government took up a position not altogether different 
form the oil companies: standards were not negotiable. I turn to the oil companies’ 
stance in the following sub-chapter.
The Position of the Oil Companies
The position of the oil companies in the debate was that their standards would have 
to be reached by all their service providers. Representatives of the three joint-venture 
partners stressed time and again that they did not intend to exclude Ugandan com-
panies or be unfair but that it was a question of whether the companies were able 
to reach the international standards, as the following quote from an information 
brochure of Tullow points out.
The oil and gas industry is a highly skilled business, with a wide range of 
specialist support skills. At the moment, these skills are simply not available 
in Uganda, where the oil and gas industry is still in its infancy. We have to 
bring in expatriates for the more senior jobs, to harness their expertise and to 
ensure that our activities run efficiently, on schedule and on budget (Tullow 
Oil PLC, (n.d.)).234
This statement is a means of managing the employment expectations of Ugandans. 
It does so by referring to the special skills needed in the industry. The argument is 
in line with the national content policy of the government. Tullow’s joint venture 
partners supported this line of argument. The Ugandan CSR manager of CNOOC 
also stressed how important international standards were and that local companies 
most of the times failed to reach the health and safety standards requested and even 
stressed that local companies had to be rejected when they were sub-standard. Ac-
cording to him, local companies lacked an awareness of health and safety standards 
234 This quote is from the booklet “Frequently Asked Questions” and the question was “Why is there 
need for expatriates?”
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(Interview, 2013). It may seem odd at first that a Chinese company stresses interna-
tional standards since Chinese companies have a reputation of neglecting standards 
in health and safety and labour rights (Tan-Mullins 2014). However, CNOOC has 
been described as being more international and closer to “Western” business prac-
tices from the outset (Meidan 2016: 29). Furthermore, CNOOC is itself listed on 
stock exchanges and is thus not just owned by the Chinese state but also to a minor 
part by international institutional or individual shareholders.
Additionally, CNOOC, Total and Tullow formed a joint-venture and as such 
were interested in harmonising their approach to standards. In 2015, they had not 
yet achieved a proper harmonisation (National Content Adviser, Tullow, interview, 
2015). Indeed, there have been investigations into CNOOC by Uganda’s Human 
Rights Commission on alleged mistreatment of workers with regard to salaries, work 
conditions such as the ability to take leave days and the suppression of opinions. 
CNOOC workers had complained in a letter to senior managers about double stan-
dards between Chinese and Ugandan staff.235 Reportedly, the company was admon-
ished in September 2014 by the commissioner of the petroleum department and 
told to fix their human resource challenges (Imaka and Wesonga, 2014).236 During 
my field trips to Uganda, such issues have not been reported on widely and I did not 
hear any complaints that differed from those levelled at the other companies.237
Despite differences in the implementation of national content between the joint 
venture partners, the rhetoric was the same and is similar to this comment a Ugan-
dan Stakeholder Engagement Manager of Tullow made during an interview:
I will tell you one thing, IHS238 standards are a must in oil and gas. And it’s a 
good thing to make sure that they are adhered to. It helps a lot. There are seri-
ous issues of health and hygiene […] and then serious issues of environmental 
protection and so forth. Now, those standards what is going to be helpful, to 
enable potential contractors or business and suppliers people to be educated 
on them and learn how to fulfil them. Because […] there’s not going to be any 
235 The letter was leaked to the national newspaper Daily Monitor, which reported on the case in July 
2014 (Imaka, 2014).
236 This issue could explain why CNOOC was more edgy about an interview appointment in 2015 
compared to 2013. While in both cases I was not allowed to record the interview, the second time 
I could not have an interview alone with staff from their Quality, Health, Safety and Environment 
department and I was not able to access the manual of that department, which I was told included a 
risk matrix and laid out their overall approach. After the interview I was asked to have my interview 
transcript approved by my interlocutor and the Corporate Affairs Manager.
237 However, in Pakwach casual workers did complain to me about the accommodation of a Chinese 
service provider. According to them the Chinese workers were accommodated in containers with 
airconditioning while the Ugandan casuals had to sleep in tents.
238 IHS (Information Handling Services) is a company that offers products and services such as 
technical documents on standards from various standard organisations, industry data and analysis, 
software and consulting services. Since 2016 it is called IHS Markit after a merger with the company 
Markit.
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circumvention. They have to be followed. And fortunately it offers an oppor-
tunity to them to also do things properly. Handle food well, transport it well. 
Not just slaughter an animal and then make another person carry it on a boda 
boda [motorcycle taxi] like this. No, it doesn’t make sense. You have to carry, 
treat something you eat properly. It has to be dressed well, it has to be packed 
well, it has to be transported well. Simple. […] I have been in the oil and gas 
industry; it’s coming to five years. I’ve learnt a lot. It’s about compliance and 
it’s about learning. But it’s not difficult, they’re not really very difficult. It’s 
about understanding what they want and how to apply it (Stakeholder En-
gagement Manager, Tullow, interview, 2013).
This quote underlines the importance of knowledge when it comes to standards and 
risks. To the Stakeholder Engagement Manager it was clear though that the stan-
dards of the oil companies made sense and were the ones everybody should operate 
with. The example of the local butcher who transported meat on a motorcycle was 
mentioned in other interviews too. A Community Liaison Officer (CLO) from Total 
in Pakwach told me how rigid the control for meat transport was and how the oil 
companies would not compromise on such standards. He also mentioned that apart 
from the standards, the oil companies needed the suppliers to be reliable and to work 
within a strict time frame. Yet, many local contractors failed these requirements and 
thus did not benefit (CLO Total Pakwach, interview, 2013).
Although national content was a formal requirement branded as CSR, it could 
also be justified with economic reasons. Contracting Ugandan labour and using 
Ugandan products and services was cheaper than the wages paid for expat labour 
and the taxes paid for and time spent on importing items.
National content is not just about meeting legislative requirements or ticking 
a box to demonstrate that we have spent money locally or created the requisite 
number of jobs; it is also about reducing project costs. It makes good business 
sense, and we have aligned our local content strategy with our business needs. 
We believe that developing local content is responsible business practice, cre-
ates a positive social and economic impact, and enhances our bottom line and 
reputation (Tullow Oil PLC, 2010: 26).
Knowing it made good business sense, the Country Manager of one of the subcon-
tractor companies told me that his company was interested in hiring local people but 
could not take the risk of work not being done properly (Country Manager, inter-
national rig operating company, interview, 2013). According to what I was told by 
representatives of both international and national companies in the oil business they 
thought that the people from the villages lacked working morale and were unreli-
able. It annoyed some of the companies that they were forced to recruit in the region 
though many people were unskilled, i.e. lacked qualifications for the work or were 
not educated enough.
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Several foreign companies in the industry expressed to me the frustration they 
felt because of the diverse expectations from in- and outside of Uganda that they had 
to deal with just like the representative of the company complained at the conference 
in Masindi that they were being “squeezed.” The Country Manager of the above-
mentioned international rig operating company explained to me how there was 
no single Ugandan expectation but rather divergent demands from various interest 
groups that had to be taken into account. He also expressed a feeling of unfairness, 
because he felt that rules were stricter for his company than for Ugandan companies. 
While Ugandan companies would not pay taxes, the government would scrutinise 
whatever they as a foreign company were doing. Indignated, he told me that accord-
ing to one of his Ugandan employees the Ugandan government considered mzungu 
companies to be “milky cows” (Country Manager, interview 2013).
The debate evidences that the oil companies had to navigate between various 
claims, those of their international investors, those of international NGOs and those 
of diverse actors in Uganda. The oil companies were walking a tight line between not 
offending people by not employing Ugandans and offending them by employing 
the ‘wrong’ Ugandans. They were juggling different demands and expectations all 
the while experiencing mistrust from the government, civil society and people they 
interacted with in the oil region as noted in the previous chapter. All these demands 
were potential sources of harm as a negative, mistrustful atmosphere against the oil 
companies. A failure of managing stakeholder relations could lead to a to a loss of the 
social license to operate, resulting in conflict with the population in the exploration 
area, sabotage or violence against the companies and their workers, which are well 
known in other contexts such as Nigeria.
National content and the connections it creates to Uganda and its people thus 
also poses a risk to the oil companies but it is a risk they cannot avoid. They can only 
manage it by establishing certain rules or standards for it that keep the risky elements, 
that is the sub-standard companies, out. The oil company representatives thereby 
moved the negotiation of participation to a technical level. Not giving contracts to 
Ugandan companies was presented as a business necessity. A necessity that was hard 
to challenge because it built on the need to adhere to international standards. The oil 
companies took the stance that international standards were self-evidently important 
to good business operations and therefore could not be lowered. They underlined 
how they were actively helping Ugandans through their CSR programs and an em-
ployment policy that favoured Ugandans. To make their point about the standards 
(and skills) in the debate, the oil companies used examples that seemed ‘common 
sense’ about health and safety, such as carrying meat openly on a motorcycle, when 
clearly the exigencies of the oil and gas industry go beyond common sense as the 
examples of the safety regimes that I describe below illustrate.
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The Safety Regime
The oil companies have safety regulations that are intended to prevent accidents 
from happening. Naturally in a high-reliability industry like the oil industry, safety 
risks abound. They are managed through the observance of certain safety measures 
presented as unavoidable international standards of risk control. The safety culture 
is supposed to manage all accidents that could happen to workers of the companies, 
residents of the communities of the production area or the environment during ex-
ploration or production.
What qualifies as an accident is the result of negotiations. In the early days of the 
oil industry up until late in the twentieth century this kind of risk awareness did not 
exist. The current risk awareness and management is, according to Appel (2012a: 
702), the result of scandals and catastrophes in the oil industry such as the Exxon 
Valdez in 1989.239 Others date the emergence of environmental awareness earlier: 
either to the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill (Olien and Davids Hinton, 2007: 136, 
146) or to the Torrey Canyon disaster off the coast of Cornwall in 1967 (Mitchell, 
2009: 408).
In Uganda, the environmental stakes of oil exploration and production are par-
ticularly high since some of the discoveries were made within the boundaries of the 
Murchison Falls National Park. Doing exploration and later production in a Na-
tional Park bore more risks to the company because there was more scrutiny on these 
areas. Operations within the national park were under many constraints. In case of a 
serious spillage, a damage to the company’s image seems very likely. A lot of emphasis 
was put on not destroying the natural environment. Total claimed it was trying to 
keep its environmental impact low by doing an environmental baseline survey, insti-
tuting an expert “watchdog committee” to monitor their exploration activities and 
by using vibrator trucks in the seismic surveys (Corporate Affairs Manager, Total, 
interview, 2013).
Generally the oil industry countered the risk of humans ending up in and caus-
ing accidents by adopting a safety concept, in which oil workers routinely had to par-
ticipate in safety trainings of recognised institutions, each day started with a safety 
induction, each activity required a special permit and at work the personal protective 
equipment (PPE), i.e. helmet, goggles and boots, needed to be worn all the time (cf. 
Appel, 2012a). Furthermore, there were hazard observation cards (HOCs) that work-
ers needed to fill out on any potential risk they encountered at their workplace.
This safety culture was pervasive to the point of annoying the oil workers. While 
having an after-work beer with expatriate workers of a big international subcontrac-
tor in Hoima, one of them started joking about HOCs. They were both tired of them 
and reference to HOCs had become somewhat of an insider joke. Half-jokingly, the 
older one explained the procedure: Looking at the centre hole for an umbrella in the 
plastic table we sat at, he said that he would have to fill out an HOC stating that 
239 For a brief description of the development of the environmental movement see Jamison (1996).
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there was a potential hazard his glass might fall into the hole. Hazard registration 
had a low threshold within the oil industry. The low threshold is needed to account 
for the unknown unknowns that could cause harm. It might seem ridiculous or 
superfluous in that moment but might prove important later on. This is the logic of 
the precautionary principle that has taken precedence in Western societies in the past 
century (Beck, 1986; Rose, 2010).
Tullow publicly displayed a very pronounced stance on safety regulations, stress-
ing them in various ways.240 At the beginning of a conference, the Community Li-
aison Officer of Tullow gave the attendants safety instructions indicating the emer-
gency exits in case of a fire. At their office in Kampala while waiting for my inter-
view appointment, I was given a safety instruction card by the receptionist, which 
explained to me how to behave in case of a fire. When the secretary walked me to 
where my interlocutor was, she waited for me to put my hand on the banister for 
going up the staircase and pointed out any tiny hump on our way lest I trip and fall. 
In the hallways on a table next to a pair of armchairs a framed safety instruction was 
informing about proper sitting at work. At the coffee/tea table a sign was advising the 
potential consumers that the water was hot and so on.
While the safety regime looks very stringent on a representational level – some-
times even bordering on the ridiculous (cf. Appel, 2012a) – actual practices may, of 
course, differ from it. In one of my first interviews, my interlocutor who had been 
working in the oil industry for many years and, at the time of the interview, was run-
ning a training institute called Petroleum Skills241 in Kampala, told me the following 
about the oil industry:
So the practical side you need, you can’t come out of university with a de-
gree, go on a drilling rig and manage it. It’s impossible. Because it’s such a 
completely different beast from anything else that I’ve ever encountered. […] 
you need the theory combined with the practical. And it’s got to be back and 
forward and it’ll depend on the personnel how quickly they then move on to 
the next level […] In the UK, I know of people who were […] assistant super-
visors let’s put it and they actually couldn’t read and write. So the oil industry 
240 In this analysis I again focus more on Tullow than the other companies more material is available 
online on their risk management. It creates the image of an earnest, clean and social company that 
nevertheless has economic success and profit as its core values. From the general information I got on 
Total’s website, their system is similar to Tullow’s. When I first checked, nothing regarding safety stan-
dards or risk management could be found on CNOOC’s homepage. Since 2015 their Health, Safety 
and Environment (HSE) unit has undergone improvements and their website now includes informa-
tion on employee responsibility and social responsibility, including operational safety, environmental 
protection and response to climate change. This corresponds to the obersvation that Chinese oil 
companies have only recently turned to implementing risk management in line with market demands 
(Kong 2010: 144). 
241 The institute later merged with Ogas Solutions. For more information see their website: http://
ogassolutions.com/about-us/ [February 2018].
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is a strange beast that you can do things through bad colouring and this was 
people who were working mixing chemicals and they can do it. There’s ways 
you can get round that and as long as you know you’ve got the experience of 
how to measure certain viscosities, certain weights, you can get by (Director, 
Petroleum Skills, interview 2012).
At first sight, the quote basically highlights how important practical knowledge is in 
the oil industry. And indeed, many careers have started from “below” and continued 
to rise up to the top, e.g. the management of a drilling rig.242 However, the quote 
goes beyond a statement on the relevance of practical knowledge. The director con-
sidered the rig to be a different beast and linked it to the otherness or strangeness of 
the whole industry. He pointed to informal regulations and laid bare a contradiction 
of the industry that on the one hand hails high safety standards and on the other 
hand allows an illiterate person to mix chemicals. Things are done “through bad 
colouring” or knowing how to “get by.” The director labelled this as the industry 
being “a strange beast.”
The beast metaphor resonates with general perceptions of an oil-hungry indus-
try that scrambles for African countries. An industry that doesn’t care about the 
environment or human rights but devours all that comes its way; an industry that 
poses a risk to people, states and the whole earth. This perception corresponds with 
an image many researchers and journalists have created of the oil companies fo-
cusing on their power and obscure or even illegal machinations that disempower 
most Africans (Burgis, 2015; Frynas and Paulo, 2006; Klare, 2004, Sampson, 1975; 
Shaxson, 2008; Soares de Oliveira, 2007; Watts, 2008; Yates, 2006; Yergin, 2009). 
A perception fed further by stories and studies telling of destruction of environment, 
livelihoods and lives altogether (Breglia, 2013; Reed, 2009; Sawyer, 2004). Time 
and again, the oil industry has been found to do things “through bad colouring,” 
salting their probes, by-passing legislations and externalising the risks and uncertain-
ties of their operations onto their workers and other stakeholders spelling disaster 
for environment and extractive communities, most lately at the Deepwater Horizon 
(Watts, 2015).243 What seems to be important is that the certificates are right and 
that everything appears to be right. But at the level of practices, it seems quite com-
mon to circumvent rules.
Nevertheless, the safety regime is more than just a show. It is intended to protect 
the workers from harming themselves and the business. From a governmentality 
242 Especially in the early ages of the industry, there was no formalised training, no prior knowledge, 
everything was done as learning on the job. This hands-on knowledge and working one’s way up are 
part of what could potentially be described as an oil worker identity (Lubeck, 1989, 1978; Lynch, 
1987). 
243 Watts demonstrates on the Deepwater Horizon disaster that the risks of the offshore industry have 
become unmanageable and that it was the result of “cutthroat corporate cost-cutting, the collapse of 
government and regulatory authority, and the deepening financialization and securitization of the oil 
market” (Watts, 2015: 217–218).
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perspective on risk (e.g. O’Malley, 2000), the safety regime is a system to govern 
workers. The strict camp management, that regulates life at rig camps, could be un-
derstood as a means to maintain or even increase the work efficiency of the workers. 
The camp structure, the routines, the regulations and the constant control or threat 
of it can be compared to a panopticon (Foucault, 1994, 2006a,b).244 So far, I have 
elaborated on how the oil companies tried to achieve and portray safe operations to 
their shareholders and Ugandans. In the next section, I turn to the importance of 
the shareholders.
Risk management, Shareholders and Financialisation
In order to understand the safety regime and the risk management of the oil com-
panies in general, it is necessary to throw a glance at the underlying business logic. 
Therefore, I now turn to the role of shareholder value and the impact of finan-
cialisation on the oil industry. Shareholders are of paramount importance to the oil 
companies, especially for Tullow to start its “business cycle of value generation.” For 
Tullow, successful value creation means generating profits through successful busi-
ness operations and effective risk management, which allow the company to grow 
and expand, and deliver returns to the shareholders who had invested money in the 
company. On its website Tullow states:
Effectively managing risk across the Group is a competitive necessity and fun-
damental to creating and maintaining shareholder value and protecting our 
business, people and reputation.245
At the centre of Tullow’s risk management are the economic success of the company 
and the achievement of their business objectives. Shareholder value is at the heart of 
Tullow’s risk management despite claims that “Tullow considers the community the 
heart of everything it does” (Tullow Oil PLC, (n.d.)). In Tullow’s 2013 CSR report is 
a graphic on its strategy of “creating shared prosperity” at the centre of which is a dol-
lar sign with “financial & operational performance” written under it and explained 
in the legend as “Deliver returns to shareholders and providers of capital” (Tullow 
Oil PLC, 2013: 4).246 Shareholder value is an important guiding figure for the oil 
244 Labour control strategies of the oil industry, such as company housing in company towns, have 
been discussed for Nigeria by Ihonvbere (1998). Company housing not only creates patron-client re-
lations between company and workers but also eases surveillance of the workers. According to Shever 
(2008, 2012) similar strategies were employed by the Argentinian national oil company.
245 See Tullow’s website: https://web.archive.org/web/20170218100358/www.tullowoil.com/about- 
us/risk-management [February 2018].
246 Tullow does note though that the financial performance “underpins our ability to meet our com-
mitments to our employees, suppliers and providers of capital” (ibid.). Other elements of the graphic 
like local content, stakeholder engagement, environment, health and safety or social performance are 
considered to be important to run the business successfully. 
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industry. To be attractive companies generate returns for investors by monetising 
assets.247
The focus on the shareholder value is a rather new phenomenon, especially in 
Europe. In 1999 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) set it as a principle that corporations should be run in the interest of the 
shareholder. Up until the 1970s, companies were first led and controlled by family 
owners and later by salaried managers, whose position was then challenged by the idea 
to give control to the shareholders (Aglietta, 2000: 149; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
2000: 15–16). It was popularised in the United States and Britain in the 1980s by 
economists who wished to leave the conduct of corporations to the market. Share-
holder value was considered as being a way to allow the free market to do so. It pri-
oritises the shareholder over other constituents of the firm (Ho, 2009: 183; van der 
Zwan, 2014: 107). The main objective is to maximise dividends and keep the stock 
prices high. The performance of the company is judged by financial performance 
measures such as return on equity or return on investment,248 international account-
ing standards and publication of quarterly reports (van der Zwan, 2014: 108). The 
financial gains of a good performance are not (completely) reinvested in production, 
but are distributed to the shareholders through dividend payments and stock repur-
chases at high prices (Lazonick, 2015: 3). This strategy is a way the shareholders and 
the CEOs of the company, who are usually shareholders themselves, profit from it 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 29).249
Shareholder value is connected to the process of financialisation that has trans-
formed capitalism at least since the 1970s and arguably even earlier (van der Zwan, 
2014: 117). Financialisation means the spread of finance out of the market realm 
and into everyday life:
[T]he web of interrelated processes – economic, political, social, technologi-
cal, cultural etc. – through which finance has extended its influence beyond 
the marketplace and into other realms of social life (van der Zwan, 2014: 
101).250
247 For more information see Tullow’s website www.tullowoil.com/investors [February 2018]. 
248 Both return on equity and return on investment measure efficiency. Return on investment 
measures the efficiency of investments by comparing the cost of investment to the amount returned. 
Return on equity, which is the value of an asset minus the value of liabilities on that asset, measures 
the efficiency of a company by calculating how much profit it generates with the money invested by 
shareholders.
249 The CEOs and shareholders could also be viewed as rentiers who derive their income from finan-
cial assets and transactions and not production (van der Zwan, 2014: 105).
250 It is important to note though that financialisation studies have an Anglo-American focus and the 
sweeping ideas of how financialisation impacts on every aspect of life and ultimately even on identity 
appear somewhat deterministic without being able to explain why indeed financial markets have had 
different impacts on different economies (van der Zwan, 2014: 115–116). Especially the spread of 
shareholder value beyond the U.S.A. is a process that needs more attention (ibid: 110).
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This has also been described as a resocialisation of corporate America through Wall 
Street, where Wall Street managers impose their corporate culture on others (Ho, 
2009). Ronald Dore (2000) calls this a managerial economy because the managers 
who run companies have to handle demands from insurance companies, pension 
funds, investment funds and banks which again are run by managers (Dore, 2000: 
12–13).
Unlike producer markets, financial markets are not concerned with the produc-
tion or distribution of goods but with trade of goods that are not meant for con-
sumption (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002: 912). Financial transactions are a “sec-
ond-order economy” (ibid.: 913) only indirectly linked to the “first-order economy” 
(ibid.) of production through the profits they generate. It is important to note this 
difference between the markets as the financial markets follow other objectives than 
the first-order economy but have gained a serious influence over the first-order econ-
omy through the shareholder value. Knorr Cetina (2012: 122) argues that the essen-
tial difference between financial markets and exchange transactions is the orientation 
towards the future in financial markets. Unlike in exchange situations, in financial 
markets a transaction is a promissory engagement, in which the two actors connect 
their futures. The importance of financial markets for our capitalist economies lies 
in their capital-extending function (Knorr-Cetina, 2012: 119–120). She describes 
finance as the fourth pillar of our economy, next to production, consumption and 
exchange (ibid: 116). This promissory element is fundamental to financial instru-
ments like derivatives: Appadurai shows in his recent work “Banking on Words” 
(2016) that these instruments are nothing but contracts that profit from underlying 
chains of promises and that make “risk an independent source of profit” (ibid.: 10).
The oil industry has been thoroughly impacted by financialisation as already men-
tioned in earlier chapters. According to Sandy Smith-Nonini (2016) financialisation 
has helped the major U.S. oil companies to continue the uneconomic production of 
fossil fuels with low “energy return on energy investment” through speculative debt 
financing. Financial tools are important for the oil industry in their risk manage-
ment. While the insurance companies once played a big role in the industry, the 
geographer Leigh Johnson (2015) notes a considerable shift in the oil industry away 
from classic insurance towards hedging devices. The oil industry now uses hedging 
and financial tools to counter the negative effects of (natural) catastrophes, such as 
a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico, on their business. Hurricane derivatives consist-
ing of futures and options on individual storms and seasons, turn the hurricane risk 
into a “quasi-commodity” (ibid.: 207–208).251 She states that the insurance industry 
is now in competition with the financial traders, as some companies go completely 
without insurance these days. Risk management is thus not passive, but includes 
251 Combined with “natural hedges,” i.e. the storage of fuel at times of low prices in order to sell it 
during times of high prices, it adds to the profit. Furthermore, they pay for their own meteorologists, 
getting more accurate information than the general public.
Challenging Standards: The Intricacies of National Content  205
active elements of shaping the environment in a way that is advantageous to the 
companies.
Risk-taking then is to ensure the success of the company measured in the share-
holder value, that is its ability to deliver high returns on investment to its sharehold-
ers. The evaluation of a company’s investment worthiness falls to financial analysts 
who draw on a variety of data, calculations and gut feelings to create investment 
advices for their clients (cf. Leins, 2013, 2018; Wansleben, 2012, 2013). The stories 
analysts write about the market are not structured by the numbers, as one might as-
sume, following a “classic” economic understanding of risk as calculated uncertainty, 
but rather the numbers are matched to the story. Contrary to the saying, numbers do 
not speak for themselves, it is narratives that create meaning.
Risk management is thus an optimisation strategy to minimise negative effects 
on the shareholder value. The value could be affected negatively by disruptions in 
the operations, which are ultimately increasing costs, or expensive accidents and an 
increase in costs reduces the profit of the company or even their asset base as noted 
above. This means a lower return on investment. The risk management must make 
sense to its shareholders to ensure that shareholders are willing to invest their money, 
extending Tullow or other oil companies the financial means to conduct its business. 
The shareholders’ satisfaction is the object at risk in Tullow’s reports to the sharehold-
ers while the government and extractive communities become risk objects.
This sub-chapter has shown that it is always fruitful to look at that which is 
presented as obvious and self-evident. Although presented as universal necessities, 
the oil industry standards are not self-evident. Rather, they pertain to a specific kind 
of risk awareness and management pertinent to financial capitalism. The stance on 
international standards can only be understood if the safety regime and the reasons 
for it are considered. The new wave of business ethics, described under the discus-
sion of CSR, in conjunction with the importance of shareholders in the oil industry 
has increased the importance of (apparently) high standard business operations in an 
industry that is more known for its risky and reckless production methods than for 
concerns for human beings and the environment.
This analysis of the safety regime and its link to financialisation was necessary in 
order to understand what the representative at the national content conference in 
Masindi meant when he spoke about them being “squeezed” by different demands. 
The oil companies had to answer demands from Ugandans and they had to pro-
tect their shareholders’ interest in safe and successful business operations. The oil 
companies praised themselves for helping Ugandans take part in the industry and 
assisting in development through their CSR. These claims were challenged though 
at the Masindi conference. In the next section, I discuss the position of Ugandan 
companies.
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The Position of Ugandan Companies
Here I present the position held by Ugandan entrepreneurs and companies that 
countered the rhetoric of shared prosperity of the oil companies. In his speech, the 
AUOGS spokesman suggested that there was unfairness and that they needed a clear 
definition of a local company. He drew on the resource curse discourse, suggesting 
others than Ugandans would profit from the oil.
AUOGS stressed the indigenousness of the company, meaning that the company 
was fully incorporated in Uganda and owned by Ugandans. AUOGS was trying to 
cut out subsidiaries of foreign companies or companies that were incorporated in 
Uganda but owned by foreigners. Furthermore, the spokesman stressed the impor-
tance of local content at the managerial level. Only then the money would also be 
invested in Uganda and there would be more trickle-down effects as he claimed that 
30 people relied on each employed Ugandan (Vice Chairman AUGOS, interview, 
2013). AUGOS members were trying to get their foot into an international busi-
ness via national legislation. They urged for a protection of local businesses by giving 
them an extra hand in reaching the international standards and by levelling out the 
advantage international competitors have had through prior experience and relations 
to the oil companies. Drawing on an element of the resource curse discourse, the risk 
they highlight is that of having an enclave industry in the country.
AUOGS thus framed its concerns as not just that of a few companies but as 
an essential element of Uganda’s participation in the oil industry. The emphasis on 
particular standards produced a feeling of exclusion for Ugandan entrepreneurs who 
did not know the rules of the game and who had to question their own concept of 
running a business. AUOGS agreed with the oil companies that there was a ‘standard 
gap’ between what Ugandan companies could deliver and the international standards 
but they thought it was the responsibility of the oil companies to help Ugandan 
companies bridge that gap.
AUOGS was in touch with parliamentarians and ministers and tried to get 
publicity for their demands. As mentioned before, the creation of AUOGS was en-
couraged by the government as part of their national content strategy. AUOGS was 
promoting their services and lobbying, sometimes rather aggressively, for a bigger 
participation in the oil industry. They also demanded the enforcement of joint ven-
tures between Ugandan and international companies, which was taken up in the oil 
legislation (Vice Chairman, AUOGS, interview, 2013). Joint ventures were desired 
as it was expected that they would help in the knowledge transfer. Likewise Ugandan 
entrepreneurs and politicians were hoping to get better insights into the industry 
in order to be able to become more self-sufficient. In an interview I asked the Vice 
Chairman of AUOGS about the differences in standards. He told me an anecdote of 
his own experience of the standard gap252:
252 He had two companies Quantum Associates for warehousing and storage and Ecosol for waste 
management.
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I think the government has a responsibility and I do think that the oil compa-
nies also, they have a responsibility. Because you know, like I said, to come and 
say ‘You don’t meet the standard, so as such we cannot hire you’ is very unfair. 
[…] It’s more standard we’ve ever followed. […] I’ll give you an example, a 
small anecdote. I went down to Hoima with some gentleman from Total. We 
were building a warehouse and I had contracted an Indian company, which 
in here, in Uganda, is very reputable. Almost everybody uses them, they’re 
efficient, they’re speedy. So we got to my site and with these two guys from 
Total. They were just doing a feasibility study, […] they hadn’t moved yet in 
some two, three years ago.
So we go to the site and I thought they’d be very impressed with the way 
work was going. So we get to the site and they look around and nobody was 
wearing helmets. They’re like a hundred people, workers, hammering away, 
welding what. No one was wearing helmets. No one was wearing protective 
goggles. No one was wearing a reflective jacket. The way we do building, there 
was some guy who was round about ten feet off the ground […] on a little 
plank of wood, carrying concrete and wood, pushing it up. With no safety 
down, no support, nothing. […] It was a hazard. […] That’s how we’ve always 
done it. And this is a company that’s reputable, my contractor, Indian, very 
good, very… always meets time line. So these guys [from Total] tell me ‘If this 
was a contract, we would cancel it. Now. Say, this is an accident waiting to 
happen.’ […]
Now, I was not aware that there’s a certain health and safety minimum 
standard that is required. What we’ve always been aware of is financing: Am 
I working within the budget. This is my budget, can you deliver within my 
cost. How you do it, I don’t really care. […] So that’s what I’m talking about 
standards. So that was my eye-opening. So I realised what people want. So I 
called Chris and said ‘Man, get your people in helmets. I want to see reflective 
jackets. Get some sort of health and safety here.’ It was nothing like a first aid 
box anywhere. If any accident happens you’ve got a potential fatality. […] It 
is a learning curve. So the willingness to work is there. […] nobody was born 
with the knowledge of standards. […] These are things that can be acquired. 
These are things that can be passed on. And that’s why it’s very important to 
have JVs [joint ventures], to have MoUs because then, you just migrate this 
practice (Vice Chairman, AUOGS, interview, 2013).
This quote highlights the disparity between risk perception between the oil compa-
nies and Ugandan entrepreneurs. For the Total representatives the way construction 
was going on was an “accident waiting to happen.” This was not acceptable and not 
according to the health and safety regulations that rule the industry as I laid out in 
the last section. It was a risk Total was not willing to take since it might lead to acci-
dents that will either be the direct responsibility of the company or in case of a bigger 
accident delay the whole operation and thus affect the company as well.
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According to his initial perception the Vice Chairman of AUOGS was ready for the 
oil industry. However, safety standards were not part of his business planning. To 
him the risk was not relevant, not because of a failure to perceive the possibility of 
an accident happening, but rather because it was not important in his business logic. 
It could not substantially impact either costs or the public image of the company in 
a way that would make them lose profits. While the oil companies had to adhere to 
certain standards in order to manage or avoid risks, to Ugandan companies appar-
ently only two business factors were important: budget and timeline. Any extra cost 
to the budget means a reduction of profit and could negatively influence the image 
of the company. A company that fails to deliver within the set budget and timeline 
was not attractive. Therefore, on the Ugandan market, a company that could deliver 
on time and within budget had a competitive advantage.
The spokesman at the conference appealed to fairness several times – a notion of 
fairness not further specified. What does fairness mean to a businessman in Uganda? 
While I was not able to talk to him about fairness, I asked the Vice Chairman of the 
association to elaborate their position on fairness and he stated that the speaker had 
misrepresented their interests and in fact, he had to have a conversation with Tullow 
after the conference to clarify that they were not “on the war path” again. He elabo-
rated to me that they as an association did not expect Ugandan companies to take up 
specialised services like supplying drill bits that they do not have enough knowledge 
about. A refusal on this ground by the oil companies was logical to him and could 
only be changed through joint ventures and knowledge transfer. The unfairness the 
Vice Chairman saw was if the Ugandan companies did offer comparable services and 
still failed to win the tender:
The unfairness that I would probably myself allude to would be the fact that 
me and company X have a pretty much equal footing in terms of competence 
in terms of price, right? And then company X will take one tender and take 
another tender. […] I would detect a little of an unfairness. That is unfair 
because I can match you for price. I can match you for competence. Why do 
you keep winning? You see? That is where the unfairness is. But I cannot say 
that I’m gonna come and […] compete with Halliburton and expect to win. 
It’s not likely. It’s not likely (Vice Chairman AUOGS, interview, 2013).
The unfairness he alludes to in this quote is cronyism: the suspicion he and the 
speaker of the association expressed were that the oil companies were favouring cer-
tain companies not based on business principles but on clientelism. In a publication, 
an AUOGS member claimed that there was favouritism in the oil industry, that 
despite the improvement of capacity by Ugandan companies, foreign firms were still 
in an advantageous position. The Vice Chairman accused the oil companies that the 
lack of capacity was being used as an excuse to exclude Ugandan companies from 
the oil business (Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, [2013]c: 37). AUOGS 
understood how the reference to international standards undermined their ability 
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to deliver services and they resisted it. Given the image of or even the revelations of 
the multinational oil companies as shady and mafia-like corporations that disregard 
ethics, human rights, and environmental protection as long as they can make a profit 
(e.g. Burgis, 2015; Shaxson, 2008), it does not seem surprising or exaggerated to 
accuse them of unfairness.
It was the pronounced goal of AUOGS to establish transparency and to increase 
local expertise as well as know-how and know-who in the oil industry through joint 
ventures. Know-who was very relevant in the oil industry, which, as many workers 
told me, was very small and where everybody knew everybody. If one made oneself 
a bad name in one company, one would not be able to get a foot down again in the 
industry. The cronyism ascribed to the oil companies is not so far away from how 
business is done in Uganda’s economy.
Know-who is also important in Uganda’s economy and clientelist features includ-
ing maintaining good relationships to the government and kick-back payments are 
part of how business is done in Uganda. It is alleged that many big Ugandan com-
panies have connections to the ruling elite or are actually owned by an elite member 
and do not have to conform to budgets or timelines.253 Corruption scandals are 
almost a common feature of politics and in 2013 a major one had just swept across 
the Ministry of the Prime Minister.254
Often, Uganda has been described as a neoliberal economy because of the major 
structural adjustments it underwent during the NRM regime, most notably a broad 
privatisation of public enterprises in the 1990s (Kiiza et al., 2006).255 The neoliberal 
reforms have been described as having had far-reaching consequences for market and 
society in Uganda with a decline in fairness in market transactions (Wiegratz, 2010). 
However, in neoliberalism fairness is generated through a free market where no state 
protection or monopolistic corporation would decide.
The narrative of a successful neoliberal economy is potentially relevant for at-
tracting investors. On the “Ease of Doing Business Index” by the World Bank, which 
measures the business experience of small and medium-sized companies across 190 
economies in the world, Uganda ranks among the top ten in Africa and third best in 
East Africa after Kenya and Rwanda.256 Despite accounts of such global neoliberal 
253 The alleged connection being an escrow agreement between the official owner of the company 
and the silent owner who is officially in the government. Widespread are allegations of a link between 
Museveni’s brother Salim Saleh and Saracen but despite such rumours circulating around the big 
companies, there is little evidence to show.
254 For more on corruption in Uganda see Tangri and Mwenda (2013).
255 For an account of this process by two employees of the International Finance Corporation see 
Nyirinkindi and Opagi (2010).
256 The pronounced objective of the index is to improve the regulatory environment for business 
around the world. Data of the index is gained from a combination of methods such as an analysis of 
laws, information from registrars and questionnaires. For more information see http://www.doing-
business.org/data/exploreeconomies/uganda [February 2018].
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influence as promoting selfishness and transforming the shape of economies, the 
importance of personal relations noted above persists.
The profoundest difference I see between Uganda’s economy and the economic 
system in which the oil companies are rooted is the absence of widespread financiali-
sation. Currently, the anthropology on financial markets and stock exchanges is fo-
cusing on North American and European markets, yet ethnographic research on e.g. 
the Ugandan stock exchange could deliver new insights into processes of financialisa-
tion in Africa and beyond. In 2016, the Uganda Securities Exchange listed only 16 
companies.257 Most Ugandan companies are not traded on the stock exchange and 
therefore have no shareholders to whom they are responsible. Therefore, Ugandan 
companies were not confronted with the same demands as the shareholder-driven 
oil companies and standards for health and safety were not as important. While in fi-
nancial capitalism, the shareholders have a very powerful role, in Uganda’s economy 
this group of actors is almost absent and most likely the important actor is the (often 
secret) owner of the company who is to be satisfied with profits and whose interest 
is to be kept safe from harm. In shareholder capitalism it is necessary to display stan-
dards to a diverse set of actors while in Uganda it is mainly the opinion of the owner 
that matters. The connection to and penetration by the financial market is different 
and this is reflected in the different positions towards safety standards.
To sum it up, in the debate, the companies were challenging the way the oil com-
panies tried to settle in a more disentangled way building on pre-established relations 
with international service providers. With their lobby organisation the Ugandan 
companies emphasised the need for fairness, meaning assistance to Ugandan compa-
nies or protection of the service market via national content legislation, to avoid the 
pitfalls of the resource curse. They did not accept that the standard gap should be an 
excuse for the oil companies’ preference for international service providers.
AUOGS targeted the way the oil companies operated in Uganda. The Ugandan 
companies were still finding a unified position in 2013 and the approaches ranged 
from challenges of the use of international standards to the challenge of the insuf-
ficiency of the national content policy of the companies, that is their willingness to 
invest in trainings for contractors. While it may seem they were taking a position for 
all Ugandans, people in the extractive communities were demanding their share of 
opportunities and considered national companies a threat to it as I elaborate in the 
next section.
257 The companies listed included banks, media groups, an airline and a brewery, a power company 
and a supermarket. The exchange was established as a company in 1997. For more information see 
www.use.or.ug/ [February 2018]. 
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Positions from the Extractive Communities
In this section I would like to discuss a position that differed from that of the compa-
nies from Kampala and AUOGS that claimed to be lobbying on behalf of all Ugan-
dans. In the extractive communities the standard debate was just as vibrant as in the 
capital. Restaurant and shop owners were frustrated that the oil companies would 
not buy their food and drinks locally and people did not understand why they would 
not employ the local welders, electricians and drivers. At numerous conferences, citi-
zens expressed their frustration with the employment and contracting practice of the 
companies. Same as on the national level, the reference to international standards was 
perceived as a criteria designed to exclude Ugandans especially those in the extrac-
tive communities. Naturally, the extractive communities are neither a homogenous 
nor an institutional group, as will also become apparent in this sub-chapter. Still, I 
would like to discuss the positioning of residents in the oil region as coming from a 
strategic group united by their claim of belonging to the extractive community and 
the entitlements they derive from this.
A recurring question during conferences and conversations was why standards 
had to be the way they were. In 2013, just before a radio show on oil issues facilitated 
by the civil society organisation RICE, the presenter started talking off air about 
standards.258 He said that he had done a small investigation about the subject and 
found out that most people were unhappy because it was companies from Kampala 
that did the catering or camp maintenance and not them. The programme officer of 
RICE explained to the journalist that this was due to the international standards and 
the presenter queried why the standards had to be international.
As highlighted in the fifth chapter, one of the major expectations created by oil 
discovery is jobs or general income opportunities. These expectations were reflected 
in a rise in private institutions geared at providing oil-related education. The prolifer-
ation of private schools and universities Uganda has experienced since 1988 (Kasozi, 
2002), has now expanded into the oil sector making use of people’s expectation of 
finding job opportunities within the wider oil industry. A friend of mine in Hoima 
was willing to spend a substantial amount of money for a course at one of these 
universities because he was made to believe that with this certificate he could get a 
job in the oil industry. However, this is highly unlikely as a certificate alone without 
experience or connection does not pave the way into the oil industry. As the state-
ment by the director of the training institute, mentioned in the sub-chapter on the 
oil industry, made clear: both theory and practice are needed. At conferences or in 
conversations with me, I often heard youths from villages of the oil region complain 
that no or not enough casual work was available and accessible. These statements 
reflect a feeling that while indeed much money could be made, like the government 
and civil society stressed, it was Ugandans from Kampala who were profiting and not 
258 Usually, as part of their activities, CSOs buy radio time to have discussions with various actors, 
e.g. from the Ministry of Energy or the oil companies.
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the ones from the oil region because they lacked the ‘picking device’ to harvest the 
outside fruits of the mango tree mentioned in the introduction of this chapter.
With regards to jobs, again and again the question was raised who was being 
recruited and where this person came from. In the villages of the exploration area the 
concern was not so much with Europeans or Americans but with Ugandans coming 
from other parts of the country to do the casual work. Instead of seeing their youth 
gain money from the industry, they saw the consequence of young men from other 
districts moving into their area as I pointed out in the fifth chapter.
Recruitment for jobs with the oil companies differed from company to company 
but in general the casual work was given to allegedly ‘locals’ while the higher posi-
tions were advertised in the Ugandan newspapers that in theory are available nation-
wide.259 Under Tullow’s system in villages along the shore of Lake Albert, I heard 
politicians complain that the recruitment system had worsened with the Ugandani-
sation of the oil companies, which was in fact part of the implementation of the local 
content policy. According to them, other Ugandans, not them, were profiting from 
this policy.
The system used to be good. When they used to come for casual workers, 
people got jobs. Also Tullow did provide jobs to the community. But the cor-
ruption of the people working there started. They were getting their brothers 
jobs. But before for the company it was good, there was no discrimination. 
They would come and tell how many people they need and it was then down 
to the chairman to decide who was good to propose to work for them (NRM 
politician Kaiso, interview, 2013).
Also a Chairman LC 1 of one of the villages close to exploration activities told me 
on several occasions that with the Ugandanisation of Tullow, recruitment became 
worse with clientelism whereas the “wazungu” had no brothers or sisters in Uganda. 
This is a very different perspective on the effects of national content. It proposes that 
national content or the entanglement of the industry with the national economy 
comes with the Ugandan way of doing business. Once again know-who appears as 
an important factor and the unequal starting positions of companies and workers 
from Kampala and those in the extractive communities came to bear. The changing 
interaction style of the company and the actual decline in recruitment was attested 
to the involvement of Ugandans and not to overall company policies or business 
necessities.
Unlike the complaint against Ugandanisation levelled at Tullow by some ac-
tors, the Chairman LC 5 in Total’s exploration area in Nebbi district complained 
about the lack of personal relations in the recruitment system. According to Total, 
they informed the community in advance that recruitment would take place. On 
259 However, few if any newspapers reach the villages and if so then mainly those in local languages or 
the state-owned New Vision. However, news from the papers are read out on local radio stations.
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recruitment day an employee of Total and local politicians (Chairman LC 1, women 
and youth representatives) were present and informed the applicants on duration of 
work, requirements and work conditions and all interested filled out an application 
form. All applications were put in a big box and then the workers’ names were drawn 
publicly. The lucky ones were then informed and sent for the physical examination. 
This process was meant to create equal opportunities for all and to prevent patron-
age.260 This new standards of recruitment were contested though. The Chairman LC 
5 of Nebbi district expressed his discontent with the recruitment system at a multi-
stakeholder dialogue organised by RICE in his town.
So, I know recruitment is very crucial. And I’m told the method of your [ad-
dressing a representative of Total] recruitment is also transparent. That you 
just go and when you need about ten people, you have number one, two out 
up to 100 and then you pour them in a basket, then someone comes from 
behind and comes and picks. So when you get number one, you are recruited. 
When you get number… the method is good, alright. But sometimes it will 
not give you competent people who will work. Because for us, we know our 
people better than any other person. […] You will pick someone who are weak 
and who will be a problem to you and tomorrow you will begin regretting that 
these people of Panyimur, they’re lazy. […] These people of Alur, they’re lazy. 
And yet they’re not lazy. We know the people who are capable, who can help 
you. But for you, you say, we don’t want political involvement in this thing. 
We don’t want technical… now what do you want? […] Who is the head of 
this thing? Eh? Eh? Politicians are claiming to be there and even technocrats 
are claiming to be there. You consult them, eh! Nobody is an island. We are 
here to help you. And we are here to guide you on the best way to carry your 
good job. Because when you get the muyaaye261 from the roadside, that muy-
aaye got number one or number six, then the second day he is recruited. Then 
when he is disturbing you, who will you come and consult? You go and con-
sult that number which you have drawn. Don’t consult us (Chairman LC 5 
Nebbi, RICE dialogue, Nebbi, 2012).
The ballot system could be viewed as a mechanism to reduce connections to the 
community by not depending on local expertise but on a lottery system. This system 
creates an impartiality meant to dissipate feelings of unfairness on the side of the 
community. From the quote it can be deduced that it is precisely the intention of 
260 The system may differ for subcontractors depending on the contracting company’s policy. Total’s 
subcontractors were supposed to follow the lottery procedure and Total’s CLO was supposed to par-
ticipate in their recruitment exercises. Other subcontractors just hired workers from among men who 
were waiting at their gates, as one casual worker had experienced it himself (Casual worker, Caroil/rig 
operating company, interview, 2013).
261 Muyaaye is Lugandan for thug or idler and is usually used in derogative way. This politician is not 
a Muganda but some Lugandan words are used by speakers of other languages too.
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reducing the amount of brokers and the non-involvement with local politicians that 
distressed the Chairman LC 5. He exclaimed it was impossible to proceed in such a 
disentangled way, as “nobody is an island.” A mechanism that was supposed to ease 
relations with the communities, leaving little room for accusations, was contested 
as also leaving little room for negotiation and intervention. The disapproval of the 
Chairman LC 5 was not a light thing since it could have impacts on the social license 
to operate if the LC 5 mobilised people against the company.262
However, when I later discussed this speech with a close relative of this Chairman 
LC 5, who is himself a politician, he claimed that the ballot system was superior to 
Tullow’s recommendation system because it provided equal chances. In comparison 
to the Ugandan job market in general, which relies heavily on know-who, Total’s 
recruitment system indeed held at least the chance of recruitment without connec-
tions. The politician laughed at the comment of his relative and said that he was only 
campaigning for support (Field notes from informal conversation, 2015). Clearly, 
the companies’ recruitment systems were used in politicking. Depending on the 
recruitment system politicians could either use it to widen their patronage system or 
could use disgruntlements to garner supporters for their campaigns.
Despite the claims of impartiality, more than once was I told stories of patronage 
and of loopholes in the process. There are many rumours of CLOs being involved 
in giving out jobs to friends and relatives. I confronted a representative of Total with 
these accusations and she was well aware of them but alleged they stemmed from 
pure envy and frustration (Corporate Affairs Manager, Total interview, 2013). The 
complaints around the recruitment systems reveal the intricacies of national content: 
While Total’s lottery system was criticised for lacking the personal note that is so im-
portant in the overall Ugandan economy, Tullow’s was criticised precisely for keeping 
personal relations in the recruitment process.
This section has shown how the connections between the oil industry and Ugan-
dan entrepreneurs were also debated in the extractive communities and attempts 
of disentanglement challenged. It was the standards of safety and the recruitment 
systems that aroused objections since they threatened to keep smaller entrepreneurs 
out of the oil business, taking from them the ability to partake in the fruits of the 
industry. The standards the industry was trying to enforce were perceived as quite 
alien compared to what was going on in Uganda’s economic and political system 
and failures of the standards, especially with regard to fair recruitment, increased the 
feeling that these were mere smokescreens set up to extract profits without sharing 
the spoils.
Coming back to the mango tree metaphor, the perception was that the oil com-
panies and the better situated companies from Kampala were not just tapping the 
inside of the tree but also picking the many fruits on the outside and yet the tree was 
standing on the soil of the extractive communities but all they would get was the 
fallen mangos and leaves.
262 The exploration license cannot be affected though because it is issued by the central government.
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Analysis: Establishing a Technological Zone
So far, I have elaborated the positions of four strategic groups have taken with re-
gard to the debate on national content. All positions centred on the inhibiting ef-
fect international standards had on national content. The standards were presented 
as non-negotiable. Demands for lowering them or accusations of unfairness where 
refuted with reference to the demands of the shareholders. Ugandans were told they 
could expect gaining options on business opportunities from the oil but only if they 
conformed to the way Tullow, or the oil companies in general, do their business. 
This came into conflict with the position from Ugandan companies who were not 
used to operate in shareholder capitalism but who have done well in an economy 
that necessitates know-who and that does not follow strict labour policies. While the 
Ugandan companies claimed to be speaking on behalf of all Ugandans, complaints 
from the extractive communities show that they were actually speaking on behalf of 
an elite, thus proving Ovadia’s perspective on national content as a means for elite 
enrichment (Ovadia, 2016). In this section I will analyse the national content debate 
further with regard to the oil industry’s disconnection strategies.
My initial perception of the debate was that the national content intricacies are a 
clear case of how the market regulates itself through offer and demand and of Ugan-
dans catching up with what the world market demands. However, this would mean 
black-boxing the safety demands of the market represented through the international 
standards. So why indeed should the standards be international as the radio journal-
ist from West Nile put it? After all, as I have shown, international standards are not 
self-evident but an expression of a certain risk perception and risk management.
Standards that were implemented by the oil companies were connected to the 
risks the companies saw and tried to establish. Thus standards cannot be easily disen-
tangled from different perceptions of risks and of how to do business. The oil com-
panies were very well placed to argue for their standards because they could draw on 
a deep practical knowledge of the industry, scientific knowledge and the certificates 
of recognised international standard organisations. Additionally, they could count 
on the Ministry of Energy that was interested in turning the international standards 
into indigenous ones. The reference to the internationality of the standards lent le-
gitimacy to the companies’ claims. The standardisation through bodies such as ISO 
suggests that there are objective kinds of risks that can be managed through risk 
management mechanism. But as Boholm (2015: 105) stresses, this is a positivistic 
attitude that disregards the findings of many risk scholars that risks are not just out 
there but are socially constructed and hence not separable from the cultural and 
social values they represent.
The risk management that underlies the international industry standards, I sug-
gest in this chapter, is connected to the financialisiation of the industry. Companies 
on the stock market do not only need to lay open their corporate structure, projects 
and profits but also their risk management. Purchasing international standards, that 
is the knowledge and technologies, is a way of proving a sound risk management 
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to shareholders. Standards function in shareholder capitalism as a guarantee for the 
investors. Additionally, it is possible to argue that shareholder capitalism which oper-
ates through externalisation and modularity, came into conflict with Uganda’s per-
sonalised and owner-centred economy.
National content works counter to attempts by the oil companies to work in 
a disentangled or disembedded way. Ferguson (2005) famously postulated that 
oil companies produce oil in an island-like, i.e. disentangled, fashion. Anna Zalik 
(2009) points out that the oil companies construct disembeddedness by moving to 
the supposedly spatially isolated offshore. In her article, she compares displacement 
of people from key extractive sites in Nigeria and Mexico offshore. She describes 
these zones of extraction as zones of (state assisted) exclusion of the local population 
showing that the offshore is actually not disembedded from the social surrounding 
and especially not from the state. Rather it needs a more regulated state (Zalik, 2009: 
577). Saulesh Yessenova (2012) also describes how these enclaves of efficient, but at 
times lawless, production need assistance by the host state power in order to main-
tain their business operation. In the case of the Tengiz oil enclave the state helped 
quell riots of workers.
Writing on the offshore oil industry in Equatorial Guinea, Hannah Appel (2012a) 
shows that disentanglement is an image of disconnectedness created discursively and 
technologically by the oil industry. The oil companies create an image or narrative 
of disentanglement. While connections with the surroundings exist, the intention 
of the oil companies is to appear clearly disconnected from the local communities. 
This leads to the perception that the end product, the oil, has been produced fric-
tionlessly. The oil companies achieve this via modularity – that is, connecting their 
industry system, which encompasses a set of technologies, infrastructures and people 
who strive to work independently of the environment, to the system of Equatorial 
Guinea in a specific way that is intended to create a minimum of linkages and that 
can be reproduced in other parts of the world without changing the set-up of the 
local system (Appel, 2012a: 697).
According to Appel, the industry achieves disentanglement not just by ignor-
ing the entanglements but also by ignoring the risks that their workers face outside 
of work.263 Appel calls this modular capitalism. In offshore production, modular-
ity is supposed to maximise profit and increase shareholder value. In order for the 
shareholder value to be high, certain risks need to be taken, while others avoided. 
There are two types of risks in the oil industry, which are mutually dependent: the 
profitable one of trading on the oil futures market which promises high profits and 
the explosive one which threatens lives, equipment and operations (Appel, 2012a: 
703).264 The oil industry externalises what is a risk to their shareholder value. Dis-
263 Appel (2012a) describes how modularity runs through the life of Equatoguinean workers who are 
the connection between the two different systems, Equatorial Guinea and the oil industry, and how 
they handle this externalisation of risks unto their lives.
264 The productive life of risk has been noted on elsewhere (Zaloom, 2004).
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entanglement is a way of reducing unproductive risks from the surroundings from 
which the oil companies cannot entirely withdraw since oil is a territorial resource. 
Therefore, oil companies need to be attentive to their environment, monitor all that 
could potentially have a negative influence on the shareholder value and (re-)act ac-
cordingly.
The oil companies in Uganda did worry about the effects a dissatisfied commu-
nity could have on their operations: delays, increased costs and loss of value. These 
in turn could lead to less return for shareholders and hence dissatisfied shareholders 
and thus ultimately a plummet in shareholder value. Looked at from a relational 
perspective of risk, extractive communities in Tullow’s understanding of risk are the 
risk object and not the object at risk. The risk management is thus not primarily 
engineered to protect the communities from the risk of the oil exploration and pro-
duction. The final objective is business success and benefits for the community are 
simply part of the deal by now.
Disconnectedness, or the appearance of it, is important for the business opera-
tion and profit generation, and I had the impression during my research that it also 
speaks to a widespread sense of being different among the workers in the oil industry. 
In the analysis of the oil companies’ position, I noted that the industry perceives 
itself as a strange beast and this was reinforced by the country manager of an interna-
tional drilling and cementing company in Uganda, according to whom the industry 
perceived itself as a foreign element in a country. He described the oil industry as an 
organism in a system, which they do not know or understand. They would come, 
do what they know best, i.e. drilling and cementing, and then leave again (Country 
Manager, field notes from informal conversation, 2013). Demarcations of difference 
are both physical such as the fence that separates a rig camp from its surrounding 
areas, and intangible such as the safety regulations that regulated access to and life 
on the camp.
An island-like operation is appealing to the oil companies because work in 
community areas involves a lot of negotiations that can slow down the exploration 
process. Therefore, the disconnection work is easier in an offshore setting than in 
onshore projects especially in a land-locked country like Uganda. Nevertheless, in 
Uganda there are spaces similar to the ones Appel found in Equatorial Guinea, es-
pecially the rig camps and the gated communities. The rig camps differ starkly from 
their surroundings, as the director of a CBO from Hoima concisely put it during 
one of our first conversations: “They have brought Europe down there” (Interview, 
2012). Access to them was controlled and the life inside the camp was governed by 
company-made rules.
Disconnection work in Uganda was favoured by the fact that exploration activi-
ties were allowed within the national park Murchison Falls. There the companies only 
had to deal with the animals and the environment and not with communities.265 It 
265 The agencies concerned with regulating the environmental impact of the activities of the oil indus-
try are the National Environmental Authority (NEMA), Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and to a 
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offered the great advantage of only causing technical problems that could be solved 
by engineers, rather than social problems that would involve lengthy negotiations. 
The metaphor of a strange beast points to the functioning of the oil industry through 
modularity, which in Uganda is achieved by high standards, and simultaneously it 
highlights the flexibility of the industry in their business operation. While modu-
larity was indeed at work in Uganda it was the lack of flexibility that was central 
to contestations by Ugandan companies. In Uganda, the oil companies insisted on 
the unacceptability of getting around regulations and thus controlled linkages to 
their environment by defining which Ugandan companies can be given contracts 
to. While the application of modularity in Equatorial Guinea was successful, this 
chapter showed that modularity is the result of negotiations.
The standards enabled the oil companies’ disentanglement work that is severing 
or obscuring linkages to the Ugandan environment. While the Ugandan government 
was trying to enable entanglement through the national content regulation, its sup-
port of the standards had the opposite effect and eased the disentanglement work. 
I argue that the standards of the industry can be understood with Andrew Barry’s 
concept of “technological zones” or more especially “zones of qualification”. Within 
these zones everything, all objects and practices, are judged according to common 
standards and criteria (Barry, 2006: 240). In Barry’s words:
A technological zone can be understood, in broad terms, as a space within 
which differences between technical practices, procedures or forms have been 
reduced, or common standards have been established (Barry, 2006: 239).
The impact of such standardisation on local companies has been discussed by Eliza-
beth Dunn (2005). She describes how orientation towards European Union stan-
dards has changed the meat industry in post-communist Poland by dividing it into 
small-scale and sub-standard slaughterhouses that service countries to the East and 
large-scale, high standard factories that deliver to the West and are at times even 
owned by Western corporations. She notes that standards do not just make products 
but also firms “by making standards into targets as well as measures, and by using 
audit technologies to make the activities of the firm visible” (Dunn, 2005: 176). This 
is an example of how the adherence to higher standards pushes certain actors out 
of the market because they can only deliver sub-standard products or services. The 
indigenisation of standards, as intended in Uganda, is therefore not a simple matter 
of passing regulations but one that can have serious implications for companies – if 
the regulations get enforced.
However, the technological zones have no clear boundaries like nation states but 
are rather unstable, contested and uncertain. According to Barry technological zones 
are best researched as they unfold.
lesser extent also the National Forest Authority (NFA). Monitoring was weak though considering the 
poor resources of these institutions. 
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[I]n the middle of events, at times and places where the discrepancies between 
the public statements of international organisations, multinational corpora-
tions and NGOs and the complexity of social forms become most apparent, 
and when the direction of change is uncertain and contested (Barry, 2006: 
244).
My research took place in a state of not-yet-ness which is characterised by many 
negotiations in the oil arena, including such a formative moment of the zone of 
qualification around the oil industry and of the oil project in Uganda in general. 
The disentanglement through the establishment of a technological zone made the 
industry appear to Ugandans as that “strange beast” it considers itself to be. The 
establishment of a technological zone could be described as a “technological drama” 
(Pfaffenberger, 1992). Pfaffenberger lists strategies for technological regularisation 
once a new technology is introduced to society among them standardisation, which 
“diminishe[s] local autonomy and marginalize[s] local culture” (Pfaffenberger, 1992: 
293). While Pfaffenberger writes about the introduction of new technology, one 
could expand this argument to the establishment of the oil industry in Uganda be-
cause of the technologies and risk associated with oil exploration and production. 
The oil industry comes with its own standard system, rules of procedure and tech-
nology, which are presented as non-negotiable. However, as became evident in this 
chapter, a technological drama is always filled with controversies and negotiations. 
Ugandans questioned the standards and discussed the willingness of the companies 
to help them reach the standards.
Taken together, these negotiations around standards as a new “technological zone” 
reveal once again how important risks are in the oil-making or resource-making in 
general. Risks that find acceptance provide leverage in negotiations and thus enhance 
the chances of influencing how the oil will be produced. The oil companies needed 
to ensure, in the interest of their shareholders, that the process of oil-making brings 
high returns to them. The self-evidence of the standards on which they relied, backed 
by the government, made a successful challenge of them difficult.
The technological zone therefore selected who was allowed into the circle of the 
industry and who had to stay out because they were sub-standard. Much as people 
rejected this, the consequence of taking up resistance and thus becoming a real threat 
to the operations, were not chosen. I have heard rumours of a small strike of oil 
workers in Buliisa but it was subdued quickly and did not spread. It seems the un-
certain situation, in which the extractive communities found themselves, reduced 
willingness to resistance. Even the usual allies of the extractive communities, the civil 
society organisations, who were at the forefront of managing the resource curse risk, 
were not offering much assistance since also to them, from what I got in conversa-
tions and comments made during conferences, the standards were self-evident. It 
seemed the only option was to reach the demands of the company.
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Chapter Conclusion6.4 
This chapter was concerned with the way oil companies negotiated their business 
operation in Uganda and therefore their current and future position in the Ugandan 
oil complex. It is through the establishment of risks that the oil companies tried to 
maintain their place in the oil complex, and influence the oil project and their way 
of profiting from it. With the acceptance of the international standards that govern 
the industry and which show in their risk management, the industry could postulate 
that there was a standard gap between them and the Ugandan companies. They thus 
created a technological zone around the industry that was hard to enter for Ugan-
dan companies. While formally giving opportunities to Ugandan entrepreneurs and 
workers, the institution of a technological zone prevented many of them from ac-
tually partaking in the profits. Sometimes baffled, sometimes outraged Ugandans 
realised that the industry was that ‘strange beast’ it portrayed itself to be. A beast that 
managed to set itself up as a gatekeeper to the benefits from the oil.
The chapter has shown how this standardisation has been challenged by Ugandan 
companies, thus putting into stark relief the power negotiations that a simple refer-
ence to the internationality of some standards obscures. Like Dunn (2005) shows in 
her study for Poland, standards and regulations are a way of homogenising capital-
ist processes, in other words of making modularity possible – albeit probably never 
achieving it entirely. Essentially, standards, irrespective of their value, do keep certain 
entrepreneurs and companies out of the market. Just like in post-communist Poland 
where EU regulations kept small butchers from selling their produce on the EU 
market, in Uganda the standards of the oil industry kept local companies out of the 
oil industry. It was not sure who was really responsible for making them catch up to 
a well-established oil industry that keeps expanding and changing its technologies 
and machineries.
My research suggests that in order to understand the developments of capitalist 
projects such as the production of oil, it is helpful to look at the rules or standards 
and more broadly the risk management it is based on. In this case of national con-
tent, the successfully established risks to the environment or safety set the conditions 
for interactions in the arena.

Figure 20: Hoima-Kaiso Road (2015).
Conclusion7 
The fact that oil bears hazardous qualities for people, states and the environment 
has been widely commented on. The exploration for as well as the production and 
consumption of oil are associated with massive environmental degradation – from 
polluted rivers and lands up to climate change. Oil is the prime source of energy of a 
capitalist society that is driven by a thirst for ever more growth and expansion. And 
oil is the black gold that has made many people rich and brought suffering upon 
many others at the same time. While many studies have looked at oil when its effects 
have become visible; when the riches have materialised in impressive buildings and 
white elephants, or when the destruction of nature and livelihoods has brought hard-
ship and conflict to people in the extractive areas, my dissertation project was done 
at a time when the massive changes were on the horizon but had not yet taken place. 
People had already experienced disruptions during the exploration for oil and they 
formed the outlook to the future that was yet to come. My research took place at a 
moment of waiting for the oil and focused on the processes and practices of anticipa-
tion. The whole dissertation project, including the writing of this book, was situated 
at the interstices of the oil life cycle.
The aim of this ethnography was to understand how the not-yet-ness of oil was 
seized by Ugandan actors to negotiate the oil and their position vis-à-vis the oil. 
In the introduction I quoted Ugandans who compared the wait for the oil with a 
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pregnancy. A pregnancy is a state of anticipation, which is filled with both joy and 
anxiety. Like a baby during pregnancy, Uganda’s oil had not yet fully materialised but 
was, and still is, becoming. And as I have shown throughout the book, various actors 
connect both hopes and fears with the oil. Much of the talk around the oil involves 
the dichotomy of blessing/curse and it was not clear which one the oil would be. The 
analogy of pregnancy is appropriate in another sense as well: while there are already 
changes during a pregnancy, the major changes will come once the baby is born.
Unlike a pregnancy though, the waiting for oil in Uganda is characterised by in-
determinacy. There is a timeline but every year it gets expanded and in 2018, over ten 
years after the first discoveries, having oil still seems to belong to an uncertain future. 
During my research, some people even started doubting whether the oil would ever 
come and feared it had already been secretly taken by the government. This ethnog-
raphy looked at oil in this state of not-yet-ness and thereby described how various 
actors in Uganda, from the state, to the oil industry, the civil society, and the extrac-
tive communities, influenced the becoming of oil as a resource and the constitution 
of the oil complex.
Not-yet-ness is a concept that is concerned with the impact of the future on the 
present. It considers how actors anticipate the future. To understand the not-yet-ness 
of oil in Uganda, I have used risk and uncertainty as an analytical perspective. I have 
argued that risks are particularly helpful for understanding how oil is turned into a 
resource because they are ways of anticipating the future and managing its uncertain-
ty. The actions people take based on the knowledge of the risk influence the future. 
Once recognised they can be reduced, avoided or put to profitable use. I combined 
insights from studies on risk and uncertainty with studies on oil.
I applied a relational understanding of risk to analyse the anticipation of oil in 
Uganda. Risks depend on who creates what kind of linkages between that which is at 
risk and that which creates the risk. Risks do not exist outside the social construction 
of them, which includes scientific knowledge, norms and values and power interests. 
Established risks are power resources in the arena in which the negotiations of the 
oil and the petro-future take place. With risks, blame can be assigned and broker 
space obtained for those who know how to manage the risk. People in Uganda com-
municated and used risks to anticipate and influence the future with oil and most 
especially their own place within it. In the following, I briefly summarise the main 
arguments of each chapter and relate them to the main argument of this book.
The history chapter delivered information on the history of oil exploration in 
Uganda, which was characterised by many setbacks and delays. The chapter showed 
how risks figure prominently in the exploration process. The government sought to 
de-risk its (potential) assets to attract investors and gain better deals. Some investors 
in turn intended to profit from the wildcat risk. Investors can gain a lot of money 
when their gamble on a prospective oil field proves right and lose dearly if all they 
find are dry wells. As the chapter showed getting one’s risks acknowledged provides 
a better bargaining position. Convincingly argued, risks can thus open a space for 
brokerage for the one communicating the risk. The chapter highlighted how again 
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and again actors argued on the basis of risks and uncertainties to influence the de-
velopment of the oil project in their own favour. For example, by establishing the 
risk of enclave production, the government successfully pushed for a refinery in the 
negotiations with the oil companies.
 In the fourth chapter on the resource curse I considered in detail the visions of 
a petro-future that circulated in Uganda. One major way in which the oil was be-
ing anticipated in Uganda was the resource curse. I analysed the way civil society 
activists communicated about the curse and the reactions this provoked. Gathering 
knowledge from social science, Ugandan civil society organisations translated the 
resource curse to the Ugandan context by holding conferences and radio talk shows 
and publishing articles, documentaries, posters and other material to inform their 
fellow citizens of the resource curse. With the aid of donor money, the resource curse 
was established as a risk in Uganda. The chapter looked in detail at the risk narrative 
and how it caught on beyond civil society. The resource curse as a travelling model 
had become a power resource that could be used in shaping the country’s future with 
oil: The development brokers secured themselves a place in the oil arena to monitor 
the activities and ultimately influence how the oil would be produced.
In the fifth chapter I showed how the risk narrative – including threatening im-
ages of the Niger delta – had repercussions on people in the oil region. Together 
with the effects from exploration activities, such as destruction of homes and dis-
placement, the discourse on oil created uncertainty for the people in the oil region 
with regard to their place in the petro-future. The chapter looked at the hopes and 
expectations and at the ways people reacted to the changes that have taken place 
such as the immigration of job-seekers, the construction of a road, the acquisition 
of land, and the seismic surveys and other exploration activities which resulted in 
the destructions of houses, fields and even cultural sites. This chapter portrayed the 
viewpoint of residents in the oil region regarding the oil and their future, and how 
they managed the uncertainty that came with the oil. I discussed a case of compensa-
tion claims which showed that people in the community were also participating in 
the oil arena by emphasising their risks. On the one hand, cultural leaders claimed 
that the oil companies were at risk of the spirits whose sites they had destroyed un-
less they paid the leaders to hold ceremonies. On the other hand, they presented the 
destruction of these cultural sites as a risk to the community and to the area’s cultural 
heritage, drawing on international and national desires to protect heritage. The cul-
tural leaders were not successful in this negotiation and their different attempts of 
risk establishment failed.
This failure does not mean though that communities have no leverage in the ne-
gotiations. Communities present a risk to the oil companies as they can increase the 
cost of exploration and production or even revoke the social license to operate and 
create havoc for the oil company. Trying to manage this risk, the company sought 
to maintain good relations through corporate social responsibility. Through safe op-
erations and attempts at creating shared prosperity with Ugandans, or at least the 
pretence of it, the oil companies tried to maintain a certain level of control over how 
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the oil would be produced. Their risk management relied on international standards, 
which were too high for most Ugandan companies to attain and thus excluded them 
from the opportunities in the oil industry.
The sixth chapter centred on this issue of national content, which as an idea holds 
out the hope of a more prosperous future to Ugandans. In practice, the participation 
of Ugandans in the oil industry was not an easy solution to the resource curse but 
complicated by intricacies. Maintaining high standards, the oil companies argued, 
was good for Ugandans and the environment. However, these standards created an 
exclusionary technological zone around the oil. Access to the zone needed better 
education and training options that were not within reach of most Ugandans. To the 
oil companies, the technological zone also had the advantage of enabling them to re-
fuse risky connections to sub-standard Ugandan companies and thus go about their 
business in a more disentangled way. This disentanglement is needed for a business 
operation that is ultimately only interested in creating shareholder value.
Comparing Uganda to other petro-states can be a fruitful exercise, and one that 
has informed this ethnography throughout the research and the analysis. Reading 
about countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, or Venezuela the society-changing 
role of oil becomes more than apparent. In these societies, the oil appears to be every-
where and behind everything. Unlike Uganda, these countries have seen decades of 
oil production and therefore could only help me understand what prospects Uganda 
might be facing. Indeed, as I showed in chapter four on the resource curse, it is coun-
tries such as Nigeria that serve as a horror vision of what could go wrong with oil.
In the present though, it is more fruitful to compare Uganda to other early oil-
producers or those waiting to become one. Uganda seems to be having similar ex-
periences to São Tomé and Príncipe (Weszkalnys, 2011). In both cases, we see an 
economy of expectations at work that is not only testament to the social dynamics 
before any oil is produced but also to the rents oil generates before it is even pro-
duced or traded on the market. Here, oil is relevant not as an all-dominating force 
that sweeps a country into a bleak future, but rather as a new arena in which actors 
can negotiate their positions, as this book has shown. Such dynamics can lead to 
conflicts as they did in Chad (Behrends 2008), but this is not a deterministic feature 
of the oil itself but greatly depends on the context.
This ethnography supports the necessity of looking at oil at an early stage and be-
fore its revenues circulate “like blood through the national body” (Apter, 2005: 23). 
A comparison of Uganda to Niger, a new oil producer, shows remarkable similarities, 
such as the way oil is used as a new idiom in politics (Schritt, 2016). However, there 
are also certain differences, such as less urgency on the Ugandan side to produce the 
oil and an altogether different configuration of oil in Uganda. The different set-up 
of the oil industry in each country, a Chinese state company in Niger and a joint 
venture between a Chinese, an Irish, and a multinational company in Uganda, are 
relevant when it comes to the negotiations of the oil.
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To conclude this book, I would like to point out how this book speaks to four dif-
ferent concerns in contemporary anthropology – the future, risk, uncertainty and 
oil – and how it contributes to the discussion of the impacts of oil on Uganda.
Looking at the not-yet-ness, oil in Uganda is relevant to the recent anthropo-
logical interest in the future (Appadurai, 2013; Guyer, 2007). Most importantly, 
this study joins a trend to further split up the future conceptually: there is not just 
the distant and the near but also the not-yet. The not-yet is a future-in-the-coming, 
without knowing when the arrival will be. It is a future threatening or promising 
to materialise but without reference to closeness or distance in time. It is a future 
that could have already started and that got postponed, or one that will never come. 
People have their approximations of “knowing the future” through risks or divina-
tions and they use forecasts of the future to shape the present. The future as we 
research and analyse it is a construction in the present and it speaks to the present. 
This becomes abundantly clear when looking at risk as a mode of anticipation that is 
used to directly influence both present and future.
This book conveys how a focus on risks and their communication can be fruitful 
to the anthropology of oil. And more especially oil in a state of not-yet-ness. Looking 
at who blames whom and what is considered to be at risk reveals what is of value. 
Furthermore, it allows us to see what use the communicator can draw from this 
communication. Most times putting risk and oil together in one sentence conjures 
up images of reckless oil companies and destruction on a local or even global scale, 
but this is not the way this book looks at risks and oil. Risks are rather dependent 
on the position of the actor in the oil arena and they can be used to gain space for 
brokerage or leverage in negotiations. Risks are one way to influence the future, since 
they are a means to anticipate it and to deal with its uncertainties. The imagination 
of a petro-future is filled with risks, which are not just pending catastrophes but also 
ways to profit from the oil.
This book also contributes to anthropology of uncertainty by looking at a phase 
of uncertainty and how people manage it. Uncertainty can feel overpowering and 
it can foreclose agency but it may also be appreciated for leaving the options open. 
People might strategically seek contingency (Whyte and Etyang Siu, 2015) or they 
might also use uncertainty as a power resource in negotiations. In Uganda, actors 
used uncertainty to promote their vision of the future and to influence partners in 
negotiations. Hopes of becoming rich with oil were cast into doubt by civil society 
actors, who presented the effects of oil in the resource curse risk narrative. Both risks 
and uncertainty can thus be used as power resources. Uncertainty serves to confuse 
the other actors in the arena, while risks change the arena and make certain moves 
possible or impossible. Another insight from my analysis is that risk and uncertainty 
are not connected in a linear fashion from uncertainty to risk, or from lack of knowl-
edge to approximation of knowledge. Instead, they are connected in a loop. Risks do 
not reduce uncertainty but can actually bring new uncertainties.
This study contributes to the anthropology of oil, which has been concerned 
with the question of how people live with oil, how they handle its effects and how 
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they imagine their futures with and without oil. This study adds to an understand-
ing of the social dynamics of oil in oil producers-to-be. The study is situated at the 
interstices of the oil life cycle, which are rarely paid attention to. Instead of seeing 
these interstices as times of waiting in which nothing much is going on, this book has 
shown that waiting is an activity, which involves anticipation and practices aimed at 
influencing the process of oil-making.
Finally, this study offers a comprehensive view of oil in Uganda. It is the first ma-
jor anthropological study on oil in Uganda that pays attention to the perspectives of 
various actors and their performances in the oil arena. Rather than following a well-
trodden path of estimating whether the oil will turn out to be a blessing or a curse, 
this book looked in detail at practices of resource-making. I emphasise the advantage 
of looking at the visions, narratives and practices of anticipation to understand how 
the oil is turned into a resource both materially and socially. I suggest that in order 
to understand oil in Uganda and the future the country has, we should look at the 
negotiations in the oil arena as they are taking place and more specifically at the role 
visions of the future play in these negotiations.
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Table on History of Oil in Uganda9.1 
Year Oil in Uganda (including other important political events in Uganda and international oil-related events)
1890 First remark on oil seepages at Lake Albert in colonial records by Frederick Lugard
1900 Licensing of British East African Syndicate
1913 First exploration camp, Kibiro
1925 Reconfirmation of evidence of hydrocarbons by geological survey
1926 Cooperation between Anglo-Persian and Britain
1938 First wells drilled, African-European Investment Company, promising pros-pects in Butiaba Waki B-1
1948–1951 Unsuccessful test wells by colonial government
1957 Petroleum Act passed in Legislative Council
1962
Independence
Milton Obote becomes President
1964 Exploration rights given to Shell
1971
Exploration rights given to Kirkwall Associates and Collin Oil and Gas
Idi Amin becomes President in a coup d’état
1973 Oil crisis
1978–1979
Uganda-Tanzania war (“Liberation war”)
End of Idi Amin’s regime
1980
Milton Obote’s Second Term
Begin of civil war (“Bush War”) between NRA and Milton Obote’s forces
1980–1984 Aerial magnetic survey
1985
World Bank credit for seismic survey to GSMD
Establishment of Petroleum Unit within GSMD
Passing of Petroleum Act
1986
End of civil war and begin NRA/NRM regime with Yoweri Museveni as Presi-
dent
Military successes of Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) by Alice Lakwena
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1987
Military loss and dispersal of HSM
Formation of Lord’s Salvation Army (later Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA) by 
Joseph Kony
1988 Negotiations with Esso, Petrofina, Shell
1990 “Agreement of Cooperation for the Exploration of Hydrocarbons and the Exploitation of Common Fields” between Uganda and Zaire signed
1991
Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with Petrofina signed
Establishment of Petroleum Exploration and Production Department (PEPD) 
at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development
1992
800 km gravity survey of Lake Albert by Universities Columbia, Leeds and 
Lubumbashi, Fina Exploration Uganda and PEPD
Aeromagnetic Survey of North Eastern and Central Uganda revealed Kyoga 
and Kadam-Moroto sedimentary basin
1993 Expiration of Petrofina’s license
1994 Presentation of Uganda’s prospects by PEPD at American Association of Petroleum Geologists convention, Denver, Colorado
1995 PSA with Uganda Works and General Engineering Company signed
1996 Presidential elections: Yoweri Museveni voted as President
1997 PSA with Heritage Oil & Gas Ltd. signed for EA 3
1998
Seismic survey of EA 3 by Heritage with positive results
Attack of Kichwamba Technical College by Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in 
Semliki Area (EA 3)
2001 PSA with Hardman Petroleum and Energy Africa for EA 2
2002
Exploration well by Heritage
Syda Namirembe Bbumba becomes Minister of Energy
2003
Heritage sells Energy Africa 50% stake in EA 3
Exploration well by Heritage
2004
Appraisal well by Heritage
Tullow buys Energy Africa, gaining exploration rights to EA 2 and 3
Heritage awarded 50% working interest in EA 1 and 3A
PSA with Neptune Petroleum for EA 5
Subsidy of Norway for “Strengthening the State Administration of the Up-
stream Petroleum Subsector project”
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2005
Discovery at Mputa-1 (exploration well) by Hardman Resources
Removal of presidential term limits by parliamentary vote
2006
Discovery Mputa-2 by Hardman Resources
Discovery at Waraga-1 by Hardman Resources
Discovery at Kajubirizi (former Kingfisher)-1/-1A and Nzizi-1 by Tullow Oil/
Heritage
Takeover of Hardman by Tullow
MoU with Tullow signed
PSA between DR Congo and Heritage signed
Presidential elections: Yoweri Museveni retains power
Daudi Migereko becomes Minister of Energy
Peace Agreement with LRA
Creation of Buliisa District
2007
License to Dominion Petroleum for 4B
Five exploration or appraisal wells by Tullow
Flow test at Kingfisher confirms commercial viability
Skirmish between DRC and UG army on Lake Albert
“Arusha Agreement”: Uganda and DRC sign new agreement on cooperation 
in surveying and prospecting
2008
Draft of “National Oil and Gas Policy” 
Establishment of Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas
Discoveries by Tullow (Taiti-1/1A, Kigogole-1), plus five exploration and ap-
praisal wells
Discoveries by Heritage (Ngiri-1, Jobi-1, Rii-1, Kajubirizi-2, 3/3A)
2009
Court case filed for publication of PSAs by Greenwatch and two journalists
Heritage offers ENI 50% in EA 1 and 3A
Discoveries by Tullow (Ngassa-2, Nsoga-1, Kigogole-3, Wahrindi-1), plus five 
exploration or appraisal wells
Hilary Onek becomes Minister of Energy
Dry well by Neptune (Iti-1)
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2010
Tullow buys Heritage’s stakes in EA 1 and 3A
Foster Wheeler feasibility study on refinery by the government and Norway
Discoveries by Tullow (Nsoga-5, Mpyo-1, Kigogole-2/-4/-5), plus five appraisal 
wells
Dry wells by Neptune (Avivi-1) and Dominion (Ngaji-1)
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law
2011
Discoveries by Tullow (Nsoga-2A, Kigogole-6/6A, Ngege-2/2A, Jobi-2/2A, 
Jobi-East-1/2/2A, Mpyo-3, Gunya-1) plus two dry wells
Presidential elections: Yoweri Museveni retains power
Corruption scandal involving ENI and Hilary Onek, Amama Mbabazi and Sam 
Kutesa
Parliamentary committee instituted to investigate bribery allegations
Moratorium on issuance of licenses and signing of contracts until passing of 
oil bills
Irene Muloni becomes energy minister
Sell and purchase agreement between Tullow and CNOOC and Total
2012
Pull out of Dominion Petroleum
Ophir Energy buys license to Block 4B
Discoveries by Tullow (Ngege-3/4/4a/5/7, Nsoga-3/3A/4, Waraga-2), plus one 
appraisal well
Discoveries by Total E&P (Ngiri-3, Jobi-3/4/5/5A), plus six exploration or ap-
praisal wells
Dry wells by Neptune and CNOOC
Proposal, debate and passing of oil bills in parliament
Standoff over clause 9 of Exploration, Development and Production Bill
OPM (Office of Prime Minister) Corruption Scandal and suspension of aid 
from European donor countries
PSA with Tullow signed for EA 1 and Kanywataba despite moratorium
Farm-down deal of 2/3 of Tullow’s concession to CNOOC and Total E&P com-
pleted
Land demarcation, Refinery Area
First Ugandan head of oil company in Uganda: Jimmy Mugerwa becomes 
General Manager of Tullow
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2012 / cont.
Internal struggles at CSCO and PWYP-U
Tax dispute between Tullow and the government at the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Oil discoveries in Kenya and Tanzania
2013
“Exploration, Development and Production Bill” and “Refining, Gas Processing 
and Conversion, Transportation and Storage Bill” signed into law
High Court in London rules in favour of Tullow in Tullow-Heritage case
Corruption allegations against Museveni and Tullow
Discoveries by Total E&P (Ngiri-5/5A/6/7, Mpyo-4/4A/5/5A), plus 15 appraisal 
wells and two dry wells
One appraisal well by Tullow
Production license for Kajubirizi-1A for CNOOC
Commissioning of first oil laboratory in Kampala
NRM expels four of its Members of Parliament for participation in the Parlia-
mentary Forum on Oil and Gas
Compensation of Refinery Area Residents
Mineral Wealth Conference in Kampala
2014
MoU with Tullow, CNOOC, Total signed
Completion of Hoima-Kaiso Road
New discoveries boost Ugandan reserves to 6.5 billion bbl
Uganda Tax Appeals Tribunal rules against Tullow Oil in tax dispute
Recall of Total E&P’s general manager
2015
Restructuring of PEPD into Directorate of Petroleum
First competitive bidding process for licenses
RT Global Resources wins tender for refinery construction
Settlement of tax dispute between Tullow and the government
Appointment of new general manager by Total E&P
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Transcript of the Documentary “Blessing or Curse?”9.2 
The following transcript includes brief descriptions in brackets of the pictures and persons 
shown in the film.
[Sceneries from Uganda such as women walking on a road or school children run-
ning along the road] Male narrator: “What do you wish for Uganda’s future?”
[A middle-aged man] “I want a bright future for Uganda.”
[A young woman] “I wish to see a developed, a developed Uganda in the 
future.”
[A young man who speaks English with English subtitles] “I would like the 
country to improve the economic standards of the country. We should bring 
up and put into position employment opportunities so that the youth can 
gain.”
[A group of school children shouting] “Education.”
[A school building and children] Female voice translated into English: “We 
need to make sure that education is good and that class rooms are not over-
crowded.”
[A woman with child] “I wish my children to be educated from primary, sec-
ondary and even get a professional course.“
[A doctor] “Health care.”
[Patients at a hospital] Female voice translated into English: “I wish for more 
supplies in our hospitals and more drugs. We need medicine to help children 
get well and more nurses at rural clinics.”
[Karimojong women carrying jerry cans and wood] Male voice translated into 
English: “Our country needs stability and protection from rebel groups.”
[A man with salads on a bicycle] “Economy.”
[A field] Female voice translated into English: “I hope for a stronger farming 
sector to help with job creation and productivity.”
[A man standing in front of a field] “I would like the government to create a 
good market for our produce.”
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[A man who speaks English with English subtitles] “We are growing many 
crops but we don’t have market because of poor roads.”
[Flooded road] Male voice translated into English: “Better roads will allow more 
transport of goods and crops around the country.”
[People moving down stairs] Female voice in English but with subtitles in Eng-
lish: “Our country has a large young population and our young people need 
employment.”
[A young woman] “Electricity.”
[An old man] “We want good governance.”
[Ugandan parliament building from outside] First young woman speaks again: 
“We need to agree as citizens how we want our our country to be like.”
[A woman] “Development. That’s what we want.”
[Sunrise] Male narrator: “Whatever your hopes for Uganda’s future you must learn 
about oil and natural gas. [Oil rigs] A very large amount of these valuable resources 
has been discovered in our country. At least two billion barrels of oil and there may 
be much more. Uganda will soon become an important oil producer. The law says 
that this oil belongs to our country, to all of us, not to any private company or per-
son. After the oil and gas are pumped from the ground, they can be made into petrol, 
electricity, important chemicals and even fertilizer. Things that are very valuable both 
here in Uganda and to the rest of the world. Finding, pumping, and processing the 
oil is difficult and expensive. [Oil men working] So our government must partner 
with foreign companies who provide the skill and money. In exchange the foreign 
companies are given a share of the oil. Government will also sell some of the oil to 
foreign countries. And the money Uganda will earn will be very great: the equivalent 
of at least two billion US Dollars. [Animation of a stack of dollars] That is over four 
and a half trillion shillings every year for the next twenty-five years. [More stacks of 
money] This will be the greatest source of income our government has ever had. This 
money could help make life much better for all the people [A child pumping water] 
of Uganda. [School children under a tree] Improving schools and medical centres. 
Aiding farmers, providing good roads, electricity and other things that will allow 
business to grow and create jobs. It could free us from foreign aid donors, allowing 
us to determine our own destiny.
But natural resource wealth, the money earned from things like oil or diamonds 
or gold is very strange money. If not handled very, very carefully, instead of making 
a country richer, instead of improving the lives of its people, it can make them much 
poorer. Instead of being a blessing, it can be a curse. [From a picture of children on a 
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playground, cut to an empty building, then animation of a map of Africa, Uganda in 
yellow, Nigeria in red and Botswana in green] Here are the stories of two countries, 
one cursed by natural resource wealth, the other blessed by it. [Kampala downtown 
skyline in the background and a shanty settlement in front] With the oil money 
Uganda’s future will be like one of these countries. We do not yet know which one. 
[Back to map and zoom into Nigeria] 
Nigeria – the curse of natural resources. Nigeria is Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest oil 
producer. It has earned over 600 billion US dollars from oil since the 1960s. Dur-
ing all this time the people of the Niger Delta [Dark sky and flame of gas flaring], 
the region where the oil is being produced, have been promised the oil would bring 
them a better life. But instead it has brought sickness [Dirty barrel of shell and child 
walking next to it], poverty and war.” 
Male voice, English with English subtitles: “Before the coming of oil we had 
good fishes, rich estuaries, good coastal land. We had fresh water that was 
floating, unpolluted that our parents and our grandparents had. [Woman 
rowing a boat, then appearance of a face to the voice] They were just living 
and they were getting by. And then this thing called oil came.” [A man wan-
dering around next to an oil site, wet ground under him and dark clouds over 
him.]
Male voice, English with English subtitles: “In the Niger Delta, we have been 
colonized by the Nigerian elite, by the corporation.”
Male voice, English with English subtitles: “Every kid in the village will know 
that he is starving because of the oil.”
Another male voice, English with English subtitles: “No medical attention. No 
food commodities. No housing. No road. No electricity. It has absolutely 
nothing. It’s a hundred percent zero.” [A wire-mesh and a rig, then cut to a 
man]
“We have about 369 oil spillages in a year in the Niger delta.266 That is one 
every day.” [Two small children]
Female voice, English with English subtitles: “We don’t know what we are going 
to leave for our children. They don’t care about the human beings who are 
here. [Cut to the woman to whom the voice belongs] All they care about is 
the money they make.” [Street in a shanty settlement]
266  This seems a moderate estimate since according to Amnesty International there were 553 oil spills 
in 2015 (Amnesty International 2015).
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A man: “The situation that we find ourselves today was brought upon by the 
Nigerian government. Promises that were made by politicians were broken. 
Those promises were broken.”[Boat in river]
Narrator: “The land and water in the Niger Delta have been poisoned by oil. It is 
now impossible to earn a living from fishing or farming. Clean water and electric-
ity are rare [Dark cloudy water puddle on a road, then cut to a skinny old woman]. 
With few clinics and schools [Derelict building], the sick go without medicine. And 
many have no chance to learn to read or write. The death rate for children is among 
the highest in the world.267 [Rebels on a boat]. People live under the constant threat 
of violence. How did this great wealth, this 600 billion U.S. dollars cause so much 
poverty and misery. What is it that causes the resource curse? The most important 
reason is government corruption. There is a very big difference between what oil 
companies said they paid the Nigerian government and what the government says 
it received.
[Animation of a white man giving money to a black man, then the black man 
counts the money with an evil smile] According to a United Nations report half or 
more of the country’s natural resource money may have been stolen by a few big 
men. This corruption has weakened democracy and accountability. With the mil-
lions, the billions of dollars they have stolen, corrupt leaders are able to hire militias 
and bribe and threaten judges, election officials, members of parliament and voters. 
So the people can never remove them at election time. [Voting scenes and street 
barricades in flames] Greedy generals who want the money have several times taken 
over the country, replacing a corrupt civilian government with a corrupt military 
dictatorship.
Also, in most countries the government needs their people and the economy to 
be strong. So it will have tax revenues. But this is not true in many countries with 
natural resource wealth. With all the natural resource money the leader may no 
longer care about the economy or whether people earn enough to pay taxes. Because 
these governments receive most of their revenues from the oil companies. They also 
have failed to insist on strong environmental protections during oil production. In-
stead they have allowed communities near the oil to be poisoned. Natural resource 
wealth has often brought war. Both within a country and with its neighbours as 
people fight for control over the resource. 
Natural resource money can hurt the economy in one other way. When a lot of 
foreign money floods into a country, there can be a big change in the exchange rate. 
Imports become cheaper and exports become more expensive making it harder for 
local producers, especially farmers and factories to compete. Unless the oil money 
is invested in ways that counteract this, farmers may earn much less money even in 
267 The child mortality rates are decreasing but not as fast as in other countries. For an overview see 
this statistic from the World Bank on the child mortality rate in Nigeria: http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SH.DYN.MORT?locations=NG (February 2017).
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a good growing season. Factories and business can lose money and have to close, 
leaving many people without jobs. In Nigeria this means that people all across the 
country not only in the oil producing region are poorer than they were before the oil. 
Twenty years ago half of the people in Nigeria had escaped deep poverty. But now 
poverty is much worse with seven out of every ten people very poor.268 [Cut to the 
map and zoom into Botswana]
Botswana – the blessing of natural resources. [Sun setting or rising then a dia-
mond under zoom] Natural resource wealth, in this case diamonds, has truly been 
a blessing for Botswana. Before diamonds were discovered, Botswana was the third 
poorest country in the world. Far poorer than Uganda has ever been. From the time 
of diamond discovery in the late 1960s until now Botswana had the highest rate of 
economic growth in the world. It is now the most prosperous and stable country in 
Africa. The average person has an income of 6400 US Dollars or over 14 million 
Ugandan Shillings in one year.269 That’s four times as much as the average income in 
Uganda today.”270 
[A mine then cut to a man in helmet and vest standing in front of it.] “This 
is the mine that has built this country. All the resources, the money that has 
come of it, has been invested in building this country.” [A diamond factory]
[Cut to a woman.] “I am what I am because of the diamonds. Whoever out 
there is whoever theyare because of the diamonds. The schools, the infrastruc-
ture, the whole development that you see is because of the diamonds.”
[A man in an office]: “In Botswana the legislation is such that all mineral 
rights are invested in the Republic of Botswana.”
[Festus Mogae, Former President of Botswana] “We have used them for to de-
velop infrastructure, to develop the people themselves, to provide water – we 
are a semi-arid country – to provide health. We said ‘ok, what we should do is 
268 This estimation of the poverty rate matches data from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency see 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html [February 2018]. 
However, the World Bank reports 46% poverty in 2009 (http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria 
[February 2018]).
269 This estimation is similar to the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of 2011 (cf. 
www.tradingeconomics.com/botswana/gdp-per-capita [February 2018]). What this estimation leaves 
out is that Botswana also has a very high income inequality (see http://www.worldbank.org/en/coun 
try/botswana/overview [February 2017]).
270  Uganda’s nominal GDP per capita was 646 US Dollars in 2011 and therefore Botswana’s was 
almost ten times higher (cf. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/uganda/gdp-per-capita [February 
2018]). The comparison must have been between Botswana’s nominal and Uganda’s GDP per capita 
adjusted by purchasing power parity, which is 1649 US Dollars in 2011 (http://www.tradingeconom 
ics.com/uganda/gdp-per-capita-ppp [February 2018]).
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to educate the people so that in the future when the diamonds are finished and 
people say what did you do with it, we say that we educated the people’.”
Narrator: “The leaders of Botswana made certain that the wealth gained from its 
natural resources was invested in improving health, education and the economy 
while preserving the natural environment. Making it a blessing for all people. We all 
wish our country’s future will be like Botswana and not like Nigeria. But we must 
take careful note; Botswana is the only resource-rich African country to escape the 
curse. The story of Nigeria has been repeated again and again. [A map with countries 
that suffered from the curse, showing them in red and Botswana in green] Angola, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan. All of 
these countries suffer from some part of the curse. We don’t want Uganda to be next. 
What made Botswana so different from the other countries? What must we Ugan-
dans do to follow Botswana’s path to avoid the curse and reap the blessing?”
[Cut to a speech from Barack Obama, President of United States] “We know 
that countries are more likely to prosper when governments are accountable 
to their people. So we are leading a global effort to combat corruption, which 
in many places is the single greatest barrier to prosperity. And which is a pro-
found violation of human rights. That’s why we now require oil and gas and 
mining companies that raise capital in the United States to disclose all pay-
ments they make to foreign governments.271 And that’s why I urge the G20 to 
put corruption on its agenda and make it harder for corrupt officials to steal 
from their own people and stifle their nation’s development.”
[Cut to Festus Mogae in an interview setting] “From day one of our indepen-
dence, we pursued democratic principles. Therefore we built consensus on 
what our priorities were through a democratic dispensation and an account-
able government.”
[Cut to first man of the video] “We would like to see a serious government 
fighting against corruption.”
[Cut to a man repairing a bicycle, translated into English] “I would like to see 
us work on the problem of corruption in our country. Because resources are 
in the hands of very few individuals but nothing is done.” 
[Cut to second man of the video] “We need to have democracy in the country. 
We don’t need these political instabilities in the country. That’s what we need 
to fight upon so that we can develop.”
271  Obama is referring to the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer Protection Act that was 
passed in 2010 by the U.S. government.
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Narrator: “President Obama and president Mogae tell us and many Ugandans al-
ready know [Corruption animation again] eliminating corruption and making gov-
ernment accountable to the people is the most important thing we can do to escape 
the natural resource curse. And reap the blessing. If all the agreements and payments 
between government and the oil companies are made out in the open where all can 
see, then it will be much harder for corrupt officials to steal the money. It is easy to 
say we must end corruption but achieving it is much harder. Government has made 
many promises but there are forces within that resist. Much financial information 
is still secret or hard to get and some officials who have stolen the countries money 
go unpunished. We have seen great quantities of money lost [Animation of dollars 
stacks dwindling] to corruption again and again. Tens of millions of US dollars in 
grants from the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, 27 million US 
dollars meant for the 2007 Commonwealth Head of Government meeting, 4.6 mil-
lion US dollars from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations, billions of 
shillings meant to help farmers through NAADS never reach the people. These are 
just a few examples. The same may already be happening to oil. Government cannot 
or will not say how it has used the bonus money paid by the oil companies. If govern-
ment continues to act in this way then Uganda will surely suffer the curse.”
[Cut to a speech of President Obama] “Development depends on good gov-
ernance. That is that is the ingredient, which has been missing in far to many 
places, far too long. That’s the change that could unlock Africa’s potential. 
And that is a responsibility that can only be met by Africans.” [Cut to Statis-
tics House in Kampala]
Narrator: “Government will not change by itself. And the outside world will not 
change it for us. But we Ugandans can change the way government behaves. We 
will not have a better future simply by wishing for it. We can have a better future if 
we all work [Two men shown working on a field] to make government accountable. 
Parliament has a specially important role to play in this. [Scene from inside Uganda’s 
parliament] It is parliaments right and duty to establish the laws governing oil. And 
to oversee the management of the oil wealth, to make sure it is free from corruption. 
Uganda needs a strong independent parliament that can make sure the law is fol-
lowed and that corrupt cabinet members and MPs and public servants are removed 
and punished.
Which Uganda will you work to create, one that is cursed by the oil with money 
disappearing to corruption and doing more to destroy our country than to develop?
Or a Uganda that is blessed with the oil money reaching all our communities? 
One where democratic institutions are weakened and parliament becomes irrelevant 
or one where government acts as the guarantor of good governance and democracy 
flourishes? One where farming and manufacturing are strangled by the oil and jobs 
and livelihoods are destroyed? Or one where money is invested in ways that help 
farmers and industries to create more jobs and higher wages? A country where roads 
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remain poor and electricity and clean water are rare? Or one that uses money to 
invest in infrastructure, creating better conditions and a better transport system for 
goods and crops and better conditions for business? A Uganda where schools get 
worse and our young people lack the skills to earn a living or a country where we can 
build new schools, have more teachers and make education available to all? [School 
children] A future where health centres fall apart and health workers, supplies and 
drugs are hard to find and people die from sickness? [A health centre] Or a Uganda 
where our people receive the health care and medicines that they need.
We must all work to create a bright future for Uganda. We must insist that gov-
ernment not simply talk about ending corruption but take serious action. We must 
no longer give our votes in exchange for promises or small gifts but for deeds. If the 
people and parliament of Uganda act together, we can make government handle the 
oil money openly and honestly. If we choose to do this we can reap the natural re-
source blessing. If we do not do this we will be doomed by the curse.” [First a shanty 
building and final scene is a lake clouded over with heavy dark clouds] 
(Afiego, Nape, PWYP Documentary, Blessing or Curse).
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Acronyms9.3 
ACODE ..................... Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
ADF ........................... Allied Democratic Forces
AFIEGO .................... Africa Institute for Energy Governance
AIDS .......................... Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
API ............................. American Petroleum Institute
AUOGS ..................... Association of Ugandan Oil and Gas Service Providers
BAPENECO .............. Bunyoro Albertine Petroleum Network on Environmental 
Conservation
BBL ........................... Oil Barrel (Measurement unit)
BCSCO ..................... Bunyoro Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas
BIRUDO ................... Buliisa Initiative for Rural Development Organisation
BUCOSA ................... Bunyoro Coalition on Oil and Sustainable Livelihood
CBO .......................... Community-Based Organisation
CDO ......................... Community Development Officer
CEO .......................... Chief Executive Officer
CLO .......................... Community Liaison Officer
CNOOC ................... China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC ........................ China National Petroleum Corporation
CRED ........................ Civic Response on Environment and Development
CSO ........................... Civil Society Organisation
CSCO ........................ Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas
CSR ........................... Corporate Social Responsibility
DPC .......................... District Police Commander
DPP ........................... Directorate of Public Prosecution
DRC .......................... Democratic Republic of Congo
D/RDC ...................... Deputy Resident District Commissioner
EA .............................. Exploration Area
EIA ............................ Environmental Impact Assessment
EITI ........................... Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FESTAC .................... World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture
GDP .......................... Gross Domestic Product
GSMD ....................... Geological Survey and Mines Department
HOC ......................... Hazard Observation Card
HSE ........................... Health, Safety and Environment
HIV ........................... Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDP ............................ Internally Displaced Person
IMF ........................... International Monetary Fund
ISO ............................ International Organization for Standardization
JV .............................. Joint Venture
KHEDA ..................... Kitara Heritage Development Agency
LAPSSET ................... Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
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LC .............................. Local Council
MEMD ...................... Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development
MoU .......................... Memorandum of Understanding
MP ............................. Member of Parliament
NAPE ........................ National Association for Professional Environmentalists
NEMA ....................... Natural Environmental Management Agency
NFA ........................... National Forest Authority
NGO ......................... Non-Governmental Organisation
NRA .......................... National Resistance Army
NRM ......................... National Resistance Movement 
OECD ....................... Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC ........................ Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEPD ......................... Petroleum Exploration and Production Department
PPE ............................ Personal Protective Equipment
PSA ............................ Production Sharing Agreement
PU ............................. Petroleum Unit
PWYP ........................ Publish What You Pay
RAP ........................... Resettlement Action Plan
RDC .......................... Resident District Commissioner
RICE ......................... Rural Initiative for Community Empowerment
SFI ............................. Strategic Friends International
STI ............................. Sexually Transmitted Infection
UNBS ........................ Uganda National Bureau of Standards
UNESCO .................. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
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URA .......................... Uganda Revenue Authority
UWA.......................... Uganda Wildlife Authority
WGI .......................... Water Governance Institute
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The discovery of oil in Uganda in 2006 ushered in an oil-age era with new prospects of unforeseen riches. However, after an initial exploration boom developments stalled. Unlike 
other countries with major oil discoveries, Uganda has been slow in developing its oil. In fact, 
over ten years after the first discoveries, there is still no oil. During the time of the research for 
this book between 2012 and 2015, Uganda’s oil had not yet fully materialised but was becoming. 
The overarching characteristic of this research project was waiting for the big changes to come: 
a waiting characterised by indeterminacy. There is a timeline but every year it gets expanded 
and in 2018 having oil still seems to belong to an uncertain future. This book looks at the 
waiting period as a time of not-yet-ness and describes the practices of future- and resource-
making in Uganda. 
How did Ugandans handle the new resource wealth and how did they imagine their future with 
oil to be? This ethnography is concerned with Uganda’s oil and the way Ugandans anticipated 
different futures with it: promising futures of wealth and development and disturbing futures 
of destruction and suffering. The book works out how uncertainty was an underlying feature 
of these anticipations and how risks and risk discourses shaped the imaginations of possible 
futures. Much of the talk around the oil involved the dichotomy of blessing or curse and it was 
not clear, which one the oil would be. Rather than adding another assessment of what the 
future with oil will be like, this book describes the predictions and prophesies as an essential 
part of how resources are being made. 
This ethnography shows how various actors in Uganda, from the state, the oil industry, the 
civil society, and the extractive communities, have tried to negotiate their position in the oil 
arena. Annika Witte argues in this book that by establishing their risks and using them as 
power resources actors can influence the becoming of oil as a resource and their own place in 
a petro-future. The book offers one of the first ethnographic accounts of Uganda’s oil and the 
negotiations that took place in an oil state to be.
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